

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MANUAL

J-7
DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, J, S

CJCSM 3500.04A
13 September 1996

UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST

References: a. CJCSI 3500.01, 21 November 1994, "Joint Training Policy of the Armed Forces"
b. CJCSM 3500.03, 01 June 1996, "Joint Training Manual"
c. CJCSI 3500.02A, 8 December 1995, "Joint Training Master Plan 1998"

1. Purpose. This manual provides a standardized tool for describing requirements for the planning, conducting, assessing, and evaluating of joint and multinational training.

2. Cancellation. CJCSM 3500.04, 15 May 1995, is canceled.

3. Applicability. This manual applies to the Joint Staff, Military Services, combatant commands, and activities and agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Policy. Title 10, United States Code, section 153, prescribes that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for (a) "formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces," and (b) "formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces." See details in reference a.

5. Definitions. See the Enclosure.

DISSEMINATION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

19970428 162

25 April 97

This paper was downloaded from the Internet.

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

POC: Joint Chief of Staff
Dennis C Blair/ Vice Admiral
U.S. Navy Director

19970428 162

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

6. Responsibilities. See reference a.
7. Procedures. Detailed procedures for implementing joint training policy are contained in references b and c.
8. Summary of Changes. Compared to v2.1 this version contains significant changes to intelligence tasks, reflecting the latest guidance in joint publications for intelligence. Also, tasks related to Information Warfare are introduced. Additionally, this version contains measures designed to assist a commander with developing standards to support his command's JMETL.
9. Effective Date. This joint staff manual is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DENNIS C. BLAIR
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure:

Universal Joint Task List
Appendix A - Glossary
Appendix B - Universal Joint Task List Diagrams

DISTRIBUTION

Distributions A, B, C, and J plus the following:

	Copies
Secretary of Defense	10
Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command	25
Commander, US Forces Korea	25
Commandant, United States Coast Guard	25
President, National Defense University	10
Commandant, National War College	20
Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College	10
Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces	10
Dean, Information Resources Management College	10
Commander, Joint Warfighting Center	100
President, Naval War College	10
Commander, Air University	15
Commandant, Army War College.....	50
Commander, Naval Doctrine Command	10
Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center	10
Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education	5
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	10
Commander, USA Training and Doctrine Command	10
Director, Joint Command & Control Warfare Center	5

One hundred additional copies to:

Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, Joint Staff

DISTRIBUTION (CONTINUED)

Twenty five additional copies to:

USACOM	USCENTCOM	USSTRATCOM	USEUCOM	USPACOM
USTRANSCOM	USSOUTHCOM	USSPACECOM	USSOCOM	

Ten additional copies to:

US Army US Navy US Air Force US Marine Corps

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

The following is a list of effective pages for CJCSM 3500.04A. Use this list to verify the currency and completeness of the document. An "O" indicates a page in the original document.

PAGE	CHANGE
1 thru 2	0
i thru xiv	0
1-1 thru 1-4	0
2-1 thru 2-140	0
3-1 thru 3-40	0
4-1 thru 4-180	0
A-1 thru A-12	0
B-1 thru B-28	0
I-1 thru I-6	0

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

RECORD OF CHANGES

Change No.	Date of Change	Date Entered	Person Entering the Change

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ENCLOSURE

UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Page
1. Introduction.....	1-1
2. Universal Joint Task List	2-1
Introduction.....	2-1
Strategic Level - National Military Tasks	2-13
SN 1 Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment.....	2-13
SN 2 Develop Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.....	2-16
SN 3 Employ Forces	2-20
SN 4 Provide Sustainment	2-27
SN 5 Provide Strategic Direction and Integration	2-31
SN 6 Conduct Mobilization	2-36
SN 7 Conduct Force Development	2-41
SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations	2-46
Strategic Level - Theater Tasks	2-51
ST 1 Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces	2-51
ST 2 Develop Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	2-57
ST 3 Employ Theater Strategic Firepower	2-61
ST 4 Sustain Theater Forces	2-64
ST 5 Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control	2-69
ST 6 Provide Theater Protection.....	2-78
ST 7 Establish Theater Force Requirements and Readiness.....	2-86
ST 8 Develop and Maintain Alliance and Regional Relations	2-88
Operational Level Tasks	2-97
OP 1 Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver.....	2-97
OP 2 Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	2-104
OP 3 Employ Operational Firepower	2-108
OP 4 Provide Operational Support	2-114
OP 5 Exercise Operational Command and Control	2-120
OP 6 Provide Operational Protection.....	2-130
Tactical Level Tasks	2-139
3. Conditions for Joint Tasks	3-1
Introduction.....	3-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Page
Conditions of the Physical Environment	3-4
C 1.1 Land.....	3-5
C 1.2 Sea	3-7
C 1.3 Air.....	3-11
C 1.4 Space	3-13
Conditions of the Military Environment.....	3-15
C 2.1 Mission	3-15
C 2.2 Forces	3-18
C 2.3 Command, Control, and Communications.....	3-20
C 2.4 Intelligence	3-22
C 2.5 Deployment, Movement, and Maneuver	3-23
C 2.6 Firepower	3-26
C 2.7 Protection	3-28
C 2.8 Sustainment	3-28
C 2.9 Threat	3-29
Conditions of the Civil Environment.....	3-31
C 3.1 Political Policies.....	3-31
C 3.2 Culture.....	3-34
C 3.3 Economy.....	3-36
4. Measures for Joint Tasks	4-1
Introduction.....	4-1
Measures-National Strategic Level	4-5
SN 1 Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment.....	4-5
SN 2 Develop Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.....	4-14
SN 3 Employ Forces	4-21
SN 4 Provide Sustainment	4-30
SN 5 Provide Strategic Direction and Integration	4-35
SN 6 Conduct Mobilization	4-41
SN 7 Conduct Force Development	4-48
SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations	4-54
Measures-Theater Strategic Level	4-59
ST 1 Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces	4-59
ST 2 Develop Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	4-66
ST 3 Employ Theater Strategic Firepower	4-75
ST 4 Sustain Theater Forces	4-79
ST 5 Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control	4-87

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Page
ST 6 Provide Theater Protection.....	4-98
ST 7 Establish Theater Force Requirements and Readiness.....	4-107
ST 8 Develop and Maintain Alliance and Regional Relations	4-110
Measures-Operational Level	4-122
OP 1 Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver.....	4-122
OP 2 Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	4-133
OP 3 Employ Operational Firepower	4-140
OP 4 Provide Operational Support	4-146
OP 5 Exercise Operational Command and Control	4-156
OP 6 Provide Operational Protection.....	4-170
Appendixes	
Appendix A: Glossary.....	A-1
Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms.....	A-1
Part II Definitions	A-8
Appendix B: Universal Joint Task List Diagrams	B-1
Adjusting Location of UJTL Tasks.....	B-1
Strategic Level - National Military Tasks	B-6
SN 1 Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment.....	B-6
SN 2 Develop Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.....	B-7
SN 3 Employ Forces	B-8
SN 4 Provide Sustainment	B-9
SN 5 Provide Strategic Direction and Integration	B-10
SN 6 Conduct Mobilization	B-11
SN 7 Conduct Force Development	B-12
SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations.....	B-13
Strategic Level - Theater Tasks	B-14
ST 1 Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces	B-14
ST 2 Develop Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	B-15
ST 3 Employ Theater Strategic Firepower	B-16
ST 4 Sustain Theater Forces	B-17
ST 5 Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control	B-18

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Page
ST 6 Provide Theater Protection.....	B-19
ST 7 Establish Theater Force Requirements and Readiness.....	B-20
ST 8 Develop and Maintain Alliance and Regional Relations	B-21
Operational Level Tasks	B-22
OP 1 Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver.....	B-22
OP 2 Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	B-23
OP 3 Employ Operational Forces	B-24
OP 4 Provide Operational Support	B-25
OP 5 Exercise Operational Command and Control	B-26
OP 6 Provide Operational Protection.....	B-27
Tactical Level Tasks	B-28

Index

Index	I-1
-------------	-----

List of Tables

1-1. Definition of Terms	1-3
2-1. Notional Relationships of Commands to Levels of War.....	2-4

List of Figures

1-1. JMETL Development Process	1-1
2-1. Relationship of Levels of War to Aims or Objectives.....	2-3
2-2. An Example of Task Linkages Across the Levels of War.....	2-5
2-3. An Example of a Temporal View Operations Template for an Air Interdiction Operation	2-7
2-4. An Example of an Informational View Operations Template for an Air Interdiction Operation	2-8
2-5. An Example of a Spatial View Operations Template for an Air Interdiction Operation	2-9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Page
2-6. Joint Operation Planning Supports JMET Development	2-10
3-1. Organization of Conditions for Joint Tasks.....	3-3
3-2. Conditions of the Physical Environment.....	3-4
3-3. Conditions of the Military Environment	3-15
3-4. Conditions of the Civil Environment	3-31

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX A

Part I -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	after-action review
AAW	antiair warfare
AC	Active component
ACC	air component command
ACL	allowable cargo load
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADA	air defense artillery
ADM	atomic demolition munition
ADP	automated data processing
AE	aeromedical evacuation
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AG	Adjutant General (Army)
AI	air interdiction
AIASA	annual integrated assessment of security assistance
AJBPO	Area Joint Blood Program Office
ALD	available to load date (at POE)
AMCIT	American citizen
AMOPS	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System
AOR	area of responsibility
APIC	Allied Press Information Center
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
ASAT	antisatellite
ASBPO	Armed Services Blood Program Office
ASF	aeromedical staging facility
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ATO	air tasking order
BDA	bomb or battle damage assessment
BSU	blood supply unit
BW	biological warfare
C2	command and control
C2I	command, control, and intelligence
C2W	command and control warfare
C3	command, control, and communications
C3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	civil affairs
CAS	close air support
CAT	crisis action team

CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CI	counterintelligence
CIB	combined information bureau
CINC	commander of a combatant command; commander in chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	CJCS Instruction
CJCSM	CJCS Manual
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COMMZ	communications zone
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
CPD	contingency planning document
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRC	CONUS replacement center
CS	combat support
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CSARTF	combat search and rescue task force
CSS	combat service support
CW	chemical warfare
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCA	defensive counterair
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DEFCON	defense condition
DFM	deterrent force module
DGZ	designated ground zero
DIAC	Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DNSI	defense nuclear surety inspection
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DP	displaced person
DSWA	Defense Special Weapons Agency
DT&E	developmental test & evaluation
DWD	deployed weapons team
EA	electronic attack
EAD	earliest arrival date
EEI	essential elements of information
EMD	engineering and manufacturing development

EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EP	electronic protection
EPAT	estimated probability of arrival time
EPW	enemy prisoners of war
ES	electronic support
EW	electronic warfare
EZ	extraction zone
FCE	forward command element
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFP	firm fixed price
FFRDC	federally funded research and development companies
FLOT	forward line of own troops
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FSS	fast sealift ships
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GDP	gross domestic product
GGI&S	global geospatial information and services
GPMRC	Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
GTN	global transportation network
HAST	Humanitarian Assistance Support Team
HAZMAT	hazardous materials
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HNS	host nation support
HPT	high payoff targets
HS	home station
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVT	high-value targets
IDAD	internal defense and development
IFF	identification, friend or foe
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INFOSEC	information security
INTREP	intelligence report
IOC	initial operating capability
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPIR	initial programmed interpretation report
IR	information requirements
IRR	individual ready reserve
ITW/AA	integrated tactical warning and attack assessment
IW	information warfare

I&W	indications and warnings
JARS	Joint Automated Readiness System
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JBPO	Joint Blood Program Office
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (includes the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff)
JFC	joint force commander
JFI	Joint Force Integrator
JFITL	Joint Force Integrator Task List
JIB	joint information bureau
JLOTS	joint logistics over-the-shore
JMAO	Joint Mortuary Affairs Office
JMET	joint mission essential task
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JMRR	joint monthly readiness review
JOA	joint operations area
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPG	joint planning group, joint planning guidance
JPME	joint professional military education
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSIMS	Joint Simulation System
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
JSRC	Joint Search and Rescue Center
JSSA	Joint Service Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
LAD	latest arrival date
LEAs	law enforcement agencies
LFT&E	live fire test & evaluation
LOC	lines of communication
LRC	lesser regional contingency
MACOM	major Army command
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MASINT	measures and signature intelligence
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
METL	mission essential task list

MOOTW	military operations other than war
MPS	maritime prepositioning ships
MRC	major regional contingency
MS	mobilization station
MSCA	military support for civil authorities
MTBSP	Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan
MTF	medical treatment facility
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCMP	Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NEPA	National Environment Policy Act
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NM	nautical miles
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMS	National Military Strategy
NOK	next of kin
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPIC	National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSCS	National Security Council System
NTPI	nuclear technical proficiency inspection
NWAI	nuclear weapons assessment inspection
OA	operational area
OCA	offensive counter air
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OI	operating instruction
O&M	operations & maintenance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	On Site Inspection Agency
OSINT	open-source intelligence
OT&E	operational test & evaluation
pa	per annum
PAG	public affairs guidance
PAR	Program Assessment Review
PCCIR	priority commander's critical information requirements
PIR	priority intelligence requirements

PME	professional military education
POD	ports of debarkation
POE	ports of embarkation
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POR	preparation of overseas replacements
POW	prisoner of war
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PSYOPS	psychological operations
PTSR	postmobilization training support requirement
PVO	private voluntary organization
Q&A	questions & answers
RATT	radio teletype
RC	Reserve component
RCC	rescue coordination center
RCU	Reserve component unit
RDD	required delivery date
RDT&E	research, development, test, and evaluation
RLD	ready to load date at origin
ROE	rules of engagement
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RRF	ready reserve fleet
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSS	regional security strategy
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAO	security assistance organization
SAR	search and rescue
SBTT	small business technology transfer
SELRES	selected reserve
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLOC	sea lines of communications
SOA	special operations area
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status of forces agreements
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SRV	search and rescue vehicle
SSM	surface-to-surface missile
TACON	tactical control
TBM	tactical ballistic missile

TECHINT	technical intelligence
TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of Natural Capabilities Program
TMEP	Theater Mortuary Evacuation Point
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TOR	transfer of responsibility
TP	transportation priority
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TPMRC	Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
TW/AA	tactical warning/attack assessment
UARM	unconventional assisted recovery mechanism
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
ULN	unit line number
UMD	unit manning document
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USACOM	US Atlantic Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARPAC	US Army Pacific
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command
USDAO	US Defense Attaché Office
USG	US Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USPACOM	US Pacific Command
USRs	unit status reports
USSPACECOM	US Space Command
USTRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
VA	Veterans Administration
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

Part II -- DEFINITIONS

Unless identified as extracted from Joint Pub 1-02, the following terminology is not standardized within the Department of Defense and is applicable only in the context of this document.

after-action review (AAR). A process designed to provide commanders direct feedback on the accomplishment of selected joint mission essential tasks, conditions, and standards stated in terms of training objectives in order for the commander to evaluate training proficiency. An analytical review of training events that enable the training audience, through a facilitated professional discussion, to examine actions and results during a training event. (JTM)

CINC Joint Training Plan (JTP). A plan developed and updated annually by each combatant commander that defines the training objectives and methods used to train assigned forces (training audience) in joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to accomplish the mission requirements (Joint Mission Essential Task List) over the selected training period. Specifically, the plan identifies the training audience, the joint training objectives, the training events, and required training resources. Also called CINC JTP. (JTMP)

CJCS Joint Training Master Plan (JTMP). A plan developed and updated annually by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that provides planning guidance and identifies common joint training requirements. The CJCS JTMP includes, as a minimum, CJCS guidance, common joint tasks, and CJCS commended training issues. (JTMP)

CJCS Joint Training Master Schedule (JTMS). A program developed and updated annually by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that integrates the CINC's Joint Training Schedules and CJCS-sponsored exercises. The schedule includes, as a minimum, exercise summaries for the program year as well as proposed summaries for the following five years. Also call CJCS JTMS. (JTM)

CINC Joint Training Schedule (JTS). A program developed from the CINC JTP events summaries and updated annually which consolidates the training events exercise schedule and the regional engagement exercises. For instances, regional exercises focused on such CINC priorities as coalition building, overseas presence and access, demonstrating national resolve, and visible support for allies/coalition partners. The CINC JTS refines the events summaries by applying resource constraints. (JTM)

command linked tasks. These task depict the interfaces between supported and supporting commands. Command-linked tasks are key to the accomplishment of command or agency JMETs.

common joint tasks. Joint tasks selected by more than one combatant command as a JMET. (JTMP)

component interoperability training. Operational training in which more than one Service component participates, without joint force commander and /or Joint Staff participation. Normally, this training involves combatant command- or Service-based initiatives to improve responsiveness of assigned forces to combatant commanders. The purpose is to ensure interoperability of combat, combat support, combat service support, and military equipment between two or more Service components. (JTM)

conditions. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect performance. (JTMP)

essential. Describes those tasks that are absolutely necessary, indispensable, or critical to the success of a mission.

exercise. A military maneuver or simulated operation involving planning, preparation, and execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a multinational, joint, or single-Service exercise. (JTM)

exercise objective. Specific statement of purpose, guidance, and/or direction for an exercise. Exercise objectives relate to operation plans and/or concepts, theater strategy, training goals, and testing or evaluating equipment, tactics, and procedures. (JTM)

GGI&S Readiness Level. A tool that assesses the military's posture, from a GGI&S perspective, to fight. Inputs to this indicator are: customer needs; GGI&S coverage (standard, substitute, and interim products); and DMA production and distribution plans and capabilities. Expressed in terms of C-Rating (c-1 through c-4) as defined in CJCSI 3901.01, *Requirements for Global Geospatial Information and Services*.

global geospatial information and services (GGI&S). Worldwide, positionally accurate, current, spatially co-referenced, attributed feature information about the earth arranged in a coherent structure to support measurement, mapping, monitoring, modeling, terrain evaluation, terrain visualization, and spatial reasoning applications. (DMA)

interagency operations. Operations that often will involve several departments and agencies of the US Government. These organizations may include the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and Transportation; and the Intelligence Community. (JTM)

interim products and information. Products or information that do not meet a DOD specification for the need but partially meet the customer's intended use criteria. This is considered an interim risk mitigation measure pending the production of DOD standard or substitute products or information.

joint after-action report. A written report consisting of summary joint universal lessons learned that provides the official description of an operational training event and identifies significant lessons learned. (JTM)

joint exercise. Exercises based on joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures that train and evaluate joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to requirements established by joint force commanders to accomplish their assigned mission(s). (JTM)

Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). A list of joint tasks considered essential to the accomplishment of assigned or anticipated missions. (JTM)

joint professional military education (JPME). The portion of professional military education concentrating on the instruction of joint matters. (JTM)

joint training. Military training based on joint doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to operational requirements deemed necessary by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. (JTM)

joint training assessment. An analytical process used by commanders to determine an organization's current level of training proficiency on joint mission essential tasks. This process also supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's and combatant commanders' cumulative assessments of overall joint readiness. (JTM)

joint training evaluation. The process used by commanders to measure the demonstrated ability (e.g., demonstrated during joint training events, exercises, or operations) to accomplish specified training objectives. (JTM)

joint training event. Any event conducted for the purpose of joint training. This includes academics, seminars, war games, command post exercises, and field training exercises. (JTM)

joint training objective. A statement that describes the desired outcome of a joint training activity. A joint training objective is derived from joint mission essential tasks, conditions, and standards. Joint training objectives are defined by the following criteria:

- a. performance--the action or activity desired.
- b. training condition--the environment or situation under which the training occurs.
- c. level of performance--the desired indication that the training is complete. (JTM)

military education. The systematic instruction of individuals in subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war. (JP 1-02)

military training. The instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks; the exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance combat readiness. Military training has three components: Service, joint, and multinational. (JTM)

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 1-02)

multilateral peace operations. Actions taken by the United Nations under the authority of Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, by regional arrangement pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN charter, or by ad hoc coalitions pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution under the authority of Chapter VI or VII of the UN charter or consistent with Chapter VI of the UN Charter in order to preserve, maintain, or restore the peace. (JTM)

multinational exercises. Exercises that train and evaluate US and other nation's forces or staffs to respond to requirements established by multinational force commanders to accomplish their assigned mission(s). (JTM)

multinational training. Military training based on allied and/or coalition, joint, and/or Service doctrine or tactics, techniques and procedures, as applicable, to prepare personnel or units for multinational operations in response to NCA directives. (JTM)

need(s). A specific product(s), piece(s) of information, service(s), or capability necessary for satisfaction of an overall requirement for GGI&S support.

peace building. Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 1-02)

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (JP 1-02)

priority 1. Need, if unavailable, will prevent performance of mission.

priority 2. Need, if unavailable, will result in significant deficiencies that reduce mission capability and generate significant risk in execution.

priority 3. Need, if unavailable, will result in minor deficiencies that limit mission effectiveness. Worldwide Readiness Requirements are Priority 3 (See Worldwide Readiness Requirements).

professional military education (PME). The systematic instruction of professionals in subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war. (JTM)

program of instruction. A series of related courses designed to satisfy a specific joint training requirement (e.g., joint task force headquarters, etc.). (JTM)

Service training. Military training based on Service policy and doctrine to prepare individuals and interoperable units. Service training includes basic, technical, operational, and component interoperability training. Component interoperability training can be the result of either combatant commander or Service initiative. (JTM)

standard. The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a particular task under a specified set of conditions. It is defined by the combatant commander and consists of measure and criterion.

Measure. Provides the basis for describing varying levels of task performance.

Criterion. Defines acceptable levels of performance. (JTM)

standard products and information. Products or information that meet a DOD standard specification and the customer's intended use criteria for the need.

substitute products and information. Products or information that do not meet the DOD specification for the need but fully meet the customers' intended use. In view of customer satisfaction with a substitute product, DMA production of DOD standard products or information that is not required.

supporting task. Specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of a joint mission essential task. Supporting tasks may be accomplished at the same command level or by subordinate elements of a joint force (i.e., joint staff, functional components, etc.).

task. A discrete event or action, not specific to a single unit, weapon system, or individual, that enables a mission or function to be accomplished by individuals and/or organizations. (JTM)

training assessment. An analytical process used by joint commanders and other leaders to determine an organization's current levels of training proficiency on mission essential tasks. This process also supports the Chairman's and combatant commanders' cumulative assessments of overall joint readiness. (JTMP)

training evaluation. The process used to measure the demonstrated ability (e.g., demonstrated during training events or exercises) to accomplish specified training objectives. (JTMP)

worldwide readiness requirements. A requirement submitted in support of a developmental or operational system that could be deployed worldwide.

APPENDIX B

**UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK
LIST DIAGRAMS**

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX B

UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST DIAGRAMS

ADJUSTING LOCATION OF UJTL TASKS

Some tasks in this version of the UJTL have been realigned or moved since the publication of CJCSM 3500.04 (UJTL Version 2.1 of 15 May 1995). This realignment was intended to organize the tasks into a more logical hierarchy of related tasks. The table below identifies the old and new placement of the UJTL tasks which have been relocated.

SN (Strategic National)

Title	Old Number v2.1	New Number
Determine National Strategic Targeting Policy	SN 2.1.1	SN 3.2.5
Determine Strategic Intelligence Issues and Requirements	SN 2.1.2	SN 2.1.2 SN 2.1.5
Collect Information on Strategic Targets	SN 2.2.2	SN 2.2.1
Support Combatant Command Intelligence Needs	SN 2.2.3	SN 2.2.2
Collect Information on Meteorology, Oceanography, Topography/Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy	SN 2.2.4	SN 2.2.1
Provide Baseline Intelligence Assessment and Reassessment	SN 2.3	SN 2.4
Assess Global and Regional Issues and Threats	SN 2.3.1	SN 2.4.1.1
Assess Strategic Vulnerabilities	SN 2.3.2	SN 2.4.1.2
Analyze Areas of Interest Regionally and Worldwide	SN 2.3.3	SN 2.4.1.1
Integrate All-Source Strategic Intelligence	SN 2.3.4	SN 2.4.1
Develop National Strategic Indications and Warning of Threat Worldwide	SN 2.3.5	SN 2.4.2.1
Prepare and Disseminate National Strategic Intelligence Estimates, Assessments, and Reports	SN 2.4	SN 2.4.2 SN 2.5
Apply National Strategic Firepower	SN 3.2	SN 3.3
Demonstrate National Military Capabilities	SN 3.2.4	SN 3.3.3
Attack Strategic Targets	SN 3.2.5	SN 3.3.1
Integrate Strategic Firepower	SN 3.2.6	SN 3.3.2
Protect Strategic Forces and Means	SN 3.3	SN 3.4
Protect Homeland and Strategic Forces and Means	SN 3.3.2	SN 3.4.4
Coordinate Worldwide Operations Security	SN 3.3.3	SN 3.4.5
Assist Civil Defense	SN 3.3.5	SN 8.2.4
Provide Security for Strategic Forces and Means	SN 3.3.6	SN 3.4.7

Title	Old Number v2.1	New Number
Provide for Nuclear Surety	SN 3.3.7	SN 3.4.8
Support Personnel Recovery Worldwide	SN 3.3.8	SN 3.4.9
Provide DOD/Government-Wide Support	SN 3.4	SN 8.2
Support DOD and Joint Agencies	SN 3.4.1	SN 8.2.1
Support Other Government Agencies	SN 3.4.2	SN 8.2.2
Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters	SN 3.4.3	SN 8.2.3
Generate and Launch Space Systems	SN 3.4.4	SN 3.5.1
Monitor and Maintain On-Orbit Systems	SN 3.4.5	SN 3.5.1
Provide Space Control	SN 3.4.6	SN 3.5.2
Support Other Nations or Groups	SN 3.5	SN 8.1
Provide Security Assistance	SN 3.5.1	SN 8.1.1
Support Nation Assistance	SN 3.5.2	SN 8.1.2
Support Peace Operations	SN 3.5.3	SN 8.1.3
Support Military Civic Action	SN 3.5.4	SN 8.1.4
Provide for Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance	SN 3.5.5	SN 8.1.5
Provide Civil Affairs Support Policy	SN 3.5.6	SN 8.1.6
Coordinate Information Sharing Arrangements	SN 3.5.8	SN 8.1.7
Provide Personnel Management and Morale Support	SN 4.2.6	SN 4.3.1
Coordinate Defense-wide Religious Support	SN 4.2.7	SN 4.3.2
Provide Defense-wide Health Services	SN 4.2.8	SN 4.3.3
Provide Management Headquarters	SN 4.2.9	SN 4.2.6
Coordinate Defensewide Legal Support	SN 4.2.10	SN 4.2.7
Establish Prisoner Control Policy	SN 4.2.11	SN 4.2.8
Acquire Host-Nation Support (HNS)	SN 4.2.12	SN 3.1.5
Reconstitute National Forces and Means	SN 4.3	SN 4.4
Set Sustainment Priorities	SN 4.4	SN 4.5
Provide Public Affairs (PA) Worldwide	SN 5.1.5	SN 5.6
Design Units	SN 7.3	SN 7.3.3
Develop Unit Reference Sheet Organizations	SN 7.3.1	SN 7.3.5
Develop Equipment Basis of Issue and Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information	SN 7.3.2	SN 7.3.5
Develop and Document Unit Organization and Equipment Authorizations	SN 7.3.3	SN 7.3.5
Size Combat Force	SN 7.4	SN 7.3.1
Conduct Objective (Constrained) Force Planning	SN 7.4.2	SN 5.3.5.1
Determine Force for Program	SN 7.4.3	SN 5.3.5.1

13 September 1996

Title	Old Number v2.1	New Number
Develop Support Force Structure	SN 7.5	SN 7.3.2
Determine Global, Theater Support Force Structure, and Strategic Mobility Requirements	SN 7.5.1	SN 7.3.2
Match Requirements to Available Forces	SN 7.5.2	SN 7.3.2
Conduct Trade-Off and Prioritization Analyses	SN 7.5.3	SN 7.3.2
Integrate Strategic Forces	SN 7.5.4	SN 5.3.5.1
Document Unit Authorization	SN 7.6	SN 7.3.5
Educate and Train the Force	SN 7.7	SN 7.4
Coordinate Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) Development	SN 7.7.1	SN 7.4.1
Establish Education and Training Programs and Allocate	SN 7.7.2	SN 7.4.2
Conduct Professional Education and Training	SN 7.7.3	SN 7.4.3
Assess Training and Education Effectiveness	SN 7.7.4	SN 7.4.4
Ensure Interoperability	SN 7.8	SN 7.5

ST (Strategic Theater)

Title	Old Number v2.1	New Number
Collect Information on Theater Strategic Targets	ST 2.2.2	ST 2.2.1
Provide for Theater Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance	ST 2.2.3	ST 2.1.4 ST 2.2.1
Evaluate Strategic Threat Information	ST 2.3.1	ST 2.4.1
Analyze Theater Area of Interest	ST 2.3.2	ST 2.4.1
Evaluate Social/Political/Economic/Health Environment in Theater	ST 2.3.3	ST 2.4.1.1.
Integrate Strategic Intelligence	ST 2.3.4	ST 2.4.1.2
Develop Indications and Warning	ST 2.3.5	ST 2.4.2.1
Identify Operational Vulnerabilities	ST 2.3.6	ST 2.4.1.2
Prepare and Disseminate Theater Strategic Intelligence Reports	ST 2.4	ST 2.4.2 ST 2.5
Coordinate Theater Reception Activities	ST 4.2.5	ST 1.1.2
Provide Public Affairs in Theater	ST 5.1.5	ST 5.6
Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operations Plans, and Orders	ST 5.4.1	ST 5.3.4
Issue Theater Strategic Operation Plans, Orders, and ROE	ST 5.4.2	ST 5.4.1
Synchronize Joint Operations and Subordinate Campaign Plans	ST 5.4.3	ST 5.4.2

Title	Old Number v2.1	New Number
Establish, or Participate in a Joint, Combined, or Multinational Force	ST 5.4.4	ST 5.4.3
Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Strategic Forces in Theater	ST 6.2.4	ST 6.2.5
Provide Security for Theater Forces and Means	ST 6.2.5	ST 6.2.6
Support Escape, Evasion, and Recovery of Forces	ST 6.2.6	ST 6.2.7
Establish NBC Protection in Theater	ST 6.2.7	ST 6.2.8
Employ Theater Operations Security	ST 6.3	ST 6.3.1
Employ Theater Signal Security (SIGSEC)	ST 6.3.1	ST 6.3.2
Employ Concealment Techniques for Theater Forces/Facilities	ST 6.3.2	ST 6.3.4
Support Peace Operations in Theater	ST 8.2.9	ST 8.2.8
Support Multilateral Peace Operations	ST 8.2.9.1	ST 8.2.8.1
Conduct Peacekeeping	ST 8.2.9.2	ST 8.2.8.2
Conduct Peace Enforcement	ST 8.2.9.3	ST 8.2.8.3


OP (Operational)


Title	Old Number v2.1	New Number
Provide Operational Reconnaissance and Surveillance	OP 2.2.3	OP 2.1.4 OP 2.2.1
Collect Information on Operational Targets	OP 2.2.2	OP 2.2.1
Evaluate Operational Threat (and Friendly) Information	OP 2.3.1	OP 2.4.1
Analyze and Evaluate Operational Areas	OP 2.3.2	OP 2.4.1.1
Integrate Operational Intelligence	OP 2.3.3	OP 2.4.1
Develop Enemy Operational Intentions	OP 2.3.3.1	OP 2.4.1.2
Develop Operational Target Information	OP 2.3.3.2	OP 2.4.2.4
Identify Enemy Vulnerabilities	OP 2.3.3.3	OP 2.4.1.2
Develop Indications and Warning	OP 2.3.4	OP 2.4.2.1
Produce Operational Intelligence Reports	OP 2.4	OP 2.4.2 OP 2.5
Coordinate Theater of Operations Reception	OP 4.4.6	OP 1.1.3
Maintain Operational Information and Force Status	OP 5.1.3	OP 5.1.4
Monitor Strategic Situation	OP 5.1.4	OP 5.1.5
Provide Public Affairs in Theater of Operations/JOA	OP 5.1.5	OP 5.8


Title	Old Number v2.1	New Number
Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC)	OP 5.1.6	OP 6.3.2
Plan and Integrate Operational C2W	OP 5.6.1	OP 5.6.2
Control C2W Operations	OP 5.6.2	OP 5.6.3
Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Operational Forces	OP 6.2.4	OP 6.2.5
Conduct Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theater of Operations/JOA	OP 6.2.5	OP 6.2.6
Establish Disaster Control Measures	OP 6.2.6	OP 6.2.7
Establish NBC Protection in Theater of Operations/JOA	OP 6.2.7	OP 6.2.8
Coordinate Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Support	OP 6.2.8	OP 6.2.9.3
Employ Operations Security in Theater of Operations/JOA	OP 6.3	OP 6.3.1
Employ Signal Security (SIGSEC) for Operational Forces	OP 6.3.2	OP 6.3.3


UJTL Diagrams


The remainder of this appendix contains diagrams of each of the major tasks in the UJTL. The diagrams are sequenced with SN tasks first, ST tasks second, OP tasks third, and TA tasks last.































































Tactical (TA) Tasks



SECTION 3

CONDITIONS FOR JOINT TASKS

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

CONDITIONS FOR JOINT TASKS

1. Introduction. The list of conditions in this section is designed to be used as part of the Joint Training System. This process is initiated by combatant commanders, who examine their assigned missions as specified in the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*, the *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*, and other taskings to specify their "capability requirements." These capability requirements are expressed as joint mission essential tasks (JMETs), associated conditions for these tasks, and standards for these tasks. JMETs are selected from among the tasks found in the UJTL. Tasks that are essential to the accomplishment of the combatant commander's missions are selected as JMETs.

2. Conditions. Conditions are those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect performance. Not all conditions affect tasks in the same way. Therefore, conditions that greatly affect the performance of some tasks will have little or no affect on the performance of other tasks. This document provides a complete listing of the conditions that can be used by combatant commanders to describe the conditions under which tasks may be performed as part of their missions. The conditions selected for a JMET should be those that have the greatest performance impacts on it.

a. Some conditions are shared by both friendly and hostile forces involved in joint military operations. Such conditions include those related to the climate and weather of an area, its geography, bodies of water within the area, and the space above it. Other conditions, such as those related to the forces involved in a joint military operation, may be different for friendly and enemy forces. For example, the types and quality of forces may be different for friendly and enemy forces. Also, conditions related to political support for a military operation or the economic strength of an area, may pertain to friendly or enemy areas. To accommodate this, some conditions require the specification of to whom or where the conditions apply.

b. Conditions in this manual are organized into three broad categories: Physical, Military, and Civil. Beneath each category, a number of related conditions are organized. For example, conditions that are organized under the physical environment include land, sea, air, and space. Each condition contained in this document is briefly defined and is assigned a unique reference code beginning with the letter "C." In addition, for each condition, several descriptors are provided that allow a user to specify how the condition is likely to exist in a particular mission or scenario. For example, for the condition C 1.3.1, *Climate*, descriptors allow the user to specify whether the climate is tropical, temperate, arctic, or arid. When the tasks and conditions associated with a mission have been specified, the combatant commanders will then use measures provided to set standards for each JMET.

3. Development of Conditions. Conditions were developed using the guidelines in this paragraph. These guidelines should be used to develop proposed changes to UJTL conditions.

- a. Conditions should be factors of the immediate environment. Conditions are aspects of the environment immediately surrounding the performance of a task.
- b. Conditions should directly affect the performance of a task. A condition must directly affect the ease or difficulty of performing at least one task.
- c. Conditions list should not include tasks. Task performance may be constrained or enabled by the level of performance of a related task; however, related tasks are not treated as conditions because they do not directly affect performance of the task.
- d. Each condition should have a unique, understandable name. Each condition should have a name that distinguishes it from every other condition and from every task.
- e. Conditions may apply to all levels of war and all types of tasks. Some conditions may seem to apply to a particular level of war or a particular type of task (joint vs. Service), but they are, in fact, generic.
- f. Conditions should be placed logically in conditions list structure. Each condition was logically placed under the physical environment (land, sea, air, and space), the military environment (mission, forces, C3-related, intelligence-related, movement-related, firepower-related, protection-related, sustainment-related, and threat-related), or the civil environment (political, cultural, and economic).
- g. Each condition has a single set of descriptors identifying three or more distinct categories. Categories have been developed for each condition that distinguish among several levels at which the condition may be experienced and are based, whenever possible, on objective, quantitative criteria.
- h. Conditions and descriptors should be written to be compatible with task/conditions/standards framework. Conditions are expressed within the framework of the phrase, "perform this task under conditions of..." Therefore, each condition and condition descriptor phrase should fit within this framework.

4. Conditions List Organization. This conditions list is organized into three parts. Each condition is defined and described. The conditions are arranged according to physical environment, military environment, and civil environment. The organization of each of the conditions in each of the three sections is graphically depicted in figures at the start of each section. Figure 3-1 displays the overall organization of conditions for joint tasks.




Figure 3-1. Organization of Conditions for Joint Tasks

Conditions of the Physical Environment

This section includes factors arising from nature and the physical environment as modified by man. Figure 3-2 shows the organization of physical conditions, to include the major subcategories of land, sea, air, and space.




Figure 3-2. Conditions of the Physical Environment

- C 1.0** **PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT** – Includes those factors of the natural environment and other factors, within the natural realm, as modified by civilization.
- C 1.1** **LAND** – Physical characteristics, both natural and synthetic, of a land area.
Descriptors: Highly developed (urban); Moderately developed (suburban, rural); Undeveloped (natural state).
- C 1.1.1** **Terrain** – General characteristics of land areas.
Descriptors: Mountainous; Piedmont; Steppe (pampas, plains, savanna, veldt) Delta (river systems, lakes regions); Desert; Jungle; Arctic.
- C 1.1.1.1** **Terrain Relief** – Height of immediate terrain relative to surrounding area, measured from a base point (adjacent valley or plateau).
Descriptors: High (> 500 ft); Moderate (100 to 500 ft); Low (10 to 100 ft); Very Low (< 10 ft).
- C 1.1.1.2** **Terrain Elevation** – Height of immediate terrain in reference to sea level.
Descriptors: Very high (> 10,000 ft); High (6,000 to 10,000 ft); Moderately high (3,000 to 6,000 ft); Moderately low (1,000 to 3,000 ft); Low (500 to 1,000 ft); Very low (< 500 ft).
- C 1.1.1.3** **Terrain Slope** – The average steepness or grade of a land area.
Descriptors: Steep (> 10%); Moderate (3 to 10%); Little (< 3%).
- C 1.1.1.4** **Terrain Firmness** – The terrain's ability to support weight.
Descriptors: Excellent (paved); Good (hard-packed ground); Fair (firm surface when dry or frozen); Poor (spongy soil, soft sand, deep snow).
- C 1.1.1.5** **Terrain Traction** – Ability to maintain sufficient friction with terrain to control movement.
Descriptors: Good (wet or dry); Fair (good when dry); Poor (sandy, muddy, icy).
- C 1.1.1.6** **Vegetation** – Plants, trees, and shrubs.
Descriptors: Jungle (rain forest, canopied); Dense (forested); Light (meadow, plain); Sparse (alpine, semi-desert); Negligible (arctic, desert).
- C 1.1.1.7** **Terrain Relief Features** – Specific terrain features in immediate area.
Descriptors: Large raised (mountain, mesa, butte); Small raised (hill, knoll); Small depressed (gap, ravine, gully); Large depressed (canyon, valley).
- C 1.1.2** **Geological Features** – Features relating to the earth's subsurface.
Descriptors: Stable; Unstable.

- C 1.1.2.1 Geological Activity** – Seismic or volcanic activity in region.
Descriptors: Current (volcanic eruptions, earthquakes); Recent (aftershocks, minor emissions); Inactive.
- C 1.1.2.2 Magnetic Variation** – Deviations caused by position relative to the location of the magnetic pole.
Descriptors: Significant; Moderate; Slight.
- C 1.1.2.3 Subsurface Water** – Availability of underground water supplies.
Descriptors: Accessible (adequate supply and reasonably close to surface); Somewhat accessible (at moderate depths); Inaccessible (unavailable or present only at great depth).
- C 1.1.3 Synthetic Terrain Features** – Degree to which civilization and military actions have impacted the physical environment.
Descriptors: Significant (large-scale civilian or military impact); Moderate (impact on specific small areas); Negligible (undeveloped land area).
- C 1.1.3.1 Urbanization** – Presence of built-up population centers.
Descriptors: Significant (> 500,000 people); Moderate (50,000 to 500,000 people); Minor (< 50,000 people); Negligible (rural).
- C 1.1.3.2 Significant Civil Structures** – Synthetic structures that alter terrain (bridges, stadiums, canals), or that could impact terrain, if damaged (locks, dams, tunnels).
Descriptors: Numerous (urban); Some (suburban); Few or none (rural).
- C 1.1.3.3 Synthetic Terrain Contrast** – The color or shading differential between civilian and military objects and the natural or physical environment.
Descriptors: Significant (dark or light objects on opposing background); Moderate (distinct variation between objects and background); Negligible (objects blend with background).
- C 1.1.3.4 Obstacles to Movement** – The presence of obstacles to movement and maneuver; covering land, sea, and air operations (land and sea mines, barrage balloons, constructed obstacles).
Descriptors: Extensive (system of obstacles); Moderate (some use of obstacles); No.
- C 1.1.3.5 Route Availability** – The availability of navigable routes over land areas.
Descriptors: High (multiple paved, all weather roads); Moderate (Some paved, but limited all weather road surfaces); Low (Few roads or trails, no all weather routes).

- C 1.1.4 Landlocked Waters** – Bodies of water surrounded by land to include lakes, reservoirs, and wetlands.
Descriptors: Very large (large lakes); Large to moderate (lakes, reservoirs); Small (ponds).
- C 1.1.4.1 Landlocked Waters Depth** – The depth of water at a particular point or area.
Descriptors: Deep (> 30 feet); Moderate (10 to 30 feet); Shallow (4 to 10 feet); Very Shallow (< 4 feet).
- C 1.1.4.2 Landlocked Waters Current** – A steady, generally predictable flow of water.
Descriptors: Strong (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Gentle (< 1 knot).
- C 1.1.4.3 Landlocked Waters Width** – Width of bodies of water.
Descriptors: Very large (> 5 NM); Large (1 to 5 NM); Moderate (3000 feet to 1 NM); Small (500 to 3000 feet); Narrow (< 500 feet).
- C 1.1.4.4 Landlocked Waters Bottom** – Characteristics of the land underneath landlocked waters.
Descriptors: Flat and Firm; Flat and soft; Moderate slopes; Irregular or Rocky.
- C 1.1.4.5 Landlocked Waters Shore Gradient** – Slope of the land at the edge of the water.
Descriptors: Gentle (< 3%); Moderate (3 to 10%); Steep (> 10%).
- C 1.2 SEA** – Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers.
Descriptors: Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 nautical miles of land); Littoral (Coastal, near (within 5 nautical miles of land areas); Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected landlocked waters).
- C 1.2.1 Ocean Waters** – Primary bodies of salt water that are not landlocked.
Descriptors: Atlantic (North and South); Pacific (North and South); Indian; Arctic.
- C 1.2.1.1 Ocean Depth** – The depth of ocean water at a point or for an area.
Descriptors: Shallow (< 100 fathoms); Limited (100 to 500 fathoms); Deep (500 to 2500 fathoms); Very deep (> 2500 fathoms).
- C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents** – A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in a littoral coastal ocean waters.
Descriptors: Strong (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Little or no (< 1 knot).

- C 1.2.1.3 Sea State** – Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances.
Descriptors: Calm to gentle (< sea state 3); Moderately rough (whitecaps, sea state 3 to 5); Rough (foamy tops, sea state 6); Extremely rough (tops of waves blowing off, sea state 7 to 9).
- C 1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature** – Water surface temperature (degrees Fahrenheit).
Descriptors: Extremely cold (< 35° F); Cold (35° to 55° F); Moderate (56° to 75° F); Warm (> 75° F).
- C 1.2.1.5 Saline Content** – Level of salt content in water (parts per thousand).
Descriptors: Low (< 25 ‰); Average (25 to 35 ‰); High (> 35 ‰).
- C 1.2.1.6 Ocean Features** – Features just above, just below, or within 10 fathoms of the ocean surface to include islands, atolls, reefs, shoals, rocks, or icebergs.
Descriptors: Large raised (islands); Small raised (atolls, reefs); Small submerged (rocks, icebergs); Large submerged (shoals, subsurface reefs).
- C 1.2.1.7 Sea Room** – Availability of space for maritime maneuver. Includes dynamic factors such as confining ice, submerged wrecks, or potentially damaging floating objects such as logs. Applies especially to coastal polar, littoral, or riverine environments.
Descriptors: Unrestricted (open ocean); Moderate (some confining factors); Confined (coastal and riverine waters).
- C 1.2.1.8 Ocean Acoustics** – Qualities of the subsurface environment that affect the ability to detect subsurface objects.
Descriptors: Good (subsurface detection systems not limited by acoustics); Fair (systems moderately degraded by acoustic conditions); Poor (systems severely degraded by acoustic conditions).
- C 1.2.1.9 Ocean Bioluminescence** – Emission of visible light by living marine organisms.
Descriptors: Bright (significantly enhances visibility near water surface), Noticeable (provides some additional light near water surface); No.
- C 1.2.1.10 Ocean Ice** – The presence of ice at or near the ocean surface.
Descriptors: Pack (surface covered with solid ice); Marginal (broken ice on surface); Isolated (ice chunks/icebergs possible); No
- C 1.2.1.11 Ocean Ice Thickness** – The thickness of ocean surface ice.

Descriptors: Great (>8 feet); Moderate (between 3 and eight feet); Minimal (<3 feet).

- C 1.2.1.12 Ocean Ambient Noise** – The ambient noise level in the ocean caused by marine life, geological factors, or by civilization.
Descriptors: High; Moderate; Low.
- C 1.2.2 Ocean Bottom** – The characteristics of the sea bottom.
Descriptors: Regular (no significant features); Irregular (sea bottom irregularities).
- C 1.2.2.1 Sea Bottom Contours** – Gradient of the seabed.
Descriptors: Flat (floors of ocean basins, plains); Gentle (continental shelf); Moderate (ridges, fracture zones); Steep (trenches, sea mounts).
- C 1.2.2.2 Sea Bottom Composition** – Seabed material from the ocean bottom to the littoral.
Descriptors: Sandy; Silty; Rocky.
- C 1.2.3 Harbor Capacity** – The size and characteristics of a harbor.
Descriptors: Large (accommodates many large ships); Moderate (accommodates a few large ships); Limited (accommodates one large ship); No (unable to handle large ships).
- C 1.2.3.1 Harbor Shelter** – The amount of protection provided from the open ocean by natural features.
Descriptors: Complete (well protected from wind and surf); Limited; Little or no (completely exposed to wind and surf).
- C 1.2.3.2 Harbor Depth** – Water level at low tide.
Descriptors: Deep (> 60 ft); Moderate (30 to 60 ft); Shallow (< 30 ft; may not be able to handle fully-loaded ships).
- C 1.2.3.3 Harbor Currents** – Moving water caused by tidal change and river runoff.
Descriptors: Fast (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Negligible (< 1 knot).
- C 1.2.4 Littoral Characteristics** – The characteristics of the shore area, including contiguous water and land areas.
Descriptors: Harsh (difficult grades, surfaces, inshore currents; extensive obstacles); Moderate (moderate grades, currents; some obstacles); Mild (gentle natural factors; no obstacles).

- C 1.2.4.1 Littoral Gradient** – Slope of the beach, from low tide up to the extreme high tide mark.
Descriptors: Gentle (< 2%); Moderate (2 to 5%); Steep (> 5%).
- C 1.2.4.2 Littoral Composition** – Shoreline material, from shallow water to high tide marks.
Descriptors: Firm (hard sand, pebbled); Slippery (shale pieces); Soft (mud, soft sand).
- C 1.2.4.3 Littoral Terrain Features** – Those land features that overlook the littoral.
Descriptors: Negligible (inland barely rises above high tide mark); Influential (treeline, embankment); Controlling (cliffs, hills).
- C 1.2.4.4 Littoral Tides** – Change in height from low to high tide.
Descriptors: Great (> 10 ft); Moderate (3 to 10 ft); Small or negligible (< 3 ft).
- C 1.2.4.5 Littoral Currents** – Flows peculiar to that shoreline area.
Descriptors: Extreme (dangerous undertow); Moderate (some impediment to movement); Negligible.
- C 1.2.5 Riverine Environment** – Type of riverine environment.
Descriptors: River; Canal; Delta.
- C 1.2.5.1 Riverine Navigability** – Category of navigable waterway.
Descriptors: Type I (shallow rivers, not navigable by coastal or ocean going vessels); Type II (rivers navigable by coastal or ocean going vessels); Type III (deltas, canals).
- C 1.2.5.2 Riverine Tidal Turbulence** – The extent of turbulence in the tidal zone causing the movement of material such as debris, pollutants, or vegetation, thereby affecting visibility through water.
Descriptors: High; Moderate; Low.
- C 1.2.5.3 Riverine Current** – The velocity of flowing water in riverine environment.
Descriptors: Strong (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Gentle (< 1 knot).
- C 1.2.5.4 Riverine Bank Gradient** – Slope of the land at the water's edge.
Descriptors: Gentle (< 5 degrees); Moderate (5 to 15 degrees); Steep (> 15 degrees).
- C 1.2.6 Shipping Presence** – Presence of shipping activity in area.
Descriptors: High (active shipping area); Moderate (some shipping activity in area); Negligible.

- C 1.2.6.1 Shipping Density** – The general level of shipping in an area.
Descriptors: Heavy (> 10 vessels per 60 square mile area); Moderate (5-10 vessels per 60 square mile area); Light (< 5 vessels per 60 square mile area).
- C 1.2.6.2 Shipping Type** – The primary characteristics of the shipping in an operating area.
Descriptors: Ocean going (vessels over 200 feet long); Coastal (vessels between 50-200 feet long); Small Craft (vessels < 50 feet long); Mixed (combination of vessel sizes).
- C 1.2.6.3 Shipping Identifiability** – The physical characteristics of vessels that allow them to be identified to include size, markings, unique hull forms, observable activity, electromagnetic emissions, and communications capability.
Descriptors: Easy (minimal assets required to identify vessels); Moderate (moderate level of assets required to identify vessels); Difficult (substantial assets required to identify vessels).
- C 1.3 AIR** – Characteristics of the lower atmosphere, to include climate, visibility, and weapons effects.
Descriptors: Natural (climate, visibility); Induced (atmospheric weapons effects).
- C 1.3.1 Climate** – Aggregate, long-term weather history for a region.
Descriptors: Tropical; Temperate; Arctic; Arid.
- C 1.3.1.1 Season** – Periods of the year characterized by changes in temperature, daylight length, storm activity, and precipitation.
Descriptors: Winter (cold; short days); Spring (wet; moderate temperatures); Summer (hot; long days); Fall (cool; dry weather).
- C 1.3.1.2 Weather Systems** – Systems that determine weather over the next 2 to 5 days.
Descriptors: Clear (high pressure); Unsettled (low pressure); Major storm.
- C 1.3.1.3 Weather** – Current weather (next 24 hours).
Descriptors: Clear; Partly cloudy; Overcast; Precipitating; Stormy.
- C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature** – Atmospheric temperature at ground level (degrees Fahrenheit).
Descriptors: Hot (> 85° F); Temperate (40° to 85° F); Cold (10° to 39° F); Very cold (< 10° F).
- C 1.3.1.3.2 Barometric Pressure** – Measured air pressure.
Descriptors: High (>30.20); Rising; Falling; Low (< 29.50).

- C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity** – The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet..
Descriptors: Light (< 7 mph); Moderate (7 to 24 mph); Strong (25 to 46 mph); High (47 to 72 mph); Hurricane force (> 73 mph).
- C 1.3.1.3.3.1 Low Altitude Wind Velocity** – The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude between 500 to 10,000 feet..
Descriptors: Light (< 7 mph); Moderate (7 to 24 mph); Strong (25 to 46 mph); High (47 to 72 mph); Very High (> 73 mph).
- C 1.3.1.3.3.2 Medium Altitude Wind Velocity** – The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude between 10,000 and 25,000 feet..
Descriptors: Light (< 20 mph); Moderate (20 to 50 mph); Strong (50 to 100 mph); High (100 to 150 mph); Very High (> 150 mph).
- C 1.3.1.3.3.3 High Altitude Wind Velocity** – The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude higher than 25,000 feet..
Descriptors: Light (< 20 mph); Moderate (20 to 50 mph); Strong (50 to 100 mph); High (100 to 150 mph); Very High (> 150 mph).
- C 1.3.1.3.4 Wind Direction** – The relative direction of the air moving through the atmosphere.
Descriptors: Head Wind; Crosswind; Tail Wind
- C 1.3.1.3.5 Humidity** – Amount of water vapor in the air.
Descriptors: Very Low (< 10%); Low (10 to 50%); Moderate (50 to 75%); High (> 75%).
- C 1.3.1.3.6 Precipitation** – Amount of moisture that falls to earth.
Descriptors: Heavy (downpour, blizzard); Moderate (steady rain or snow); Light (light rain or flurries); No.
- C 1.3.1.3.7 Altitude** – Height above sea level.
Descriptors: Low (sea level to 500 ft); Moderately low (500 to 10,000 ft); Moderately high (10,000 to 25,000 ft); High (25,000 to 45,000 ft); Very high (> 45,000 ft);
- C 1.3.2 Visibility** – Maximum distance to see an object given the moisture and particulate matter (dust, salt, ash) suspended in the atmosphere.
Descriptors: WOXOF (< 1/4 NM); Low (1/4 to 1 NM); Moderate (1 to 3 NM); Good (3 to 10 NM); High (10 to 20 NM); Unlimited (> 20 NM).

- C 1.3.2.1 Light** – Light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources.
Descriptors: Bright (sunny day); Day (overcast day); Low (dusk, dawn, moonlit, streetlight lit); Negligible (overcast night).
- C 1.3.2.2 Obscurants** – Temporary addition of material (smoke, chaff, dust) to the atmosphere.
Descriptors: Dense (hides objects); Moderate (makes objects difficult to see or detect clearly); Light (slight reductions in ability to see or detect); No.
- C 1.3.3 Atmospheric Weapons Effects** – Nuclear, biological, chemical, or electronic impacts.
Descriptors: Strong; Moderate; No.
- C 1.3.3.1 Nuclear Effects** – Extent of nuclear effects (level of exposure to unprotected personnel over period of five days).
Descriptors: High (> 400 rads); Moderate (200 to 400 rads); Low (25 to 200 rads); Negligible (< 25 rads).
- C 1.3.3.1.1 Nuclear Blast/Thermal Effects** – Extent of nuclear blast/thermal effects. Defined in terms of Nuclear Damage (ND) scale.
Descriptors: High (ND > 10); Moderate (ND 7 - 10); Low (ND 4 - 6); Negligible (ND < 4).
- C 1.3.3.1.2 Nuclear Radiation Effects** – Extent of radiation effects (level of exposure to unprotected personnel over period of five days)
Descriptors: High (> 400 rads); Moderate (200 to 400 rads); Low (25 to 200 rads); Negligible (< 25 rads).
- C 1.3.3.2 Chemical Effects** – Effects of chemical weapons employment.
Descriptors: Extensive (widespread and persistent); Some (limited area or temporary); No.
- C 1.3.3.3 Biological Effects** – Effects of biological weapons employment.
Descriptors: Deadly; Disabling; No.
- C 1.3.3.4 Electromagnetic Effects** – Extent to which electronic warfare, nuclear electromagnetic pulse, or directed energy are employed.
Descriptors: Extensive; Minor; No.
- C 1.3.4 Airspace Availability** – Freedom of airspace from confining factors such as FIRs, restricted areas, MOAs, Fire Support Control Zones, Air Space Coordination Areas that limit freedom of flight.
Descriptors: Unrestricted (no confining factors); Moderate (some confining factors); Limited (extensive confining factors).

- C 1.4** **SPACE** – Characteristics of the upper reaches of Earth's atmosphere.
Descriptors: Natural (sunspot activity); Induced (objects in space).
- C 1.4.1** **Objects in Space** – Satellites, vehicles, particles, and debris in orbit around the earth.
Descriptors: Communications satellites; Navigation satellites; Reconnaissance satellites; Environmental satellites; Surveillance satellites; Weapons; Debris
- C 1.4.1.1** **Orbit Density** – Existing satellites and space junk in a particular orbit.
Descriptors: High (many objects); Moderate (a scattering of objects); Low (very few objects).
- C 1.4.1.2** **Orbit Type** – A space object's elliptical path around the earth.
Descriptors: Geosynchronous (orbit matches earth's rotation); Sun synchronous (over the same part of the earth at the same time each day); Medium Earth; Polar; Molnya (highly elliptical); Low earth.
- C 1.4.2** **Solar and Geomagnetic Activity** – Level of solar electromagnetic activity and/or geomagnetic activity.
Descriptors: High (significant magnetic disturbances); Moderate (moderate magnetic disturbances); Little or No (very low presence of magnetic disturbances).
- C 1.4.3** **High Energy Particles** – Level of high energy particles caused by solar activity.
Descriptors: High (significant presence of high energy particles); Moderate (moderate presence of high energy particles); Little or No (very low presence of high energy particles).

Conditions of the Military Environment

This section includes factors related to military forces. Figure 3-3 shows the organization of military conditions to include the major sub-categories of mission, forces and conditions related to the areas of command, control, and communications; intelligence; deployment, movement, and maneuver; firepower; protection; sustainment; and threat. Conditions in this section may apply to either friendly or enemy forces, as indicated parenthetically after the name of the condition (friendly, enemy).




Figure 3-3. Conditions of the Military Environment

C 2.0 Military Environment – Those factors related to the mission, command structure, and forces. These factors can apply to US forces, allied and coalition forces, neutral forces, and enemy forces.

C 2.1 Mission – Those factors that frame and influence the execution of the mission assigned or understood.
Descriptors: Straightforward (well within current capabilities); Moderately challenging (safely within current capabilities); Stressful (very demanding mission relative to current capabilities).

- C 2.1.1 Mission Instructions** – Clarity of instructions, directives, policy guidance (including end state), strategies, or Status of Forces Agreements, below the NCA level.
Descriptors: Clear (addresses likely issues and hedges, leaves little or no ambiguity as to intent, and allows freedom of action where required); Minimal (few in number, leaves most decisions to the on-scene commander); Restrictive (a large number of instructions, leaves little discretion to the on-scene commander).
- C 2.1.1.1 Command Level** – The level of command directing the mission.
Descriptors: NCA; Combatant Commander; Commander, Joint Task Force; Joint Force Component Commander; Service Component Commander; Multinational.
- C 2.1.1.2 Pre-Existing Arrangements** – Those plans, organizations, relationships, and arrangements that existed before the present mission or tasking and that might influence execution of the concept of operations.
Descriptors: No; Partial; Strong (e.g., NATO).
- C 2.1.1.3 Mission Classification** – The degree of secrecy assigned to the mission.
Descriptors: Overt; Covert.
- C 2.1.1.4 ROE** – The divergence of the Rules of Engagement from the standard ROE, as published by the Director of Operations, The Joint Staff.
Note: The issue of ROE restrictiveness should be addressed as C 2.1.1, Mission Instructions.
Descriptors: US; NCA Modified; NORAD; NATO; UN (applying to UN operations, from Korea to peacekeeping); Multinational (ROE agreed amongst several nations in a coalition operation)
- C 2.1.1.5 SOFA** – The degree of control a host nation cedes over the conduct and punishment of guest forces under Status of Forces Agreements or like instruments.
Descriptors: Cooperative; Restrictive.
- C 2.1.1.6 Military Commitments to Other Nations** – The amount of commitment on the part of one nation to assist another.
Descriptors: Major (robust use of lift or furnishing of major end items); Limited (clothing and individual equipment for whole units of battalion size or larger); Negligible.
- C 2.1.1.7 Military Commitments from Other Nations** – The amount of commitment on the part of other nation to support mission.
Descriptors: Major (large contributions of forces, supplies, or other resources); Limited (some contributions of forces, supplies, or other resources); Negligible.

- C 2.1.2 Legal State** – The legal state under which military forces are operating.
Descriptors: Peace; Military Operations Other Than War; War.
- C 2.1.3 Mission Preparation** – Degree to which preparations for mission have been completed at time of mission execution. Includes intelligence, logistic, positioning of units, etc.
Descriptors: Completed (fully developed plan, including approval); Partially Completed (an OPLAN has been developed but is not fully refined and approved); Outline (a concept of operations or a draft OPLAN has been produced); No.
- C 2.1.4 Theater Dimensions** – The location and size of the theater or sub-area of a theater and the time available for mission accomplishment.
Descriptors: Massive (a theater of war, a vast area with long distances); Medium (a theater of operations with a large area); Small (a joint operations area).
- C 2.1.4.1 Location** – The location where the task must be performed.
Descriptors: Ashore; Afloat; Airborne; Space.
- C 2.1.4.2 Theater(s)** – The number of theaters or areas of war or operations within which actions are taking place. Does not include peaceful transit of AOR of geographic combatant commanders.
Descriptors: Single; Two; More than Two.
- C 2.1.4.3 Joint Operations Area** – Physical scope and breadth of an area, usually the joint operations area.
Descriptors: Very small (< 100,000 km²); Small (100,000 to 300,000 km²); Moderate (300,000 to 1,000,000 km²); Large (1,000,000 to 3,000,000 km²); Very large (> 3,000,000 km²).
- C 2.1.4.4 Tactical Area of Responsibility** – Physical scope and breadth of a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).
Descriptors: Very small (< 500 km²); Small (500 to 1,000 km²); Moderate (1,000 to 10,000 km²); Large (10,000 to 100,000 km²); Very large (> 100,000 km²).
- C 2.1.4.5 Intertheater Distance** – Mileage between two locations (e.g., CONUS to joint operations area).
Descriptors: Very short (< 1000 NM); Short (1,000 to 3,500 NM); Moderate (3,500 to 5,000 NM); Long (5,000 to 7,500 NM); Very long (> 7,500 NM).
- C 2.1.4.6 Intratheater Distance** – Mileage between two locations (e.g., airfield to the FEBA).

Descriptors: Very short (< 10 NM); Short (10 to 50 NM); Moderate (50 to 150 NM); Long (150 to 500 NM); Very long (> 500 NM).

- C 2.1.5 Time Available** – The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations.
Descriptors: Minimal (minutes to hours); Short (hours to days); Moderate (days to weeks); Long (weeks to months).
- C 2.1.5.1 Lead Time** – The time from receipt of a warning or directive to initiation of military operations.
Descriptors: Minimal (minutes to hours); Short (hours to days); Moderate (days to weeks); Long (weeks to months).
- C 2.1.5.2 Mission Duration** – The time a unit is expected to continue to conduct a mission.
Descriptors: Very short (< 30 days); Short (30 to 90 days); Medium (90 to 180 days); Long (180 to 365 days); Very long (> 365 days).
- C 2.2 Forces** – The overall capabilities of the forces of a nation, alliance, or coalition.
Descriptors: Strong (large, modern, well trained, well equipped, well led); Marginal; Weak (small, old, poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly led).
- C 2.2.1 Forces Assigned** – The capabilities of combat and support forces assigned to a combatant commander day-to-day.
Descriptors: Strong (planned forces in place); Marginal (planned defensive forces in place); Weak (reinforcements needed for defensive operations).
- C 2.2.2 Competing Apportionments** – The extent to which forces are distributed for planning, in that the same force may be apportioned simultaneously to more than one combatant commander (for planning).
Descriptors: No; Two; Multiple.
- C 2.2.3 Forces Allocated** – The extent to which forces are distributed to a commander for accomplishment of assigned mission.
Descriptors: Strong (exceeds plan); Adequate (meets plan); Marginal (less than plan).
- C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability** – The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks.
Descriptors: High (fully trained and equipped); Partial (partially trained and equipped); Low (poorly trained and equipped).
- C 2.2.4.1 Personnel Nutrition and Health** – The degree to which the members of a force are healthy and free of disease.

Descriptors: Excellent (> 90%); Fair (50 to 90%); Poor (< 50%).

- C 2.2.4.2 Personnel Literacy** – The literacy level of military personnel.
Descriptors: Very high (most with some college); High (most with high school education); Moderate (most with no high school, but with some literacy); Low (most lack basic literacy skills).
- C 2.2.4.3 Personnel Physical Conditioning** – The level of physical conditioning of military personnel.
Descriptors: Excellent (extensive, demanding training); Good (some organized training); Poor (no organized training).
- C 2.2.4.4 Personnel Morale** – The state of a force's spirit and confidence.
Descriptors: Excellent (determined, will stand and fight); Good (under normal circumstances will meet the enemy and give a good account of themselves); Poor (not committed to the leader or the effort, likely to yield ground or surrender).
- C 2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience** – The degree to which the civilian and military personnel assigned the task are experienced at the task.
Descriptors: High (professional long-term military and civilian personnel); Normal (mix of professional personnel with new personnel and reserves); Limited (largely a conscript force or a force with very high turnover of personnel); Negligible.
- C 2.2.4.6 Personnel Fatigue** – The degree to which personnel, due to lack of rest, are experiencing fatigue.
Descriptors: No (personnel are well rested); Moderate (personnel operating with inadequate rest; decision making skills are somewhat impaired); Severe (significant impairment to physical and decision making skills; need extended recovery period).
- C 2.2.5 Modern Military Systems** – The availability of modern weapon and information systems.
Descriptors: Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force); Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled); Few (treated as “magic bullet” systems or weapons and very closely controlled).
- C 2.2.5.1 Modern Weapons Systems** – The availability of modern weapons systems in numbers and types.
Descriptors: Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force); Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled); Few (treated as “magic bullet” systems or weapons and very closely controlled).

- C 2.2.5.2 Modern Information & Intelligence Processing Systems** – The availability of modern information systems in numbers and types.
Descriptors: Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force); Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled); Few (treated as “magic bullet” systems and very closely controlled).
- C 2.2.5.3 Military Systems Reliability** – The qualities of reliability, maintainability, and sustainability built into military systems.
Descriptors: High (few breakdowns and those fixed without major effort); Acceptable (operates at or near established reliability standards; maintainable in theater); Low (often breaks down or must be repaired by specialists in rear areas).
- C 2.2.5.4 Military Systems Maturity** – The development and deployment status of a force’s leading edge technology systems.
Descriptors: Brass Board (pre-production state of development); Early (first units equipped and trained with new systems); Evolved (numerous units equipped with new systems; follow-on systems are in development); Advanced (fully developed and integrated into the force); Overage (questionable reliability).
- C 2.2.6 Interoperability** – The ability of systems, units, or forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems, units, or forces.
Descriptors: Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally); High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds); Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate); No.
- C 2.2.7 Military Force Relationships** – The extent to which force elements (e.g., military branches, paramilitary organizations) cooperate with each other and adhere to the chain of command.
Descriptors: Strong (act as single team and adhere to chain of command); Moderate (some individual force element agendas, but general adherence to chain of command); Poor (uncooperative, force elements may act independently).
- C 2.3 COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS – Related Conditions**
- C 2.3.1 Command Arrangements** – Type of relationships or procedures set up among forces and their staffs for the effective management of forces and accomplishment of the mission.
Descriptors: NATO; Multinational; Joint; Service Unilateral; Ad Hoc.

- C 2.3.1.1 Joint Staff Integration** – The extent to which staffs of two or more forces or agencies of the same nation have integrated their doctrine, staff, force techniques and procedures, and training.
Descriptors: Full (broadly based and fully interactive); Partial (lacks broad base or experience working together); Poor (not broadly based and has not worked together).
- C 2.3.1.2 Multinational Integration** – The extent to which staffs of two or more forces, or agencies of two or more nations, have integrated their senior command and staff billets, information and intelligence, doctrine and procedures, logistics, and training.
Descriptors: Full (broadly based and fully interactive); Partial (lacks broad base or experience working together); Poor (not broadly based and has not worked together).
- C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise** – The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Descriptors: High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned); Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces); Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces).
- C 2.3.1.4 Pre-Existing Command** – The extent to which an existing command and staff headquarters structure exists.
Descriptors: No (ad hoc); Partial (pre-designated command organization, with at least some training of augmentees); Strong (existing and functioning).
- C 2.3.1.5 Command Authority** – Degree of authority and support of the commander of the force.
Descriptors: Combatant Command (COCOM); Operational Control (OPCON); Tactical Control (TACON).
- C 2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity** – The degree to which communications can be maintained up and down the chain of command and horizontally.

Descriptors: Continuous (operates with almost no interruptions); Intermittent (some interruptions will occur); Periodic (only operates periodically); Comm Out.

C 2.3.1.7 Classification – The highest level of information security at which a headquarters or force is operating.

Descriptors: Secret; Top Secret; Code Word; NATO Secret; NATO Cosmic Top Secret; Multinational Designated.

C 2.3.1.8 Information Exchange – The freedom with which information (e.g., intelligence and logistic data and operations plans) can be distributed or released within a staff or to operating units, to include among allies or coalition partners.

Descriptors: Unrestricted; Restricted; Highly restricted.

C 2.3.1.9 Information Volume – The volume of data or information generated or made available to decision makers.

Descriptors: High (>50 inputs per hour, often containing conflicting information); Moderate (20-50 inputs per hour, containing some conflicting information); Low (<20 inputs per hour, containing highly consistent information).

C 2.3.2 Military Style – The approach of a nation and its commanders to the conduct of military operations.

Descriptors: Predictable (closely follows doctrine, narrow, inflexible); Conventional; (range of capabilities, some flexibility); Innovative (adapts easily to changing circumstances).

C 2.3.2.1 Leadership Style – The approach of the commander to the exercise of command and handling of subordinates.

Descriptors: Autocratic; Bureaucratic; Participative; Mission Orders.

C 2.3.2.2 Force Emphasis – The special weight or importance placed by a nation in the specific characteristics or composition (e.g., land, sea, air) of its armed forces.

Descriptors: Nuclear; Nuclear triad; Balanced conventional; Land; Maritime; Air; Space; Unconventional.

C 2.3.2.3 Flexibility of Warfare Style – Extent to which a nation's armed forces can adapt to various styles of warfare (e.g., moving from conventional to unconventional warfare).

Descriptors: High; Moderate; Low.

C 2.3.2.4 Component Headquarters Location – The location of component command headquarters with relation to the joint force commander's headquarters.

Descriptors: Separate; Collocation of some; Collocation of all.

C 2.4 INTELLIGENCE—Related Conditions

C 2.4.1 Warning – The degree of certitude of warning received.
Descriptors: Unambiguous; Ambiguous.

C 2.4.2 Intelligence Data Base – The availability of intelligence to support a mission or task.
Descriptors: Abundant (multiple sources of current intelligence data on most or all targets); Adequate (at least one current source of intelligence on most targets); Marginal (intelligence data is neither current nor complete); Negligible (Little or no current intelligence on any targets).

C 2.4.3 Theater Intelligence Organization – The status of an intelligence collection, processing, and production organization within a theater or dedicated to the theater.
Descriptors: Mature; Growing; Immature.

C 2.4.4 Theater Intelligence Access – The ability of intelligence gathering resources to penetrate and cover the AOR.
Descriptors: Easy (easily penetrable); Minimally difficult (penetrable with minimal difficulty); Difficult (penetrable with major difficulty); Negligible (impenetrable).

C 2.4.5 Intelligence Countermeasure Capability – The ability of a nation to detect and counter intelligence gathering by an enemy.
Descriptors: Strong (thoroughly understand and control enemy sources); Moderate (partial understanding and control over enemy sources); Weak (little understanding or control over enemy sources).

C 2.4.6 Certitude of Data – The degree of confidence in the accuracy of intelligence data.
Descriptors: Absolute (100% confidence); High (>90%); Moderate (50-90%); Low (25-50% confidence); Little or No (<25% confidence).

C 2.5 DEPLOYMENT, MOVEMENT & MANEUVER—Related Conditions

C 2.5.1 LOC and Planning Status – Status of lines of communication and planning for deployment, movement, or maneuver.
Descriptors: Good (secure LOCs and planning well advanced); Poor (LOCs not secure or planning not well advanced); Bad (neither secure LOCs nor planning exists).

- C 2.5.1.1 TPFDD Availability** – Availability of time-phased force and deployment data needed to execute a deployment.
Descriptors: Full (planned and refined TPFDD exists); Partial (an applicable TPFDD has been in development); No (no planning has been conducted for this size force or this area).
- C 2.5.1.2 Deployment Lead Time** – The amount of time to travel from home station to arrival where the unit will be deployed.
Descriptors: Long (weeks to months); Moderate (days to weeks); Minimal (days).
- C 2.5.1.3 Intertheater LOCs** – Freedom of movement for forces and materiel between theaters.
Descriptors: Secure; Contested; Unsecured.
- C 2.5.1.4 Intratheater LOCs** – Freedom of movement for forces and materiel within a theater.
Descriptors: Secure; Contested; Unsecured.
- C 2.5.1.5 Entry Capability** – Extent to which a military force is capable of entering an area of operations unopposed or opposed.
Descriptors: Strongly Opposed; Moderately Opposed; Unopposed; Administrative.
- C 2.5.2 Lift Assets** – Adequacy of lift assets for moving and supporting forces.
Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.1 Airlift Assets** – Availability of airlift assets for deployment or employment of forces.
Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.2 Sealift Assets** – Availability of sealift assets for deployment or employment of forces.
Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.3 Ground Transportation Assets** – Availability of ground transportation assets to support deployment or employment of forces.

Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

C 2.5.2.4 Spacelift Assets – Availability of launch pads, vehicle assembly/staging areas, launch vehicles, and range facilities.

Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

C 2.5.2.5 Refueling Assets – Availability of refueling assets for deployment or employment.

Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

C 2.5.3 En Route Support – Availability of support needed to ensure the movement of forces. Includes refueling (or bunkering), arming, maintaining, troop support, and basing. For maritime movement, includes convoy escorts and naval covering forces.

Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

C 2.5.3.1 Intermediate Staging Bases – Availability of intermediate bases and ports for staging aircraft, ships, and troops for strategic deployment.

Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

C 2.5.3.2 Overflight/Passage Rights – Right to overfly national territory or national waters or to transit sovereign waters.

Descriptors: Granted (most direct route is available); Limited (fairly direct route is available); Restricted (best route is quite indirect).

C 2.5.3.3 En Route Supply – Availability of supply needed to ensure the movement of forces. Includes refueling (or bunkering), arming, maintaining, troop support, and basing.

Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

C 2.5.4 Reception and Onward Movement – Ability to support the delivery and disposition of units, equipment, and personnel arriving by intertheater or intratheater strategic lift.

Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

- C 2.5.4.1 Reception Facilities** – Extent to which facilities are available to allow off-load of ships or aircraft.
Descriptors: Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.4.1.1 Wharfage** – The amount of berthing space available to load or unload ships.
Descriptors: Generous (> two FSS size vessels); Moderate (one to two FSS size vessels); Little (< one FSS size vessel).
- C 2.5.4.1.2 Maximum on Ground (MOG)** – The maximum number of aircraft an airfield can accommodate at one time for unloading and loading, often presented in C-5A equivalents.
Descriptors: High (> 10); Medium (4 to 10); Low (1 to 3).
- C 2.5.4.1.3 Runway Length** – The length of usable runway.
Descriptors: Long (> 8200 ft); Commercial (5000 to 8200 ft); Short (3500 to 5000 ft); Very short (< 3500 ft).
- C 2.5.4.1.4 Runway Weight Bearing Capacity** – The weight bearing capacity of a runway or the larger airport surfaces.
Descriptors: Jumbo (C-5); Large (B-747); Medium (C-141, C-17); Low (C-130).
- C 2.5.4.2 Onward Movement Facilities** – Facilities available to marshal cargo and personnel and move them forward in the theater.
Descriptors: Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.
- C 2.5.4.2.1 Beddown Facilities** – Space available for handling materials and personnel from arriving ships and aircraft.
Descriptors: Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.
- C 2.5.4.2.2 Marshaling Facilities** – Facilities for assembling, holding, and organizing supplies and equipment, especially vehicles and transportation, for onward movement.
Descriptors: Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.
- C 2.5.4.2.3 Staging Area** – Location established for the concentration of units and transient personnel between movements.
Descriptors: Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.
- C 2.6 FIREPOWER—Related Conditions.**

- C 2.6.1 Degree of Dispersion** – The degree to which forces or facilities are concentrated in one area or conform to linear formations or lines, e.g., FLOT, FEBA, or naval battle group formations.
Descriptors: High (a dispersed battlefield with no force concentrations and no major sustainment or logistic concentrations or chokepoints); Moderate (forces are attempting to maintain a fluid situation and large concentrations of sustainment and logistic chokepoints are avoided); Low (front lines consisting of trenches and other fortifications or massed groupings behind the FEBA).
- C 2.6.2 Degree of Camouflage** – The degree to which forces, units, items of equipment, or personnel are hidden from visual, electronic, or other forms of detection.
Descriptors: High (widespread and effective); Moderate (neither widespread nor highly effective); Low.
- C 2.6.3 Target Hardness** – The degree to which a target or set of targets has been protected against firepower attacks.
Descriptors: Super (buried to great depth and otherwise protected, e.g., DPRK HARTS); Heavy (reinforced construction, usually with added protection, such as rock rubble); Sheltered (e.g., hangerette); Unprotected.
- C 2.6.4 Preplanned Targets** – The degree to which initial fires have been preplanned, particularly in peacetime.
Descriptors: Fully (initial targeting complete and current); Partially (initially targeting either incomplete or dated); No.
- C 2.6.5 Target Mobility** – The ability of a potential target to relocate.
Descriptors: High (dwell time in minutes, can quickly relocate upon detection or taking a combat action); Good (can move < 30 minutes); Limited (can move < 90 minutes); Very limited (several hours to tear down and erect); No (fixed site).
- C 2.6.6 Target Range** – The range of a target from an attacking system or unit.
Descriptors: Greater than 1500 NM; Between 1000-1500 NM; Between 500-1000 NM; Between 250-500 NM; Between 50-250 NM; Between 30-100 km; Between 10-30 km; Between 3-10 km; Between 1-3 km; Between 0.3-1 km; Less than 0.3 km.
- C 2.6.7 Collateral Damage Potential** – The degree to which the civilian population and structures (e.g., homes, hospitals, schools) are close to targets, and therefore at risk from attacks.

Descriptors: High (civilian structures are in close proximity to military targets); Moderate (there is some separation between civilian structures and military targets); Low (military targets are well separated from civilian population centers).

C 2.6.8 Target Thermal Contrast – The temperature differential between background areas and targets.

Descriptors: High (greater than 10°C); Moderate (2°C to 10°C); Little or No (< 2°C).

C 2.7 PROTECTION—Related Conditions.

C 2.7.1 Rear Area/Local Security – The extent to which the rear area or local area is secure.

Descriptors: High; Moderate; Limited.

C 2.7.2 Air Superiority – The extent to which operations in the air, over sea or, and over land can be conducted with acceptable losses due to hostile air forces and air defense systems action.

Descriptors: Full (Air Supremacy); General; Local; No.

C 2.7.3 Space Control – The ability to conduct operations in the air, land, sea, and space with acceptable losses due to hostile space action.

Descriptors: Full; Partial; No.

C 2.7.3.1 Space Platforms – The number of space platforms that are available for the specific AOR.

Descriptors: Abundant (> 100% required platforms); Sufficient (> 90% required platforms); Limited (20 to 75% required platforms); Severely limited (< 20% required platforms); No.

C 2.7.3.2 Space Platforms (Availability) – The percentage of available time space platforms that can be used over the AOR. Time can be limited due to operational procedures, general ephemeris conditions, or sun angle (too high or eclipse).

Descriptors: High (> 90 %); Moderate (60 to 90 %); Low (< 60 %).

C 2.7.3.3 Space Platforms (Linkability) – The method required to link the AOR commanders to the space platforms.

Descriptors: Complex (never been attempted before); Defined (design on paper); Proven (fully operational).

- C 2.7.4 Maritime Superiority** – The extent to which operations on, over, or under the sea can be conducted with acceptable losses due to hostile military naval actions.
Descriptors: Full; Local; No.
- C 2.7.5 Ground Superiority** – The extent to which operations on or over land can be conducted with acceptable losses due to hostile military ground actions.
Descriptors: Full; Local; No.
- C 2.8 SUSTAINMENT—Related Conditions.**
- C 2.8.1 Sustainment Facilities** – Those grounds, buildings, and equipment available to provide and support sustainment of the force.
Descriptors: Abundant; Adequate; Limited; No.
- C 2.8.2 Deployed Supplies** – The number of days of supply available to forces in a military operation.
Descriptors: Abundant (> 90 days); Sufficient (30 to 90 days); Limited (10 to 30 days); Short (3 to 10 days); Negligible (< 3 days).
- C 2.8.3 CONUS Resupply** – The adequacy of national level production and supply stocks and theater priority, which allows the theater to draw sustainment from out of the theater.
Descriptors: Adequate (no impact on defensive or offensive operations due to lack of long-term logistic support); Sufficient (no impact on defensive operations due to lack of long-term logistic support); Limited (defensive operations must be tailored to accommodate limits on logistic support); Negligible (deferred theater).
- C 2.8.4 Pre-positioned Materiel** – Equipment or supplies pre-positioned at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location.
Descriptors: Extensive (can equip most ground forces and provide fuel and ammunition for air and naval forces apportioned); Limited (can equip and support early arriving forces, e.g., DFMs); No.
- C 2.8.5 Host Nation Support (HNS)** – The extent of civil and military assistance provided by a host nation to foreign forces within its territory.
Descriptors: Extensive (includes engineering, security, and medical services, which reduce equivalent deployment requirements by > 50%); Moderate (includes engineering, security, and medical services, which reduce equivalent deployment requirements by 15 to 50%); Limited (includes engineering, security, and medical services, which reduce equivalent deployment requirements by < 15%); No.
- C 2.8.6 Commercial Procurement** – The extent to which materiel and services can be procured from the local economy in theater.

Descriptors: Fully available (> 90% of items normally available in the US); Extensive (50 to 90% of items normally available in the US); Limited (15 to 50% of items available in the US); Negligible (< 15% of items available in the US).

C 2.9 THREAT—Related Conditions.

C 2.9.1 Threat – Seriousness of threat to the nation.

Descriptors: Extreme (national survival); Grave (national interest); Very serious (treaty commitment); Serious (UN Resolution).

C 2.9.2 Threat Form – Types of potential aggression.

Descriptors: Conventional; Unconventional (guerrilla warfare); Nuclear; Chemical; Biological; Terrorist; Economic.

C 2.9.3 Threat Existence – The perceived potential for aggression or harm to a nation, government, or its instrumentalities.

Descriptors: Acknowledged (threat is understood); Unacknowledged (threat is neither understood nor accepted as genuine).

C 2.9.4 Threat Posture – The timing of potential aggression against friendly forces.

Descriptors: Imminent (overt attack has begun); Ready (preparations for immediate attack completed); Near-term (preparations for immediate attack noted); Long-term (long-term indicators noted).

C 2.9.5 Threat Size – The relative size of the potential aggressor to friendly forces.

Descriptors: Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly assets); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly assets); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly assets); Low (less enemy than friendly assets).

C 2.9.5.1 Threat Land Force Size – The relative size of land forces of the potential aggressor to friendly land forces.

Descriptors: Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly land forces); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly land forces); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly land forces); Low (less enemy than friendly land forces).

C 2.9.5.2 Threat Naval Force Size – The relative size of naval forces of the potential aggressor to friendly naval forces.

Descriptors: Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly naval forces); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly naval forces); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly naval forces); Low (less enemy than friendly naval forces).

- C 2.9.5.3 Threat Air Force Size** – The relative size of air forces of the potential aggressor to friendly air forces.
Descriptors: Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly air forces); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly air forces); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly air forces); Low (less enemy than friendly air forces).
- C 2.9.6 Threat Disposition** – The location of forces belonging to a potential aggressor.
Descriptors: Full (fully positioned for attack); Partial (partially positioned for attack); Little or No (not positioned to initiate attack).

Conditions of the Civil Environment

This section includes factors related to a people, their government, politics, culture, and economy that impact military operations. Figure 3-4 shows the organization of civil conditions, to include the major subcategories of: political policies, culture, and economy.




Figure 3-4. Conditions of the Civil Environment

- C 3.0** **Civil Environment** – Those factors related to a people, their government, politics, culture, and economy that impact military operations.
- C 3.1** **Political Policies** – Those factors that derive from the people, their national government, and international and non-government organizations that support or oppose military action.
Descriptors: Fully supportive; Mixed support; Neutral; Opposed.

- C 3.1.1 Domestic Political Support** – Support of the people and government in the region (excluding National Command Authorities) for military actions.
Descriptors: Full; Limited; Negative.
- C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support** – Public support for the actions of their government.
Descriptors: Full (large majority of citizens in support); Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations); Negative (Public opinion in opposition).
- C 3.1.1.2 Congressional Support** – Legislative Branch support of the Executive Branch or NCA.
Descriptors: Full (resolution passed; non-partisan support); Limited (resolution passed with restrictions); Negative (resolution rejected).
- C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships** – Extent to which Executive Branch of government agencies work together toward articulated goals.
Descriptors: Strong (fully cooperative); Correct (partially cooperative); Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another).
- C 3.1.1.4 Legality** – The extent to which an act or action is in accordance with domestic or international law.
Descriptors: Full; Disputed (ambiguous); Condemned (clearly violates laws).
- C 3.1.1.5 Press Relations** – The rapport between the military and the press, and the attitude of the press toward particular military activities.
Descriptors: Mutually supportive; Cooperative; Strained; Adversarial.
- C 3.1.2 International Politics** – Those political factors, independent of one's own government, which impact the commander's freedom of action.
Descriptors: Supportive; Indifferent; Opposed (unilateral action).
- C 3.1.2.1 Major Power Involvement** – The existence of major power interests with regard to a region or military operation and the ability and willingness of a particular major power to act on those interests.
Descriptors: Active (major power has interests and may be willing to act); Limited (major power has interests but is not inclined to act); No (lack of major power interest).
- C 3.1.2.2 Foreign Government Stability** – The degree to which governments in a region remain in power and are consistent in their policies.
Descriptors: High (solid); Moderate (fluctuating); Low (unpredictable).

- C 3.1.2.3 Foreign Government Support** – The willingness of a foreign government to support military actions of another nation.
Descriptors: Complete; Diplomatic; Limited; Negative.
- C 3.1.2.4 Foreign Public Opinion** – The expressed attitude of foreign publics toward a military operation.
Descriptors: Supportive; Indifferent; Moderately opposed; Aggressively opposed.
- C 3.1.2.5 International Organization Support** – The extent to which supra-national organizations (non-governmental organizations) support military actions.
Descriptors: Fostering; Limited; Uncertain; No.
- C 3.1.2.6 Multinational Business Support** – The extent to which multinational business organizations support military actions (e.g., oil companies).
Descriptors: Fostering; Limited; Uncertain; No.
- C 3.1.3 NCA Decisions** – Decisions taken by the NCA with regard to national security policy and strategy.
Descriptors: Clear and unrestrictive; Vague; Restrictive.
- C 3.1.3.1 Number of Crises** – The number of crises (MRC or LRC) being addressed by the NCA and the NSC.
Descriptors: Large (> two); Moderate (two); Small (only one).
- C 3.1.3.2 Mission Priority** – The relative priority of the mission being performed.
Descriptors: High (higher than other current missions); Moderate (comparable priority with other current missions); Low (lower than other current missions).
- C 3.1.3.3 Mobilization Level** – The extent of mobilization by a nation.
Descriptors: Selective Callup; US Secretarial Callup; US Selective Reserve Callup; Partial; Full; Total.
- C 3.1.3.3.1 Force Level** – The size of mobilization required.
Descriptors: Total (all Reserve component forces plus draft); Full (major force buildup); Partial (major support units required); Limited (augmentation by Reserve component personnel or units required).
- C 3.1.3.3.2 Draft** – Compulsory military service.
Descriptors: No; Partial; All males; Full.
- C 3.1.3.3.3 Mobilization Facilities** – Those grounds, buildings, and equipment available to train or retrain an expanding active duty force.
Descriptors: Abundant; Adequate; Limited; No.

- C 3.1.3.4 Restraints on Action** – The limitations on a commander's freedom of action attendant to an NCA-assigned mission.
Descriptors: Severe (impedes mission accomplishment); Moderate (alternate COAs can accommodate); No.
- C 3.2 Culture** – Those aspects of a people that relate to their language, customs, economics, religion, and character.
Descriptors: Western; Non-Western.
- C 3.2.1 Language** – The spoken and written means of communication.
Descriptors: Primarily English; English as secondary; Other.
- C 3.2.1.1 Language Translation** – The types of translations to be performed during the mission, including weaponeering, engineering, intelligence, POW interrogation, and staff coordination.
Descriptors: Diplomatic/political (Level 3/4/5); Technical (Level 3+); Social (Level 2+).
- C 3.2.1.2 Language Translators** – The number and type of translators to be used during the mission, including those for weaponeering, engineering, intelligence, POW interrogation, and staff coordination.
Descriptors: Numerous (> 50 Level 3+); Many (10 to 50 Level 3+); Few (< 10 Level 2/3); Negligible (in-house capability).
- C 3.2.2 Customs Adjustment** – Customs within a nation or an area that may require accommodation.
Descriptors: Significant; Minor; No.
- C 3.2.2.1 Societal Openness** – The degree to which the population of a nation or an area is open to the presence of people from different nations or cultural backgrounds.
Descriptors: Limited (very hard to penetrate); Moderate; High (easy to penetrate).
- C 3.2.2.2 Legal Penalties** – The seriousness of legal or religious penalties, in a foreign nation, associated with acts that violate cultural or legal norms.
Descriptors: Low; Moderate; High.
- C 3.2.2.3 Law Source** – The basis for current laws and justice (see C 3.2.2.2, Legal Penalties).
Descriptors: Koran; English Common Law; Napoleonic Code.
- C 3.2.3 Religious Beliefs** – Strength of adherence to religion, the impact on behavior, and the degree of domination over the life of a nation.
Descriptors: Strong; Moderate; Indifferent.

- C 3.2.3.1 Religious Unity** – Degree of religious unity within a nation.
Descriptors: Strong (monolithic); Moderate (stratified); Low (fragmented).
- C 3.2.3.2 Religious Militancy** – The degree to which a religious group believes it can or should impose its views on others, internally or externally, by force of arms, if necessary.
Descriptors: Significant (pursues internal domination and exports beliefs by force); Moderate (politically active internally and exports beliefs by missionary activity); Limited (disinclined to impose religious views externally); No.
- C 3.2.3.3 Religion-State Relationship** – The extent to which a given religion influences the civil government of a nation.
Descriptors: Dominant (theocracy); Strong (guides civil law); Limited (influences civil law); No.
- C 3.2.4 Significant Cultural Sites** – Restrictions on actions due to the existence of particular sites held by certain cultures or religions to be sacred places or national treasures.
Descriptors: Presence of internationally; Presence of locally; No.
- C 3.2.5 Cultural Unity** – The extent to which a country is free from serious ethnic, cultural, and language divisions.
Descriptors: High (unified); Moderate (few divisions, causing minor problems); Low (serious divisions; causes internal conflict).
- C 3.2.6 National Character** – Perceived behavior of the populace in a nation or an area.
Descriptors: Open and adaptable; Careful and moderate; Closed and rigid.
- C 3.2.6.1 National Discipline** – The historically-based perception of a nationality's response to the direction and will of their central government.
Descriptors: High (blind adherence); Moderate (willing conformance); Limited (questioning acceptance); Low (rebellious nonconformance).
- C 3.2.6.2 National Aggressiveness** – Tendency to use national power to achieve goals.
Descriptors: High; Moderate; Low.
- C 3.2.6.3 Nationalism** – Belief that the good of the nation is paramount.
Descriptors: High; Moderate; Low.
- C 3.2.6.4 Ethnocentrism** – Degree of emphasis on a particular ethnic grouping or background.
Descriptors: High; Moderate; Low.

- C 3.2.6.5 Internationalism** – Degree of involvement in international organizations, even to the extent of granting some degree of sovereignty to such an international organization.
Descriptors: Strong (supports supra-national approaches); Moderate (cooperates with international organizations); Low (resists involvement of international organizations); Anti- (actively opposes supra-national approaches).
- C 3.3 Economy** – Those factors that provide a nation with the manpower, materiel, and money to allow it to play a role on the military stage and shape that role.
Descriptors: Knowledge-based, post industrial (Third Wave); Industrial (Second Wave); Agrarian (First Wave).
- C 3.3.1 Population** – The population of a nation or region based on the estimates from the Bureau of the Census.
Descriptors: Very large (> 150 million); Large (75 to 150 million); Medium (30 to 75 million); Small (5 to 30 million); Very small (< 5 million).
- C 3.3.1.1 Size of Military** – The number of people in a nation or region who are currently under arms, or who are trained and available for military service.
Descriptors: Very large (> 5 million); Large (2 to 5 million); Medium (500,000 to 2 million); Small (200,000 to 500,000); Very small (< 200,000).
- C 3.3.1.2 Population Growth Rate** – The annual change in a nation's population due to birth rates, migration, etc.
Descriptors: Exploding (> 2%); Positive (.5 to 2%); Stable (.5 to -.5%); Declining (< -.5%).
- C 3.3.1.3 Educated Population** – The general level of education of the people of a nation. Ranked here by average literacy level, however, it is also reflected by (1) total secondary schools, technical schools, and university graduates per 100,000 population; and (2) total schools and universities per 100,000 population.
Descriptors: Highly (> 90%); Moderately (60 to 89%); Poorly (< 59%).
- C 3.3.1.4 Civil Health** – The physical and medical condition of a people, ranked here by only one indicator, life expectancy at birth.
Descriptors: Robust (> 70 years); Good (61 to 69 years); Fair (55 to 60 years); Poor (< 55 years).
- C 3.3.1.5 Health Risk** – Disease presence and conditions favorable to disease transmission.
Descriptors: Low; Moderate; High.

- C 3.3.1.6 Civil Unrest** – The level of dissension within a nation or region as reflected by acts of civil disobedience or demonstrations against government or government policies.
Descriptors: Extensive (weekly incidents); Moderate (quarterly incidents); Little (annual incidents).
- C 3.3.2 Refugee Impact** – Impact of need for humane treatment of refugees and displaced persons on military operations.
Descriptors: Severe (highly disruptive); Moderate (minor impacts); Negligible.
- C 3.3.2.1 Refugee Type** – The principal reason for population dislocation or migration.
Descriptors: Political; Economic; Religious; War.
- C 3.3.2.2 Refugee Congestion** – Degree of disruption of main supply routes, avenues of approach, and LOCs.
Descriptors: Severe (stoppages, prolonged slowdowns); Moderate (speed reduced significantly); Negligible.
- C 3.3.2.3 Refugee Care Responsibility** – Requirement to provide basic shelter, security, health, sanitation, and nutrition for refugees.
Descriptors: Significant (drain on forces); Moderate (some services provided by other groups); No.
- C 3.3.2.4 Refugee Relocation Effort** – Degree of effort expended by the military force to place refugees back in their original homes or cities.
Descriptors: Significant (drain on forces); Moderate (performed by other groups); No.
- C 3.3.3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)** – The value of all goods and services produced domestically, measured in US dollars.
Descriptors: Very large (> 1000 billion); Large (500 to 1000 billion); Medium (100 to 500 billion); Small (30 to 100 billion); Very small (< 30 billion).
- C 3.3.4 International Economic Position** – The relative economic standing of a nation or region.
Descriptors: Powerful (G-7+); Strong (post-industrial); Moderate (industrial); Low (newly industrialized); Poor (pre-industrial).
- C 3.3.4.1 Economic Self-Sufficiency** – The ability of a nation to sustain itself without support from other nations. It is not only the amount of imports to exports, but also the dependence on the import of a particular product—and the uniqueness of that product—that can make a nation vulnerable.

Descriptors: High (self-sufficient); Moderate (dependent on other nations for few goods); Low (dependent on other nations for critical items).

C 3.3.4.1.1 Self-Sufficiency in Food – Amount of food consumption produced locally.

Descriptors: High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

C 3.3.4.1.2 Self-Sufficiency in Fuel – Amount of fuel consumption produced locally.

Descriptors: High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

C 3.3.4.1.3 Self-Sufficiency in Raw Materials – Amount of raw materials (needed for finished goods consumption) produced locally.

Descriptors: High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

C 3.3.4.1.4 Self-Sufficiency in Finished Goods – Amount of finished goods (needed for local economy) produced locally.

Descriptors: High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

C 3.3.4.1.5 Self-Sufficiency in Machinery – Amount of machinery (needed for local economy) produced locally.

Descriptors: High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

C 3.3.4.2 Fiscal Position – The availability of currency and reserves to support military action.

Descriptors: Strong; Adequate; Weak.

C 3.3.4.3 Infrastructure Dependence – The degree of infrastructure (roads, shipping/fishing fleet, railroads, pipelines, communications, etc.) required to sustain the economy.

Descriptors: Low (excess infrastructure capacity or low economic needs required to sustain economy); Moderate (economy capable of withstanding some loss of infrastructure); High (full infrastructure required to sustain basic economy).

C 3.3.5 Industry – The general ability of a nation to produce materiel for warfighting.

Descriptors: Highly developed; Moderately developed (produces some materiel that supports military operations); Limited (depends heavily on imports).

C 3.3.5.1 Industrialization – The extent of industrialization, measured as percent of GDP.

Descriptors: Heavy (> 30% GDP); Moderate (20 to 30% GDP); Limited (5 to 20% GDP); Low (< 5% GDP).

C 3.3.5.2 Industrial Growth Rate – Annualized rate of growth in industrial production.

Descriptors: High (> +4%); Moderate (2 to 4%); Low (0 to 2%); Declining (0 to -4%); Dangerously declining (any continuous decline).

- C 3.3.5.3 Electrical Production** – Electrical generation capacity per capita.
Descriptors: High (> 4000 kWh); Moderate (1000 - 4000 kWh); Low (< 1000 kWh).
- C 3.3.5.4 Armaments Production Capacity** – Annual armaments production capacity.
Descriptors: Limited; Significant (multiple areas); Extensive (nearly self-sustaining).
- C 3.3.6 National Potential** – A nation's ability to expand its economy and thus its warmaking potential.
Descriptors: Large (ability to rapidly convert industry to defense); Moderate (ability, over time, to convert industry to defense); Limited (little or no ability for conversion to defense).
- C 3.3.6.1 Transportation Infrastructure** – Number of railroads, highways, inland waterways, pipelines, sea and air ports, merchant marine ships, and telecommunication stations.
Descriptors: Extensive; Moderate; Limited.
- C 3.3.6.2 Telecommunications Infrastructure** – Extent of national capability for transmission, emission, or reception of signals, writings, images, sounds, or information by wire, radio, visual, or any other means.
Descriptors: Extensive (strong, modern capability); Moderate (significant infrastructure, but not modern); Limited.
- C 3.3.6.3 Available Capital** – A nation's available capital, including capital markets (banks, pension funds), capital goods (manufactured products used to produce other goods), and capital formation.
Descriptors: Abundant (unlimited); Ample; Modest; Meager (unavailable internally).
- C 3.3.7 Science and Technology** – The level of effort and ability of a nation to develop and exploit science and technology.
Descriptors: Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.
- C 3.3.7.1 Basic Research** – The amount of a nation's intellectual resources applied to basic research.
Descriptors: Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.
- C 3.3.7.2 Research Application (Military)** – A nation's ability to turn basic research into (militarily) useful products.
Descriptors: Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.

C 3.3.7.3 High Technology Production – A nation's ability to mass-produce high-technology products.

Descriptors: Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.

C 3.3.7.4 Information Management – A nation's ability to collect and process information.

Descriptors: Extensive (fully integrated and networked); Good (partially integrated and networked); Fair (poorly integrated, but with access to Internet); Poor (limited distributed-computer network).

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This CJCSM is designed as an interoperability tool for use by joint force commanders to communicate their mission requirements. It serves as a common language and reference system for joint force commanders, operational planners, combat developers, and trainers. It can also be useful to analysts and planners for understanding and integrating joint operations. As applied to joint training, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) is a key element of the requirements-based, "mission-to-task" joint training system (See Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States (CJCSI 3500.01)). In this system, commanders examine their mission and document their command warfighting requirements in a Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL).

2. Universal Joint Task List. The UJTL contains a comprehensive hierarchical listing of the tasks that can be performed by a joint military force. The UJTL also contains a common language of conditions that is used to describe the operational context in which tasks are performed. Finally, the UJTL contains a menu of measures of performance for each UJTL task. These measures are used to develop standards of performance consistent with mission requirements. The UJTL does not address how a task is performed (found in Joint doctrine), or "who performs the task" (found in the concept of operations). The UJTL does identify "what" is to be performed in terms common to multiple combatant commands and joint force components.

3. JMETL Development Process. A commander develops a JMETL based on assigned missions. The JMETL Handbook and the Joint Training Manual (CJCSM 3500.03) describes the JMETL development process (see Figure 1-1). Combatant commanders are assigned missions based on their geographic areas of responsibility or on their functional capabilities. The missions are assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), NCA taskings, or treaty obligations in accordance with the principles and procedures found in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Through careful analysis of assigned missions, the combatant commander will develop a concept of the operation and identify a set of mission-based required capabilities. Required capabilities are expressed in terms of the essential tasks to be performed, the conditions under which these tasks are performed, and the standards to which these tasks must be performed. This CJCSM supports the JMETL development process.




Figure 1-1 JMETL Development Process

4. Joint Tasks. Joint tasks describe in broad terms the current and potential capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States. Joint tasks are those assigned by joint force commanders to be performed by joint staffs and integrated Service components. This CJCSM provides an overall description of joint tasks that can be applied at multiple levels of command, i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical (each military Service publishes its own tactical task list to supplement the UJTL). Joint forces or Service components may perform tasks at the national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A detailed description of each of these tasks is provided in dictionary form. The tasks contained in the UJTL, when associated with mission-derived conditions and standards, describes a required capability but do not describe the means to fulfill that requirement.

5. Conditions. Conditions are variables of the environment that affect the performance of tasks. Some conditions are designed to help describe the theater of operations (e.g., host nation support), others describe the immediate joint operational area (e.g., maritime superiority), while still others describe the battlefield conditions (e.g., littoral composition). When linked to joint tasks, conditions help frame the difference or similarities between assigned missions.

6. Measures of Performance. Measures of performance provide a way of describing how well (i.e., the standard) a joint organization or force must perform a joint task under a specific set of conditions. Measures are used by the joint force commander to establish task standards based on mission requirements. These standards, when linked to conditions, provide a basis for planning, conducting, and evaluating training events.

7. Joint Training System. The Joint Training Master Plan (CJCSI 3500.02A) and the Joint Training Manual (CJCSM 3500.03) describe how a command's JMETL supports the joint training system. A command's JMETL provides the basis from which training objectives for command training events are derived. It is also the basis for the commander's assessment of command training events. Observations collected during joint training events are keyed to a command's JMETL and UJTL structure. In this system, a command's JMETL provides traceability from the training events to the mission-based capability requirements they are designed to support. This system applies to USACOM training of CONUS-based forces that may be assigned to support other combatant commands. This system also applies to Service components that develop Service component METL to describe their interoperability requirements for combatant commanders and to Defense agencies that develop agency METL to describe their support requirements to combatant commanders.

8. Definition of Terms. In applying the UJTL to the requirements-based joint training process, a number of basic terms apply. Definitions of these terms are shown in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. Definition of Terms

Term	Definition
Mission	The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor.
Essential	Absolutely necessary; indispensable; critical.
Task	A discrete event or action, not specific to a single unit, weapon system, or individual that enables a mission or function to be accomplished.
Condition	A variable of the operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect performance.
Standard	The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a particular task under a specified set of conditions. Standards are established by a joint force commander.
Joint Mission Essential Task (JMET)	A task selected by a joint force commander from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) deemed essential to mission accomplishment.
Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)	A list of joint tasks considered essential to the accomplishment of assigned or anticipated missions. A JMETL includes associated conditions and standards and may identify command-linked and supporting tasks.
Supporting Task	Specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of a joint mission essential task. Supporting tasks are accomplished at the same command level or by subordinate elements of a joint force (i.e., joint staff, functional components, etc.).
Command-Linked Tasks	Tasks that depict the seams between supported and supporting commands. Command-linked tasks are key to the accomplishment of command or agency JMETs.

9. Applicability to Other Processes. The UJTL and JMETL structures have applicability beyond the Joint Training System. The UJTL and JMETL structure can be used to focus requirements for joint simulations (i.e., JSIMS). JMETL assessments can assist in the joint monthly readiness review (JMRR) process. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCA) can be indexed to multicommand JMETL assessments that indicate long-term, systemic issues than can be addressed in terms of doctrinal, training, organizational, or materiel improvements. Plans for a future Joint Automated Readiness System (JARS) can use inputs from the JMETL-based Joint Training System. Finally, institutions providing joint professional military education (JPME) cross-reference learning objectives to the UJTL tasks to better align the joint training and education systems.

10. Updates to the UJTL. The military operates in a dynamic environment of changing resources, doctrine, technology, and threats. As a result, it is important that this manual be updated periodically. Such updates will draw heavily from experienced users in the field. Only in this way will the UJTL maintain its utility to these users. Updates to this manual should be developed using the applicable guidance in sections 2, 3, and 4. Updates should be forwarded to the Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division, Fenwick Rd., Building 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651.

SECTION 4

MEASURES FOR JOINT TASKS

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

MEASURES FOR JOINT TASKS

1. Introduction. This section contains measures of performance for every task contained in the UJTL. The CINCs and their staffs will use these measures to establish standards of performance based on their assigned missions. These measures are a common language and reference system for joint force commanders, operations planners, and trainers. They are also useful to analysts and planners for understanding and integrating joint operations. The link between planners and trainers should ensure that forces truly train the way they will fight.

2. Definition of Standards. A standard provides a way of expressing the degree to which a joint organization or force must perform a joint task under a specified set of conditions. A standard consists of one or more measures for a task and a criterion for each measure. The terms "measure" and "criterion" are defined below.

a. A measure provides the basis for describing varying levels of joint task performance. A measure is directly related to a task. For example, take the task, OP 5.1.1, *Communicate Operational Information*, which refers to the sending and receiving of information from one unit or organization to another by any means. Measures of performance for this task include the speed with which information is transmitted (queuing time for message transmission) and the accuracy of communications (percent of messages sent to the right addresses with the right content).

b. The second parameter of a standard is the "criterion". A criterion defines acceptable levels of performance. It is often expressed as a minimum acceptable level of performance. The combination of the measure and the criterion comprise the standard for a task.

3. Setting Standards. The standard for a joint task is set within the framework of the combatant commander's mission and in the context of the conditions that are linked to those missions. Thus, the standard(s) for a joint task can only be set when (1) the mission analysis is complete, (2) the linked conditions have been identified and described, and (3) measures have been selected that reflect the task contribution to mission accomplishment. This means that standards are tied to missions. That is, just because a joint task has a particular standard on one mission does not mean that the same standard will apply to other missions. A task standard could be the same across missions, but it could also be different for each mission.

a. Each joint task can have a standard using one or more measures. A standard can be set using any measure(s) that apply to a task. In some situations, one measure may be sufficient. However, in most situations, a commander may have to specify a standard using more than one measure to fully define a required level of performance.

For example, in specifying a standard for engaging enemy targets (OP 3.2.6, *Provide Firepower in Support of Operational Maneuver*), under the condition of overwhelming threat land forces (C 2.9.6.1), measures for both the time to engage (M1, Minutes to complete

attack after target identification) and the accuracy of the engagement (M4, Percent of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded) may be needed to fully define a required level of performance. The resulting tasks, conditions, and standards will comprise the joint mission capability requirements for a combatant commander.

b. A standard for a single joint task does not normally have to be met by a single joint force component. In many cases in joint operations, several elements of the force (system types, component commands, coalition members) will be assigned responsibility for a joint task. Therefore, the assessment of performance will often reflect the aggregated capabilities of multiple force elements.

c. Joint task standards reflect the combatant commander's understanding of required capabilities based on his assigned missions (and the associated concept of operations) and the conditions likely to be experienced in carrying out that mission. Joint task standards also should be established with cognizance of friendly force capabilities (i.e., do not expect a division to be as capable as a corps, a single ship to be as effective as a carrier battle group).

d. Joint task standards should be traceable across levels of command. A commander who has established task standards based on an analysis of assigned missions must assume some level of performance for organizations performing command-linked and supporting tasks. For example, in a strategic deployment mission, assume that a functional combatant commander establishes a standard for moving forces to the theater (SN 1.2.5, *Move Forces from POE to POD*). To perform this task successfully, a geographic combatant commander must meet a performance standard on a command-linked task (ST 7.1.4, *Determine Forces and Cargo to be Deployed*). Also, a component command of the functional combatant command must meet a performance standard on a supporting task (SN 1.2.7, *Coordinate Global Strategic Refueling*). As a result, when each of these commands establishes its joint task standards for a mission, it must be aware of the relationship between its own task performance and that of the command(s) with whom it operates.

4. Development of Measures. Measures were developed using the guidelines in this paragraph. These guidelines should be used to develop proposed changes to UJTL measures.

a. Measure should reflect understanding of task. Carefully read the task definition to understand the scope of the task and what activities it comprises.

b. Measure should reflect how task contributes to mission success. Measures are selected to establish standards based on the context of a mission. The mission establishes the requirement to perform a task, provides the context for task performance (including the conditions under which a task must be performed), determines where a task is performed (one or more locations), determines when a task must be performed, determines the degree to which a task must be performed (implied in the concept of the operation), and provides a way to understand precisely how the performance of a task contributes to mission success.

c. Measures should be sensitive to the impact of conditions on task performance. Examining conditions that can impair task performance during a mission can provide clues as to the key dimensions of performance that should be measured. For example, if the primary targets of intelligence collection are fixed sites (i.e., condition of target mobility), the currency of intelligence data would not seem to be a critical aspect of performance on the other hand, if the targets at which intelligence collection is aimed are highly mobile, the currency of the collected intelligence data would seem to be a key measure of performance.

d. Measures should reflect key dimensions of task performance. Every task has multiple dimensions of performance that can be measured. At a minimum, most tasks can be measured in terms of the time required to initiate or to complete a task (i.e., response time), the rate at which progress is being made (e.g., rate of movement), an overall level of completion or success (e.g., percent of targets correctly identified, hit rate), size of deviation (e.g., proximity of fires to target), in terms of power (e.g., engagement range), lethality (e.g., rate of kills given a hit), or success (e.g., percent of messages accurately transmitted). Measures should not simply indicate a level of activity (e.g., sortie rate as measure of air interdiction), but must reflect varying levels of real success in task performance.

e. Measures should be developed that distinguish among multiple levels of performance. Good measures distinguish among multiple levels of performance (as opposed to a go/no go measure). This can be accomplished most easily using either an absolute numerical scale (e.g., applicable to number, time, or distance) or a relative scale (e.g., proportion of number, time, or distance).

f. Measures should focus on the outputs or results of performance rather than on the process. In identifying dimensions of task performance, focus on the outputs or results of performance as opposed to either the inputs/resources applied (e.g., the number of aircraft involved in conducting air interdiction) or the process followed (e.g., number or percentage of substeps performed correctly or in the correct sequence). The dimensions of task performance should not be peculiar to a specific means for performing task; rather, they should apply to all means that can be employed to perform task.

g. Maximize use of context independent measures. Performance measures that are highly context-dependent require detailed information on the mission/scenario to interpret a performance outcome. While no measure is completely independent of its mission context, there is wide variability among measures in this regard. Measures of the time it takes to perform a task (like collect intelligence on targets) are fairly context independent. Measures of rate (like the rate of movement of ships from one location to another) can also be fairly context independent. On the other hand, a measure of the percent of forces deployed by D-Day requires knowledge of the mission or scenario timeline to fully understand the level of performance involved.

h. Take advantage of the strengths of both absolute and relative scales. Absolute scales are those that, beginning from a start point (usually zero), measure the number of occurrences, the amount of time, or the movement across distance. The advantage of absolute scales is

that the result or output is clearly specified. The disadvantage is the lack of information about the adequacy of any particular value (from simply looking at the measure) on the absolute scale. Relative scales are those that compare a particular value to the total and are often expressed as a proportion or percentage (e.g., percent complete). The advantage of relative measures is that they clearly indicate the degree of completion of a task. The main disadvantage is that such measures do not indicate the size or scope of effort on the task.

i. Keep measures simple. A simple measure requires only a single measurement (e.g., hours to develop an operations order). These measures may be the easiest for operators to understand. A more complex measure might involve a ratio (e.g., ratio of enemy targets destroyed to friendly losses). Such complex measures, while attempting to be more meaningful, actually tend to reflect contributions of more than one task (e.g., number of targets destroyed is related to engaging enemy targets while friendly losses is related to protecting friendly forces and systems).

j. Take advantage of existing task performance data. If two task performance measures are similar in other respects, always pick the one for which performance data is readily available.

5. Organization of Measures. The measures for each UJTL task are listed under that task and are numbered sequentially beginning with M1, M2, etc. Some tasks may have only a few measures while others may have ten or more.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL TASK MEASURES

SN 1 Conduct Strategic Deployment And Redeployment

M1	Percent	Of sealifted units close by LAD.
M2	Percent	Of TPFDD airlifted units close by LAD.
M3	Percent	Of units close by LAD.
M4	Percent	Of sustainment movement requirements met by available sealift (during execution).

SN 1.1 Determine Transportation Infrastructure and Resources

M1	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility.
M2	Hours	To identify available common user lift assets worldwide to support critical, short-notice requirements in support of national or theater military strategies.
M3	Hours	To identify demand for lift assets (in crisis situation).
M4	Months	From approval of JSCP to approved OPLAN/TPFDD.
M5	Percent	Of airlift requirements miss LAD because of unforeseen lack of en route support.
M6	Percent	Of requirements close between EAD and LAD.
M7	Percent	Of requirements planned to close between EAD and LAD.
M8	Percent	Of sealift requirements have adequate en route support.
M9	Weeks	Since demands on common-user and organic lift assets last verified.
M10	Y/N	In crisis action planning, USTRANSCOM can determine transportation feasibility in time to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's commander's estimate for submission to the CJCS.
M11	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from Warning Order).
M12	Y/N	USTRANSCOM will determine if an OPLAN or CONPLAN with TPFDD is transportation feasible NLT the final TPFDD refinement conference.
M13	Percent	Of OPLANs and CONPLANs determined transportation feasible NLT final TPFDD Refinement Conference.

SN 1.1.1 Determine Transportation and Support Availability

M1	Days	To update and modify an assessment.
M2	Hours	To determine commercial transport industry response times and asset availability (from execution).
M3	Hours	To ascertain current state of CRAF and SRP and RRF assets.
M4	Hours	To identify SPOEs (after CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To identify transportation availability data for combatant command Course of Action development or analysis (for CONUS)
M6	Hours	To verify availability of all sourced civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) aircraft and crews.
M7	Hours	To verify en route support facilities available, functioning at projected level or capable of reaching required operational levels with sourced deploying en route support equipment and personnel.
M8	Hours	To verify impact of current and forecast weather on transit times.
M9	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircraft.

13 September 1996

M10	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced deploying en route support personnel (during Crisis Action Planning).
M11	Hours	To verify overflight and landing rights.
M12	Hours	To verify transit times with respect to weather.
M13	Minutes	To identify APOE/APOD current and predicted throughput capacity (after CJCS Warning Order).
M14	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircraft (during Crisis Action Planning).
M15	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircrews (during Crisis Action Planning).
M16	Months	Since last theater on-site capability assessment.
M17	Percent	Of CONUS installation outloading capability available at execution, compared to DD Form 1726 Reports.
M18	Percent	Of POE/POD capacity employed.
M19	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated rail capacity from point of origin to port of embarkation, actually in place.
M20	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for installation, actually achieved.
M21	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for POD, actually achieved.
M22	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for POE, actually achieved.
M23	Hours	To identify transportation availability data for combatant command Course of Action development or analysis (for OCONUS/hostile).
M24	Hours	To verify OPLAN/CONPLAN transit times with respect to current and forecast weather (assuming overflight rights, landing rights, en route support facilities, and critical common-user lift assets are available).
M25	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced deploying en route support equipment.
M26	Y/N	Planned throughput does not exceed capacity of any POE/POD used
M27	Percent	Of POE/POD with planned throughput exceeding capacity.

SN 1.1.2 Coordinate and Match Transportation Resources and Requirements

M1	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M2	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M3	Hours	To reallocate strategic lift assets IAW JTB decisions.
M4	Hours	To justify and obtain change in lift allocation (during Crisis Action Planning).
M5	Hours	To provide CONOPS and estimate of lift capability in relationship to apportioned airlift assets (during Crisis Action Planning).
M6	Hours	To reallocate strategic lift assets IAW JTB decisions.
M7	Hours	To recommend change in lift allocation (during Crisis Action Planning).
M8	Percent	Of planning time, used to determine transportation feasibility.
M9	Percent	Of unique deployable criteria, addressed.
M10	Y/N	USTRANSCOM will determine if an OPLAN or CONPLAN with TPFDD is transportation feasible NLT the final TPFDD refinement conference.
M11	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from Warning Order).
M12	Percent	Of TPFDD LADs planned with sufficient transportation resources for stated requirements during deliberate planning.
M13	Hours	Deviation from supported commander's CAP TPFDD closure and USTRANSCOM's evaluation.

SN 1.1.3 Determine Possible Closure Times

M1	Days	Deviation between LAD and RDD for self-deploying Service and component forces.
----	------	--

M2	Days	Deviation from LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M3	Days	Deviation from LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M4	Percent	Of ULNs, close after their LAD (improperly calculated closure times).
M5	Y/N	USTRANSCOM can determine initial closure times in time to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's Commander's Estimate for submission to the CJCS (in Crisis Action Planning)
M6	Percent	Of planning time USTRANSCOM uses to determine initial closure times.
M7	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from Warning Order).
M8	Y/N	In Deliberate Planning, USTRANSCOM can project closure dates at the end of the final TPFDD Refinement Conference.
M9	Percent	Of time USTRANSCOM projects closure dates by end of final TPFDD Refinement Conference.
M10	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M11	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M12	Percent	Of ULNs close after LAD (due to improperly calculated closure times).

SN 1.1.4 Provide for En route Support and Clearances

M1	Airframe-Days	Lost en route maintenance.
M2	Airframe-Days	Lost to indirect routing.
M3	Days	To post changes to DOD Foreign Clearance Guide.
M4	Hours	Before C-Day and L-Hour, support teams available.
M5	Hours	Until support teams available (after C-Day and L-Hour).
M6	Hours	To be prepared to request priority diplomatic clearance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M7	Hours	To verify overflight and landing rights needed for deployment execution (during crisis).
M8	Hours	Until support teams available (after L-Hour).
M9	Percent	Decrease in ship sailings because of non-availability of staging bases, bunkering, or routing.
M10	Percent	Of airlift/tanker sorties diverted or canceled.
M11	Percent	Of airlift/tanker sorties overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of base, fuel, support facilities, or ramp space).
M12	Percent	Of DCS movements, jeopardized by overflight/layovers in nation not covered by SOFA or other agreements.
M13	Percent	Of HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements, provided to supported CINC before he submits his commander's estimate.
M14	Percent	Of ship sailings, delayed, diverted, or canceled (lack of Diplomatic Clearance).
M15	Percent	Of sorties containing courier material, diverted or canceled.
M16	Percent	Of support, clearance, and overflight permit requests, filled using current references/SOPs.
M17	Percent	Of tanker sorties, diverted or canceled.
M18	Percent	Of tanker sorties overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of POL, support facilities, or ramp space).
M19	Percent	Of TPFDD airlift sorties have required Diplomatic Clearances.
M20	Percent	Of unique deployable criteria, addressed.
M21	Ship-Days	Lost because of ship husbanding or repair facilities en route.
M22	Steaming-Days	Lost because of lack of available ship handling and repair facilities en route.
M23	Y/N	USTRANSCOM identifies HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements to support Course of Action analysis (in Crisis Action Planning).

M24	Percent	Of HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements identified (to support COA analysis).
M25	Hours	To identify HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements (to support COA analysis).
M26	Y/N	USTRANSCOM identifies HNS, en route support, intermediate staging bases, and diplomatic clearance requirements to support given COAs and provide this information to the supported CINC prior to his submission of the commander's estimate.
M27	Hours	To identify HNS, en route support, intermediate staging bases, and diplomatic clearance requirements (to support COA analysis).
M28	Instances	Of airlift sorties which must overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of POL, support facilities, or ramp space).
M29	Hours	From last update J-2 provides updated information on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment operations.

SN 1.1.5 Determine Impact of Threat, Climate, and Geography on Deployment

M1	Hours	Since distribution of last combatant command classified weekly INTEL summary.
M2	Hours	From action by threat until an update presented to CAT by J-2.
M3	Hours	From identification of event until Contingency Planning Document (CPD) or Theater Planning Document, disseminated.
M4	Hours	To reroute airlift flow around new threats.
M5	Minutes	To verify OPLAN/CONPLAN transit times with respect to current and forecast weather.
M6	Percent	Of airborne strategic airlift/tanker deployment missions, delayed, diverted, re-routed, or canceled.
M7	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker assets lost, delayed, or diverted (due to unpredicted threats).
M8	Percent	Of strategic airlift assets, on schedule.
M9	Percent	Of strategic airlift, changed or canceled.
M10	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker deployment aircraft, destroyed by hostile enemy action.
M11	Percent	Of strategic lift assets, on schedule.
M12	Percent	Of strategic lift, delayed, diverted, changed or canceled.
M13	Percent	Of strategic sealift assets, on schedule.
M14	Percent	Of strategic sealift, delayed, diverted, changed or canceled.
M15	Percent	Of strategic sealift vessels, destroyed by hostile enemy action.
M16	Percent	Of transit time computations include factors for historical data on adverse weather.
M17	Percent	Of strategic sealift assets lost, delayed, or diverted (due to unpredicted threats).
M18	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker sorties changed or canceled (due to unanticipated geographic considerations).
M19	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker sorties changed or canceled (due to unanticipated climatic considerations).
M20	Percent	Of strategic sealift changed or canceled (due to unanticipated climatic considerations).
M21	Percent	Of essential elements of information are collected.
M22	Days	Projection of weather by METOC for Daily presentation to CAT.

SN 1.2 Conduct Deployment and Redeployment

M1	Hours	To evaluate validated TPFDD force modules and pass to components.
M2	Percent	Of available ship-days, lost awaiting cargo.

13 September 1996

M3	Percent	Of cargo planned for delivery, delivered.
M4	Percent	Of ULNs close by LAD.
M5	Percent	Of ULNs closed within EAD/LAD window.
M6	Ship-Days	Lost awaiting cargo.

SN 1.2.1 Integrate Deployment Systems

M1	Days	Delay of frustrated cargo.
M2	Hours	Delay in DCS material because of faulty prioritization procedures.
M3	Hours	To modify TPFDD.
M4	Hours	Maximum Lag in high priority cargo In-Transit Visibility (ITV).
M5	Hours	Lag in High Priority Cargo In-Transit Visibility (ITV).
M6	Hours	To account for all rolling stock.
M7	Hours	To generate, transmit, and centralize movement information from source systems.
M8	Hours	To generate, transmit, and centralize movement information from various sources and input to GTN.
M9	Hours	To locate specific personnel or cargo en route.
M10	Hours	To review feasibility for supported commander's high priority cargo versus available lift assets (after supported commander's Warning Order).
M11	Incidents	Of DCS cargo not placed in "move ahead of all others" status because of lack of USTC prior coordination with supported CINC.
M12	Minutes	To identify 90 percent of complex issues.
M13	Minutes	To obtain selective GTN query responses (by type, mode, geographic area, date, IB/OB, on-hand waiting).
M1	Percent	Accuracy in generated movement information for GTN.
M15	Percent	Completeness in generated movement information for GTN.
M16	Percent	Of DCS material, delayed more than 24 hours (faulty prioritization procedures).
M17	Percent	In-Transit Visibility (ITV) accuracy.
M18	Percent	Of ADP systems interface or have work-around.
M19	Percent	Of available airframe days, lost awaiting cargo.
M20	Percent	Of cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M21	Percent	Of generated movement information for GTN, current.
M22	Percent	Of supported commander's high priority cargo, identified.
M23	Y/N	During Planning and execution no data transfer between networked stations is responsible for a supporting command failing to meet a request/requirement.
M24	Percent	Percent of currency in generated movement information in GTN.

SN 1.2.2 Provide Forces and Mobility Assets

M1	Days	For railroad cargo support to reach full capacity.
M2	Hours	Prior to first planned aircraft arrival time, deploying en route support elements, in place.
M3	Hours	To alert deploying en route support elements, prior to planned departure time.
M4	Hours	To load aircraft.
M5	Hours	To load/unload ship.
M6	Hours	To reconfigure commercial aircraft to support military operations (down time).
M7	Hours	To unload aircraft.
M8	Percent	Of aircraft, loaded within CONOPS specified time.
M9	Percent	Of aircraft, unloaded within CONOPS specified time.
M10	Percent	Of APOD throughput capacity, available prior to first EAD.
M11	Percent	Of cargo, damaged.

13 September 1996

M12	Percent	Of en route support bases, fully operational prior to first planned aircraft arrival.
M13	Percent	Of FSS, MPS, RRF ships met activation schedule.
M14	Ship-Days	Lost because of ship maintenance problems.
M15	Percent	Of assigned APODs, operating at EAD.
M16	Percent	Of allocated/apportioned transportation assets, available for movement of forces and cargo.
M17	Percent	Of required transportation assets meet ALD/RLD (in proper configuration and operational status).
M18	Percent	Of sourced airlift aircraft, mission capable by C-day.
M19	Percent	Of sourced tanker aircraft, mission capable by planned deployment date.
M20	Percent	Of sourced units report equipment readiness levels at C2 or better.
M21	Percent	Of SPOEs and SPODs reach required operational capability NLT first ALD.
M22	Percent	Of tasked units receive valid tasking in time to meet ALD.
M23	Percent	Ships load/unload on schedule.
M24	Percent	Of allocated/apportioned transportation assets, provided by USTRANSCOM.
M25	Percent	Of transportation assets meet ALD/RLD.
M26	Ship-days	Lost for sailing.
M27	Ship-days	To make ships fully operationally ready (down time).
M28	Hours	For carrier providing AE aircraft to divert aircraft to support maintenance facility (to reconfigure).
M29	Hours	For carriers to supply aircraft (after call up).

SN 1.2.3 Provide Terminal Operations

M1	Days	For APOEs to reach full operating capability.
M2	Days	For theater SPODs to reach full operating capability.
M3	Days	For theater SPODs to reach initial operating capability.
M4	Days	For theater SPODs/APODs to reach full operating capability.
M5	Days	For theater SPOEs to reach full operating capability.
M6	Percent	Of theater SPODs, open before required time.
M7	Hours	Delay in opening of APOD or SPOD because of late arrival of port personnel.
M8	Hours	For TPFDD-identified theater APOD to reach initial operating capability (IOC).
M9	Hours	Maximum Port hold time for TP2 and 3 air channel cargo.
M10	Hours	Port hold time for TP2 and 3 air channel cargo.
M11	Hours	Maximum Port hold time for Transportation Priority 1 air channel cargo.
M12	Hours	Port hold time for Transportation Priority 1 air channel cargo.
M13	Hours	To determine location of all sealift assets.
M14	Percent	Of aircraft, loaded at APOE within CONOPS/specified time.
M15	Percent	Of APOE throughput capacity achieved prior to first ready to load (RTL) date.
M16	Percent	Of cargo unloaded at POE incorrectly manifested.
M17	Percent	Of cargo, damaged during terminal operations.
M18	Days	To move cargo from reception area.
M19	Percent	Of cargo frustrated by shortfall in reception capability.
M20	Percent	Of cargo, visible during terminal operations.
M21	Percent	Of POEs and PODs reach required operational capability IAW TPFDD NLT first ALD.
M22	Percent	Of required APODs, operating at EAD to support mission mobility requirements.
M23	Percent	Of Standard Ship unload times, achieved.

13 September 1996

M24	Percent	Of support element, fully operational at APOD 24 hours prior to first scheduled aircraft arrival.
M25	Percent	Of theater APODs, open before required time.
M26	Y/N	Sufficient APODs operating at EAD to support mission mobility requirements by time and phase
M27	Percent	Of required APODs operating at EAD.

SN 1.2.4 Provide Movement to POE and Port Support Services

M1	Hours	Between unit's C-Day and L-Hour and unit's departure from HS for POE.
M2	Hours	To validate location of DOD-owned prepositioned transport assets.
M3	Months	Since last review of port call process timelines.
M4	Percent	Of cargo arrived at POE at its TPFDD RLD.
M5	Percent	Of DFB alignments to installations and units, still valid at execution.
M6	Percent	Of DOD organic transport and DOD commercial capability meet TPFDD RLD/ALDs.
M7	Percent	Of DOD-owned prepositioned transport assets have valid location held at L-Hour.
M8	Percent	Of movements delayed by late port calls.
M9	Percent	Of movements rerouted because of lack of waivers for hazardous materials.
M10	Percent	Of ports have Port Support Services in place at time first load arrives.
M11	Percent	Of TPFDD RLD/ALDs met by DOD organic transport and/or DOD commercial capability (during execution).
M12	Percent	Of units arriving at POE, properly configured to load.
M13	Percent	Of units arriving at POE, properly documented.
M14	Percent	Of waivers and permits, granted in time to preclude cargo delays (during execution).

SN 1.2.5 Move Forces from POE to POD

M1	Percent	Of air cargo, damaged en route.
M2	Percent	Of cargo closed before JFC EAD without any place to offload or store.
M3	Percent	Of combat forces closed within supported combatant commander's EAD/LADs.
M4	Percent	Of sea cargo, damaged en route.
M5	Percent	Of strategic mobility and support assets, in place to move forces IAW validated TPFDD.
M6	Percent	Of ULNs closed within LADs.
M7	Percent	Of validated requirements (ULNs) closed within supported combatant commander's EAD/LAD window.
M8	Percent	Of combat support and combat service support units closed within Supported Combatant Commander's EAD/LADs.
M9	Percent	Of support units closed within Supported Combatant Commander's EAD/LADs.
M10	Percent	Of Army combat support and combat service support units closed within Supported Combatant Commander's EAD/LADs.

SN 1.2.6 Backhaul Personnel and Equipment from Theater

M1	Days	Cargo (other than major end items) awaits backhaul.
M2	Days	Delay for major end items await backhaul.
M3	Hours	Delay for personnel awaiting movement.
M4	Percent	Of backhaul requirements, matched to available and capable backhaul assets.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Of cargo aircraft leave theater below capacity (with items awaiting transport).
M6	Percent	Of passengers and cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of ships closed within supported combatant commander's LADs.
M8	Percent	Of validated requirements (ULNs) closed within supported combatant commander's LAD window.
M9	Percent	Of sealift leave theater below capacity (with items awaiting transport).
M10	Hours	For USTRANSCOM to validate incoming short notice requirements for air refueling and notifies component (after receipt).
M11	Y/N	Validate air refueling requirements for direct support to strategic aircraft deployments and air bridge operations prior to final TPFDD Refinement conference
M12	Y/N	Validate air refueling requirements for direct support to strategic aircraft deployments and air bridge operations in time for supported CINC's commander's estimate (In Crisis Action Planning).
M13	Hours	To validate air refueling requirements for direct support to strategic aircraft deployments and air bridge operations in support of CINC's commander's estimate (In Crisis Action Planning).
M14	Percent	Of receivers diverted (due to lack of refueling).

SN 1.2.7 Coordinate Global Strategic Refueling

M1	Days	For ship's transit.
M2	Hours	To provide supported CINC feasibility study on short notice requirement for air refueling assets.
M3	Percent	Of aircraft, diverted from planned destination (missed aerial refueling).
M4	Percent	Of airlift sorties must stop en route because of lack of tanker support.
M5	Percent	Of bomber combat missions, diverted or canceled for lack of tanker support.
M6	Percent	Of combatant UNREPs (for fuel), conducted by gray bottoms.
M7	Percent	Of fighter deployments (USAF, USN, or USMC) must use en route stops (lack of tanker support).
M8	Percent	Of receiver aircraft must divert (tankers missing ARCTs).
M9	Percent	Of tanker packages (ULNs) meet complete scheduled offload.
M10	Percent	Of tanker packages, which support strategic AR (ULNs), meet LAD.
M11	Percent	Of air refueling requirements, validated prior to final TPFDD refinement conference.

SN 1.2.8 Provide Global Patient Movement Aeromedical Evacuation

M1	Days	For Aeromedical Evacuation airfield staging facility to be operational.
M2	Days	Recycle time for AE or MTF provided medical equipment to be returned.
M3	Days	Supply of medications, special diets, and consumable supplies.
M4	Days	To deploy Aeromedical Evacuation OT to Theater of War or Theater of Operations locations.
M5	Hours	Delay for Aeromedical Evacuees awaiting transportation.
M6	Hours	Aeromedical Evacuees remain on ground during intermediate stops awaiting fuel or repairs.
M7	Hours	For Aeromedical Evacuation CRAF aircraft to be available (once activated).
M8	Hours	For Aeromedical Evacuee to be moved bed-to-bed.
M9	Hours	For departure of first aircraft scheduled (after validated requirement in an emergency).
M10	Hours	For deployable TPMC to be available for deployment.
M11	Hours	For deployable TPMC to be in place and operating (after designation of unit C-Day and L-Hour).

M12	Hours	For Joint Movement Center and TPMC to adjudicate disconnects in patient movement.
M13	Hours	To reconfigure an airlift aircraft for Aeromedical Evacuation use.
M14	Kilometers	From E4 MTF to designated Aeromedical Evacuation point.
M15	Minutes	Aeromedical Evacuees remain on aircraft at destination awaiting movement to treatment facilities.
M16	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuation flights have flight surgeon or medical attendant on board.
M17	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees' condition worsens during MedEvac flight.
M18	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees, determined to have not been suitable patients for movement by air.
M19	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees, moved within 24 hours of being available.
M20	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees can be tracked through ITV.
M21	Percent	Of originating attending MO patients, refused AE (lack of suitable medical equipment, reusable items or consumable supplies).
M22	Percent	Of patients have no loss of personal effects during transfer.
M23	Percent	Of patient records, available at destination medical facility with or before patient arrival.
M24	Percent	Of patients (scheduled for strategic evacuation), actually evacuated.
M25	Percent	Of special needs patients have medical attendants assigned to them for AE.
M26	Percent	Of time, in MOOTW theater medical assets, reduced below planned levels to support AE.
M27	Personnel	An ASF can decontaminate at one time.
M28	Weeks	For OSIA charges to be posted
M29	Percent	Of patients scheduled for strategic evacuation (IAW Evacuation Policy).
M30	Percent	Of patient movement by retrograde aircraft (aircraft do not deviate from schedule missions).

SN 2 Develop Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance

M1	Days	Of Warning time (of actual enemy action).
M2	Days	Of Warning time (of potential enemy action).
M3	Months	To update assessments of overall regional threats.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs with new intelligence data.

SN 2.1 Plan and Direct Strategic Intelligence Activities

M1	Percent	Of new requirements not previously met.
M2	Percent	Of PIRs with supporting intelligence data.

SN 2.1.1 Develop National Strategic Intelligence Policy

M1	Days	Since intelligence data on PIRs last collected.
M2	Hours	In advance of collection, deployment intelligence collection requirements identified.
M3	Instances	Of identified threats, en route or at PODs, resulted in diverted or delayed sealift missions.
M4	Instances	Of PIRs identified after collection begins.
M5	Percent	Of new requirements not previously met.
M6	Percent	Of PIRs covered by Collection Plan.
M7	Percent	Of supporting combatant commander PIRs contained in Theater Collection Plan
M8	Percent	Of supporting combatant commander PIRs satisfied (in time to support deployment planning).
M9	Percent	Of theater PODs where actual throughput capacity matched TPFDD planned capacity.
M10	Percent	Of validated PIRs have no collection effort.
M11	Percent	Of duplicate PIRs eliminated (during validation).
M12	Months	Since information on theater OPLAN PODs and transportation infrastructures updated.
M13	Percent	Of duplicate PIRs (during validation).
M14	Percent	Of essential elements of information are collected.

SN 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize National Strategic Intelligence Requirements

M1	Hours	In advance of collection, intelligence requirements identified.
M2	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M3	Hours	To prioritize requirements.
M4	Percent	Of prior PIRs require modification or deletion.

SN 2.1.3 Prepare National Strategic Collection Plan

M1	Hours	To create Collection Plan.
M2	Hours	To revise Collection Plan.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs not covered by Collection Plan

SN 2.1.4 Allocate National Intelligence Resources Worldwide

M1	Augmentees	Provided by National and Defense Agencies
M2	Percent	Of collection plan satisfied.
M3	Percent	Of collection plan satisfied by assigned theater assets.
M4	Percent	Of validated PIRs denied collection effort by national level.
M5	Hours	Range in overtime worked in DOD intelligence organizations.

13 September 1996

M6	Hours	Range in overtime worked in DOD intelligence organizations (during non-crisis period).
----	-------	--

SN 2.1.5 Determine National Strategic Intelligence Issues

M1	Percent	Of collected material backlogged.
M2	Percent	Of validated PIRs with no collection effort.

SN 2.2 Collect Strategic Information

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Feet	Horizontal and vertical geolocation accuracy.
M4	Hours	For C2 structure to receive threat warning (from identification of threat to combatant command resources).
M5	Hours	Since data last collected.
M6	Hours	To disseminate data to users.
M7	Percent	Level of assuredness.
M8	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M9	Percent	Of PIRs satisfied.
M10	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M11	Percent	Of unit support tailored to meet validated joint force requirements.
M12	Targets/Day	Collected.
M13	Targets/Day	Detected, classified and identified.

SN 2.2.1 Collect Information on Strategic Situation Worldwide

M1	Feet	Of horizontal/vertical accuracy of national military and theater strategic geographical location data.
M2	Hours	To provide strategic intelligence data in support of operational commander (from receipt of request).
M3	Hours	For reconnaissance or surveillance assets to respond (from receipt of tasking).
M4	Hours	Since high priority targets last detected, identified and located.
M5	Hours	To prepare CI collection effort before becoming aware of CI requirement.
M6	Hours	Until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond (from receipt of tasking).
M7	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M8	Instances	Of unit support tailored to meet validated CTF requirements.
M9	Instances/Day	Of information collected on strategic targets in support of operational commander.
M10	Months	Since available meteorology, oceanography, topography/mapping, charting and geodesy data updated (at crisis outbreak).
M11	Months	Since information on OPLAN theater strategic situation updated.
M12	Percent	Of commander's geographic area has required reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
M13	Percent	Of counter intelligence PIRs satisfied.
M14	Percent	Of counter-intelligence PIRs filled.
M15	Percent	Of disease non battle injury (DNBI) (from unanticipated medical threats).
M16	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery have current imagery before flight briefing.
M17	Percent	Of outstanding PIRs (on situation).
M18	Percent	Of PIRs where at least one source yielded intelligence information.
M19	Percent	Of PIRs where more than one source yielded intelligence information.

M20	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one collection source.
M21	Percent	Of potential high-payoff targets accurately located.
M22	Percent	Of PIRs collected.
M23	Percent	Of proposed potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M24	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M25	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M26	Percent	Of targets detected, identified, located and classified in detail IAW Defense intelligence guidance.
M27	Years	Since most current map data updated.
M28	Hours	After PIR satisfied CRM retasks collection asset to outstanding PIR.
M29	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority One geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M30	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M31	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

SN 2.2.2 Support Combatant Commander's Surveillance and Reconnaissance Requirements

M1	Percent	Of national asset capability untasked with combatant commanders having validated requirements.
----	---------	--

SN 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Strategic Information

M1	Percent	Of multiple sources integrated and deconflicted.
M2	Days	To provide initial assessment of captured enemy materiel from in-country.

SN 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation of Strategic Information

M1	Hours	To process raw material (from receipt).
M2	Hours	To decode messages (for which keys exist).
M3	Minutes	To read wet film after recovery of aircraft or other photo system.
M4	Minutes/Page	To translate foreign national security material into English.
M5	Percent	Of collected information processed within 24 hours.
M6	Percent	Of intelligence collection data correctly processed for further exploitation.
M7	Percent	Of national asset collection of raw data processed within one year.
M8	Weeks	To provide final assessment of captured enemy materiel.

SN 2.3.2 Collate National Strategic Information

M1	Percent	Of packages returned to all source analyst for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of unincorporated items of information identified as critical after intelligence produced.

SN 2.3.3 Correlate National Strategic Information

M1	Data Points	Assembled on single subject.
M2	Percent	Of reported information graded credible based upon number of pieces of data combined and associated.
M3	Percent	Of reported information which graded High Reliability.
M4	Sources	Provided information.

SN 2.4 Produce Strategic Intelligence

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
----	------	---

13 September 1996

M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Hours	For newly received intelligence to be passed to components or joint force.
M4	Hours	Until completion of initial analysis of raw information (from receipt).
M5	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M6	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M7	Percent	Of recipients received information in timely manner (as defined by customer requirements).
M8	Percent	Of strategic intelligence collection and dissemination capability in place prior to D-Day.

SN 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze and Interpret Information

M1	Hours	To report change in enemy condition (e.g., disposition, order of battle).
M2	Percent	Of PIRs have complete data.
M3	Days	Since last review of critical intelligence data.
M4	Days	Since last vulnerability assessment.
M5	Hours	To review critical intelligence data.
M6	Days	To review intelligence data.
M7	Days	Since last review of intelligence data.

SN 2.4.1.1 Identify Global and Regional Issues and Threats

M1	Hours	To report change in enemy condition (disposition, order of battle).
M2	Months	Before fielding, new formations or weapons systems identified.
M3	Days	Since last review of critical intelligence data.
M4	Days	Since last review of intelligence data.
M5	Hours	To review critical intelligence data.

SN 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Global Capabilities and Strategic Courses of Action

M1	Percent	Of joint force(s) identified enemy decisive points and HVTs being monitored.
M2	Days	Less warning than predicted warning period.
M3	Days	Warning of war.
M4	Months	Leadtime in identifying emerging threats to the nation.
M5	Percent	Of enemy decisive points and HVTs identified.

SN 2.4.1.3 Determine Enemy's Centers of Gravity

M1	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified and addressed.
M2	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of crisis action planning).
M3	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of crisis).
M4	Instances	Of centers of gravity not identified.
M5	Instances	Of emerging or new centers of gravity correctly identified.
M6	Percent	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of hostilities).
M7	Percent	Of recommended counters to enemy centers of gravity are accepted.
M8	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified and addressed in detailed planning.

SN 2.4.2 Prepare National Strategic Intelligence Products

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Hours	For intelligence to be passed to components or joint force (from receipt).
M4	Hours	Until initial analysis of raw information complete (from receipt).
M5	Percent	Of distributed copies of finished intelligence product are read by at least one person (from a sample).

M6	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M7	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M8	Days	Projection of weather by METOC for Daily presentation to CAT.
M9	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M10	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M11	Percent	Of Priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M12	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M13	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M14	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.

SN 2.4.2.1 Provide Worldwide National Strategic Indications and Warning

M1	Days	Less than predicted warning period for deliberate planning.
M2	Days	Less warning, than predicted warning period.
M3	Days	Since indicators last reviewed (in peacetime).
M4	Hours	For first update after designation of warning problem.
M5	Percent	Of indicators developed, reported.
M6	Percent	Of warnings issued result in diplomatic, economic, or military action.
M7	Days	Warning of war.

SN 2.4.2.2 Provide Current Intelligence to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Hours	Lag between breaking events and dissemination to NMCC CAT planning personnel.
M2	Minutes	After breaking events of national strategic importance to prepare briefing for decision makers.
M3	Minutes	Intelligence briefing length.
M4	Minutes	Since last J-2 update to CAT on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment.
M5	Percent	Of basic background facts adjusted between initial and next subsequent briefing.
M6	Percent	Of METOC meteorological/oceanographic updates in time for next day's planning.
M7	Hours	Hours from last update J-2 provides updated information on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment operations.

SN 2.4.2.3 Provide General Military Intelligence to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of Joint Staff J-2 reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Percent	Of actual enemy military strength (number of people, equipment or sustainment) compared to Joint Staff J-2 estimate.
M3	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces answered by data in DIA, Service, or other national data bases.
M4	Days	Between hard copy updates of defense intelligence reports on enemy military capabilities.

SN 2.4.2.4 Provide Intelligence for National Strategic Targeting

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified by JSTPS targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of failed attacks on national strategic HPTs (attributed to incorrect location data).
M3	Percent	Of national strategic HPTs have correct location data.
M4	Percent	Of possible national strategic targets have mensurated coordinates available.
M5	Percent	Of target locations verified by JSTPS or component intelligence before launch of follow-on missions.

SN 2.4.2.5 Provide Scientific and Technical Intelligence for R&D and Force Planning

M1	Months	Lead time provided on foreign developments in applied research.
M2	Months	Lead time provided on foreign developments in basic research.
M3	Months	Lead time provided on IOC of non-US strategic weapons systems.
M4	Months	Lead time provided on IOC of non-US weapons systems.
M5	Percent	Of weapons system's actual characteristics relative to predicted.
M6	Percent	Of weapons system's actual capabilities relative to predicted.

SN 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate National Strategic Intelligence

M1	Days	To evaluate threat estimates for potential threat nations.
M2	Hours	To disseminate data to users in support of operational commander.
M3	Hours	To prepare, publish, and disseminate intelligence report.
M4	Instances	Of commander making decision without sufficient information.
M5	Minutes	After major change in threat to update intelligence.
M6	Months	Since last review and update of strategic and operational centers of gravity of national threats.
M7	Months	To update evaluation of overall threats to combatant commander's assets and operations.
M8	Percent	Of significant new formations or fielded weapons systems were correctly anticipated.
M9	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M10	Percent	Of required Priority Two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M11	Percent	Of required Priority Three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.

SN 2.5.1 Provide Finished Intelligence Products to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Days	For all combatant commands to receive hard copy product (after printing run).
M2	Days	For Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) to arrive in theater and be operational.
M3	Days	For distribution of hard copy intelligence products (from final copy).
M4	Days	To provide customer pull on demand capability.
M5	Days	To provide intelligence in appropriate form and suitable means to consumer
M6	Hours	To post electronic copy of intelligence products (from final copy).
M7	Hours	To convert compartmented intelligence updates to intelligence annexes and briefings
M8	Minutes	To respond to request for information on threats to and status of inter/intra-theater transportation infrastructures and PODs.
M9	Percent	Of finished intelligence products distributed by user preferred means.
M10	Percent	Of intelligence consumer requests requiring clarification

13 September 1996

M11	Percent	Of intelligence watch leaders with authority to sanitize, summarize, and interpret highly classified information and intelligence
M12	Percent	Of joint force intelligence organizations or higher echelons with pull-on-demand capability for national intelligence data base.
M13	Percent	Of major headquarters (joint and component) with installed SCI intelligence chatter nets
M14	Percent	Of planners and decision makers with need to know receive finished intelligence products.
M15	Percent	Of plans and orders have updated intelligence products

SN 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Days	To evaluate new threat estimates for potential threat nations.
M2	Percent	Of crisis response products have active follow-up.
M3	Percent	Of routine products have active follow-up.
M4	Percent	Of significant new formations or fielded weapon systems, correctly anticipated.

SN 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities

M1	Hours	To provide initial feedback (after evaluation of national strategic intelligence activities).
M2	Percent	Of combatant command intelligence evaluations reviewed for applicability to national strategic level intelligence activities.
M3	Percent	Of deficiencies noted in national strategic intelligence activities incorporated in joint lessons learned system.
M4	Percent	Of evaluator observations of joint intelligence activities validated.
M5	Percent	Of intelligence evaluator feedback recommendations adopted.
M6	Percent	Of respondent's time consumed by evaluator interviews and data collection.
M7	Percent	Of the five intelligence tenets evaluated in examining national strategic intelligence activities.
M8	Percent	Of users of national strategic intelligence products surveyed in given year.
M9	Percent	Of users of national strategic intelligence products surveyed in last five years.
M10	Weeks	To provide feedback after evaluation of national strategic intelligence activities.

SN 3 Employ Forces

M1	Days	From decision to employ national strategic firepower until desired damage levels achieved.
M2	Time	From event detection to data receipt by NORAD.
M3	Minutes	From initial notification until establishment of a Missile Event Conference.
M4	Percent	Of potential multi-crisis situations (requiring apportionment of national assets), wargamed.
M5	Percent	Of space and missile launch events detected.
M6	Days	To designate a primary theater in a multi-crisis situation (requiring apportionment of forces or assets).

SN 3.1 Coordinate Forward Presence of Forces in Theaters

M1	Days	For interagency coordination of theater SOFAs or bilateral political agreements.
M2	Percent	Of stationing costs in AOR supported by host nation(s).

SN 3.1.1 Station Forces Forward in Theaters

M1	Percent	Of annual commitments to host-nations or IOs satisfied.
M2	Percent	Of housing for unaccompanied personnel meets CONUS housing standards.
M3	Percent	Of stationing costs provided by host-nation funding.
M4	Man-days	Spent annually collecting, coordinating, and submitting to Congress mandated overseas troop strength data.
M5	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments), ceded to US.

SN 3.1.2 Coordinate Periodic and Rotational Deployments, Port Visits, and Military Contacts

M1	Percent	Of periodic deployment costs, provided by host-nation funding.
M2	Percent	Of port visit costs, provided by host-nation funding or services.
M3	Percent	Of rotational deployment costs, provided by host-nation funding.
M4	Percent	Of scheduled port visits, delayed or canceled because of a lack of coordination.
M5	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments), ceded to US.

SN 3.1.3 Support Establishment of Access and Storage Agreements

M1	Percent	Of all AOR countries have treaties, executive agreements, and memoranda of understandings with US.
M2	Percent	Of stationing costs for selected US equipment and supplies, provided by host-nation funding.
M3	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments), ceded to US.

SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Multinational Exercises

M1	Percent	Of exercise costs, provided through host-nation funding.
M2	Percent	Of exercise forces, provided by non-US forces.
M3	Percent	Of exercises conducted primarily for access purposes.
M4	Percent	Of exercises conducted primarily for training purposes.

SN 3.1.5 Acquire Host Nation Support (HNS)

M1	Dollars	Offset payment (in dollars or dollar value of equipment) for each host-nation support manpower position provided or promised.
M2	Dollars	Offset payment (in dollars or dollar value of equipment) for each HNS manpower position provided or promised.

13 September 1996

M3	Time	Delay between requisitioning agreed support and receiving it.
M4	Percent	Of existing plans have fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M5	Percent	Increase in availability of tactical forces through use of host-nation security and means in JF plans.
M6	Percent	Of JSCP assigned OPLANs identify or project host-nation support resources.
M7	TONS	Of material provided by HNS.
M8	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs, with fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M9	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs without fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M10	Percent	Of peacetime support provided by host-nation.
M11	Percent	Of specialized maintenance units, prepared to convert captured material to friendly use.
M12	Percent	Of stationing costs, paid by host-nation.
M13	Percent	Of total combat service support, supplied by host-nation.
M14	Percent	Of total combat support, supplied by host-nation.
M15	Percent	Of total cost of an operation paid for by HN and third party nations.
M16	Percent	Of total cost of an operation paid for by third party nations.
M17	Percent	Reduction in combat service support personnel, because of host-nation support.
M18	Percent	Of total support, supplied by host-nation.
M19	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M20	Days	Saved in closing TPFDD (relative to C-day) because of HNS.
M21	Percent	Of strategic deployment requirements reduced by HNS.
M22	Time	To obtain basing rights.
M23	Time	To obtain overflight authorization.

SN 3.2 Develop National Strategic Firepower

M1	Percent	Of alert forces obtain directed LERTCON/Posture status within timelines specified in EAP-STRAT series publications.
M2	Percent	Of available forces generated and dispersed within planned time.
M3	Percent	Of enemy strategic space assets destroyed/degraded.
M4	Percent	Of targets reviewed for collateral damage, DE, casualties and political ramifications.
M5	Percent	Planned casualties exceeds guidance.
M6	Percent	Planned collateral damage exceeds guidance.
M7	Percent	Planned Damage Expectancy (DE) exceeds guidance.
M8	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD available).
M9	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD not available).
M10	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD available).
M11	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD not available).
M12	Hours	To construct a Theater Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD available).
M13	Hours	To construct a Theater Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD not available).
M14	Hours	To construct Theater Option of one weapon against one target (TDD not available).

M15	Hours	To coordinate TLAM-N plan.
M16	Days	To process, apportion, and integrate firepower resources based on <i>major</i> SIOP/JSCP doctrine, policy, or guidance changes.
M17	Days	To process, apportion, and integrate firepower resources based on <i>routine</i> SIOP/JSCP doctrine, policy, or guidance changes.

SN 3.2.1 Process Strategic Targets

M1	Percent	Of national strategic High Priority Targets (HPTs) discovered within execution cycle are reprioritized.
M2	Percent	Of selected HPTs have measured coordinates available.
M3	Percent	Of selected target components can be attacked (sufficient delivery systems and munitions available).
M4	Percent	Of selected targets have critical components identified.
M5	Hours	To develop a target for attack (after identification as a strategic decisive point).

SN 3.2.2 Generate and Disperse Strategic Forces

M1	Hours	To achieve horizontal dispersion.
M2	Hours	To achieve vertical dispersal.
M3	Minutes	To pass vertical dispersal message.
M4	Days	To achieve specific force generation level.
M5	Time	For last until to reach safe separation distance from point of departure.

SN 3.2.3 Manage Strategic Force Readiness Levels

M1	Days	Longest maximum readiness can be maintained.
M2	Hours	To generate forces to new readiness level.
M3	Hours	To re-obtain readiness level after a missile goes off alert unexpectedly.
M4	Hours	To re-obtain readiness level after an aircraft goes off alert unexpectedly.
M5	Hours	To re-obtain readiness level after an SSBN goes off alert unexpectedly.

SN 3.2.4 Manage Strategic Weapon Stockpile Allocation

M1	Percent	Of inspected units, pass Nuclear Assessment Program.
M2	Percent	Of units receive Nuclear Assessment Program inspection within program timelines.
M3	Months	Since formal review of world-wide nuclear asset availability.
M4	Weeks	Since update of geographic combatant command nuclear weapons requirements.
M5	Months	To reconstitute TLAM(N) capability at sea (assessed).

SN 3.2.5 Determine National Strategic Targeting Policy

M1	Percent	Of collateral damage (under proposed targeting policy), to non-military targets.
M2	Man-Months	To develop proposed targeting policy.
M3	Percent	Of enemy nuclear forces form a secure reserve after US retaliation under proposed targeting policy.
M4	Percent	Of nominated targets have weapons available (under proposed targeting policy).
M5	Percent	Probability of success for pre-emptive attacks on minor nuclear powers (under proposed targeting policy).
M6	Months	Since damage criteria study published.
M7	Percent	Success expected from proposed targeting policy.
M8	Percent	Success expected from published targeting policy.
M9	Months	To develop, coordinate, and publish proposed targeting policy.

SN 3.3 Apply National Strategic Firepower

M1	Incidents	Of errors in crew force response when force execution directed by President.
M2	Incidents	Of errors in crew force validation and authentication.
M3	Incidents	Of errors in EAM preparation and transmission.
M4	Incidents	Of errors in EAM preparation and transmission; crew force validation and authentication; and crew force response when force execution directed by President

SN 3.3.1 Attack Strategic Targets

M1	Percent	Of failed HPT attacks attributed to lack of integration.
M2	Percent	Of national strategic firepower missions flown/fired without requested theater support.
M3	Percent	Of SAPs cannot be integrated with non-SAP systems for security reasons.
M4	Percent	Of strategic SOF missions executed without notification of non-SOF operating forces.

SN 3.3.2 Synchronize Strategic Attacks

M1	Percent	Of planned targets, hit on time.
M2	Percent	Of uncovered targets, attacked by regenerated forces.
M3	Percent	Of units receive execute order through primary system.

SN 3.3.3 Demonstrate National Military Capabilities

M1	Hours	Before clear indications that target government has modified its position.
M2	Incidents	Involving loss of non-US life
M3	Incidents	Involving loss of US life.

SN 3.3.4 Apply National Nonlethal Capabilities

M1	Percent	Of CINC's PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host-nation.
M2	Percent	Of PSYOP efforts begin within first 1/3 of hours between Warning Order and H-hour.
M3	Hours	To provide JCS approval of CINC's PSYOP campaign.

SN 3.3.5 Conduct National Combat Assessment

M1	Percent	Difference between DIAC and NPIC combat assessment.
M2	Percent	Difference between DIAC/NPIC combat assessment and combatant commander assessment.
M3	Hours	For DIAC to provide attack assessment to combatant commander of his attacks.
M4	Hours	For NPIC to provide attack assessment to combatant commander of his attacks.
M5	Percent	Of DGZs assessed in first 24 hours of nuclear response.
M6	Hours	To provide retargeting information to USSTRATCOM.
M7	Hours	To report to NCA on success of Direction Action mission.

SN 3.4 Protect Strategic Forces and Means

M1	Visits	For staff assistance and liaison conducted each year to Federal and State Emergency Management Offices.
M2	Percent	Of enemy manned air breathing vehicles successfully penetrate friendly airspace.
M3	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of critical US Government command and control facilities, hardened against nuclear, biological, and chemical attack.

M6	Percent	Of defense-wide deception operations (in approved OPLANs) contradict deception operations in other plans or national deception operations.
M7	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles(of all types), destroyed before impact.
M8	Percent	Of national strategic operations have a deception plan.
M9	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.
M10	Months	Since last update meeting between FEMA and DOD to review potential strategic threats to US.

SN 3.4.1 Provide Strategic Air Defense

M1	Percent	Of enemy attacks were successful.
M2	Percent	Of military casualties were from enemy attacks.
M3	Percent	Of penetrations of US airspace by enemy manned air breathing vehicles were successful.
M4	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.
M5	Percent	Of US non-combatant casualties were from enemy attacks.

SN 3.4.2 Provide Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment

M1	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US, Attack Assessment issued.
M2	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US forces, Attack Assessment issued to TBM forces.
M3	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US forces, Threat Warning issued to TBM forces.
M4	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US, Threat Warning issued.
M5	Percent	Of Threat Warnings to TBM forces are false.
M6	Incidents	Of false Threat Warnings.
M7	Minutes	To determine objectives of attack.

SN 3.4.3 Provide Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense

M1	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M2	Percent	Of CONUS civil government command and control assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M3	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches, provide cueing for counterforce operations.

SN 3.4.4 Protect National Strategic Capabilities

M1	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M2	Percent	Of CONUS civil government command and control assets are defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M3	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets are defensible against a ballistic missile threat.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, are defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Incidents	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts, ports) destroyed or damaged.
M6	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches provided cueing for counterforce operations.
M7	Incidents	Of penetrations of US airspace by enemy manned air breathing vehicles.
M8	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.

13 September 1996

M9	Incidents	Of US POE facilities being damaged or destroyed by enemy terrorist action.
M10	Casualties/ Week	To US non-combatants.

SN 3.4.5 Coordinate and Conduct Strategic Operations Security

M1	Percent	Of key personnel change timing and route of their routine movements on a weekly basis.
M2	Percent	Of media reports described close-hold friendly actions.
M3	Percent	Of movements of critical units or equipment made even though threat reconnaissance systems overhead.

SN 3.4.6 Protect National Strategic Information, Information-Based Processes, and Information Systems

M1	Percent	Of commands have adequate information processing hardware and software.
M2	Percent	Of commands have current processes and programs to protect information systems, processes, and networks.
M3	Percent	Of commands have fully trained and manned information systems management and operating personnel.
M4	Instances	Of confirmed loss of classified data from penetrations.
M5	Instances	Of detected penetrations of command information systems.
M6	Percent	Of time, command joint information systems down.
M7	Instances	Of penetrations of multiple command information systems.
M8	Minutes	To detect attempted penetration of information system.
M9	Minutes	To restore major information system after attack.
M10	Minutes	To switch to an alternate system after attack on major information system.

SN 3.4.7 Provide Security for Strategic Forces and Means

M1	Hours	After CI EEI satisfied, collection asset retasked.
M2	Percent	Change in sabotage incidents, per month, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M3	Percent	Change in terrorism incidents, per month, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M4	Total	Facilities (e.g., command posts), destroyed.
M5	Hours	For a reaction force to reach an installation or facility under attack.
M6	Percent	Of CONUS based aircraft and ships, damaged or destroyed on the ground/in port prior to declaration of war or C-Day.
M7	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements covered by collection plan.
M8	Percent	Of critical CONUS facilities (e.g., command posts), destroyed or damaged.
M9	Percent	Of critical movements (e.g., nuclear weapons transfers), conducted under observation of non-friendly overhead assets.
M10	Percent	Of critical movements conducted after declaration of war, C-Day, or national emergency, under observation of non-friendly overhead assets.
M11	Percent	Of DOD personnel assigned to counterintelligence.
M12	Instances	Of first strategic movements attacked by enemy lethal or non-lethal forces.
M13	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified because of successful enemy intelligence collection efforts.
M14	Instances	Of sabotage or terrorism, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M15	Instances	Of strategic movements detected or attacked by enemy lethal/nonlethal means.

13 September 1996

M16	Instances	Of terrorism, per month, in CONUS after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M17	Hours	Since most current intelligence information collected.

SN 3.4.8 Provide for Nuclear Surety

M1	Months	Since last review of overall launch platforms firing circuit inspection program.
M2	Months	Since last review of overall SAS inspection program.
M3	Months	Since most recent DOD/DOE assessment of current nuclear weapons programs and procedures was conducted.
M4	Percent	Of nuclear capable systems which have firing circuitry which is current and certified
M5	Percent	Of recommendations from most recent DOD/DOE assessment implemented within 60 days.
M6	Percent	Of units all nuclear capable units which have received a DNSI within the last year.
M7	Percent	Of units receiving a DNSI (Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection) in last year receive a satisfactory or better grade.
M8	Percent	Of units receiving a Nuclear Weapons Assessment Inspection (Nwai) pass on the first inspection.
M9	Percent	Of units receiving a Personnel reliability Program inspection receive a satisfactory or better grade.
M10	Percent	Of units receiving an NTPI receive a satisfactory or better grade.
M11	Percent	Passed Defense Nuclear Agency inspections of the USSTRATCOM Personnel Reliability Program with a Satisfactory or better.
M12	Percent	Passed Nuclear Weapon Tech Inspections of Service Component Command capability to handle, store, and maintain nuclear weapons with a Sat or better.
M13	Percent	Passed Service Weapon Systems inspections with Satisfactory or better results.
M14	Days	Since last Annual report and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile.
M15	Months	Delay to initiate underground nuclear testing, if directed by the President.
M16	Percent	Of nuclear weapons components which can be tested through sub-critical tests.
M17	Percent	Of nuclear weapons deemed one point safe.
M18	Percent	Of nuclear weapons inventory exceeding design life (to include extensions of design life).
M19	Percent	Of US hydronuclear tests exceeding a yield of four pounds.
M20	Percent	Overall degradation of nuclear weapons stockpile from original weapons production capability.
M21	Percent	Of stockpile currently certified to not produce a nuclear yield if dropped or fired safe.
M22	Percent	Of stockpile currently certified to properly function upon release.
M23	Percent	Of sub-critical nuclear weapons tests result in a self-sustaining nuclear reaction.
M24	Percent	Of sub-critical nuclear weapons tests result in the release of nuclear materials to the atmosphere.

SN 3.4.9 Support Personnel Recovery Worldwide

M1	Percent	Of aircrews that transmit their location, rescued within 24 hours of being shot down.
----	---------	---

13 September 1996

M2	Percent	Of escapees, recovered.
M3	Percent	Of isolated personnel, enter UAR system.
M4	Percent	Of known POW/MIA families made aware of DOD support.
M5	Months	Since defense-wide SERE training updated.
M6	Months	Since inter-agency operating agreements updated.
M7	Months	Since national policy supporting SERE requirements reviewed.

SN 3.4.10 Protect the National Sea Frontiers

M1	Days	Between hostile actions against strategic shipping.
M2	Days	Between pollution or toxic waste events that impact strategic shipping.
M3	Man-days/year	To clean-up marine pollution or toxic waste spills.
M4	Ship Days	Lost by commercial shipping because of marine pollution or toxic waste.
M5	Dollars	Negative impact on national economy because of marine pollution or toxic waste spills.
M6	Percent	Of strategic shipping lost because of hostile action.
M7	Instances/week	Of attacks on coastal shipping.
M8	Percent	Of fisheries closed because of marine pollution or toxic waste.
M9	Percent	Of military operations delayed or disrupted by explosive ordnance incidents.
M10	Percent	Of Military operations delayed or disrupted by hostile action.
M11	Percent	Of military operations delayed or disrupted by marine pollution or toxic waste.
M12	Instances/week	Of significant damage to forces, materiel, or equipment.

SN 3.5 Provide National Space Capabilities

M1	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth (peacetime).
M2	Percent	Decrease in support of combatant commander or joint force commander because of surge in national level requirements.
M3	Percent	Degradation of space capability over one year.
M4	Days	Delay in theater operations because of saturation of on orbit capabilities.
M5	Percent	Of DOD required space capability, owned by DOD.
M6	Percent	Of DOD required space capability, owned by the US Federal Government.
M7	Percent	Of promised on orbit capability provided to combatant commander or joint force commander.
M8	Percent	Of TENCAP capability used each year.
M9	Percent	Of TENCAP requests filled each year.
M10	Months	To design, produce, and constitute on orbit a new generation of a particular existing space capability.
M11	Years	To design, produce, and constitute on orbit a new space capability.
M12	Months	To reconstitute a space capability after loss through attack (wartime).
M13	Hours	To respond to a combatant commander or joint force commander request for change in support from on orbit assets.
M14	Months	To restore to a combatant commander or joint force commander on orbit capability lost because of system failure (peace time).
M15	Weeks	To restore to a combatant commander or joint force commander on orbit capability lost because of hostile action (crisis or war).

SN 3.5.1 Provide Space Support

M1	Days	To restack a launch platform to carry a new and different specific space platform.
----	------	--

13 September 1996

M2	Hours	To move on-orbit assets from support of one theater to support of another.
M3	Minutes	For maximum ground facility operations capability "red" time (per 24-hour period).
M4	Minutes	To report the functional loss of a major space platform (mission loss).
M5	Minutes	To report the functional loss of a major system of a space platform (mission loss).
M6	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth.
M7	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from on-orbit (assuming on-orbit assets).
M8	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth.
M9	Months	To produce a space platform for launch.
M10	Percent	Of a space platform's efficiency lost because too close to other platforms.
M11	Percent	Of a space platform's overall effectiveness lost because too close to other platforms.
M12	Percent	Of launches are delayed after preparations begin, due to scheduling conflicts.
M13	Percent	Of launches successfully place space platforms on orbit.
M14	Percent	Of successful launches (total).
M15	Percent	Of successful launches within seven days of original schedule ("Successful Launch" includes inserting satellite into proper orbit).
M16	Percent	Of successful satellite communications supports (each system).
M17	Total	Number (maximum) of emergency satellite supports (per 24-hour period).
M18	Weeks	To produce a launch platform.
M19	Percent	Of space platforms orbits must be adjusted from original orbit plans because of conflicts with other space objects.

SN 3.5.2 Provide Space Control

M1	Hours	To assemble and dispatch Space Support Team
M2	Percent	Of first contingency requirements for space support met.
M3	Percent	Of second contingency requirements for space support met.
M4	Hours	To deploy Joint Space Support Teams (JSSTs) (after initial request).
M5	Hours	For JSST to direct combatant commander's request for specific space support to appropriate USSPACECOM or component office.

SN 3.5.3 Provide Space Force Enhancement

M1	Percent	Of enemy space capability destroyed/degraded/disrupted (as ordered by NCA).
M2	Percent	Of items in near space, fully catalogued.
M3	Percent	Of space platforms orbits must be adjusted from original orbit plans because of conflicts with other space objects.
M4	Percent	Of US military satellite communications capability destroyed/degraded.
M5	Percent	Of US satellite navigation capability destroyed/degraded.
M6	Percent	Of US space-based environmental monitoring capability destroyed/degraded.
M7	Percent	Of US space-based intelligence capability destroyed/degraded.
M8	Percent	Of US space-based missile warning capability destroyed/degraded.
M9	Days	To fully analyze new space debris and determine its on orbit characteristics.
M10	Days	To fully analyze new space platforms and determine their on orbit characteristics.

SN 4 Provide Sustainment

M1	Line Items	Backlogged.
M2	Percent	Of planned sustainment delivered to theater during operations.
M3	Percent	Of regional nations forces integrated into logistics plan.
M4	Percent	Of required logistics in place to support national objectives.
M5	Tons	Of backlogged support requirements.
M6	Months	To fully establish new sustainment infrastructure.
M7	Percent	Of cargo booked and available misses ship sailing.
M8	Percent	Of requirements for Defense Fuel Supply Center documented in plans.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment movement requirements met by available sealift (during execution).

SN 4.1 Acquire and Distribute Personnel

M1	Days	From recruitment to commencement of basic training.
M2	Dollars	To recruit new service member.
M3	Percent	Of inductees have at least a high school diploma.
M4	Percent	Of inductees successfully complete basic training.
M5	Percent	Of military inductees qualify for security clearance.
M6	Percent	Of new DOD civilians qualify for security clearance.
M7	Percent	Of officer inductees have at least a bachelors degree.
M8	Percent	Of recruitment goals met during preceding year.
M9	Percent	Of recruits are female.
M10	Percent	Of recruits from racial or ethnic minority.

SN 4.1.1 Determine Human Resource Requirements

M1	Days	To consider and approve change in manning document.
M2	Percent	Of total DOD civilians are SES.
M3	Percent	Of total DOD manning are civilians.
M4	Percent	Of total military personnel are officers.
M5	Percent	Of total officer manning are GOs/FOs.
M6	Weeks	To approve manpower change requests (backlogged).
M7	Days	In advance of need manpower requirements identified.

SN 4.1.2 Acquire, Train, Supply, and Transport Personnel

M1	Days	Between completion of training and arrival at unit of assignment.
M2	Dollars	For basic training per individual.
M3	Percent	Of Air Force personnel are college graduates.
M4	Percent	Of Army personnel are college graduates.
M5	Percent	Of civilian authorizations filled (have personnel assigned).
M6	Percent	Of Marine personnel are college graduates.
M7	Percent	Of military authorizations filled (have personnel assigned).
M8	Percent	Of Navy personnel are college graduates.
M9	Percent	Of personnel receive assignment to unit prior to completion of initial training.
M10	Weeks	Initial training rate achieved.

SN 4.2 Provide for Base Support and Services

M1	Days	To let procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M2	Percent	Of average commercial market costs paid for DOD Non-Developmental Items (NDI).
M3	Percent	Of pre-positioned WRM required to support TPFDD, pending resupply.

M4	Weeks	To let procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.
----	-------	---

SN 4.2.1 Determine National Military Support Infrastructure

M1	Days	To determine necessary support infrastructure.
M2	Percent	Of actual operations worldwide for which sustainment base/infrastructure adequate.
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs have assigned logistic support responsibilities to Service components and other commands.
M4	Percent	Of required infrastructure in place prior to crisis.
M5	Percent	Of support infrastructure capable of supporting surge requirements.
M6	Percent	Of sustainment facilities relocated to support particular contingency.

SN 4.2.2 Provide Depot Supply and Maintenance

M1	Days	For depot system to issue TCTO/MWO (after problem identified to depot system).
M2	Days	Of supply on-hand to support executed OPLAN.
M3	Months	To outfit below-the-line or new units with table of equipment allowance.
M4	Months	To respond to tasked CINC's industrial activities.
M5	Percent	Of days when ammunition (Class V) distribution is adequate to support operations.
M6	Percent	Of days when ammunition (Class V) distribution is adequate to support operations in primary theater.
M7	Percent	Of days when fuel (Class III) distribution is adequate to support operations.
M8	Percent	Of major end items have surge repair capacity in CONUS.
M9	Percent	Of OPLAN's scheduled requirements for supplies provided.
M10	Percent	Of personnel in training with clothing and equipment they will need in their assigned units.
M11	Percent	Of planned ammunition (Class V) delivered to theater forces at execution.
M12	Percent	Of repair facility's capacity in operation.
M13	Percent	Of required work force available to perform overhaul.
M14	Percent	Of theater personnel have full issue of clothing and protective gear.
M15	Days	To complete major overhaul of equipment.

SN 4.2.3 Control National Inventories and Movements

M1	Man-days	Lost per month because personnel in casual status (awaiting transportation).
M2	Percent	Of end items completely depleted under expected usage rates before industry reopens production.
M3	Percent	Of inventory items (valued from \$101 to \$5,000), lost.
M4	Percent	Of inventory items (valued under \$100 each), lost.
M5	Percent	Of inventory stock line items exceed expected five year usage.
M6	Percent	Of items in transit (valued over \$100,000) have in transit visibility (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of Service and CINC requirements in inventory stocks.
M8	Days	In advance of shortage possible shortage identified.

SN 4.2.4 Develop Sustainment Base

M1	Dollars	To prepare CONUS base for return to civil use.
M2	Months	To expand CONUS port facilities to handle container or breakbulk ships.
M3	Percent	Of construction material acquired or produced locally.
M4	Percent	Of military confinement facilities meet standards.
M5	Weeks	To build CONUS sustainment base facility.
M6	Years	Average age of sustaining base facilities.

13 September 1996

M7	Years	Average age of telecommunications infrastructure.
M8	Years	Average age of transportation infrastructure.
M9	Percent	Of total CONUS sustainment requirements met.

SN 4.2.5 Provide Defensewide Base Operations Support

M1	Days	To identify and marshal forces to restore unused standard runway to full operations.
M2	Percent	Of total procurement costs in contract administrative costs.
M3	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$100,001 to \$500,000.
M4	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$2,501 to \$100,000.
M5	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts over \$500,001.
M6	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts under \$2500 (micro-purchases).
M7	Months	To let procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.
M8	Percent	Of planned administrative support services available.
M9	Percent	Of planned capacity to process and issue supplies available.
M10	Percent	Of planned electronic communications links available.
M11	Percent	Of planned transportation available.
M12	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard fighter/attack suitable runway.
M13	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard intratheater airlift suitable runway.
M14	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard runway.
M15	Weeks	To let procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M16	Percent	Of planned geospatial products available.
M17	Months	To generate new geospatial products.
M18	Percent	Of geospatial products meet user requirements.

SN 4.2.6 Provide Management Headquarters

M1	Dollars	To maintain combatant command HQ, including personnel, systems, and rent (annually).
M2	Percent	Of manpower assigned to HQ meet all personnel requirements.
M3	Percent	Of Joint Headquarters located within their theater.
M4	Percent	Of Joint Headquarters manpower positions participating in DOD PPBS process.
M5	Weeks	To establish joint force headquarters.
M6	Percent	Of theater force assigned to headquarters.

SN 4.2.7 Coordinate Defensewide Legal Support

M1	Days	To provide legal opinion on international MOU, LOA, or Executive Agreement.
M2	Hours	For legal review of ROE change request.
M3	Percent	Of legal professionals are in deployable units.
M4	Weeks	To provide legal opinion on treaty.
M5	Percent	Of instances where access to legal support avoids delays in legal action.

SN 4.2.8 Establish Prisoner Control Policy

M1	Hours	To evacuate EPWs from initial capture to their final EPW compounds.
M2	Instances	Of law and order policy not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.
M3	Instances	Of shortfalls in EPW processing sites.
M4	Months	Since EPW policy last reviewed by legal personnel.
M5	Percent	Of EPW compounds cited for serious deficiencies by International Red Cross.

M6	Percent	Of EPW compounds guarded by security forces (versus combat troops).
M7	Percent	Of military confinement facilities certified by civilian certifying agency.
M8	Percent	Of EPWs for whom prison control policy is clear.

SN 4.3 Provide for Personnel Support

M1	Percent	Of personnel-complete initial service/contract obligation.
M2	Percent	Difference between assigned strength and authorized strength (military and civilian).
M3	Percent	Of authorized strength filled by assigned personnel (military and civilian).
M4	Percent	Of difference between authorized/assigned strength and present for duty strength.
M5	Percent	Of DOD positions filled by civilian employees or contractors.
M6	Percent	Of losses replaced by new personnel.
M7	Percent	Of personnel assigned to organization fully qualified according to individual position descriptions.
M8	Percent	Of personnel in CONUS qualified for assignment outside of CONUS
M9	Percent	Of personnel retained beyond initial service/contract obligation.
M10	Percent	Of personnel, in critical/essential occupational areas retained in service (military and civilian).
M11	Percent	Of positions filled by qualified personnel.
M12	Days	To replace personnel.

SN 4.3.1 Provide Personnel Management and Morale Support

M1	Percent	Of personnel involved in educational programs.
M2	Percent	Of personnel- complete initial service/contract obligation.
M3	Percent	Of personnel retained beyond initial service/contract obligation.
M4	Percent	Of personnel, in critical/essential occupational areas retained in service (military and civilian).

SN 4.3.2 Coordinate Defensewide Religious Support

M1	Percent	Of military member faith groups below DOD average for chaplain representation.
M2	Percent	Of religious faiths, accredited to minister to DOD, with no ministers on active duty.
M3	Percent	Of military personnel with access to religious services in their faith.

SN 4.3.3 Provide Defensewide Health Services

M1	Days	For CONUS hospital facilities to accommodate returning wounded and injured service members.
M2	Percent	Of military personnel, fit for duty.
M3	Percent	Personnel deployed meeting preparation for overseas movement requirements.
M4	Hours	For casualty to obtain "stabilizing" medical care.
M5	Days	For casualty to obtain "recuperative" medical care.

SN 4.4 Reconstitute National Forces and Means

M1	Days	To develop post-SIOP plan to support NMS.
M2	Days	To reconstitute post-SIOP force.
M3	Months	From S/T/M-Day, for recalled Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units to be certified prepared for combat.
M4	Months	From S/T/M-Day, for recalled Reserve Component combat units to be certified prepared for combat.
M5	Months	From S/T/M-Day, to field cadre division.

M6	Months	From S/T/M-Day, to recommission naval vessels recalled from mothball fleet.
M7	Months	To field last Army combat unit (with laid-up military assets).
M8	Months	To field last US Air Force combat squadron (with laid-up military assets).
M9	Months	To field last US Marine Corps combat unit (with laid-up military assets).
M10	Percent	Of OPLANs with reconstitution provisions.

SN 4.5 Set Sustainment Priorities

M1	Days	To designate primary theater.
M2	Days	To provide combatant commanders apportionment of below the line forces.
M3	Percent	Of below the line forces dual apportioned in JSCP.
M4	Percent	Of CS and CSS assignments to primary theater match combat forces.
M5	Percent	Of reviewed theater OPLANs with major deficiencies in sustainment (during planning cycle OPLAN review).
M6	Percent	Of strategic lift dual apportioned in JSCP.

SN 5 Provide Strategic Direction And Integration

M1	Days	To answer Combatant Command requests for guidance.
M2	Days	To revise and issue TPFDD after change in OPLAN at CINC level. .
M3	Hours	To publish changes by executing units after changes in OPLAN at JFC level. .
M4	Months	To update national (or multinational) published strategy after major shift in US midterm strategy.
M5	Months	To update national or multinational published strategy.
M6	Percent	Of national (or multinational) suggested changes to JSR, NMS, or other strategy development and strategy documents accepted.

SN 5.1 Operate and Manage Global Strategic Communications and Information Systems

M1	Minutes	To begin Decision Making (DM) Conference.
M2	Minutes	To begin transmitting FD EAM to bombers, tankers (PCL only) (availability of individual NCCS C4I systems).
M3	Minutes	To begin transmitting FM messages to bombers/tankers/ICBM's (availability of NMCS and CINC C4I systems).
M4	Minutes	To begin transmitting FM messages to bombers/tankers/ICBMs (availability of bomber/tanker/ICBM NCCS C4I systems).
M5	Minutes	To begin transmitting Situation Monitoring (SM), Threat Warning (TW), and Attack Assessment (AA) messages (availability of NCCS C4I systems).
M6	Minutes	To process and authenticate EAM for execution of preplanned options against fixed SIOP targets (ICBM/SSBN/Bomber crews).
M7	Minutes	To process RECORD COPY Emergency Action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M8	Minutes	To process VOICE Emergency action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M9	Minutes	To transmit EAM to Bombers for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M10	Minutes	To transmit EAM to ICBMs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M11	Minutes	To transmit EAM to SSBNs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M12	Percent	Of addressees received messages.

SN 5.1.1 Communicate Strategic Decisions/Information

M1	Minutes	To begin sending messages (Queuing time delay).
M2	Minutes	To process RECORD COPY Emergency Action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M3	Minutes	To process VOICE Emergency action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M4	Minutes	To transmit EAM to Bombers for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M5	Minutes	To transmit EAM to ICBMs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M6	Minutes	To transmit EAM to SSBNs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M7	Percent	Of addressees received messages.
M8	Percent	Of messages obtained outside normal communications channels.
M9	Percent	Of classified messages sent via channels with less than required level of security.
M9	Percent	Of data received (within established timelines).

13 September 1996

M10	Hours	For C2 systems to transmit order worldwide.
M11	Y/N	During Planning and execution no data transfer between networked stations is responsible for a supporting command failing to meet a request/requirement.
M12	Percent	Of involved units are listed addressees.

SN 5.1.2 Manage National Military C4 Systems Worldwide for Communicating Strategic Information

M1	Minutes	To begin Decision Making (DM) Conference.
M2	Minutes	To begin transmitting FD EAMs to bombers/tankers (Positive Control Launch only) and ICBMs (availability of individual NCCS C4I systems).
M3	Minutes	To begin transmitting Force Management (FM) messages to bombers/tankers and ICBMs (availability of bomber/tanker/ICBM NCCS C4I systems).
M4	Minutes	To begin transmitting Force Management (FM) messages to bombers/tankers and ICBMs (delay in availability of NMCS and CINC C4I systems).
M5	Minutes	To begin transmitting Situation Monitoring (SM) Threat Warning (TW)/Attack Assessment(AA) messages (availability of NCCS C4I systems).
M6	Minutes	To transmit FLASH message traffic to recipients.
M7	Percent	Of articles on netted system available in heavy demand environment.
M8	Percent	Of C2 nodes have minimum required communications capabilities.
M9	Percent	Of communications networks critical to operations fully operational.
M10	Percent	Of communications outages equipped with adequate redundant communications paths to ensure timely receipt of record traffic.
M11	Percent	Of communications systems provide access by intelligence personnel to consumers
M12	Percent	Of communications systems remain operational during Intelligence Cycle
M13	Percent	Of DOD long-haul communications channels saturated.
M14	Percent	Of information system interfaces require information scanning, retyping, reformatting, or other non-direct translation methods.
M15	Percent	Of operational C4 networks and nodes available.
M16	Percent	Of operational C4 networks and nodes reliable.
M17	Percent	Of surge capacity available in DOD long haul communications.
M18	Percent	Of traffic sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.

SN 5.1.3 Maintain Global Strategic Military Information and Force Status

M1	Minutes	To access and display shared local data bases.
M2	Minutes	To access and display shared remote data bases.
M3	Minutes	To distribute reports to required organizations (after initial receipt).
M4	Minutes	To enter most current information on status of forces.
M5	Minutes	To process status information and disseminate (turnaround time).
M6	Percent	Of audited reports accurate.
M7	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel show current status.
M8	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to agencies within specified time limits.
M9	Percent	Percent of currency in generated movement information in GTN.

SN 5.1.4 Monitor Worldwide Strategic Situation

M1	Hours	To update information on other joint force, other military forces, and non-DOD agencies operating adjacent to crisis area.
M2	Instances	Of CJCS learning of emerging Pol-Mil event from source outside joint staff.
M3	Minutes	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.

13 September 1996

M4	Minutes	To respond to a request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M5	Percent	Of joint staff POL-Mil specialists and subspecialists focus primarily on worldwide rather than theater strategic situations.

SN 5.2 Reassess Worldwide and Regional Strategic Environment

M1	Days	To complete JSR after submission of combatant commander's input.
M2	Hours	To develop strategic options (after convening CAT).
M3	Instances	Of major deficiencies (from a theater perspective) in Defense Planning Guidance.
M4	Months	To complete review of strategic options.
M5	Months	To update regional security strategy .
M6	Percent	Of combatant commander's inputs to JSR accepted by The Joint Staff.
M7	Percent	Of international agreements expired in past year for failure to review.
M8	Percent	Of political events occur with available options.

SN 5.2.1 Conduct Joint Military Net Assessments

M1	Percent	Of above-the-line forces covered by JMNA.
M2	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M3	Months	To update the JMNA (when required).

SN 5.2.2 Conduct National Military Strategy Review

M1	Days	Delay publishing Defense Planning Guidance.
M2	Instances	Of crises where NMS guidance not adequate.
M3	Percent	Of CINC recommendations forwarded for additions to areas covered by NMS.
M4	Percent	Of enemy actions, operations, or campaigns accurately forecasted.
M5	Percent	Of identified strategic sequels had developed COAs.
M6	Percent	Of issues generated by CINCs in JSR.
M7	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M8	Percent	Of theater identified major deficiencies, corrected in national military strategy review.
M9	Weeks	To prepare and forward proposal to change strategic forces and force postures (after issuance of NIE).
M10	Weeks	To review and respond to a JSR.
M11	Instances	Of National Military Strategy not adequately translating policy guidance into national military objectives.

SN 5.2.3 Review Operation Plans

M1	Hours	To provide strategic options (after CJCS issues Warning Order).
M2	Percent	Of OPLANs have identified assets shortfalls.
M3	Weeks	To propose changes to strategic forces and force postures (after issuance of NIE).

SN 5.2.4 Decide on Need for Military Action or Change

M1	Days	To promulgate Execute Order (after transmittal of CJCS Warning Order or Alert Order).
M2	Hours	To complete Phase II (Crisis Assessment) when combatant commander considers crisis time sensitive.
M3	Instances	Of CAP returning to Phase I from Phase II or canceled, only to return to Phase II.
M4	Incidents	Of international events, soliciting US military response, occur without a preplanned option.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Of expected (preplanned) I&W warning period available to combatant commander (after issuance of warning or alert order).
M6	Percent	Of political events occur with options available.

SN 5.3 Determine National Military Strategic Direction

M1	Hours	To complete accepted Staff estimate (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels (during execution).

SN 5.3.1 Issue Strategic Planning Guidance

M1	Hours	To complete accepted Staff estimate (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (during execution).

SN 5.3.2 Develop and Analyze Multinational and National Military Strategy Options

M1	Hours	To approve or deny requests for changes to ROE.
M2	Incidents	Of misunderstood ROE.
M3	Days	To submit COA's (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M4	Percent	Of accepted COA's have feasible alternatives submitted.

SN 5.3.3 Select or Modify Multinational and National Military Strategy, Plans, and Other Strategic Actions

M1	Hours	To complete accepted Staff Estimate (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (during execution).

SN 5.3.4 Review Strategic Options and Recommendations with NCA and Other Officials and Adjust

M1	Days	To submit COA's (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M2	Hours	To complete review of strategic options.
M3	Hours	To develop and provide strategic options (after CJCS issues Warning Order).
M4	Months	To complete review of strategic options.
M5	Percent	Of accepted COA's have feasible alternatives submitted.

SN 5.3.5 Set Worldwide Priorities and Allocate Resources

M1	Alternatives	Provided to the President.
M2	Alternatives	Wargamed against projected threat(s).
M3	Months	To update SecDef "Forces For" Paper.
M4	Percent	Change in defense budget for costliest alternative.
M5	Percent	Difference between optimum support force structure and actual support structure.
M6	Percent	Of amendments attached to allocation of national and Service resources, respond to clarification requests.
M7	Percent	Of current budget, actually required to support least costly alternative.
M8	Percent	Of subordinate headquarters traffic to Joint Staff J-3 requested clarification of allocation guidance.
M9	Weeks	To allocate national and Service resources (after receipt of NCA/JCS guidance).
M10	Weeks	Delay in publishing JSCP.
M11	Weeks	Delay in publishing NMS.
M12	Years	To achieve capabilities being programmed.

SN 5.3.5.1 Produce a National Military Strategy

M1	Alternatives	Provided to the President.
----	--------------	----------------------------

13 September 1996

M2	Alternatives	Wargamed against projected threat(s).
M3	Percent	Change in defense budget for costliest alternative.
M4	Percent	Difference between optimum support force structure and actual support structure.
M5	Percent	Of combatant commander's strategic issues addressed in NMS.
M6	Percent	Of unclassified NMS in agreement with classified NMS.
M7	Percent	Of current budget, actually required to support least costly alternative.
M8	Weeks	Delay in publishing NMS.
M9	Months	To complete new draft of NMS (after receipt of NCA strategic guidance or Defense policy guidance).
M10	Years	To achieve capabilities being programmed.

SN 5.3.5.2 Produce a Capabilities-Based National Strategic Plan and Assign Forces

M1	Days	To deliver draft "Forces For" Paper to OSD.
M2	Instances	Of error-based changes issued to SecDef "Forces For" Paper.
M3	Months	To produce final OPLANs based (on last JSCP).
M4	Months	To update SecDef "Forces For" Papers.
M5	Percent	Of JSCP forces dual apportioned to major planning tasks.
M6	Percent	Of JSCP tasked plans call for deterrent force option.
M7	Percent	Of JSCP tasked plans require more than SelRes callup of RC.
M8	Weeks	Delay in publishing JSCP.

SN 5.3.5.3 Allocate Forces and Resources at Execution

M1	Hours	To produce force allocation.
M2	Percent	Of amendments (attached to allocation of national and Service resources) respond to requests for clarification.
M3	Percent	Of initial combatant commander's force requests met.
M4	Percent	Of initial force allocation modified at end of first week.
M5	Percent	Of subordinate headquarters traffic to Joint Staff J-3, requested clarification of allocation guidance.
M6	Weeks	To allocate national and Service resources (after receipt of NCA/CJCS guidance).

SN 5.4 Provide Strategic Direction to Forces Worldwide

M1	Hours	To provide strategic direction to combatant commands, after receipt of Warning Order (in crisis planning).
M2	Percent	Of assigned and supporting forces commence operations on time.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commands request clarification of strategic direction.
M4	Percent	Of issued changes caused by missing or incorrect data or entries.

SN 5.4.1 Prepare and Issue Strategic Estimates, Priorities, and Joint Operation Plans

M1	Days	To develop, coordinate, and promulgate guidance and policy complying with National Guidance and Presidential directives.
M2	Hours	SOF forces conduct cross-border operations (prior to commencement of hostilities).
M3	Hours	To identify USTC controlled forces and issue Warning Order (following receipt of CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	To issue USTC Deployment Order to TCCs (following CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To issue USTC Deployment Pre-Order to TCCs (following CJCS Warning Order).
M6	Hours	To submit strategic direction for approval (after receipt of Warning Order).

13 September 1996

M7	Months	To develop combatant commander's OPLANs/OPORDs in accordance with Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
M8	Months	To develop Emergency Actions Procedures (EAP)--USSTRATCOM in support of annual EAP-CJCS revision.
M9	Months	To develop Theater Support Plans.
M10	Percent	Of operations in OPLAN conform to US and International Law.
M11	Percent	Of ROE conform to requirements.
M12	Percent	Of ROE consistent with current policy.
M13	Instances	Of ROE exceptions determined outside established procedures.

SN 5.4.2 Coordinate Support for Unified, Joint, and Multinational Operations

M1	Days	To refine TPFDD (in Crisis Action Planning).
M2	Months	To complete OPLAN coordination, from Draft OPLAN to final approval (in Deliberate Planning).

SN 5.4.3 Synchronize and Manage Global Operations and Resources

M1	Hours	To produce feasible TPFDD, after issuance of Warning Order.
M2	Months	To complete approved OPLAN with TPFDD on shelf, after issuance of JSCP.
M3	Months	To establish rotation policy.
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs reviewed within last 24 months.
M5	Percent	Of TPFDD units arrive IAW RDD.

SN 5.4.4 Prepare and Issue CJCS Orders

M1	Hours	To promulgate alert order to subordinate headquarters.
M2	Hours	To promulgate CJCS execute orders to subordinate headquarters.
M3	Hours	To promulgate warning order to subordinate headquarters.

SN 5.5 Coordinate Worldwide Information Warfare (IW)

M1	Days	To reach agreement within interagency on IW plan (after onset of a crisis).
M2	Hours	To issue IW policy (after onset of crisis).
M3	Percent	Of friendly operations disrupted.
M4	Percent	Of integrated IW operations completed as planned.

SN 5.6 Provide Public Affairs (PA) Worldwide

M1	Days	To provide Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or defense major newsworthy event.
M3	Hours	To provide Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) after crisis event.
M4	Hours	To provide to press initial DOD or Service position on breaking news story.
M5	Instances	Of errors in released information.
M6	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials accepted.
M7	Percent	Of media support requests answered.
M8	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M9	Hours	To answer requests for information from organizations, media, and private citizens.
M10	Hours	To answer requests for information from organizations.
M11	Hours	To answer requests for information from media.
M12	Days	To answer requests for information from private citizens.

SN 6 Conduct Mobilization

M1	Days	Until MS/CRC ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M2	Days	To process RC units through MS/CRC.
M3	Percent	Of required initial mobilization reports submitted on time.
M4	Percent	Of units arrive at Mobilization Station by LAD.
M5	Percent	Of units arrive at Mobilization Station before EAD.
M6	Months	Since installation capability plans for mobilization reviewed.
M7	Percent	Increase in CONUS Replacement Centers achieved.
M8	Percent	Of selected reservists, called to active duty early, meet requirements (right people for job).
M9	Percent	Of key personnel report within planning timelines.
M10	Percent	Of alert and activation messages, dispatched within timelines.

SN 6.1 Prepare for Mobilization

M1	Percent	Of selected reservists, called to active duty early, meet current requirements (right people for job).
M2	Percent	Of OPLANs have specific 200K breakout by uniformed Service and combatant commander.
M3	Percent	Of JSCP OPLANs, that require partial mobilization, include breakdown of that mobilization by uniformed Service and combatant commander.
M4	Percent	Of selected reservists, contacted.
M5	Percent	Of selected reservists, not contacted because of incorrect or incomplete addresses.
M6	Percent	Of reservists report fit for duty.
M7	Months	Since review of installation capability plans for mobilization.
M8	Hours	To complete first USR (after alert).
M9	Percent	Of real property maintenance and new construction, fully funded.
M10	Emergency Requisitions	Dropped at M-Day.
M11	Months	Since last test of alert notification plans.

SN 6.1.1 Develop and Evaluate Installation Plans, Policies, Procedures, and Systems for Mobilization

M1	Months	Since review of installation capability plans for mobilization.
M2	Percent	Of real property maintenance and new construction, fully funded.
M3	Percent	Increase in CONUS base needed to support emergency and mobilization requirements.

SN 6.1.2 Develop and Exercise RC Unit and Individual Mobilization Plans

M1	Months	Since last test of alert notification plans.
M2	Percent	Of mobilized personnel report within established criteria.
M3	Percent	Of personnel are knowledgeable about own mobilization and reporting requirements.

SN 6.1.3 Participate in Joint Operation Planning to Support Mobilization

M1	Percent	Of JSCP OPLANs requiring partial mobilization include breakdown of mobilization by uniformed Service and combatant commander.
M2	Percent	Of JSCP OPLANs requiring 200K callup include breakdown of mobilization by uniformed Service and combatant commander.

SN 6.1.4 Increase Readiness of Key Mobilization Personnel

M1	Percent	Of selected reservists ordered to active duty report on time.
M2	Percent	Of selected reservists, contacted.
M3	Percent	Of selected reservists, not contacted because of incorrect or incomplete addresses.
M4	Percent	Of reservists report fit for duty.
M5	Hours	For selected USTRANSCOM staff members to be prepared (to Service standards) for deployment to meet supported CINC request.
M6	Hours	For Component Commands to identify and assess readiness of units selected for mobilization.

SN 6.1.5 Maintain Current Operational Readiness Status of Units

M1	Percent	Difference between last peacetime USR and alert USR.
M2	Percent	Difference between most recent peacetime USR and current evaluation by higher authorities.
M3	Hours	To complete first USR (after alert).

SN 6.2 Alert Forces for Mobilization

M1	Days	Until MS/CRC ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M2	Days	To process RC units through MS/CRC.
M3	Percent	Of required initial mobilization reports, submitted on time.
M4	Hours	To submit initial mobilization reports.
M5	Percent	Of key personnel report within planning timelines.
M6	Percent	Of alert and activation messages, dispatched within timelines.
M7	Percent	Of notified units, able to alert all personnel within 24 hours.
M8	Percent	Of units, notified by non-DOD communications links.
M9	Hours	To notify Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU) members selected for activation (from time of activation decision).
M10	Hours	To notify Transportation Component Command reservists selected for activation (from time of activation decision).

SN 6.2.1 Alert Units and Individuals of Pending Mobilization

M1	Percent	Of units, notified by non-DOD communications links.
M2	Percent	Of key personnel reported within planning timelines.
M3	Percent	Of alert messages, dispatched within timelines.
M4	Percent	Of alert messages, returned for incomplete or inaccurate addresses.
M5	Percent	Of notified units, able to alert all of their personnel within 24 hours.
M6	Hours	To alert JTRU members of possible recall (from time of initial force list determination).
M7	Hours	To alert Transportation Component Command selected reservists of possible recall (from time of initial force list determination).

SN 6.2.2 Prepare HS and MS/CRC for Reception of Activated Units and Individuals

M1	Days	Until MS/CRCs ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M2	Hours	Until HS ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M3	Days	To process RC units through MS/CRC.

M4	Hours	To initiate and process orders to activate JTRU members (from time of notification).
M5	Percent	Of personnel in deployable health (medical and dental).

SN 6.2.3 Activate Key Personnel.

M1	Percent	Of key personnel reported within planning timelines.
M2	Percent	Of activation messages, dispatched within timelines.
M3	Percent	Of activation messages, returned for incomplete or inaccurate addresses.
M4	Hours	To notify JTRU members selected for activation (from time of activation decision).
M5	Hours	To notify Transportation Component Command reservists selected for activation (from time of activation decision).

SN 6.2.4 Conduct Preparatory Administrative, Logistic, Medical, and Readiness Activities

M1	Percent	Of initial mobilization reports, submitted on time.
M2	Hours	To submit initial mobilization reports.

SN 6.3 Mobilize at HS

M1	Percent	Of required training programs have qualified and sufficient training personnel (at mobilization).
M2	Emergency Requisitions	Dropped at M-Day.
M3	Months	Since last review of training and support plans.
M4	Days	To complete inventory.
M5	Percent	Of required inventory items, NOB.
M6	Percent	Of mobilized units, ready to move to MS upon callup.
M7	Days	To assemble forces.
M8	Hours	To report readiness status of personnel, equipment, and training.
M9	Percent	Of Units report training deficiencies.
M10	Percent	Of identified training deficiencies, covered by established training plans.

SN 6.3.1 Assemble Forces and Report Status

M1	Days	To assemble forces.
M2	Percent	Of OPLANs contain RC personnel to support plan.
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs identify RC personnel to move force (i.e., AMC, MTMC, MSC and HQ USTRANSCOM requirements).
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs identify RC personnel for mobilization and deployment (e.g., medical, dental, security, mob station staff).
M5	Percent	Of OPLANs identify RC personnel to deploy (e.g., units and individuals required by supported and supporting CINCs and included in TPFDD).
M6	Percent	Of OPLANs identify number of RC personnel to backfill (i.e., units and individuals to replace deployers to continue essential services in CONUS and OCONUS).
M7	Hours	To report readiness status of personnel, equipment, and training.
M8	Percent	Of personnel report fully equipped and trained.
M9	Percent	Of activated JTRU report within recall criteria.
M10	Percent	Of activated members report within recall criteria.
M11	Hours	For sufficient activated members to report to allow expanded operations to begin.

M12	Hours	For sufficient activated members to report to allow expanded operations to be sustained.
M13	Percent	Of activated members reported for duty within individual unit designated operational capability standards.
M14	Days	For activated members to report for duty.
M15	Percent	Of activated JTRU physically fit and current in job qualification based on UMD.
M16	Percent	Of activated members physically fit and current in job qualification based on Unit Manning Document (UMD).

SN 6.3.2 Conduct Specified Training

M1	Percent	Of required training programs have qualified and sufficient training personnel (at mobilization).
M2	Percent	Of units report training deficiencies.
M3	Percent	Of identified training deficiencies, covered by established training plans.
M4	Percent	Of activated JTRU meet minimal mobilization task within recall criteria.
M5	Hours	For activated JTRU to meet minimal mobilization task.
M6	Percent	Of reserve units meet minimal mobilization task within recall criteria.
M7	Hours	For reserve unit to meet minimal mobilization task.

SN 6.3.3 Requisition MS Training and Support Requirements

M1	Emergency Requisitions	Dropped at M-Day.
M2	Months	Since review of training and support plans.

SN 6.3.4 Transfer HS Property and Prepare for Movement to MS

M1	Hours	To complete inventory.
M2	Percent	Of inventoried items, NOB.
M3	Percent	Of mobilized units, ready to move to MS upon callup.
M4	Percent	Of units depart for MS on time.

SN 6.4 Move to Mobilization Station

M1	Percent	Of units arrive at Mobilization Station by LAD.
M2	Percent	Of units arrive at Mobilization Station before EAD.
M3	Percent	Of TPFDD planned transportation, actually required.

SN 6.4.1 Develop Requirements/Movement Plans from HS to MS (or POE)

M1	Days	To develop movement plans from HS to MS or POE.
M2	Percent	Of deployment requests have missing information.
M3	Percent	Of deployment requests, adjusted at execution.
M4	Percent	Of deployment requests, furnished in timely manner.
M5	Percent	Of requests for non-organic transportation assets, provided during planning.
M6	Percent	Of unit lift requirements from HS to POE exceed established TPFDD.
M7	Hours	For receipt of information on unit movement requirements.
M8	Percent	Of deployment requests have fatal errors.

SN 6.4.2 Provide Transportation for Mobilized Units and Individuals

M1	Hours	To complete movement.
M2	Percent	Of unit equipment, shifted to common carrier in order to arrive at MS IAW planned arrival dates and times.

M3	Percent	Of units requested additional transportation in order to arrive at MS or POE IAW planned arrival dates and times.
M4	Percent	Of units using programmed (non-organic) transportation to move to Mobilization Station or POE arrived IAW planned arrival dates and times (during execution).

SN 6.4.3 Provide Mobilization Movements Control

M1	Percent	Of surface movements delayed due to traffic bottlenecks.
M2	Percent	Of movement lack information input from state transited.

SN 6.5 Prepare Units and Individuals at Mobilization Station (MS) for Deployment

M1	Percent	Of administrative services, provided within planned timelines.
M2	Percent	Of chaplain services, provided within planned timelines.
M3	Percent	Of RCU, retirees, and IRR fillers, processed within planned timelines.
M4	Percent	Of health services, provided within planned timelines.
M5	Percent	Of legal services, provided within planned timelines.
M6	Percent	Of financial services, provided within planned timelines.

SN 6.5.1 Receive and Provide Base and Operations Support for Units and Individuals

M1	Percent	Of units, fully ready and validated for deployment.
M2	Percent	Of units, not validated because of logistics shortages.
M3	Percent	Of units, not validated because of personnel shortages.
M4	Percent	Of units, not validated because of training deficiencies.
M5	Percent	Of units require operational readiness training in order to meet minimum readiness for deployment criteria.
M6	Percent	Of units with training shortfalls, trained in time to meet deployment timelines.

SN 6.5.2 Validate RC Units for Deployment

M1	Percent	Of units require reallocation or reassignment of personnel to meet minimum readiness for deployment criteria.
M2	Percent	Of units, not validated because of materiel shortages.

SN 6.5.3 Cross-Level and Redistribute Personnel and Equipment

M1	Percent	Of units, with personnel shortfalls, cross-leveled to meet deployment timelines.
M2	Percent	Of units, with materiel shortfalls, cross-leveled to meet deployment timelines.
M3	Days	Units remain in a deficiency status awaiting personnel or equipment.
M4	Percent	Of units deploy with excess personnel or equipment.
M5	Percent	Of units, not validated because of manning shortages.
M6	Percent	Of units, not validated because of equipment shortages.
M7	Percent	Of units, not validated because of personnel shortages.
M8	Percent	Of units, not validated because of training deficiencies.

SN 6.5.4 Train Units and Individuals to Minimum Operationally Ready/POR Status

M1	Percent	Of units require operational readiness training to meet minimum readiness for deployment criteria.
M2	Percent	Of units, with training shortfalls, trained in time to meet deployment timelines.
M3	Percent	Of units, fully ready and validated for deployment.
M4	Percent	Of units, not validated because of training deficiencies.

SN 6.5.5 Secure Clearance for Deploying Nonvalidated Units

13 September 1996

M1	Percent	Of nonvalidated units receive combatant commander's approval for deployment in time to meet deployment timelines.
M2	Percent	Of units fail to meet gaining combatant commander's validation requirements.

SN 6.6 Mobilize CONUS Sustaining Base

M1	Percent	Of existing posts, camps, and stations, sufficient to receive, house, supply, and train deploying units.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in mobilization stations.
M3	Percent	Increase in training base, achieved.
M4	Percent	Increase in CONUS Replacement Centers, achieved.
M5	Percent	Increase in logistics support, achieved.
M6	Percent	Increase in health services support, was achieved.
M7	Percent	Increase in transportation support, achieved.
M8	Percent	Increase in C2, was achieved.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 30 days.
M10	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 45 days.
M11	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 90 days.
M12	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 12 months.

SN 6.6.1 Expand Mobilization Stations

M1	Percent	Of existing induction centers, reception centers, training centers, and schools, sufficient to train deploying forces.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in mobilization stations.
M3	Percent	Increase in CONUS Replacement Centers, achieved.
M4	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization stations, corrected within 30 days.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization stations, corrected within 45 days.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization stations, corrected within 60 days.

SN 6.6.2 Expand Training Base

M1	Percent	Of existing induction centers, reception centers, training centers, and schools, sufficient to train mobilizing forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in training base, achieved without new acquisition or construction.
M3	Percent	Increase in training base, achieved.
M4	Weeks	Before existing training base can absorb additional recruits.
M5	Months	Before expanded training base can absorb additional recruits.
M6	Months	To correct shortfall in training base.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in training base, corrected within 30 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in training base, corrected within 6 months.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in training base, corrected within 12 months.

SN 6.6.3 Expand Logistic Support

M1	Percent	Of existing maintenance systems, facilities, supply, and service support, sufficient to meet deployment/employment requirements of total force
M2	Days	To correct initial shortfall in logistics support.
M3	Months	To correct shortfall in logistics support of AC/RC force at mobilization.
M4	Years	To correct shortfall in logistics support of mobilized force.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 30 days.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 60 days.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 90 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 6 months.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 12 months.

SN 6.6.4 Expand Health Service Support

M1	Percent	Of existing medical, dental, optometry, veterinary, and preventive medical support, sufficient to meet deployment/employment requirements of force
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in health service support.
M3	Percent	Of shortfall in health service support, corrected within 30 days.
M4	Percent	Of shortfall in health service support, corrected within 45 days.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in health service support, corrected within 60 days.

SN 6.6.5 Expand Transportation System

M1	Percent	Of FSS, MPS, RRF ships met activation schedule.
M2	Percent	Of CRAF airframes with aircrews, available within required time limits.
M3	Days	To obtain rail cars, trucks, and buses from commercial sources (at S-Day, T-Day or M-Day).
M4	Percent	Of required domestic port stevedore service, in place.
M5	Months	Since industrial preparedness transportation objectives, reviewed.
M6	Months	Since Service transportation preparedness programs, reviewed.
M7	Percent	Of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) shipping assets broken out on time.
M9	Percent	Of properly configured DOD organic transport assets, augmented by appropriate commercial carriers capabilities, meet RLD/ALDs during execution.
M10	Percent	Of assured seaport capability, including stevedore services, available to meet TPFDD ALDs (during execution).
M11	Percent	Of commercial transportation provided as agreed.

SN 6.6.6 Expand Other Support

M1	Percent	Of existing family assistance, legal, security/law enforcement, chaplain, finance, and public affairs support meet deployment requirements.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in other support.
M3	Percent	Of C2 traffic, sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.
M4	Percent	Of DOD long-haul communications channels, saturated.
M5	Percent	Of forces, under C2 from callup to departure from MS.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in other support, corrected within 30 days.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in other support, corrected within 45 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in other support, corrected within 60 days.

SN 6.6.7 Plan and Maintain Industrial Base Preparedness

M1	Percent	Of existing industrial base prepared to reconstitute US armed forces.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in industrial base.
M3	Months	Since industrial preparedness objectives, reviewed.
M4	Months	Since Service preparedness programs, reviewed.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 30 days.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 45 days.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 60 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 12 months.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 24 months.

SN 6.7 Provide Command and Control over Mobilized Units and Individuals

M1	Percent	Of forces, under C2 from callup to departure from MS.
M2	Days	For IMA to come under command and control of gaining unit.
M3	Hours	To change combatant command assignment of mobilizing units upon callup.

M4	Percent	Of mobilized units called to active duty without their common RC command headquarters.
----	---------	--

SN 7 Conduct Force Development

M1	Percent	Of multinational strategy force apportionment requests, met in the JSCP.
M2	Percent	Of national military force apportionment requests, met in the JSCP.
M3	Percent	Of national security strategy force apportionment requests, met in the JSCP.
M4	Percent	Of officers assigned to joint commands/HQs who completed recommended education courses.
M5	Months	To revise and approve joint doctrine/concepts.
M6	Years	To develop new major systems.

SN 7.1 Formulate Joint and Service Concepts, Doctrine, and Requirements

M1	Months	To develop and submit a Mission Needs Statement.
M2	Percent	Of changes to joint, combined, or multinational doctrine originate at national level.
M3	Percent	Of new concepts, tested in national level exercises.
M4	Percent	Of prioritized solution sets accepted by JROC
M5	Percent	Of proposed new concepts, accepted by CJCS and Services without major changes.
M6	Weeks	From submission of a Service needs statement to approval or rejection by the JROC.
M7	Weeks	To categorize combatant command, joint, and Service needs.
M8	Weeks	To coordinate integrated and prioritized list.
M9	Weeks	To develop and provide new solution sets to the CJCS.
M10	Months	Since top down guidance reviewed.

SN 7.1.1 Issue Top-down Strategic Guidance

M1	Weeks	Between Chairman's submission of Roles and Missions and issuance of revised top-down guidance.
M2	Years	Out, planning guidance identifies materiel changes.

SN 7.1.2 Develop Joint and Service Warfighting and Other Concepts, Doctrine, and TTP

M1	Percent	Of new concepts, tested in national level exercises.
M2	Percent	Of proposed new concepts, accepted by CJCS and Services without major changes.
M3	Percent	Of approved concepts for which current doctrine exists.
M4	Months	To develop and approve new doctrine.

SN 7.1.3 Determine Needs and Solutions

M1	Months	Since cost-benefit analysis of existing solution sets.
M2	Months	To develop and provide new solution sets to CJCS.
M3	Months	After exercise/operation to analyze lessons learned.
M4	Percent	Of prioritized solution sets, accepted by JROC.
M5	Percent	Of submitted new solution sets, accepted.
M6	Weeks	To develop and submit a Mission Needs Statement.

SN 7.1.4 Document Requirements and Solutions

M1	Percent	Of combatant command commanders' inputs, integrated and prioritized.
M2	Percent	Of line numbers/line items changed during coordination process.
M3	Percent	Of Service needs statements, not accepted or rejected within 12 months.
M4	Weeks	To categorize combatant command, joint, and Service needs.
M5	Weeks	To coordinate Integrated and Prioritized List (IPL).

13 September 1996

M6	Weeks	To receive approval or rejection by the JROC, after submission of a Service needs statement .
----	-------	---

SN 7.2 Conduct Research and Development

M1	Percent	Of approved R&D projects backlogged for funding.
M2	Percent	Of basic research, linked to operational concepts or needs.
M3	Percent	Of nation's systems and technology production capacity (at all tiers) subject to assessment and tracking systems.
M4	Percent	Of projects, transition from basic research to technology development.
M5	Percent	Of projects, transition from technology development to advanced engineering demonstration.
M6	Percent	Of R & D projects, transition to developmental implementation.
M7	Percent	Of R & D funding, spent on evaluation of non-US end items.
M8	Percent	Of DOD R&D funding spent on evaluation of NDI products.
M9	Percent	Of DOD R&D programs duplicative of other government or private research.
M10	Percent	Of R&D represents a coordinated effort between and among various resource sources: DOD Labs; National Labs; Industry; Academe.
M11	Percent	Of T & E joint.
M12	Years	To fielding from initiation of R & D program.
M13	Percent	Of R & D coming from private sector.
M14	Percent	Of R & D projects with non-DOD applications.

SN 7.2.1 Conduct Basic Research

M1	Months	To develop critical enabling technology.
M2	Percent	Improvement in desired capability.
M3	Percent	Of 6.1 account programs, continued after management review.
M4	Percent	Of 6.2 account programs, continued after management review.
M5	Percent	Of 6.3 account programs, continued after management review.
M6	Percent	Of basic research conducted in a cooperative manner (between and among DOD Labs; National Labs; Industrial, and Academic Sources).
M7	Percent	Of critical enabling technologies with established DOD processes to track and assess their development.
M8	Percent	Of critical enabling technology development dependent on foreign sources (for business proprietary or national critical technology policy reasons).
M9	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs, carried out in universities.
M10	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs, carried out in-house.
M11	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs pay off within ten years.
M12	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs pay off within twenty years.
M13	Percent	Of Federal investment in basic research, DOD 6.1 funded.
M14	Percent	Of projects ultimately improve capability needed in fleet/field forces.
M15	Percent;	Of critical enabling technologies have identified development constraints.
M16	Years	For DOD 6.1 program to pay off.
M17	Years	To achieve stated objectives.
M18	Percent	Of R & D projects with non-DOD applications.

SN 7.2.2 Integrate Capabilities and Prioritize R&D or Acquisition Programs

M1	Dollars	Annual investment in Foreign Comparative Testing.
M2	Instances	Of Defense Technology Objectives identified for given year.
M3	Instances	Of problems (constraints) in timely development of required and validated systems and technologies.
M4	Instances	Of Strategic Research Objectives identified for given year.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Of ARPA funding, focuses on critical technologies underpinning the 20-year military vision.
M6	Percent	Of ARPA projects, directly track to combatant command warfighting needs.
M7	Percent	Of DOD systems and processes have procedures to map down to (and validate) mission area analysis needs.
M8	Percent	Of FFRDCs and UARCs work centers on institution's core concept.
M9	Percent	Of programs directly tied to Defense Technology Objectives.
M10	Percent	Of programs directly tied to Strategic Research Objectives.
M11	Percent	Of systems and technology development centers, assessed by DOD systems and processes to minimize program duplication.

SN 7.2.3 Conduct Demonstration, Engineering Development, and Production

M1	Percent	Of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) have active combatant command participation.
M2	Percent	Of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), taken to production.
M3	Years	For Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to enter production.
M4	Percent	Of DOD major acquisition programs use Commercial Technology Insertion Program.
M5	Percent	Of foreign produced technologies, components, and systems under DOD consideration, subject to processes to establish, validate, and justify funding profiles.
M6	Percent	Of major procurements are FFP.
M7	Percent	Of major procurements, competed.
M8	Percent	Of NEPA, RCRA, and CERCLA requirements for technology development, production, life cycle maintenance, and demil/disposal (for all DOD systems) have assessment systems and processes.
M9	Percent	Of new major acquisitions apply commercial practices.
M10	Percent	Of projects meet stated Service or Joint Mission or Support Area requirements.
M11	Percent	Of systems development programs make use of all available (all Service) development and production capabilities.
M12	Years	To progress from concept exploration through EMD and production.

SN 7.2.4 Conduct Testing

M1	Instances	Of coordination problems (constraints) to effective and efficient planning and use of Joint testing (vice Service peculiar testing).
M2	Instances	Of problems (constraints) in coordination of range and test facilities use for joint and Service DT & E/OT & E programs.
M3	Months	To compare Joint and Service acquisition test programs' lessons learned between DOD agencies.
M4	Percent	Of DT & E/OT & E programs, conducted using combined processes and methodologies.
M5	Percent	Of potential major acquisition programs feature significant OT&E early involvement in acquisition program development.
M6	Percent	Of programs fail testing and are canceled.
M7	Percent	Of projects meet stated requirement to pass Milestone Approval.
M8	Percent	Of Service and Joint OT & E test programs (for validated mission area requirements), validated using existing systems and processes.
M9	Percent	Of Service DT & E/OT & E test facility, simulation, and modeling capabilities subject to systems and processes to minimize duplication.

M10	Percent	Of Service DT &E/OT & E modeling capabilities duplicate other Service capabilities.
M11	Percent	Of Service DT &E/OT & E modeling capabilities duplicate other Federal capabilities.
M12	Percent	Of Service DT &E/OT & E simulation facilities duplicate other Service capabilities.
M13	Percent	Of Service DT &E/OT & E simulation facilities duplicate other Federal capabilities.
M14	Percent	Of Service DT &E/OT & E test facilities duplicate other Service capabilities.
M15	Percent	Of acquisition programs that pass testing that are successfully fielded.
M16	Months	That program development is help up for testing.

SN 7.3 Structure the Force

M1	Months	To review and approve design change to unit or organization.
M2	Percent	Of organization and unit designs current with respect to operational concepts, personnel and equipment.
M3	Months	From approval of new unit/organization design to standing up new unit.

SN 7.3.1 Develop Combat Force Structure

M1	Items	Of exception by the combatant commands (major).
M2	Items	Of exception by the Services (major).
M3	Percent	Difference between optimum combat force structure and actual combat structure.
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs fully resourced with combat forces without restoring to dual apportionment.
M5	Month	To complete review of combat force structure.

SN 7.3.2 Develop Support Force Structure (Below-the-Line Force)

M1	Days	To move an LRC force 6000 miles with active duty strategic lift assets.
M2	Days	To move an MRC force 7000 miles with fully mobilized strategic lift assets.
M3	Hours	To move an LRC force 2000 miles with active duty strategic lift assets.
M4	Months	Since complete comparison of forces and requirements conducted.
M5	Months	Since determination of resources required to correct program deficiencies.
M6	Months	Since full analysis of base force against existing OPLANs.
M7	Percent	Difference between optimum force structure and actual support structure.
M8	Percent	Of OPLAN wargame analyses included examination of mobilization base.
M9	Weeks	To conduct determination of resources requirements.
M10	Weeks	To conduct force requirements comparison.

SN 7.3.3 Design Units and Organizations

M1	Months	To change unit or organization design.
M2	Percent	Of units or organizations whose designs are current.
M3	Months	From concept to unit or organization design approval.
M4	Months	To review and adjust unit manning document to reflect new or modified weapons systems or equipment items.
M5	Percent	Agreement between unit task documented in organizational design and unit task per assigned OPLAN.
M6	Percent	Of changes in personnel quantity, quality, or training, accomplished by time of fielding new or modified weapons system or equipment items.
M7	Percent	Of joint headquarters organizational design and manning, reviewed in last 24 months.

13 September 1996

M8	Percent	Of Service organization design efforts include inputs from other Services.
M9	Percent	Of unit personnel have more than two weeks casual status (awaiting training).
M10	Weeks	To transition a given unit to new or modified weapons systems or equipment.

SN 7.3.4 Integrate Unit Design

M1	Percent	Of joint headquarters organizational design and manning, reviewed in last 24 months.
M2	Percent	Of Service organization design efforts include inputs from other Services.
M3	Months	To coordinate unit or organization design change with Joint Staff/other Service.

SN 7.3.5 Authorize Units and Organizations

M1	Days	C-2 or below for personnel and equipment, because of insufficient trained personnel or support equipment (during transition).
M2	Days	Not operationally ready, because unit has insufficient trained personnel or support equipment (during transition).
M3	Months	To review and adjust unit manning document to reflect new or modified weapons systems or equipment items.
M4	Percent	Of changes in personnel quantity, quality, or training, accomplished by time of fielding of new or modified weapons system or equipment items.
M5	Percent	Of changes in support equipment delivered, accomplished by time of fielding of new or modified weapons system or equipment items.
M6	Percent	Of unit personnel have more than two weeks casual status (awaiting training).
M7	Days	Since Data Base updated.
M8	Percent	Of unit/organization design AC records maintained in an automated format.
M9	Percent	Of force design information automated.

SN 7.4 Educate and Train the Force

M1	Months	Since organization's JMETL or Service METL updated.
M2	Months	Since training policy guidance issued.
M3	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M4	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M5	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support units, evaluated against an OPLAN during the past year.
M6	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat units, evaluated against an OPLAN mission during the past year.
M7	Percent	Of combatant commander JMETL tasks covered by annual training events.
M8	Percent	Of combatant commander JMETL tasks covered by annual training.
M9	Percent	Of graduates of joint PME fill a joint billet within five years of graduation.
M10	Percent	Of linguists, needed to train host-nation personnel during MOOTW, are available.
M11	Percent	Of officers assigned to joint headquarters have completed a joint staff or senior level college.
M12	Percent	Of OPLANs have associated JMETL.
M13	Percent	Of PME includes a joint block within its curriculum.
M14	Percent	Of training data current at execution.
M15	Percent	Of units evaluated each year to determine their proficiency in JMETL tasks.
M16	Instances	Of Joint exercises or operations carried out per year.
M17	Percent	Of MRC JF Common Operational Joint Tasks, fully trained.

13 September 1996

M18	Percent	Of MRC tactical-level JFI interoperability tasks, fully trained.
M19	Percent	Of missions for which assigned forces are fully trained.
M20	Percent	Of missions for which assigned forces are partially trained.
M21	Percent	Of missions for which assigned forces are untrained.

SN 7.4.1 Coordinate Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) Development

M1	Months	Since Joint Force Integrator reviewed combatant commander's JMETL.
M2	Months	Since methodology and policy guidance issued.
M3	Months	Since Service METL updated.
M4	Percent	Of JCS exercise program based on JMETL process.
M5	Percent	Of OPLANs have associated JMETL.
M6	Months	Since CINC JMETL updated.

SN 7.4.2 Establish Education and Training Programs and Allocate Resources

M1	Months	Since policy, education, and training vision reviewed.
M2	Months	Since update of combatant commander's assessment of theater training risk.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commander JMETL tasks covered by annual training.
M4	Percent	Of OPLAN, CONPLAN, FUNCPLAN requirements identified in JMETL.
M5	Percent	Of total training hours devoted to training management.

SN 7.4.3 Conduct Professional Education and Training

M1	Percent	Of graduates of joint PME fill a joint billet within five years of graduation.
M2	Percent	Of officers assigned to joint headquarters completed a joint staff or senior level college.
M3	Percent	Of PME programs include block of instruction on joint operations.

SN 7.4.4 Assess Training and Education Effectiveness

M1	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M2	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M3	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat force structure, trained to meet Service METL requirements.
M4	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support force structure, trained to meet Service METL requirements.
M5	Percent	Of enlisted personnel on first post-technical training tour have applicability of their education evaluated by their immediate superiors.
M6	Percent	Of NCOs and Petty Officers on first post-PME tour have applicability of their education evaluated by their immediate superiors.
M7	Percent	Of officers on their first post-PME tour evaluated by their immediate superiors to determine benefits of their PME.

SN 7.5 Ensure Interoperability

M1	Percent	Improvement in each theater's communications equipment in last five years.
M2	Percent	Improvement in each theater's fuel interoperability in last five years.
M3	Percent	Of agreement between US doctrine and agreed Alliance doctrine.
M4	Percent	Of ammunition can be cross-serviced to each theater's apportioned aircraft.
M5	Percent	Of each theater's ammunition is HERO compatible.
M6	Percent	Of each theater's apportioned vehicles interoperable for fuel.
M7	Percent	Of each theater's communications equipment is interoperable.
M8	Percent	Of each theater's forces use same Geodetic Reference.
M9	Percent	Of US rations acceptable to multinational partners.
M10	Percent	Of US rations acceptable to recipients of humanitarian assistance.
M11	Percent	Of units/organizations with doctrine consistent with unit design, training and materiel.
M12	Percent	Of all transportation ADP systems interface or have established work-arounds.

SN 8 Foster Multinational And Interagency Relations

M1	Percent	Of weapons and major systems transfers to foreign nations, funded by grants.
M2	Percent	Of weapons and major system transfers to foreign nations, funded by loans.
M3	Percent	Of weapons and major systems transfers to foreign nations, provided through FMS.
M4	Percent	Of major weapons and other defense systems transfers to foreign nations, provided through private sales between corporations and foreign agents.
M5	Weeks	To provide assistance to other nations (upon request).
M6	Percent	Of US security deployments, made to nations with treaty ties to US.
M7	Percent	Of scheduled US overseas deployments, met.
M8	Months	To prepare USG position on major security related issue.
M9	Percent	Of USG overseas operations with approved consequence management plans.
M10	Percent	Of actions forwarded with hedges against failure, previously coordinated within Interagency Process.
M11	Percent	Of proposed weapons transfers, gain congressional approval.
M12	Percent	Of operations support non-DOD authorities (e.g. NGO/PVO).
M13	Percent	Casualty rate in NEO operation (for friendly forces).
M14	Casualties	In NEO operation (among evacuees).
M15	Percent	Of NGOs and PVOs have formal agreements with USG.

SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups

M1	Days	To respond to Country Team requests for assistance.
M2	Percent	Of Country Team's foreign military students nominated for training, complete training.
M3	Percent	Of Allied forces and equipment, moved by USCINTRANS.
M4	Percent	Of cooperative agreements, updated within last two years (nations with US treaty commitment).
M5	Percent	Of nations in theater have politico-military agreements with US.
M6	Percent	Of Country Teams' requests for military goods/services, fulfilled.
M7	Percent	Of supported nation's movement requirements, translated to meet RDD.
M8	Instances	Of nations declining military assistance.
M9	Hours	To provide cost estimate to requesting agency.
M10	Hours	To validate incoming short notice common-user lift requirements and pass to appropriate component(s).
M11	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet LAD or timeline.
M12	Hours	For USTRANSCOM to secure required clearances and approval for Defense Courier Service movement of material within hours.

SN 8.1.1 Provide Security Assistance

M1	Percent	Of new allied air weapons systems are US systems.
M2	Percent	Of new allied naval ships and weapons systems are US systems.
M3	Percent	Of new allied ground force major end items are US systems.
M4	Months	To obtain approval for security assistance from US authorities
M5	Months	To obtain agreement and approval for security assistance from host nation.
M6	Months	To deliver services or equipment (upon approval).
M7	Percent	Of Country Team proposals for Security Assistance Programs are implemented.

SN 8.1.2 Support Nation Assistance

M1	Weeks	To deliver assistance (upon approval).
----	-------	--

M2	Months	Since update of US ambassador's country plan.
M3	Months	Since update of CINC's regional plan.
M4	Percent	Of requested assistance actually provided.

SN 8.1.3 Support Peace Operations

M1	Percent	Of Peace Operations requested equipment support, provided.
M2	Percent	Of Peace Operations requested transportation support, provided.
M3	Percent	Of appropriate international agencies have information sharing memorandums/letters of agreement with CINCs.
M4	Weeks	To initiate training support for Peace Operations.
M5	Weeks	To commit US forces to support Peace Operations (upon request).

SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action

M1	Percent	Of Civic Action projects include participation from local populace.
M2	Percent	Of Civic Action projects completed
M3	Percent	Of population supportive of Civic Action projects.
M4	Weeks	To initiate a coordinated response for support of military Civic Action.
M5	Percent	Of Civic Action projects initiated by local population.
M6	Percent	Of Civic Action projects, located in secure zones.

SN 8.1.5 Provide for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Conduct Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

M1	Hours	To develop plan for providing assistance.
M2	Days	For military forces/supplies to arrive in theater.
M3	Percent	Of requested personnel, provided.
M4	Percent	Of requested supplies, provided.
M5	Y/N	USTRANSCOM provides initial feasibility analysis in time to allow supported CINC time to complete CINC's commander's estimate.
M6	Hours	To provide initial feasibility analysis to supported CINC for CINC's commander's estimate.
M7	Percent	Of supported nation movement requirements transported within sufficient time to meet RDD.

SN 8.1.6 Provide Civil Affairs Support Policy

M1	Weeks	To develop policy that addresses civil affairs needs of subject nation.
M2	Months	To develop plan/procedure for transition, continuation, or termination of CA functions.
M3	Weeks	To identify HNS contractor resources.
M4	Weeks	To assess HN government, including economic conditions and attitudes of civilians.
M5	Percent	Of subject nation civil population supporting US civil affairs policy.

SN 8.1.7 Coordinate Information Sharing Arrangements

M1	Percent	Of appropriate international agencies have information sharing MOAs or LOAs with CINCs (right agency/right agreement).
M2	Percent	Of appropriate US national level agencies have information sharing MOAs or LOAs with CINCs (right agency/right agreement).
M3	Weeks	To develop information sharing arrangements with multinational partners.
M4	Percent	Of multinational partners, allowed access to all required information.
M5	Instances	Of requests to change existing intelligence disclosure/release policy.

SN 8.1.8 Provide Support to Foreign Internal Defense in Theater

13 September 1996

M1	Months	To initiate FID support (upon request).
M2	Months	To achieve FID objectives (after initiating FID support).
M3	Percent	Of FID issues entering Interagency system, resolved by Board for Low-Intensity Conflict.
M4	Percent	Of FID cases have special management programs.
M5	Percent	Of FID programs conform to DOD and NSC guidance.
M6	Percent	Of worldwide FID activities, funded by DOD O&M or other authorized DOD funding vehicles.
M7	Instances	Of subversive acts, lawlessness or insurgent attack in target nation.

SN 8.1.9 Cooperate With and Support NGOs and PVOs

M1	Days	For NGO to obtain approval to provide support.
M2	Days	For PVO to obtain approval to provide support.
M3	Percent	Of concerned NGOs and PVOs able to obtain arrangement for cooperation with joint force commander.
M4	Percent	Of NGOs have agreements (formal or informal) with DOD on crisis response.
M5	Percent	Of PVOs have agreements (formal or informal) with DOD on crisis response.
M6	Days	For approval of NGO request for support.
M7	Days	For approval of PVO request for support.

SN 8.2 Provide DOD/Government-Wide Support

M1	Hours	For DOD forces (active and RC), to respond to request from domestic civil authorities.
M2	Hours	For DOD to contact all relevant agencies.
M3	Percent	Of military manning requirements for other government agencies met.
M4	Percent	Of military manning requirements for DOD and Joint Agencies met.
M5	Percent	Of US Agencies have established communication links to DOD.
M6	Percent	Of requested agencies participating in Joint Exercise.
M7	Percent	Of combatant commands to which Defense Agency provides LNOs.
M8	Hours	To validate incoming short notice requirements (lift or courier) and pass to appropriate component(s).
M9	Hours	To provide feasibility analysis to supported agency, if USTRANSCOM controlled assets required.
M10	Days	For USTRANSCOM to provide feasibility analysis to supported agency, if commercial lift required.
M11	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet LAD or timeline.

SN 8.2.1 Support DOD and Joint Agencies

M1	Percent	Of officers assigned to Joint Agencies, OSD, and Unified and Specified Commands, meeting standards established by law.
M2	Percent	Of military manning requirements of DOD and Joint Agencies, met.
M3	Weeks	To fill gap between departing and incoming personnel.
M4	Days	To initiate support to requesting agency.
M5	Days	Prior to first day of month of execution, USTRANSCOM provides lift schedules for CJCS exercise program.
M6	Percent	Of requested support/assistance meet LAD or timeline.

SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies

M1	Hours	To send DOD forces (active and RC), when called to aid domestic civil authorities.
M2	Percent	Of required agency support provided.

13 September 1996

M3	Percent	Of US Agencies have intelligence sharing agreements with Combatant Command.
M4	Days	To initiate support to requesting agency.
M5	Hours	To provide cost estimate to the requesting agency.
M6	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet LAD or timeline.

SN 8.2.3 Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters

M1	Percent	Of noncombatant injured or ill evacuees evacuated by medical system.
M2	Hours	To deploy Coordination Liaison Team to work with Ambassador.
M3	Hours	To assess situation and present it to CINC.
M4	Hours	To evacuate noncombatants (after CINC notified).
M5	Percent	Of NEOs have a fully operational JTF.
M6	Percent	Of American citizens and designated foreign nationals evacuated safely.
M7	Percent	Of countries in AOR have plans for NEO.
M8	Percent	Of evacuees received shelter and food equivalent to safe haven levels.
M9	Hours	To have forces available to evacuate noncombatants
M10	Hours	For USTRANSCOM to provide noncombatant evacuation operation feasibility estimate to supported commander (after receipt of Warning Order).
M11	Percent	Of missions in support of NEO operations meet required POE departure timelines (during execution).
M12	Hours	To provide cost estimate to requesting agency.
M13	Hours	To validate incoming short notice common-user lift requirements and pass to appropriate component(s).
M14	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet LAD or timeline.
M15	Hours	To secure required clearances and approval for Defense Courier Service movement of material.

SN 8.2.4 Assist Civil Defense

M1	Instances pa	Of staff assistance and liaison visits to Federal and State Emergency Management Offices.
M2	Minutes	To establish links to FEMA and State Emergency Management Offices to support civil defense.
M3	Percent	Of FEMA and State Emergency Management Offices, maintain on-line communications with DOD communications centers.
M4	Percent	Of victims have some form of shelter within 24 hours of disaster.
M5	Percent	Of victims have access to potable water within 24 hours of disaster.
M6	Percent	Of victims have one warm meal each day within 24 hours of disaster.
M7	Instances pa	Of DOD forces (active and/or RC) conducting humanitarian assistance in support of domestic civil authorities.
M8	Hours	For DOD personnel or equipment to arrive at scene of a natural disaster (after receiving a request).
M9	Hours	For DOD personnel or equipment to arrive at scene of a natural disaster (after occurrence).

SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process

M1	Hours	To respond to requests for humanitarian assistance.
M2	Percent	Of Congressional oversight foreign deployments approved.
M3	Percent	Of intelligence and security operations (requiring notification of select committees), considered favorably.
M4	Percent	Of agencies have permanent Joint Staff or OSD LNOs in place.
M5	Percent	Of Interagency visits have special badge (e.g. escort) procedures.

M6	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with Joint Staff developed hedges against failure.
M7	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with DOD coordinated hedges against failure.
M8	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with Interagency Process coordinated hedges against failure.
M9	Percent	Of interagency meetings include CJCS/JS representatives.

SN 8.3.1 Coordinate and Control Policy for the Conduct of Operations

M1	Percent	Of DOD decisions, involving <i>deployment</i> of US forces, made with interagency coordination.
M2	Percent	Of DOD decisions, involving <i>employment</i> of US forces, made with interagency coordination.
M3	Percent	Of Non-DOD decisions, involving <i>employment</i> of US forces made with interagency coordination.
M4	Hours	To pass a Presidential Decision to combatant commands
M5	Hours	To execute a Presidential Decision by a combatant commander.
M6	Percent	Of DOD actions have other Interagency actors take appropriate supporting actions.
M7	Percent	Of DOD positions have other Interagency actors take appropriate supporting positions (at Presidential level).

SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Interagency Process

M1	Hours	To prepare and disseminate information packages to Non-DOD players for interagency meetings.
M2	Hours	To initiate implementing action for NSC decisions.
M3	Hours	To complete debriefing interagency meetings to DOD and Joint officials.
M4	Percent	Of concerned agencies participating in Interagency process.

SN 8.3.3 Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures

M1	Hours	To coordinate action/option with agency.
M2	Percent	Of involved agencies have permanent Joint Staff LNOs in place.
M3	Percent	Of involved agencies have permanent Joint Staff or OSD LNOs in place.
M4	Percent	Of Interagency visits have special badge (e.g. escort) procedures.

SN 8.3.4 Perform Consequence Management in the Interagency Arena

M1	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with developed hedges against failure.
M2	Hours	To develop hedging options for decision makers.

13 September 1996

THEATER STRATEGIC LEVEL TASK MEASURES**ST 1 Deploy, Concentrate, And Maneuver Theater Forces**

M1	Percent	Of allocated theater forces in place (at campaign plan execution).
M2	Percent	Of TPFDD generated theater surface transportation requirements met (at execution).
M3	Percent	Of TPFDD transportation airlift requirements met (at execution).
M4	Percent	Of TPFDD transportation sealift requirements met (at execution).

ST 1.1 Conduct Intratheater Strategic Deployment

M1	Days	To assemble airlift for strategic intratheater deployment of forces.
M2	Days	To assemble sealift for strategic intratheater deployment of forces.
M3	Hours	To locate specific ULN deploying within theater.
M4	Hours	To locate specific unit deploying within theater.
M5	Minutes	To locate units during intratheater strategic deployment.
M6	Percent	Of cargo visible during transit (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of intratheater airlift asset requirements considered in deployment planning.
M8	Percent	Of lift requested, actually used.
M9	Percent	Of ULNs closed within JFC LADs.
M10	Percent	Of units closed within JFC LADs.
M11	Percent	Of units arrive at destination by RDD.
M12	Days	For force closure into JOA (from receipt of EXORD).

ST 1.1.1 Process Requests for Forces to be Deployed

M1	Hours	To process movement requirements.
M2	Hours	To review request and decision by combatant commander.
M3	Percent	Of requests filled as worded.
M4	Percent	Of requests returned by combatant commander for additional information.

ST 1.1.2 Provide Theater Strategic Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)

M1	Days	For JLOTS to be operational in theater.
M2	Days	For sealift vessels to be returned to USTRANSCOM control after arrival in theater.
M3	Hours	Delay in opening of APOD or SPOD.
M4	Hours	For combat squadrons to be prepared for combat sorties (after arrival at beddown airfields).
M5	Hours	For unit personnel to link up with unit equipment and move to gaining command's staging area.
M6	Hours	From unit's arrival in port until moved to gaining command's assembly area.
M7	Hours	To determine status of arriving unit.
M8	Hours	To offload ship.
M9	Hours	To offload strategic lift.
M10	Minutes	To offload airlift aircraft.
M11	Percent	Of time, airfield MOG'd out.
M12	Percent	Of unit personnel and equipment arrive at destination by RDD.
M13	Tons	Offloaded per day using existing terminals.

ST 1.1.2.1 Provide Theater Strategic Reception

13 September 1996

M1	Days	For strategic sealift vessels to be returned to USTRANSCOM after arrival in theater.
M2	Days	Personnel retained in reception area.
M3	Days	Units retained in reception area.
M4	Hours	For combat squadrons to be prepared for combat sorties (after arrival at beddown airfields).
M5	Hours	To offload airlift aircraft.
M6	Hours	To offload ship.
M7	Hours	To offload strategic lift.
M8	Percent	Of time, airfield MOG'd out.
M9	Percent	Of reception area capacity used to process personnel each day.
M10	Tons	Offloaded per day using JLOTS.
M11	Hours	To determine status of arriving unit.
M12	Percent	Of personnel arriving in theater housed in barracks or suitable cantonment areas while being processed.

ST 1.1.2.2 Provide Theater Strategic Staging

M1	Hours	For unit equipment arriving by sea to be moved from reception area.
M2	Hours	For unit personnel to link up with unit equipment and move to gaining command's staging area.
M3	Hours	For units arriving by air to move from reception area.
M4	Hours	For units personnel to link up with unit equipment and move to gaining command's staging area.
M5	Hours	From unit's arrival in port until moved to gaining command's assembly area.

ST 1.1.2.3 Provide Onward Movement in the AOR

M1	Days	Forces are en route to final destination (from staging areas).
M2	kph	Average speed of convoys en route to final destination (from staging areas).
M3	Percent	Of vehicles become misrouted en route to final destination (from staging areas).

ST 1.1.2.4 Provide Theater Strategic Integration of Deploying Forces

M1	Hours	Before arriving air units ready to conduct operations.
M2	Percent	Of units arrive at gaining command's staging area before command ready to receive.
M3	Percent	Of units arrive at gaining command's staging area prepared to conduct operations.

ST 1.1.3 Conduct Intratheater Deployment of Forces

M1	Hours	To locate specific personnel or cargo en route.
M2	Percent	Of cargo closed before JFC EAD without any place to offload or store.
M3	Percent	Of cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M4	Percent	Of cargo requested, delivered.
M5	Percent	Of force moved by means designated in commander's TPFDD.
M6	Percent	Of intratheater and (where available) HNS lift assets effectively integrated into intratheater deployment plan.
M7	Percent	Of required assets/resources, provided to JFC to complete operational movement by RDD.
M8	Percent	Of ULNs, visible during transit (ITV).
M9	Percent	Of units closed within JFC LADs.

ST 1.1.4 Provide Command and Control of Deploying Units

M1	Hours	For a unit or major cargo in transit to be located (upon request).
M2	Hours	For transfer of authority messages to be exchanged after units cross JFC boundaries.
M3	Minutes	Or less for transfer of authority message to be exchanged after unit crosses JFC boundary.
M4	Minutes	Or less to locate a deploying unit or major cargo item (upon request).

ST 1.1.5 Provide Intratheater Refueling

M1	Percent	Of accepted air-to-air refueling requests met.
M2	Percent	Of air-to-air refueling sorties delivered fragged offload.
M3	Percent	Of receivers take full offload at appropriate time and location (inbound).
M4	Percent	Of receivers take full offload at appropriate time and location (outbound).
M5	Percent	Of requests for emergency tanker support (e.g., CSAR, battle damage), met.
M6	Percent	Of tanker tracks (servicing both type receivers) flown by boom and drogue capable tankers.
M7	Pounds	Of fuel per day off-loaded in air-to-air refueling.
M8	Percent	Of receiver aircraft divert (due to tankers missing ARCTs during execution).
M9	Hours	To validate short notice request for air refueling support (from receipt).
M10	Hours	To source air refueling resources for validated short notice air refueling requests (from receipt).
M11	Hours	To provide feasibility analysis for short notice requests for additional apportioned strategic air refueling assets to support the air bridge (from receipt).

ST 1.2 Concentrate Forces

M1	Days	To move support bases for concentrating forces.
M2	Days	To concentrate forces.
M3	Percent	Of concentrating forces must road march.

ST 1.3 Conduct Theater Strategic Maneuver

M1	Hours	From acceptance of Allied forces (when required) until assigned to strategic formations.
M2	Hours	To request apportioned reinforcing forces (following Warning Order).
M3	Hours	Until unit theater forces postured to deal with an attack (following Warning Order or strategic warning of attack).
M4	Instances	Enemy forces withdraw or redeploy.
M5	Instances	Strategic deployment achieves a strategic advantage.

ST 1.3.1. Posture Forces for Strategic Maneuver

M1	Hours	From acceptance of Allied forces (when required) until assigned to strategic formations.
M2	Hours	To designate JFACC (following Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To request apportioned reinforcing forces (following Warning Order).
M4	Hours	Until unit theater forces postured to deal with attack (following Warning Order or strategic warning of attack).
M5	Hours	Until unit assigned to specific component command (following Warning Order).
M6	Instances	Enemy forces withdraw or redeploy.

ST 1.3.2 Designate Strategic Reserves

M1	Days	To close designated strategic reserve into assigned location.
M2	Hours	For strategic reserve to respond.
M3	Percent	Of strategic reserve allocated to a single joint/combined commander.
M4	Percent	Of strategic reserve specified in Campaign Plan, available.
M5	Percent	Of strategic reserve not tasked with another mission.
M6	Percent	Of strategic reserve previously designated in campaign plan.

ST 1.3.3 Synchronize Forcible Entry in Theater of War

M1	Hours	For forcible entry force to achieves planned objectives (after entry).
M2	Hours	To secure bridgehead from direct fire and observed indirect fire to permit deployment of follow-on forces (after initial forced entry).
M3	Percent	Of entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M4	Percent	Of theater of operations infrastructure supports introduction of follow-on forces (IAW theater campaign plan).

ST 1.3.4 Integrate Direct Action in Theater

M1	Hours	Between desired and actual time in position.
M2	Hours	Between planned and actual infiltration.
M3	Percent	Of direct action missions result in loss of all or most of engaged friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of operations conducted complete rehearsal (prior to infiltration).
M5	Percent	Of operations ensured full coordination and deconfliction (prior to execution).
M6	Percent	Of proposed DA missions rejected because of insufficient preparation time.
M7	Percent	Of Theater DA recovery missions successfully withdraw from immediate objective area.
M8	Percent	Of Theater DA recovery missions recover target and mission personnel to friendly control, alive.
M9	Percent	Of theater direct action missions achieve their aim.
M10	Percent	Of theater direct action missions are deliberately planned.
M11	Percent	Of time sensitive theater direct action mission achieve their aim.

ST 1.3.5 Coordinate Show of Force/Demonstration

M1	Days	Until show of force elicits diplomatic response from target nation.
M2	Days	Until show of force mentioned in target nation's press.
M3	Days	Demonstration holds attention of targeted enemy forces.
M4	Days	Until show of force elicits change in conduct of target nation.
M5	Percent	Of enemy forces drawn away from main thrust by demonstration.
M6	Percent	Of force conducting show of force/demo become decisively engaged in combat.
M7	Percent	Of force in place (at execution).
M8	Percent	Of targeted enemy forces displace toward demonstration after start.
M9	Percent	Relationship between show of force/demo and theater deception plan.

ST 1.3.6 Conduct Theater of War Operations in Depth

M1	Percent	Of supporting forces correctly linkup with forces in depth (e.g., for resupply).
M2	Kilometers	Deviation in position of forces at required check points.
M3	Miles	Deep into enemy area, actively conducting operations in depth.
M4	Minutes	Between requested and actual delivery of fires by external supporting fires.
M5	Percent	Of projected LOC capacity actually available.
M6	Percent	Of assigned targets destroyed (within time allotted).

13 September 1996

M7	Percent	Of enemy strategic centers of gravity covered by operations in depth.
M8	Percent	Of forces operating in depth, within range of friendly supporting firepower.
M9	Percent	Of multinational force integrated into theater campaign.
M10	Percent	Of projected noncombatant casualties, actually incurred.
M11	Percent	Of operations in depth, fully coordinated prior to initiation.
M12	Percent	Of operations in depth, meet planned time lines for positioning.
M13	Percent	Of target attacks by external supporting forces, aborted.
M14	Percent	Of theater actions achieve strategic position of advantage over enemy forces.
M15	Percent	Of theater operations achieve national and theater strategic objectives.
M16	Percent	Of theater strategic operations, adequately supported and contribute to successful campaign.
M17	Percent	Of time during theater campaign, significant operations in depth are active.
M18	Weeks	To plan and position forces deep in enemy area.

ST 1.3.7 Coordinate Unconventional Warfare Across Theaters of Operations

M1	Percent	Of assets shared among theaters of operation.
M2	Percent	Of indigenous population recruited to support friendly UW plan/campaign.
M3	Percent	Of isolation phase required time available.
M4	Percent	Of linkups at infiltration, successful.
M5	Percent	Of operational and strategic objectives successfully achieved by friendly force UW action.
M6	Percent	Of theater deep zone, has active UW conducting operations.
M7	Percent	Of UW cadre fully trained in UW (including area language).
M8	Percent	Of UW forces remain clandestine or covert.
M9	Percent	Of UW operations include a fully executed PSYOP preparation.

ST 1.3.8 Establish Water Space Management

M1	Incidents	Where proper water space management inadequate.
M2	Incidents	Where proper coordination of movement not adequate.
M3	Percent	Of Notices to Mariners published in timely fashion to ALCON agencies.
M4	Incidents	Of collision at sea.

ST 1.4 Enhance Strategic Mobility

M1	Percent	Of deploying forces delayed by enemy strategic countermobility efforts.
M2	Instances	Of theater operations delayed, diverted, changed, or canceled.
M3	Percent	Of mine counter-measures operations enhance freedom of movement.
M4	Percent	Of mines impacting on freedom of movement, countered.

ST 1.5 Conduct Strategic Countermobility

M1	Days	Delay in enemy operations and movement because of friendly systems of barriers, obstacles and mines.
M2	Percent	Of designated forces actually assigned to monitor and enforce friendly strategic barriers to enemy mobility.
M3	Percent	Of enemy force channeled into unfavorable avenue of approach by friendly system of obstacles or barriers.
M4	Percent	Reduction in enemy's logistics flow (to below requirements for offensive action).

ST 1.5.1 Establish Strategic System of Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines

M1	Days	Delay in construction of strategic systems of barriers, obstacles, and mines.
----	------	---

13 September 1996

M2	Percent	Of systems of friendly obstacles and barriers successful in delaying, channeling, or stopping enemy offensive action.
M3	Percent	Of locations for strategic systems of barriers, obstacles, and mines surveyed before crisis

ST 1.5.2 Establish Sanctions, Embargo, or Blockade

M1	Days	Before clear indications target government modified its position.
M2	Days	Before target nation begins to modify their targeted behavior.
M3	Percent	Of designated high interest transiting commercial vessels, kept under continuous surveillance.
M4	Percent	Of pre-action trade maintained through alternative routes.
M5	Percent	Reduction in flow of all supplies to (or from) a target nation.

ST 1.6 Control or Dominate Strategically Significant Area(s)

M1	Days	To achieve air superiority.
M2	Percent	Of forces have operations delayed because key strategic terrain not under control of friendly ground forces.
M3	Percent	Of forces have operations delayed for lack of air superiority.
M4	Percent	Of forces have operations delayed for lack of maritime superiority.
M3	Percent	Of Joint Force are casualties.
M4	Percent	Of logistics support not available because friendly forces lack maritime superiority.
M5	Percent	Of population under friendly control in MOOTW.
M6	Percent	Of theater strategic activities requiring access to space (e.g. reconnaissance, surveillance, communications), not conducted.
M7	Percent	Of villages under friendly administrative control (e.g., taxes collected in MOOTW).
M8	Weeks	To achieve maritime superiority.

ST 1.6.1 Control Strategically Significant Land Area

M1	Incidents/Day	Of enemy fires or direct assault on friendly support facilities in rear areas.
M2	Incidents	Of attacks by enemy fires on friendly airfields/seaports.
M3	Percent	Of areas identified as decisive points or enemy geographic centers of gravity, under friendly control at strategic end state.
M4	Percent	Of operations, delayed until key strategic areas controlled by friendly ground forces.
M3	Percent	Of population under friendly control in MOOTW.
M4	Percent	Of theater forces operating in areas under control of friendly ground forces.
M5	Percent	Of theater free from air attack from enemy controlled land areas.
M6	Percent	Of villages, where no leaders, teachers, policemen, or medical personnel assassinated within last three months in MOOTW.
M7	Percent	Of villages under friendly administrative control (e.g., taxes collected).

ST 1.6.2 Gain and Maintain Air Superiority in Theater of War

M1	Incidents/Day	Of attacks by enemy air forces on commercial and military airlift aircraft.
M2	Days	To achieve air superiority.
M3	Incidents	Of major operations delayed, disrupted, or canceled.
M4	Percent	Friendly attrition rate per sortie
M5	Percent	Of air transport departed on time.
M6	Percent	Of critical operations area in theater under an air superiority umbrella.

M7	Percent	Or lessor operations (and no major operations) delayed or disrupted.
----	---------	--

ST 1.6.3 Gain and Maintain Maritime Superiority in Theater of War

M1	Incidents/Day	Of attacks on commercial or military strategic lift vessels by enemy combatants.
M2	Percent	Of friendly shipping suffers significant disruption or delays.
M3	Percent	Of major operations delayed or disrupted.
M4	Percent	Of major operations delayed, disrupted, or canceled.
M5	Casualties	Suffered by force in securing maritime superiority.
M6	Percent	Of enemy naval forces gain access to friendly mined/blockaded harbors and choke points (within JOA).
M7	Percent	Of enemy naval forces gain access to open ocean areas (within JOA).
M8	Percent	Of enemy naval forces regain access to their mined/blockaded harbors and choke points (within JOA).
M9	Percent	Of equipment and supplies coming through SLOCs, delayed, disrupted, or canceled (because of enemy naval action).
M10	Percent	Of major operations, delayed, disrupted, or canceled (because of enemy air or naval actions).
M11	Weeks	To achieve maritime superiority.

ST 1.6.4 Gain and Maintain Information Superiority in Theater of War/AOR

M1	Percent	Decrease in significant enemy message traffic on command nets after 1 week of IW/C2W attack.
M2	Percent	Decrease in significant enemy message traffic on command nets after IW/C2W attack.
M3	Percent	Of indigenous Mass Media outlets accept US forces information for dissemination.
M4	Percent	Of adversary information conduits penetrated, corrupted, or monitored.
M3	Percent	Of friendly message traffic delayed, disrupted, or corrupted by adversary IW/C2W.
M4	Percent	Of Selected Access Programs employed with intended effect.
M5	Percent	Of Selected Access Programs have a coordinated employment plan before hostilities.
M6	Weeks	Delay in operation because of delay in deception operation execution.
M7	Weeks	To achieve Information Superiority in Theater.
M8	Weeks	Without significant security breach.

ST 2 Develop Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance

M1	Days	Less of actual warning than expected warning.
M2	Percent	Of PIRs have required intelligence data.
M3	Days	Of Warning Time (W) of enemy action.
M4	Hours	Since high priority PIRs last collected against (in crisis or war).
M5	Days	Since high priority PIRs last collected against (in peacetime).
M6	Hours	For critical new intelligence information to be passed to components/JTF.
M7	Percent	Of intelligence estimates disseminated within 12 hour cycle.
M8	Hours	To develop and disseminate comprehensive intelligence estimate.

ST 2.1 Plan and Direct Theater Strategic Intelligence Activities

M1	Percent	Of PIRs have required intelligence data.
M2	Percent	Of requirements resulting from liaison with allied nations.
M3	Days	To develop list of PIRs.
M4	Hours	Until PIRs identified, based on customer requirement.
M5	Percent	Of critical pieces or types of information operations staff or commander require to make decisions, identified by J-2 during execution, not identified during planning process.
M6	Y/N	Command PIRs published in applicable plans to satisfy identified information shortfalls.
M7	Percent	Of command PIRs published in applicable plans.
M8	Hours	Since J-2 reviewed and updated command Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)."

ST 2.1.1 Determine and Prioritize Theater Strategic Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)

M1	Hours	Before collection begins, intelligence requirements identified.
M2	Percent	Of identified intelligence requirements solicited from allied nations.
M3	Instances	Of PIRs open at any one time.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs incorporated into submitted RFI or collection requests (by JIC).
M5	Percent	Of SOF Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) addressed by theater PIRs.
M6	Percent	Of SOF requirements addressed by PIRs.
M7	Percent	Of unanswered priority one and two PIRs submitted as RFIs or collection requests (JIC ensured).
M8	Percent	Of validated PIRs, not collected against.
M9	Hours	To prioritize requirements.

ST 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize Theater Strategic Information Requirements (IR)

M1	Hours	Before collection begins, information requirements identified.
M2	Percent	Of identified intelligence requirements allocated to allied nations.
M3	Percent	Of unanswered priority one and two PIRs, submitted as RFIs or collection requests (JIC ensured).
M4	Percent	Of validated PIRs, not collected against.
M5	Hours	To prioritize requirements.
M6	Percent	Of applicable components J-2 queried to assist in development of intelligence requirements.
M7	Percent	Of shortfalls, identified by J-2, in required intelligence data.
M8	Y/N	J-2 has articulated what type and amounts of intelligence information exists, what is "knowable" or obtainable, and what elements of information may never be known

M9	Percent	Of information later identified as not knowable identified by J-2 at beginning of operation.
M10	Y/N	Mechanisms in place for alleviating identified intelligence shortfalls
M11	Percent	Of identified intelligence shortfalls with alleviating mechanisms in place.
M12	Hours	After identification, PIRs are submitted.
M13	Percent	Of PIR shortfalls addressed by collection plan.

ST 2.1.3 Prepare Theater Strategic Collection Plan

M1	Days	Before collection begins, collection plan distributed.
M2	Hours	For JIC to prepare collection plan for PIRs (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	For JIC to streamline collection plan (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Percent	Of collection requirements satisfied by existing information.
M5	Percent	Of PIRs collected.
M6	Percent	Of PIRs covered by Collection Plan.
M7	Percent	Of PIRs covered by Collection Plan or RFIs.
M8	Percent	Of PIRs, not satisfied by RFIs, tasked to multiple intelligence gathering assets or resources.
M9	Percent	Of validated PIRs not met.
M10	Hours	To ensure collection plan for PIRs integrated with JFC's campaign plan concept of opn/intent (after CJCS Warning Order issued).

ST 2.1.4 Allocate Intelligence Resources in AOR

M1	Percent	Of information passed to national agencies or organizations for processing and exploitation due to work overload.
M2	Percent	Of time, processing, exploitation or production assets idle in one JOA while another JOA over tasked.
M3	Percent	Of time, processing, exploitation or production assets of one component idle while another component over tasked.
M4	Hours	To request support from national or allied nations when combatant command assets not available.
M5	Hours	Until combatant command J-2 receives report of organic collection assets from newly stood up joint force.

ST 2.2 Collect Theater Strategic Information

M1	Hours	To revise collection tasking (after PIR satisfied).
M2	Percent	Of information collected from multiple sources.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs satisfied.
M4	Hours	Since intelligence report on PIRs issued (in crisis or war).
M5	Days	Since intelligence report on PIRs issued (in peacetime).
M6	Days	Since most current information collected.
M7	Hours	Since oldest PIRs last collected against (in crisis or war).
M8	Days	Since PIRs collected against (in peacetime).

ST 2.2.1 Collect Information on Theater Strategic Situation

M1	Hours	For JIC to revise collection tasking (After PIR satisfied).
M2	Days	To incorporate collection plan in campaign plan (after approval of COA).
M3	Hours	To retask collection asset (after CI PIR satisfied).
M4	Hours	For CRM to retask collection asset on new HPTs (after HPT detected, identified, and located).
M5	Hours	To retask collection asset retasked against outstanding PIR or PIP (after PIR satisfied).

M6	Hours	Until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond (from receipt of tasking).
M7	Minutes	Maximum DMSP ground facility operations capability "red" time (per 24-hours).
M8	Percent	Of aircraft or SOF attacks on theater strategic targets requiring current imagery have such imagery.
M9	Percent	Of commander's geographic area has required reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M10	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements covered by collection plan.
M11	Percent	Of disease non-battle injury (DNBI) incurred in first month of deployment (due to unanticipated medical threat).
M12	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M13	Percent	Of high-payoff targets accurately located.
M14	Percent	Of intelligence related PIRs, identified during crisis action planning process, covered by collection asset or RFI by CAP Phase IV.
M15	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery have current imagery for aircrews before flight briefing.
M16	Percent	Of non-aviation mission s requiring imagery have current imagery prior to their execution.
M17	Percent	Of PIRs covered by collection plan or RFIs.
M18	Percent	Of PIRs have at least one source yield intelligence information.
M19	Percent	Of PIRs have more than one collection source.
M20	Percent	Of PIRs have more than one source yield intelligence information.
M21	Percent	Of validated PIRs lack collection assets.
M22	Percent	Of potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M23	Percent	Of priority targeting-related intelligence PIRs (identified during CAP process) covered by collection request or RFI by CAP Phase IV.
M24	Percent	Of reconnaissance and surveillance assets fully tasked.
M25	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M26	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M27	Percent	Of validated PIRs denied collection effort by national level.
M28	Percent	Of validated PIRs inadvertently tasked to two or more reconnaissance or surveillance systems.
M29	Percent	Of validated PIRs lack appropriate collection assets.
M30	Percent	Of validated PIRs tasked to at least one collection source.
M31	Percent	Of validated PIRs tasked to two or more different reconnaissance or surveillance systems.
M32	Percent	Of PIR collection includes open sources.
M33	Hours	Since commander last made decision without sufficient information.
M34	Hours	Since high priority targets detected, identified and located.
M35	Years	Since last update of map data.
M36	Hours	Since most current information collected.
M37	Hours	To fill requests for information on new HPTs.
M38	Hours	To prepare a CI requirement after becoming aware of threat CI collection effort.
M39	Minutes	To determine raid size.
M40	Minutes	For ballistic missile to be detected (after launch).
M41	NM	Beyond engagement range, aircraft detected.
M42	NM	Difference between plotted and actual position of target.
M43	NM	From sensor, enemy air raids detected.
M44	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow weapons employment.

M45	Percent	Of raids detected.
M46	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority One geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M47	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M48	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

ST 2.2.2 Support National and JTF Surveillance Reconnaissance Requirements

M1	Percent	Of joint force commander and national level collection requirements satisfied by piggybacking on existing collection mission on non-interference basis.
M2	Percent	Of unused capability fenced to meet anticipated theater of operations/JOA or national requirements.
M3	Hours	To provide collected data to analysts.
M4	Hours	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet overriding joint force commander or national level collection requirement.

ST 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Theater Strategic Information

M1	Hours	To complete initial analysis (from receipt of raw information).
M2	Hours	To complete initial analysis for national strategic planners and decision makers (from receipt of raw information).
M3	Percent	Of multiple sources integrated and deconflicted.
M4	Percent	Of work of analysts, with limited experience in AOR, reviewed for effective collation and correlation.
M5	Hours	To pass new intelligence to combatant commanders or subordinate joint forces.
M6	Hours	To pass new intelligence to components or joint force (after processing).
M7	Instances	Of production schedule delay affecting dissemination.
M8	Percent	Of documents/products produced caused customers to request clarification.
M9	Hours	Since last situation update.
M10	Hours	Since last intelligence summary and assessment for Situation Report.

ST 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation

M1	Percent	Decrease in processing time when exploitation concurrent with processing in theater of war/AOR.
M2	Percent	Of collected information processed in 24 hour period.
M3	Percent	Of collected information processed in theater of war/AOR.
M4	Percent	Of collected materiel processed in theater of war/AOR.
M5	Hours	To provide hard copy formal report to intelligence analysts in production phase.
M6	Minutes	To provide voice or electronic mail report to intelligence analysts in production phase.
M7	Minutes	To read wet film (after recovery of aircraft or other photo system).

ST 2.3.2 Collate Theater Strategic Information

M1	Percent	Of packages, returned by combatant command all source analyst for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of time combatant commander intelligence products updated with information not previously correlated.
M3	Hours	To correlate new intelligence data.
M4	Percent	Of operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified (due to incorrect intelligence during operation execution).

ST 2.3.3 Correlate Theater Strategic Information

M1	Data Points	Assembled by combatant command J-2 analysts on single subject.
M2	Data Points	Assembled by combatant command J-2 analysts on all subjects.
M3	Percent	Of combatant command reported information graded credible.
M4	Percent	Of combatant command reported information graded highly reliable.
M5	Sources	Used by combatant command's J-2 analysts to increase credibility of information.

ST 2.4 Produce Theater Strategic Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products

M1	Hours	From receipt of raw information to complete initial analysis.
M2	Percent	Of work of analysts not experienced in area reviewed by fully experienced analysts.
M3	Hours	To pass new intelligence to components or joint force (after processing).
M4	Hours	To integrate/fuse and tailor intelligence information to satisfy JTF and component needs.
M5	Percent	Of recipients received information in timely manner (as defined by customer requirements).

ST 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret Theater Information

M1	Weeks	Since intelligence data on high priority theater areas of interest last updated.
M2	Percent	Of Centers of Gravity and decisive points identified during COA development.
M3	Percent	Of civil unrest activities (beyond control of local police), forecasted.
M4	Percent	Of election results (or other assumptions of power), forecasted.
M5	Percent	Of emerging political or religious groups (of political significance), forecasted.
M6	Percent	Of enemy theater strategic high-payoff targets identified in OPLAN.
M7	Percent	Of exploitable information analyzed.
M8	Percent	Of high payoff targets found during initial planning.
M9	Percent	Of identified enemy centers of gravity, decisive points, and high payoff targets, monitored by combatant command's JIC.
M10	Percent	Of information analyzed within 24 hours.
M11	Percent	Of medical threats identified in time to provide medical treatment to infected personnel.
M12	Percent	Of medical threats identified in time to provide prophylactic treatment to US forces, DOD civilians, and dependents.
M13	Percent	Of multiple sources, integrated and deconflicted.
M14	Percent	Of OPLANs and CONPLANs identify enemy strategic center of gravity.
M15	Percent	Of OPLANs and CONPLANs include list of enemy strategic high-payoff targets.
M16	Percent	Of OPLANs identify enemy strategic center of gravity.
M17	Percent	Of OPLANs include list of enemy theater strategic high-payoff targets.
M18	Percent	Of PIRs have completed analysis.

M19	Percent	Of strategic high-payoff targets identified in OPLAN or CONPLAN.
M20	Percent	Of theater assessments integrate National Intelligence.
M21	Years	Since available map data last updated for theater.
M22	Hours	To report changes in enemy disposition, order of battle, etc.

ST 2.4.1.1 Identify Theater Issues and Threats

M1	Hours	Between critical intelligence data reviews.
M2	Months	Between identification of newly forming units or developing weapons systems and their deployment.
M3	Days	Between intelligence data reviews.
M4	Percent	Of AOR mapping and terrain data base for newly activated theater of operations/JOA accurate.
M5	Percent	Of AOR mapping and terrain data base accurate.
M6	Percent	Of sustainment capability deployed, redundant with capability readily available on local economy.
M7	Percent	Of theater nations covered by current assessments.
M8	Months	Since update of biographical or psychological profiles of enemy leaders.
M9	Hours	To begin evaluation after indication of contingency change of mission.
M10	Hours	To report changes in enemy dispositions, order of battle, etc.

ST 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Theater Strategic Capabilities and Intentions

M1	Hours	Lag in noting enemy shifted to new campaign phase (sequel or branch).
M2	Percent	Of enemy critical targets identified as vulnerable.
M3	Percent	Of enemy high priority targets accurately located.
M4	Percent	Of enemy operational and tactical centers of gravity, correctly identified (prior to selection of COA).
M5	Percent	Of enemy vulnerabilities have exploitation analysis.
M6	Percent	Of joint force theater operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or significantly changed (due to unforeseen information about operational area).
M7	Percent	Of target attacks delayed, disrupted, canceled, or significantly changed (due to unforeseen information about operational area).
M8	Percent	Of vulnerabilities communicated to operational and strategic planners.
M9	Weeks	Since last review and update of strategic and operational centers of gravity for all nations in region.
M10	Hours	To communicate vulnerabilities to operational and strategic planners.
M11	Hours	To identify enemy strategic center of gravity.
M12	Hours	To identify relevant, attainable military objectives by assessing enemy exploitable vulnerabilities (after Warning Order).
M13	Hours	To provide insights for exploitation of enemy and for defining desired end state (after Warning Order).
M14	Hours	To update and confirm selected enemy strategic center of gravity.

ST 2.4.2 Prepare Intelligence for Theater Strategic Use

M1	Months	Between updates to threat estimates for potential threat nations not involved in crisis.
M2	Percent	Of theater recurring reports reviewed within last year.
M3	Months	Since last assessment of overall threat.
M4	Hours	Since last intelligence report on PIRs.
M5	Hours	To prepare, publish, and disseminate intelligence report.
M6	Minutes	To publish intelligence advisories to components and subordinate commands (after significant change in threat).

13 September 1996

M7	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M8	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M9	Percent	Of Priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M10	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M11	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M12	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.

ST 2.4.2.1 Provide Theater Strategic Indications and Warning

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Hours	Difference between actual warning time and expected warning time.
M4	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M5	Percent	Of nations in AOR, have updated indicators.
M6	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within the average.
M7	Percent	Of CINC's warning problems have fully developed indicators.
M8	Days	Since indicator lists developed or updated for enemy nation and its allies.

ST 2.4.2.2 Provide Theater Current Intelligence

M1	Minutes	For combatant command's J-2 Senior Watch Officer to brief J-3 Command Duty Officer (after issuing Advisory Report).
M2	Hours	For combatant command components to produce INTSUMs.
M3	Percent	Of CAT attend daily intelligence briefing.
M4	Percent	Of CAT visit J-2 posted current intelligence data.
M5	Percent	Of combatant command staff visit J-2 posted current intelligence data.
M6	Minutes	To produce intelligence update briefing.
M7	Hours	To produce daily intelligence update for CAT Chief.
M8	Hours	To produce daily intelligence update for CINC.
M9	Hours	To produce DISUM.
M10	Hours	Between threat capabilities presentations to commander.
M11	Percent	Of effected nations have threat indicators developed after identification and analysis.
M12	Hours	To apprise commander of threat capabilities.
M13	Hours	To develop and update threat indicators.

ST 2.4.2.3 Provide Theater General Military Intelligence

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of combatant command reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Days	Between hard copy updates of combatant command reports on enemy military capabilities (crisis or wartime).
M3	Weeks	Between hard copy updates of combatant command reports on enemy military capabilities (peacetime).
M4	Percent	Difference between actual enemy military strength (number of people, equipment or sustainment) and enemy strength reported by combatant command's J-2 prior to operations.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Difference between actual enemy units (ships, squadrons, battalions) engaged and units identified and reported by combatant command's J-2 or component's intelligence organizations.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces incapacitated at least once by weather conditions for which there was no advance warning.
M7	Percent	Of friendly forces incapacitated by disease for which there was no advance warning.
M8	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces, answered by data in combatant command's J-2 data bases or component's intelligence data bases.
M9	Hours	To generate comprehensive analysis of characteristics of commander's area of interest.

ST 2.4.2.4 Provide Target Intelligence for Theater Planning and Execution

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified by combatant command's targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of failed attacks on theater strategic high priority targets (HPTs) attributed to incorrect enemy location data.
M3	Percent	Of selected combatant command's High Priority Targets (HPTs) have mensurated coordinates available.
M4	Percent	Of sorties diverted by JFACC or combatant commander to higher priority targets discovered inside execution cycle.
M5	Percent	Of target locations verified by combatant command's J-2 or component's intelligence before next targeting cycle.
M6	Percent	Of theater strategic high priority targets (HPTs) have correct location data.
M7	Percent	Of Nodal Targeting Analysis and weaponeering within ATO cycle.
M8	Hours	To conduct nodal targeting analysis and weaponeering.

ST 2.4.2.5 Provide Scientific and Technical Intelligence for Planning and Execution

M1	Percent	Difference between estimate of foreign weapons systems deployed and actual numbers.
M2	Percent	Difference between combatant command's J-2 prediction of enemy weapons system's performance capabilities and actual capability encountered.
M3	Percent	Difference between combatant command's J-2 prediction of enemy weapons system's characteristics and actual characteristics.
M4	Months	Lead time provided by combatant command's J-2 on foreign developments in basic research.
M5	Months	Lead time provided by combatant command's J-2 on foreign developments in applied research.
M6	Months	Lead time provided by combatant command's J-2 on IOC of non-US weapons systems deployed in AOR.
M7	Months	Lead time provided by combatant commander on IOC of non-US theater strategic weapons systems deployed in AOR.

ST 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate Theater Strategic Intelligence

M1	Percent	Of questions asked during briefing answered immediately or personally by briefer within asker's shift period.
M2	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M3	Instances	Of commander making decision without sufficient information.
M4	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M5	Percent	Of required Priority Two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M6	Percent	Of required Priority Three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.

ST 2.5.1 Provide Theater Strategic Intelligence

M1	Percent	Of intelligence summaries disseminated late.
M2	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M3	Minutes	For intelligence updates to reach components and subordinate commands (after major change in threat).
M4	Percent	Of theater recurring reports published on time.

ST 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to Theater Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Percent	Of planner questions, personally answered by analyst or briefer during operational planning or execution.
M2	Percent	Of reader survey cards returned.
M3	Minutes	To provide follow-up to question asked during briefing to JPG or equivalent.

ST 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities in AOR

M1	Hours	Age of comments passed to combatant command J-2 organizations and personnel by DJ-2 or J-2 inspectors.
M2	Percent	Of combatant command's J-2 offices have self inspection program.
M3	Percent	Of combatant command intelligence production programs include customer survey.
M4	Percent	Of comments critical of combatant command's J-2 performance represent repeat comments.
M5	Percent	Of customer complaints result in change within combatant command's J-2 or explanation to customer of why no change.
M6	Percent	Of deficiencies noted in combatant command's strategic intelligence activities, incorporated in joint lessons learned system.
M7	Percent	Of evaluator observations validated combatant command joint intelligence activities.
M8	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations for improvement, implemented by combatant command's J-2 within 120 days.
M9	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations, specifically directed to combatant command individuals responsible for implementing any changes.
M10	Percent	Of subordinate joint force intelligence evaluations reviewed for applicability to theater strategic level intelligence activities.
M11	Percent	Of time dedicated to combatant command's intelligence evaluation, evaluated staff spends in interviews and data collection.
M12	Weeks	To provide final feedback, commendations, and recommended corrective actions after evaluation of combatant command intelligence activities.

M13	Hours	To provide initial feedback after evaluation of combatant command intelligence activities.
-----	-------	--

ST 3 Employ Theater Strategic Firepower

M1	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by forces from outside theater.
M2	Percent	Of HPTs receive desired damage levels on initial attack.

ST 3.1 Process Theater Strategic Targets

M1	Hours	For issuance of CINC's Apportionment Guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Hours	For identification of enemy's center of gravity (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	For issuance of CINC's HPT categories (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	For issuance of CINC's Prohibited Target Guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	For issuance of FSC Measures Guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M6	Hours	To develop plan to attack target, after identification as HPT.
M7	Percent	Difference between JTCB target priorities and those in CINC and NCA Guidance.
M8	Percent	Of desired results, achieved by theater strategic firepower within specified time/phase.
M9	Percent	Of mobile targets, passed to attack assets quickly enough to allow effective ordnance delivery.
M10	Percent	Of selected targets have DMPs identified.
M11	Percent	Of selected targets have suitable munitions available in theater.
M12	Percent	Of selected targets have vital areas identified.
M13	Percent	Of targets selected by JTCB, reviewed for political ramifications.
M14	Percent	Of targets susceptible to non-lethal kill, allocated to non-lethal attack systems.
M15	Percent	Of time, JTCB Guidance passed to targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC), before ATO-cycle begins.

ST 3.1.1 Select Strategic Targets in the Theater for Attack

M1	Days	Until phased theater strategic attack plan available for execution.
M2	Hours	To revise phased theater strategic attack plan.
M3	Percent	Of enemy decisive points have developed strategic targets.
M4	Percent	Of enemy decisive points, translated into HPTs.
M5	Percent	Of known enemy C2W capability, targeted for strategic attack.
M6	Percent	Of known enemy NBC capability, targeted for strategic attack.
M7	Percent	Of attacks on selected targets, had desired effect on enemy Center of Gravity.
M8	Percent	Of target sequence reflects JTCB priorities.
M9	Percent	Of targets, reviewed for collateral damage and political ramifications.
M10	Percent	Of targets selected, deemed illegal for attack.
M11	Percent	Of attacks on selected targets, cause political consequences outweighing strategic benefits.
M12	Percent	Of targets selected reflect NCA and Combatant commander's guidance.
M13	Percent	Of theater strategic HPTs (discovered within execution cycle) reprioritized.
M14	Weeks	To initially prepare theater strategic target list (during deliberate planning).

ST 3.1.2 Assign Joint/Multinational Theater Firepower

M1	Days	To complete targeting cycle.
M2	Hours	To complete targeting cycle.
M3	Hours	To reattack theater strategic objective not neutralized (from original TOT).
M4	Instances	Of theater strategic firepower assignments, appealed to JFC.
M5	Percent	Mismatch between target sets and assigned strike assets.

M6	Percent	Of joint force operations, delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified because of improper firepower allocation.
M7	Percent	Of land, air, and sea delivery systems' targets (not targets of opportunity), coordinated by JTCB.

ST 3.1.3 Conduct Theater Combat Assessment

M1	Hours	To establish coordination process between collection agencies and targeting agencies (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Hours	To provide integrated national and theater assets combat assessments (after execution of first combat fires TOT).
M3	Hours	From receipt of imagery until BDA report.
M4	Hours	To conduct theater BDA (from time attack completed).
M5	Hours	To submit recommendations for reattack (from original TOT).
M6	Percent	Difference between theater and national BDA estimates.
M7	Percent	Of available operational sources (e.g., HUD video), integrated with intelligence sources for combat assessment.
M8	Percent	Of reconnaissance assets, employed in theater BDA.
M9	Percent	Of targets correctly assessed as destroyed, neutralized, or suppressed.
M10	Percent	Of targets have applicable operational sources (e.g., HUD video) integrated with intelligence sources for combat assessment.
M11	Percent	Of targets, restruct unnecessarily.

ST 3.2 Attack Theater Strategic Targets

M1	Casualties	Among enemy civilians.
M2	Days	Until arrival of first PSYOPs units in theater (after initial landings).
M3	Hours	To complete targeting cycle.
M4	Percent	More time than allocated in campaign plan, needed to achieve desired damage levels on HPTs.
M5	Percent	Of air sorties, covered by EW.
M6	Percent	Of all available joint and allied firepower assets, considered for use in development of master attack plan.
M7	Percent	Of attacking systems penetrate to target and deliver ordnance.
M8	Percent	Of friendly attacking manned weapons systems, lost during mission.
M9	Percent	Of friendly operations employ non-lethal systems.
M10	Percent	Of operations and operational phases, covered by deception plan.
M11	Percent	Of reattacked targets, destroyed by reattacking mission.
M12	Percent	Of target sets assigned to inappropriate strike assets.
M13	Percent	Of targets destroyed by first assigned friendly mission.

ST 3.2.1 Conduct Lethal Attack on Theater Strategic Targets

M1	Percent	Loss rate for attacking systems (of total sorties).
M2	Percent	Of attacking systems penetrate to target to deliver ordnance.
M3	Percent	Of enemy offensive capability, diverted to defensive reaction.
M4	Percent	Of scheduled time, used for execution of strategic target program.

ST 3.2.2 Conduct Nonlethal Attack on Theater Strategic Targets

M1	Days	Until arrival of first PSYOP units in theater (after initial landings).
M2	Hours	To establish Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To establish and integrate C2W cell into planning process (after CJCS Warning Order).

13 September 1996

M4	Hours	To establish and integrate information warfare cell into planning process (after CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	Until combatant commander requests and coordinates PSYOP, EW, and deception support to JTF components IW/C2W cells (after establishment of JTF).
M6	Hours	Until information warfare (IW) planners, included in campaign planning inner circle (from Warning Order).
M7	Percent	Of increase in support for US activity in country of operation resulting from PSYOP efforts.
M8	Percent	Of theater strategy, OPLANS, OPORDERS, and component plans, have integrated theater PSYOP plan.
M9	Percent	Of air sorties, covered by EW.
M10	Percent	Of all sorties require EW support.
M11	Percent	Of all targets, evaluated by JTCB as candidates for non-lethal attack.
M12	Percent	Of non-lethal attacks on selected targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M13	Percent	Of non-lethal attacks on selected targets, achieve desired non-lethal effect.
M14	Percent	Of time non-lethal attack integrated into daily ATO.
M15	Percent	Of operations and operational phases, addressed by C2W plan.

ST 3.2.2.1 Conduct Theater Psychological Activities

M1	Days	To devise PSYOP campaign (when none exists).
M2	Hours	From Warning Order until PSYOP efforts begin in JOA (in crisis).
M3	Hours	To revise/confirm PSYOP campaign (after Warning Order in crisis).
M4	Hours	Until arrival of first PSYOP units in theater (from C-Day and L-Hour).
M5	Percent	Of PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host-nation.

ST 3.2.2.2 Conduct Theater Electronic Attack (EA)

M1	Days	To create frequency deconfliction plan.
M2	Hours	Delay in enemy action at theater or strategic level because of EA attack.
M3	Percent	Of overall effort, devoted to EA.
M4	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks, actually conducted.

ST 3.2.2.3 Attack Theater Information Systems

M1	Percent	Of decrease in enemy message traffic on command nets after one week of IW/C2W attack.
M2	Percent	Of decrease in significant enemy message traffic on command nets after initial IW/C2W attack.
M3	Percent	Of adversary information conduits, penetrated, corrupted, or monitored.
M4	Percent	Of enemy C2 facilities, attacked.
M5	Percent	Of enemy C2 facilities, in HPT category.
M6	Percent	Of fixed location enemy C2 facilities, destroyed within one hour.
M7	Percent	Of Selected Access Programs, employed with intended effect.
M8	Weeks	To achieve Information Superiority in Theater.

ST 3.2.3 Integrate Theater Strategic Firepower

M1	Casualties	Caused by friendly fires.
M2	Hours	To reattack theater strategic objective (from original TOT).
M3	Hours	To reattack theater strategic target (from original TOT).
M4	Instances	Of national strategic missions aborted because lack of necessary theater/JOA support.

M5	Instances	Of operational, strategic theater, and strategic national fires, not integrated into attack plan.
M6	Instances	Of SAPs cannot be integrated with non-SAP systems for security reasons.
M7	Instances	Of Strategic attacks originating from out of theater, not synchronized with those tasked from within theater.
M8	Percent	Of attacks, deconflicted with friendly forces operating in AO.
M9	Percent	Of enemy offensive capability, diverted to defensive reaction.
M10	Percent	Of failed attacks on HPTs, attributed to lack of integration of fires assets.
M11	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly fires.
M12	Percent	Of HPTs, attacked by joint force as non-ATO targets.
M13	Percent	Of operational attacks, aborted because of planned, but unavailable theater support.
M14	Percent	Of SOF missions, executed without notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M15	Percent	Of strategic national assets, used to attack targets suited to available theater assets.
M16	Percent	Of strategic national missions, aborted because of lack of necessary theater support.
M17	Percent	Of theater assets, used to attack targets better suited to available operational assets.

ST 4 Sustain Theater Forces

M1	Tons	Backlogged support requirements (at execution).
M2	Backlogged	High-value line items (at execution).
M3	Percent	Of required logistics, in place to support campaign (at execution).
M4	Percent	Of planned sustainment, delivered to theater (during execution).
M5	Days	Delay in operations because of logistic shortfalls.
M6	Percent	Of personnel, provided field and health services.
M7	Percent	Of required supplies and equipment, delivered daily.
M8	Days	Of supplies, stocked in theater.
M9	Days	To achieve minimum theater supply stock levels.
M10	Days	To provide field and health services to all personnel.
M11	Percent	Visibility of units/cargo/personnel transiting the PODs.

ST 4.1 Coordinate the Fixing and Maintaining of Equipment

M1	Days	To establish a theater maintenance depot system.
M2	Days	Delay for items in theater repair system awaiting repair.
M3	Days	Delay for items in theater awaiting evacuation.
M4	Percent	Of repair items, identified in theater fix-or-evacuate policy.
M5	Percent	Of repair facilities capacity, in operation.
M6	Percent	Of major end items can be repaired in theater.
M7	Days	Items remain in theater repair system.
M8	Days	Delay in initiating operations because of late upgrades to weapons systems or equipment items.

ST 4.2 Coordinate Support for Forces in AOR

M1	Minutes	From wound or injury until surgery.
M2	Minutes	Awaiting surgery (in theater).
M3	Minutes	Awaiting routine medical services (in theater).
M4	Percent	Of support forces, trained and equipped for salvage and battle damage repair.
M5	Percent	Of OPLANs have reconstitution provisions.
M6	Personnel	Maximum handling capacity of reception areas.
M7	Percent	Of personnel have viable rotation policy.
M8	Percent	Of personnel support can be contracted.
M9	Shortfalls	Identified for personnel.
M10	Constraints	Identified for personnel.
M11	Hours	Delay for replacements at theater base before joining a unit.
M12	Percent	Of personnel receive at least one hot meal per day.
M13	Percent	Of forces supplied by theater commander, rated C1 for readiness and no forces supplied by theater commander, below C2.
M14	Percent	Of major units remain <i>untrained</i> in at least one of their METL tasks.
M15	Percent	Manning level for deployed units during operation.
M16	Percent	Of individual personnel augmentation requirements, validated by appropriate CINC approval authority.
M17	Percent	Of personal daily water requirement provided.

ST 4.2.1 Integrate Field Services

M1	Percent	Of required aerial mail terminals and military post offices, established within planned timelines.
----	---------	--

13 September 1996

M2	Percent	Of OPLANs include tasks to establish a Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO).
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M4	Percent	Of personnel provided with required individual clothing and equipment.
M5	Days	Delay from standard in distributing mail to unit level.
M6	Percent	Of personnel receive at least one hot meal per day.
M7	Percent	Of personal daily water requirement provided.
M8	Days	Delay in search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel because of lack of graves registration system units.
M9	Personnel	Per assigned chaplain in theater.
M10	Personnel	Per assigned legal officer in theater.
M11	Personnel	Per assigned MWR person in theater.
M12	Months	To establish R&R facilities in a protracted operation.
M13	Percent	Of protracted operations have a theater or JFC established R&R policy.

ST 4.2.2 Provide Health Service Support

M1	Percent	Accountability of personnel entering health services treatment pipeline.
M2	Hours	From wound or injury until surgery.
M3	Days	Awaiting routine medical services (in theater).
M4	Percent	Of casualties, returned to duty.
M5	Percent	Of casualties die.
M6	Patients/day	Returned to duty.
M7	Patients/day	Provided medical treatment.
M8	Percent	Of health services <i>customers</i> are active duty personnel.
M9	Percent	Of total casualties treated per day are noncombatants.
M10	Percent	Of in-theater procured fresh meat, inspected by a US inspector.
M11	Percentage	Of required dental personnel, in theater.
M12	Percent	Of required nursing personnel, in theater.
M13	Percent	Shortfall in health services support personnel (in theater).
M14	Hours	Turnaround for medical lab serology and other technical lab testing results.
M15	Days	Supply of whole blood held (in theater).
M16	Percent	Of minimal casualties, returned to duty within 72 hours.
M17	Percent	Of immediate casualties evacuated to further care within 24 hours (without mortality incidence).
M18	Percent	Of total patient count were NBIs.
M19	Percent	Of mortality results from nonavailability of blood products.
M20	Percent	Of mortality results from delay in regulation of patient to further care.
M21	Percent	Of loss of limb resulted from delay in regulation of patients to further care.
M22	Percent	Of patients regulated to facilities with required capability.
M23	Hours	For casualty to obtain "stabilizing" medical care.
M24	Days	For casualty to obtain "recuperative" medical care.

ST 4.2.2.1 Manage Theater Joint Blood Program

M1	Days	To establish Blood Transshipment Center (s) in Theater of Operations/JOA.
M2	Days	To coordinate activities between theater Joint Blood Program Office and Armed Services Blood Program Office.
M3	Percent	Accuracy in submitting Blood Reports to ASBPO based on daily estimates of theater requirements.
M4	Hours	Delay in submitting daily Blood Reports from JBPO to ASBPO.

M5	Days	To establish Area Joint Blood Program Office(s) (AJBPO) in theater of operations/JOA
M6	Percent	Difference in blood product supply levels between theaters of operations/JOAs
M7	Weeks	Since JBPO conducted on-site inspection of subordinate JBPOs, AJBPOs, and units in theater of operations/JOA

ST 4.2.2.2 Coordinate Patient Evacuation from AOR

M1	Days	To establish procedures for regulating evacuation of patients within and from theater of war.
M2	Days	To determine policy for eligibility for treatment of non DOD personnel, such as UN personnel and foreign nationals.
M3	Days	To establish Theater Patient Movement Requirement Center (TPMRC) in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Days	To coordinate patient evacuation activities between TPMRC and Global Patient Movement Requirement Center (GPMRC).
M5	Days	To establish liaison and coordination with USTRANSCOM and Defense Medical Systems Support Center.
M6	Percent	Of GPMRC generated schedules must be modified for theater of operations/JOA.
M7	Percent	Difference between projected bed capacities of designated MTF's and actual patient population in theater of operations/JOA.
M8	Percent	Of patients, processed at ASF and passed on first time.

ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical and Dental Services, Laboratories, and Supply

M1	Days	To establish preventive medicine policy for theater of operations/JOA (after C-Day).
M2	Days	To establish medical laboratories in theater of operations/JOA (after organizational C-Day).
M3	Days	To inspect all facilities supplying, storing, and issuing subsistence items in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Hours	To inspect subsistence items contaminated by NBC attack in theater of operations/JOA..
M5	Days	To evaluate size and duration of operation and project levels of dental care required for theater of operations/JOA.
M6	Percent	Difference between projected and actual levels of dental care required for theater of operations/JOA.
M7	Percent	Of personnel, incapacitated by disease in theater of operations/JOA.

ST 4.2.3 Reconstitute Theater Forces

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs have reconstitution provisions.
M2	Percent	Of all assigned aircraft in theater, from Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI).
M3	Days	Of major end items in theater, war reserve stocks.
M4	Percent	Of support forces, trained and equipped for salvage and battle damage repair.

ST 4.2.4 Conduct Training of Joint Forces

M1	Weeks	From mission change until required training program established.
M2	Percent	Of JMET trained per year.
M3	Percent	Of exercises include JMETs.
M4	Percent	Of OPLAN, CONPLAN, FUNCPLAN requirements, identified in JMETL.
M5	Percent	Of required linguists, available to train host-nation personnel during MOOTW.

M6	Months	Since commander's JMETL, updated.
M7	Months	Since policy, education, and training vision, reviewed.
M8	Percent	Of designated and alternate JTF headquarters receive at least one JCS exercise, with After Action Review (each year).
M9	Percent	Of JTF headquarters (conducting major joint exercises), receive augmentation by JTF augmentation cell from theater command.
M10	Percent	Of JTF headquarters receive at least one academic training exercise in crisis action planning procedures (each year).
M11	Percent	Of joint exercises training objectives reflect participating units' JMETL assessment.
M12	Hours	For major theater units (major commands/Corps/Fleet/NAF-level headquarters) to provide an assessment to CINC of capability to accomplish each JMET.
M13	Percent	Of primary and alternate JTF headquarters receive at least one JCS exercise with AAR (each theater training cycle).
M14	Percent	Of JTF headquarters conducting joint exercises receive required theater joint staff augmentation.
M15	Percent	Of contingency JTF headquarters receive periodic academic training in crisis action planning procedures and joint procedures.

ST 4.2.5 Provide Religious Ministry Support within AOR

M1	Percent	Of major military locations have services for all major denominations available weekly.
M2	Percent	Of chapels have active lay personnel advisory groups.
M3	Percent	Of chaplain's time spent with military personnel and families outside the religious facility.
M4	Instances	Of hospital death without chaplain presence.
M5	Percent	Of hospital patients seen at least weekly by chaplains.
M6	Percent	Of installations/locations without chaplains have weekly religious services.
M7	Percent	Of major installations or commands have religious education and study programs.
M8	Percent	Of major military locations have services for all major denominations available weekly.
M9	Percent	Of NGOs have Joint Force Chaplain established liaison.
M10	Percent	Of personnel have weekly opportunity for contact with a chaplain.
M11	Percent	Of PVOs have Joint Force Chaplain established liaison.
M12	Percent	Of religious faith groups in joint force receive balanced coverage throughout AOR.
M13	Days	Since last chaplain visit to isolated location or unit.
M14	Months	Since last command chaplain survey of morale within joint force in AOR.
M15	Hours	To receive counseling, support and comfort from time of request.

ST 4.3 Distribute Supplies/Services for Theater Campaign and COMMZ

M1	Days	Operational delay because of fuel shortages.
M2	Percent	Of planned fuel deliveries, destroyed by enemy action.
M3	Percent	Of planned fuel, delivered to theater forces.
M4	Percent	Of required fuel, in place to support campaign.
M5	Incidents	Of fire support missions not fired or not completed because of ammunition shortfall.
M6	Days	Operational delay because of late redistribution of ammunition (Class V) from less affected area in theater.
M7	Tons	Of ammunition per day delivered in theater.

13 September 1996

M8	Percent	Of required munitions, in place to support campaign.
M9	Percent	Of total munitions, delivered but not fired by conflict end.
M10	Ship-days	Lost while tankers held in theater before unloading begins (floating storage).
M11	Days	To begin unloading ships (upon arrival in theater).
M12	Days	To begin unloading fuel tankers (upon arrival in theater).
M13	Tons/day	Of support cargo and equipment arrived at destination by TPFDD LAD.
M14	Tons	Of required sustainment supplies arrived at destination by TPFDD LAD.
M15	Percent	Of classes of supplies/services in theater identified and sourced within first 30 days of operation.
M16	Percent	Of active acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, confirmed by COCOM within five days of CJCS Warning Order.
M17	Days	For COCOM to confirm all active acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.
M18	Days	To inventory and report all war reserve stocks.
M19	Days	To establish a JTF supply-servicing reporting system (from establishment of JTF).
M20	Hours	For COCOM staff to identify potential sources for classes of supplies sufficient to meet operational requirements (after CJCS Warning Order).
M21	Hours	For all pertinent host-nation legal and support arrangements to be identified and reviewed (after CJCS Warning Order).
M22	Hours	For all relevant acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA) to be identified and reviewed (after CJCS Warning Order).
M23	Hours	For estimates of potential subordinate command (e.g., JTF) sustainment requirements to be reviewed (after CJCS Warning Order).
M24	Percent	Of supply classes go red or become show stoppers (during execution).
M25	Days	Delay in attacks because of lack of adequate munitions in theater.

ST 4.3.1 Provide for Movement Services Within AOR

M1	Hours	For priority cargo to move.
M2	Days	For general cargo to move.
M3	Instances	Of changes in transportation mode from theater reception until end-delivery.
M4	Passenger-miles	Provided per day.
M5	Ton/miles	Of supplies and equipment moved per day.
M6	Percent	Of key movement facilities (such as POEs, ISBs, and PODs) involved in theater movement plans, identified during COA development.
M7	Hours	For a passenger to move.

ST 4.3.2 Provide Supplies and Services for Theater Forces

M1	Days	Delay in operations because of late redistribution of ammunition (Class V) from less affected area in theater.
M2	Percent	Of required ammunition (Class V), in place to support campaign (at execution).
M3	Percent	Of planned ammunition (Class V), delivered to theater forces (during execution).
M4	Percent	Of total munitions, delivered but not fired by conflict end.
M5	Percent	Of required fuel (Class III), in place to support campaign (at execution).
M6	Percent	Of planned fuel (Class III), delivered to theater forces (during execution).
M7	Days	Delay in operations because of fuel (Class III) shortages.
M8	Percent	Of Constraints/Shortfalls in supply have alternatives.
M9	Shortfalls	Have been identified for supply.
M10	Constraints	Have been identified for supply.

M11	Days	Of supply, in place to support campaign (at execution).
M12	Tons/Day	Capacity to process and issue supplies.
M13	Percent	Of planned supply deliveries, actually delivered (at execution).
M14	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M15	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M16	Percent	Of Priority Three geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).

ST 4.3.2.1 Allocate All Classes of Supply per Theater Strategic Plan

M1	Percent	Of required ammunition (Class V), in place to support campaign.
M2	Percent	Of planned ammunition (Class V), delivered to theater forces during operations.
M3	Percent	Of total munitions, delivered but not fired by conflict end.
M4	Percent	Of required fuel (Class III), in place to support campaign.
M5	Percent	Of planned fuel (Class III), delivered to theater forces.
M6	Days	Of supply, in place to support campaign.
M7	Tons/Day	Capacity to process and issue supplies.
M8	Days	Delay in operations because of late redistribution of ammunition (Class V) from less affected area in theater.

ST 4.3.2.2 Build Up Stockage Levels for Theater Campaign

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs address time-phased operating and safety levels (of supply).
M2	Hours	For determination of availability of suitable munitions within theater (after CJCS Warning Order).

ST 4.3.2.3 Provide Maintenance Services and Parts for Theater Campaign

M1	Days	Delay in operations because of late updates or upgrades to systems.
M2	Percent	Of items can be repaired in theater.
M3	Percent	Of non-US coalition items can be maintained in theater.
M4	Days	To process requisitions for items from out of theater.
M5	Days	Awaiting repair for items in theater repair system.
M6	Days	To comply with technical orders.
M7	Days	For system updates or upgrades to systems in theater.

ST 4.4 Maintain Sustainment Bases

M1	Hours	To reestablish damaged theater LOCs.
M2	Days	To construct a standard runway.
M3	Weeks	To build a base facility within theater base.
M4	Weeks	To construct theater level field hospitals.
M5	Percent	Of construction material, acquired or produced locally.
M6	Percent	Of total engineering manpower, supplied by host-nation.
M7	Percent	Of theater base engineering work, allocated to dismantling fortifications and obstacle systems.
M8	Weeks	Before sustainment facilities, operational.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment facilities, relocated in course of supporting a series of campaigns.
M10	Percent	More theater support base construction was needed than identified in OPLAN (after OPLAN C-Day).

ST 4.4.1 Determine Number and Location of Sustaining Bases

13 September 1996

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs address main and alternate supply depots.
M2	Weeks	Before sustainment facilities, operational.
M3	Percent	Of sustainment facilities had to be relocated to support a particular campaign.
M4	Kilometers	Backhaul distance for equipment requiring theater level repair or evacuation.
M5	Percent	Of theater level sustainment, not under weather shelters.
M6	Percent	Of theater level sustainment, protected from the elements.
M7	Percent	Of sustainment facilities, capable of being relocated.
M8	Percent	Of operations in theater have adequate sustainment base/infrastructure.

ST 4.4.2 Provide Civil-Military Engineering in Theater

M1	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a standard fighter/attack suitable runway.
M2	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct field hospitals (in theater).
M3	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a base facility (in theater).
M4	Hours	To restore essential utilities (in rear areas).
M5	Hours	To reestablish damaged LOCs.
M6	Days	To restore POD/APOD to handle required shipping.
M7	Percent	Of main supply routes, pipelines, airfields, and maintenance facilities in JOA have accurate condition assessments.
M8	Hours	To respond to a request for real estate coordination by JTF or other subordinate command.
M9	Hours	To respond to a request for assistance by JTF or other subordinate command for facilities contracting requirements external to the JOA.
M10	Percent	Of tasks correctly assigned (right engineers/location/time).
M11	Percent	Of engineering requests, satisfied by contractor assets from outside theater.
M12	Percent	Of engineering requests, satisfied by theater assets.
M13	Percent	Of total procurement costs in contract administrative costs.
M14	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$100,001 to \$500,000.
M15	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$2,501 to \$100,000.
M16	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts over \$500,001.
M17	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts under \$2500 (micro-purchases).
M18	Weeks	To let a procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.
M19	Days	To let a procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M20	Percent	Of construction material, acquired or produced locally.
M21	Percent	Of supplies, under weatherproof cover at theater sustainment bases.
M22	Percent	Of planned administrative support services, available.
M23	Percent	Of planned capacity to process and issue supplies, available.
M24	Percent	Of planned transportation, available.
M25	Percent	Of theater base engineering work, allocated to dismantling fortifications and obstacle systems.
M26	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a standard runway.
M27	Days	To identify and marshal forces to restore a standard runway to full operation.
M28	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a standard intratheater airlift suitable runway.

ST 4.4.3 Provide Law Enforcement and Prisoner Control

M1	Casualties/day	Among EPWs detained by friendly forces.
M2	EPWs	Detained by friendly forces, awaiting final disposition.
M3	Percent	Of EPW compounds, guarded by security forces versus combat troops.

13 September 1996

M4	Percent	Of EPW compounds, cited for serious deficiencies by International Red Cross.
M5	Hours	To evacuate EPWs from initial capture to their final EPW compounds.
M6	Casualties/week	Among prisoners.
M7	Incidents/week	Involving off-duty US military personnel, local nationals, and alcohol or drugs.
M8	Percent	Of requests for rail and road movement escorts, met.
M9	Weeks	Since EPW policy reviewed by legal personnel.
M10	Incidents/month	Of accidents involving military vehicles.
M11	Percent	Of felony cases in theater, cleared within first month.
M12	Incidents	Of shortfalls in security forces to meet operational requirements.
M13	Requests	For construction of new EPW facilities.
M14	Incidents	Of shortfalls in EPW processing sites.
M15	Incidents	Of law and order policy not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.

ST 4.4.4 Manage and Integrate Third Party Logistics

M1	Personnel	To oversee and manage contractors' performance in providing on-schedule sustainment services in theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Days	Delay between CJCS Warning Order and briefing of contractor representatives.
M3	Percent	Of theater sustainment services, provided by third party logistics (contractor services).
M4	Percent	Of contractor personnel have equipment to allow them to deploy forward to theater of operations/JOA.
M5	Days	Delay in contract performance because of lack of specialized training.
M6	Personnel	From RC, activated to replace contractor personnel not prepared to deploy to theater of operations/JOA.
M7	Days	For contractor review of draft OPLAN.
M8	Hours	To receive contractor comments on proposed courses of action (during a crisis).
M9	Percent	Of contractor's available capacity used in theater of operations/JOA (if military support forces also employed).
M10	Days	To select contractors to deliver sustainment services in theater of operations/JOA.
M11	Months	To develop, advertise, and let contracts for sustainment services in theater of operations/JOA.
M12	Percent	Of personnel support contracted.

ST 5 Provide Theater Strategic Command And Control

M1	Days	To issue Letter of Instruction (LOI) for plan development (after receipt of CINC's strategic concept for deliberate plan).
M2	Days	To submit COA's (after receipt of national strategy direction).
M3	Hours	To provide combatant command Execute Order to components (after receipt of an Execute Order from CJCS).
M4	Months	To complete CINC's strategic Concept (after publication of JSCP).
M5	Months	To update combatant command-published strategy (after major shift in US midterm strategy).
M6	Months	To update combatant command published strategy.
M7	Percent	Of combatant command orders, properly executed by Command and supporting components.
M8	Percent	Of combatant command's suggested changes to JSR, NMS, and other strategy development and strategy documents are accepted..
M9	Percent	Of selected COA's, agreed to by CJCS.

ST 5.1 Operate and Manage Theater Communications and Information Systems

M1	Instances/ month	Of NBC Warning and Reporting System down.
M2	Percent	Of addressees received messages.
M3	Percent	Of requirements for DOD and other government agency support, identified and forwarded for resolution.

ST 5.1.1 Communicate Strategic and Operational Decisions and Information

M1	Minutes	Of queuing time for messages being sent.
M2	Minutes	To deliver FLASH message to action addressee (after receipt in servicing TCC).
M3	Minutes	To receive Flash message in working spaces (from release at originator).
M4	Minutes	To receive Immediate message in working spaces (from release at originator).
M5	Percent	Of action addressees received strategic orders and significant information by any means.
M6	Percent	Of addressees received message.
M7	Percent	Of AUTODIN messages transmitted FLASH or IMMEDIATE.
M8	Percent	Of DSN/TASS calls completed.
M9	Percent	Of messages go outside normal communications channels.
M10	Percent	Of messages queued in AUTODIN backlog (each week).
M11	Percent	Of messages sent outside proper channels for message classification.
M12	Percent	Of messages transmitted Flash precedence.
M13	Percent	Of messages transmitted Immediate precedence.
M14	Percent	Of traffic sent in DOD or dedicated lines or channels.

ST 5.1.2 Manage Theater C4 Systems for Communicating Strategic Orders and Information

M1	Days	To define theater communications requirements for military operations other than war (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Days	To integrate new headquarters into existing Global Command and Control System network.
M3	Hours	To identify surge capacity requirements in DOD long haul communications channels (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	To provide C4 planning guidance and assistance to forces on joint telecommunications/data systems (after receipt of Warning Order).
M5	Minutes	To report critical theater C4 outages to CJCS.

M6	Minutes	To update status of circuits to commander.
M7	Percent	Of C2 nodes have all required communications capabilities.
M8	Percent	Of C4 planning guidance and assistance, provided to supporting and assigned forces on joint telecommunications and data systems during planning process.
M9	Percent	Of C4I resources (required to support force redeployment), identified.
M10	Percent	Of communication outages have redundant communication paths adequate to ensure timely receipt of record traffic.
M11	Percent	Of communications networks (critical to operations), fully operational.
M12	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes identified in OPLAN.
M13	Percent	Of DOD long-haul communications channels saturated.
M14	Percent	Of information system interfaces, require information scanning, retyping, reformatting, or other non-direct translation methods.
M15	Percent	Of joint force classified systems can be networked.
M16	Percent	Of joint force headquarters LANs, authorized to interoperate, capable of interoperating (e.g., GCCS, JDISS).
M17	Percent	Of joint force voice and data communications (secure and unsecure) have unified command functional.
M18	Percent	Of joint force voice and data communications (unsecure and secure) have National Command Authority functional.
M19	Percent	Of JOPES available (via WWMCCS or GCCS).
M20	Percent	Of potential crisis areas, where existing terminals and lines of communications throughput capability, are known or estimated.
M21	Percent	Of requirements for support from DOD agencies identified and forwarded for resolution (prior to execution).
M22	Percent	Of surge capacity, available (DOD long haul communications).
M23	Percent	Of theater C4 outages reported to CJCS within standards established in CJCS initiating directive.
M24	Percent	Of traffic sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.
M25	Percent	Of communications systems, available to JTF.
M26	Percent	Of intelligence communications systems, available to JTF.

ST 5.1.3 Maintain Strategic Information, Data, and Force Status

M1	Hours	To update and confirm data reported to CINC (after daily briefing).
M2	Minutes	To access and display shared local data bases.
M3	Minutes	To access and display shared remote data bases.
M4	Minutes	To post unit data to appropriate data bases or pass to work centers (after receipt of reports).
M5	Minutes	To process and disseminate status information.
M6	Minutes	To update current information on status of forces.
M7	Percent	Of appropriate data provided to CINC, prior to decisions being made.
M8	Percent	Of audited reports contained no errors.
M9	Percent	Of decisions made in a timely manner and data presented to decision maker in suitable formats.
M10	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel with current status known.
M11	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to agencies within specified time limits.
M12	Percent	Of reports/messages delivered to designated recipient within specified time limits.
M13	Percent	Of intelligence data base systems, available to JTF.

ST 5.1.4 Monitor Worldwide and Theater Strategic Situation

M1	Hours	Since CINC updated on overall theater strategy.
----	-------	---

13 September 1996

M2	Hours	Since update of information on other joint force, other military forces, and non-DOD agencies operating adjacent to joint force operating area.
M3	Hours	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.
M4	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging theater strategic situation.
M5	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M6	Instances	Of information of critical/emerging event provided to commander by staff prior to commander notification by source outside staff.
M7	Instances	Of information on critical/emerging event provided to commander by source outside of staff (prior to being notified by staff).
M8	Instances	Where commander surprised by critical/emerging political or military event (not briefed).
M9	Months	To review overall theater strategy.
M10	Percent	Of CINC staff Pol-Mil specialists and subspecialists primarily focusing on worldwide rather than theater strategic situation.
M11	Percent	Of concurrence between ambassador and CINC inputs for security assistance.
M12	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations, that affected course of campaign, forecast.
M13	Percent	Of information (regarding emerging political events) provided to commander by staff.
M14	Percent	Of POL-Mil specialists and subspecialists on staff, focus on worldwide and theater strategic situation.
M15	Percent	Of staff possess current knowledge of strategic intent and plans.
M16	Percent	Of commander's or senior staff member's knowledge of emerging political events (which could impact theater), come from sources outside staff.
M17	Weeks	To review strategic options in deliberate planning.

ST 5.1.5 Provide for Combat Camera in Theater

M1	Hours	To dual hat Combat Camera det commander as member of JIB.
M2	Hours	To process media and produce imagery for short notice tasking (within AOR).
M3	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in theater.
M4	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in US.
M5	Hours	To respond to and be on scene for short notice tasking (within JOA).
M6	Hours	To review selected Combat Camera materials for release (until approval).
M7	Percent	Of presented coverage deemed suitable by customer (i.e., audience attention and share).
M8	Percent	Of subject coverage requests, filled.

ST 5.2 Assess Theater Strategic Environment

M1	Months	To review Regional Security Strategy.
M2	Months	To review strategic options.
M3	Months	To update Regional Security Strategy.
M4	Percent	Of international agreements renewed before expiration.
M5	Percent	Of theater significant political events occur with options available.
M6	Weeks	To prepare and submit combatant command inputs to JSR.

ST 5.2.1 Review Current Situation

M1	Hours	To complete review of current situation (from request or crisis event).
M2	Hours	To develop and provide CINC's strategic options IAW CJCS Warning Order (in crisis action planning).
M3	Hours	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.
M4	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging theater strategic crisis.

M5	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M6	Hours	To update CINC on overall theater strategy.
M7	Hours	To update information on other joint forces, other military forces, and non-DOD agencies operating adjacent to joint force operating area.
M8	Incidents	Of enemy actions or operations affecting course of campaign, correctly forecast.
M9	Incidents	Of commander being surprised by critical/emerging political or military events.
M10	Months	To review strategic options completed in deliberate planning cycle.
M11	Percent	Of emerging political events (could impact OA) briefed to commander or senior staff member.
M12	Percent	Of staff have current knowledge of strategic intent and plans.

ST 5.2.2 Assess National and Multinational Strategy

M1	Percent	Of deficiencies in NSS and NMS, identified by combatant commander.
M2	Percent	Of issues generated by combatant commander in JSR.
M3	Months	To review/update Regional Security Strategy.
M4	Percent	Of above-the-line forces covered by JMNA.
M5	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M6	Percent	Of theater identified major deficiencies corrected in National Military Strategy review.

ST 5.2.3 Review National Security Considerations

M1	Percent	Of deficiencies in NSS and NMS, identified by CINC.
M2	Percent	Of identified major deficiencies, corrected in most recent published NCA/CJCS planning guidance.
M3	Months	To review/update RSS.
M4	Weeks	To prepare and forward proposed change to theater forces or force posture (after receipt of theater NIE).
M5	Months	Since staff review of US national political and military security objectives.

ST 5.2.4 Review International Security Considerations

M1	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M2	Instances	Of issues and shortcomings identified by combatant commander in international agreements, command relationships, or collective strategies.
M3	Percent	Of emerging political events, commander's information came from source outside the staff.
M4	Percent	Of international agreements reviewed and or modified before expiration.
M5	Percent	Of international security arrangements reviewed for impact on theater relationships.
M6	Percent	Of theater political events of interest occur without options being available.

ST 5.2.5 Project Future Theater Campaigns or Strategic Operations

M1	Days	Beyond current plan's execution phase, covered by follow-on planning.
M2	Days	Of completed follow-on planning (beyond current plan's execution phase).
M3	Phases	Planned beyond current plan's execution phase.
M4	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (during execution).
M5	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (in formal plans).
M6	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels.
M7	Percent	Of identified sequels have developed COAs.

13 September 1996

M8	Percent	Of possible follow-on operations, preplanned.
M9	Weeks	Covered by follow-on planning (beyond current plan's execution phase).

ST 5.3 Determine Strategic Direction

M1	Hours	To complete plan/order.
M2	Hours	To issue combatant commander's intent (after CJCS Warning Order).

ST 5.3.1 Conduct Strategic Estimate

M1	Days	To develop theater strategic estimate (after receipt of JSCP).
M2	Days	To produce a CINC-approved strategic estimate (after receipt of JSR instructions).
M3	Days	To obtain commitment to provide support for Allies (after receipt of request).
M4	Hours	To complete strategic estimate (after convening OPT).
M5	Hours	To produce initial strategic estimate (after convening OPT during crisis).
M6	Percent	Of critical intelligence reports and AOR related intelligence estimates reviewed prior to mission analysis/end state assessment.
M7	Percent	Of available planning time allowed for subordinate planning (after selecting COA).
M8	Weeks	To approve theater strategic estimate (after receipt of JSCP).

ST 5.3.1.1 Develop Theater Courses of Action and Prepare Staff Estimates

M1	Percent	Of COAs provided an estimate of time required to reach termination objectives.
M2	Percent	Of essential tasks derived during mission analysis and used in theater planning.
M3	Percent	Of essential tasks included in theater commander's mission statement.
M4	Percent	Of implied tasks derived during mission analysis and used in theater planning.
M5	Percent	Of planning time, during crisis action planning (CAP), made available by theater commander to components for planning.
M6	Percent	Of potential COAs open to commander, if successful, will accomplish the mission.
M7	Percent	Of stated tasks derived during mission analysis and used in theater planning.
M8	Percent	Of theater COAs, include concept for maintaining theater reserve.
M9	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, acceptable.
M10	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, distinguishable.
M11	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, feasible.
M12	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, suitable.

ST 5.3.1.2 Analyze and Compare Theater Courses of Action

M1	Hours	To conduct theater COA analysis.
M2	Percent	Of COA assumptions, tested for sensitivity.
M3	Percent	Of COA wargaming options (available to theater planners) considered for theater COA analysis.
M4	Percent	Of identified enemy COAs compared to (or wargamed against) each friendly theater COA.
M5	Percent	Of critical problems with theater COA, identified during COA analysis.
M6	Percent	Of theater COA expenses have identified funds against them.
M7	Percent	Of theater COA wargaming assessment criteria selected before analysis began.
M8	Percent	Of theater COAs modified or discarded during COA analysis (after critical problems identified).
M9	Percent	Of theater logistics problems encountered, anticipated during or before COA analysis.

13 September 1996

ST 5.3.1.3 Select/Modify Theater Course of Action and Prepare Commander's Estimate

M1	Hours	To produce Commander's Estimate.
M2	Hours	To synthesize theater COA analysis and present recommendation to commander.
M3	Percent	Of branches experienced at theater level, anticipated during or before COA analysis.
M4	Percent	Of sequels experienced at theater level, anticipated during or before COA analysis.
M5	Percent	Of theater combatant commander recommended COAs, approved by NCA.
M6	Percent	Of theater combatant commander recommended COAs, recommended for approval by JCS.
M7	Percent	Of theater combatant commander recommended COAs, recommended for approval by SecDef.

ST 5.3.1.4 Conduct Mission Analysis and Prepare Mission Statement

M1	Hours	To create mission statements.
M2	Hours	To identify long- and short-term objectives for mission termination.
M3	Hours	To identify specified and implied tasks.
M4	Hours	To select priorities for multiple tasks.
M5	Percent	Of implied tasks derived during mission analysis.
M6	Percent	Of mission statement expressed in terms of who, what, where, when and why.
M7	Percent	Of specified tasks derived during mission analysis.
M8	Percent	Of stated and implied tasks translated into mission statements for subordinates.

ST 5.3.2 Develop Theater Strategic Concepts

M1	Days	To publish planning guidance (after receipt of mission).
M2	Days	To submit COA's, in crisis or wartime, after receipt of national military strategic direction.
M3	Days	To submit COA's, in crisis or wartime, after receipt of national strategy direction.
M4	Instances	Of CJCS rejection of combatant commander's recommended strategy.
M5	Months	To complete CINCs strategic concept (after receipt of JSCP).
M6	Percent	Of accepted COA's have feasible alternatives.
M7	Percent	Of COAs currently developed IAW JSCP requirement.
M8	Percent	Of comparison criteria eliminated before comparison as redundant.
M9	Percent	Of comparison criteria used, defined or weighted before comparison began.
M10	Percent	Of FDOs have adequate follow-on forces.
M11	Percent	Of functional areas covered by guidance.
M12	Percent	Of selected COA's have CJCS concurrence.
M13	Percent	Of shortfall after comparing requirements and assets estimated to be available during JSCP period.

ST 5.3.3 Issue Planning Guidance

M1	Days	To publish Planning Guidance (after receipt of mission).
M2	Hours	To approve/deny request for change to ROE.
M3	Instances	Of amendments issued to Planning Guidance.
M4	Instances	Of misunderstood ROE.
M5	Instances	Of requests for clarification of Planning Guidance/commander's guidance received from subordinate headquarters.

ST 5.3.4 Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operation Plans, and Orders

M1	Days	To submit COAs (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M2	Hours	To develop and provide strategic options (after CINC receives Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To submit operation order for approval (after receipt of Planning Guidance).
M4	Months	To submit OPLAN for approval (after receipt of LOI for plan development).
M5	Percent	Of anticipated mortuary requirements (e.g., collection points, field processing centers, US cemeteries in theater) addressed in planning.
M6	Percent	Of COAs developed deemed executable by CJCS or NCA.
M7	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes identified in planning.
M8	Percent	Of existing terminals and lines of communications and known or estimated throughput capability, addressed during planning.
M9	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies impacting presence of media, addressed in planning.
M10	Percent	Of logistic support responsibilities allocated to Service components and other commands during planning.
M11	Percent	Of planned operations conform to standards under Conduct of War and International Convention.
M12	Percent	Of pre-positioned WRM required to support TPFDD pending resupply.
M13	Percent	Of RC personnel backfill requirements for CONUS & OCONUS, identified in planning.
M14	Percent	Of reserve personnel designated to move the force (i.e., AMC, MTMC, MSC and HQ USTRANSCOM), addressed in planning.
M15	Percent	Of reserve personnel designated to support the force, (e.g., medical, dental, security, mob station staff), identified in planning..
M16	Percent	Of unit requirements in OPLAN can be sourced without dual apportionment.

ST 5.4 Provide Strategic Direction to Theater Forces

M1	Hours	To deploy Joint Task Force Staff augmentation (e.g. DJTFAC).
M2	Hours	To report Joint Staff operational (after receipt of activation order).
M3	Hours	To submit operations order for approval (after receipt of Planning Guidance).
M4	Minutes	To prepare message of strategic intent (after completion by combatant commander).
M5	Percent	Of changes issued, caused by missing or incorrect data or entries.
M6	Percent	Of CINC's assigned and supporting forces commence operation on time.
M7	Percent	Of Joint Task Force Staff deploying augmentation (e.g. DJTFAC) members, have previous training.
M8	Percent	Of proposed Operation Plans or Campaign Plans, accepted by CJCS or NCA without major changes.
M9	Instances	Of misunderstanding commander's intent, missions, and tasks.
M10	Percent	Of time (from receipt of planning guidance until written instructions), available to subordinate and supporting commands.

ST 5.4.1 Issue Theater Strategic Operation Plans, Orders, and ROE

M1	Minutes	To transmit an operation order (after approval by CINC).
M2	Percent	Of COAs developed, deemed executable by CJCS or NCA.
M3	Percent	Of operations in OPLAN, conform to US and International Law.
M4	Percent	Of requests for exceptions to ROE, determined according to policy.
M5	Percent	Of ROE conforms to requirements.
M6	Percent	Of ROE requests consistent with current policy.

13 September 1996

ST 5.4.2 Synchronize Joint Operations and Subordinate Campaign Plans

M1	Hours	To obtain commitment to support Allies (after receipt of request).
M2	Hours	To complete feasible TPFDD (after receipt of Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To conduct SOF cross-border operations, prior to commencement of hostilities.
M4	Hours	To designate theater of operations/JOA boundaries (after decision to stand up joint force).
M5	Instances	Of operational missions (e.g., SOF, PSYOP, Deception), executed without coordinating with operating forces in target area.
M6	Instances	Of requests for support sent directly to CINC's Service component.
M7	Months	To publish approved OPLAN with TPFDD (after receipt of JSCP).
M8	Percent	Of CINC assigned and supporting in-place-forces commence operation on time (right people, right place, right time).
M9	Percent	Of execution taskings to coalition partners or agencies, accepted.
M10	Percent	Of joint force accommodated within theater of operations/JOA boundaries.
M11	Percent	Of joint force missions or component missions, completed as planned.
M12	Percent	Of joint force operations accomplished without exceeding theater of operations/JOA boundaries.
M13	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs, reviewed within last 24 months.
M14	Percent	Of Special Technical Operations included in planning.
M15	Percent	Of subordinate missions executed without requested joint force or component support.
M16	Percent	Of TPFDD units arrive IAW RDD.
M17	Percent	Of TPFDD units arrive in operational sequence.

ST 5.4.3 Establish or Participate in a Joint, Combined, or Multinational Force

M1	Hours	To appoint joint force Commander
M2	Hours	To define JOA.
M3	Hours	To deploy forward and establish in theater a joint force headquarters element.
M4	Hours	To establish initial communication with host-nation and US DOS representatives (after CINC establishes joint force headquarters).
M5	Hours	To form the joint force staff.
M6	Hours	To fully augment joint force headquarters staff and commence operations (after receipt of alert order).
M7	Hours	To issue tasking to initial augmentees for newly formed joint task force.
M8	Hours	To provide JCS a copy of activation (after approval by combatant commander).
M9	Instances	Of friendly forces orders/taskings, significantly delayed because of unclear command relationships with HQ.
M10	Minutes	To notify joint force core staff (after receipt of alert order).
M11	Percent	Of designated staff positions filled.
M12	Percent	Of DOD components and involved foreign governments, adequately represented on designated joint force staff.
M13	Percent	Of joint force headquarters staff composed of augmentees.
M14	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees have previously trained as augmentees.
M15	Percent	Of nations (with allocated or apportioned forces) represented on combined force staff.
M16	Percent	Of necessary augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M17	Percent	Of operational missions coordinated with theater and coalition command structure.

M18	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations, affected by late arrival of augmentees to staff.
M19	Percent	Of theater assigned joint force missions fail, because of improper integration with joint force staff.

ST 5.4.3.1 Augment the Joint Force Staff

M1	Hours	To augment subordinate joint force headquarters staff and commence operations (after receipt of Alert Order).
M2	Hours	To deploy DJTFAC upon standing up a Joint Task Force.
M3	Hours	To provide specialized equipment (after request from JFC received by CINC).
M4	Hours	To provide specialized staff personnel (after request from JFC received by CINC).
M5	Percent	Of augmentees required identified in combatant command HQ SOP by at least rank and duty position.
M6	Percent	Of combatant command subordinate joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of augmentees to staff.
M7	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees.
M8	Percent	Of required subordinate joint force staff positions filled.

ST 5.4.3.2 Activate Theater Boards, Centers, Cells and Bureaus

M1	Hours	To establish initial communication with opposite numbers on Joint Staff and in supporting combatant commands (after CINC HQ organized for crisis or war).
M2	Hours	To form combatant command staff.
M3	Percent	Of sections and boards within combatant command established specifically to deal with crisis or war.

ST 5.5 Coordinate Theater-Wide Information Warfare (IW)

M1	Days	To achieve information superiority (after crisis onset).
M2	Hours	To change C2W plan (upon receiving status updates).
M3	Hours	To mount attack on target (after identifying new enemy C2 target).
M4	Percent	Of C2W planners have access to compartmented programs
M5	Percent	Of C2W planners have access to campaign plan.
M6	Percent	Of C2W targets included in joint targeting plans.
M7	Percent	Of campaign phases have integrated C2W efforts.
M8	Percent	Of campaign planners have access to C2W plan.
M9	Percent	Of enemy operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified, attributable to C2W Plan.
M10	Percent	Of friendly operations disrupted by enemy's ability to interfere with friendly information systems.
M11	Percent	Of integrated IW operations delayed/deferred by lack of complete participating force availability.
M12	Percent	Reduction in measured enemy communications traffic flow (after execution of theater C2W).
M13	Percent	Of mission essential US C2 systems remained after enemy C2W actions.
M14	Percent	Of US actions successful against enemy C2 systems selected for destruction/disruption or influence.

ST 5.5.1 Plan and Integrate Theater-Wide IW

M1	Hours	To issue IW policy (after crisis onset).
M2	Percent	Of indigenous media, available to IW cell.
M3	Percent	Of Public Affairs releases, coordinated with IW planners.
M4	Percent	Of US and Allied forces, pursued common IW plans.

M5	Percent	Of work sessions had Public Affairs representation.
M6	Percent	Of C2W elements, represented on C2W cell.
M7	Percent	Of C2W Staff hold SCI clearances.

ST 5.5.2 Control Theater IW Operations

M1	Days	To exploit significant enemy defector.
M2	Hours	To change a major deception operation into a show of force.
M3	Percent	Of C2W operations have existing sources.

ST 5.6 Provide Public Affairs in Theater

M1	Days	To provide PAG for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	To accredit news pool correspondent.
M3	Hours	To coordinate PAG with National Command level and non-DOD agencies and other coalition forces with whom joint force works.
M4	Hours	To establish a Joint Information Bureau (after execute order).
M5	Hours	To prepare for and conduct the first news conference on a crisis or major newsworthy event in theater.
M6	Hours	To provide PAG (after crisis event).
M7	Hours	To provide to press an initial theater position on a breaking news story.
M8	Hours	To release news to media (after event).
M9	Hours	To transmit print journalist stories, from receipt (during crisis or combat).
M10	Minutes	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on a crisis or major newsworthy event in theater.
M11	Minutes	To provide to CINC or senior staff officer, initial theater position on breaking news story.
M12	Minutes	To provide to press initial theater position on a breaking news story.
M13	Instances	Of national level internal information assets not being used.
M14	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media in AOR nations, known and addressed.
M15	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials, accepted.
M16	Percent	Of media support requests, answered.
M17	Percent	Of news released found to contain inaccurate information.
M18	Percent	Of PAG coordinated with Operations and PSYOP and deception operations.
M19	Percent	Of planning, addresses local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media in AOR nations.
M20	Percent	Of press operational access rules and security procedures incorporated in planning.
M21	Percent	Of procedures are current for obtaining DOS support for early entry of reporters into operational area.
M22	Percent	Of releases of information, coordinated in a timely manner with appropriate commands, staffs, and agencies within chain of command.
M23	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens, answered.
M24	Percent	Of phases of plan, incorporate Public Affairs strategy.

ST 5.6.1 Plan and Provide for External Media Support and Operations

M1	Days	To provide PAG for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	To accredit news pool correspondent (during crisis).
M3	Hours	To coordinate PAG with National Command level and non-DOD agencies and other coalition forces with whom joint force works.
M4	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (after execute order).

M5	Hours	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or major newsworthy event in theater.
M6	Hours	To provide PAG (after crisis event).
M7	Hours	To provide to press an initial theater position on a breaking news story.
M8	Hours	To release news to media (after event).
M9	Hours	To transmit print journalist stories (from receipt).
M10	Minutes	To provide to CINC or senior staff officer an initial theater position on breaking news story.
M11	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials, accepted.
M12	Percent	Of media support requests, answered.
M13	Percent	Of news released, found to contain inaccurate information.
M14	Percent	Of phases of plan, have incorporated Public Affairs strategy.

ST 5.6.2 Coordinate Command/Internal Information Programs

M1	Days	To deploy AFRTS capability.
M2	Days	To deploy and distribute AFRTS palletized receivers.
M3	Months	AFRTS TV programming lags US commercial programming.
M4	Months	To revise AFRTS format to reflect changing tastes.
M5	Percent	Of personnel overseas have access to <i>Stars and Stripes</i> .
M6	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens, answered.

ST 5.6.3 Plan and Conduct Community Relations Program

M1	Hours	To develop a public opinion baseline.
M2	Hours	To develop and distribute guidance for service members regarding local customs (in advance of deployment).
M3	Hours	To provide staff answers to local media questions.
M4	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies addressed in PA planning.
M5	Percent	Of requests for official representation at local events, honored

ST 6 Provide Theater Protection

M1	Percent	Of attacks by enemy air successful.
M2	Percent	Of attacks by enemy on theater forces, successful.
M3	Percent	Of attacks by enemy on theater support forces, successful.
M4	Percent	Of theater forces casualties from enemy attacks.
M5	Casualties	Of US non-DOD citizens in theater.
M6	Percent	Of forces operate in areas under control of friendly ground forces (during execution).
M7	Percent	Of forces operate under air superiority umbrella (during execution).
M8	Percent	Of forces operate within maritime superiority area (during execution).
M9	Percent	Of terrorist attacks, successful.

ST 6.1 Provide Theater Aerospace and Missile Defense

M1	Percent	Degradation in forces/material movements because of enemy attacks (affects warfighting OPTEMPO).
M2	Percent	Degradation in warfighting OPTEMPO because of enemy aerospace attacks.
M3	Percent	Of theater forces casualties from enemy air and missile attacks.
M4	Percent	Of defended asset list (DAL), defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches provide cueing for counterforce operations.
M6	Percent	Of enemy ballistic missiles launched after depletion of friendly defensive missile stocks.
M7	Percent	Of forces operate under air superiority umbrella.
M8	Percent	Of friendly C2 nodes have a theater missile early warning capability.
M9	Percent	Of indigenous key economic and government service assets, defensible against theater missile threat.
M10	Percent	Of launched ballistic missiles, destroyed before impact.
M11	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles (of all types) destroyed before impact.
M12	Percent	Of protected DAL locations, successfully defended.
M13	Percent	Of selected C2 nodes, receive actual theater missile early warning.
M14	Percent	Of enemy air attacks, successful
M15	Percent	Of theater assets, defensible against theater missile threat.

ST 6.1.1 Process Theater Aerospace Targets

M1	Minutes	To pair an interceptor or missile with a target.
M2	Percent	Of attacks paired with defensive forces.
M3	Percent	Of day's attacks, paired with interceptor aircraft or missiles sites already committed.
M4	Percent	Of enemy feints ignored.
M5	Percent	Of enemy offensive air threats to strategic environment identified.
M6	Percent	Of identified enemy offensive air threats, targeted prior to disrupting friendly operations.
M7	Percent	Of interceptor forces uncommitted when enemy targets present in system.
M8	Percent	Of main raids, paired with defensive forces.
M9	Percent	Of missile sites not committed because of conflict with interceptor aircraft.
M10	Percent	Of raids penetrate to target and inflict damage which hinders military operations.
M11	Percent	Of targets not destroyed in first pairing, reattacked or re-paired.
M12	Seconds	To identify a new track through electronic or procedural means or to declare an unknown

ST 6.1.2 Provide Airspace Control Measures

M1	Percent	Of fixed wing sorties unable to complete mission because of lack of clearance.
M2	Percent	Of friendly aircraft sorties engaged by friendly weapons systems.
M3	Percent	Of friendly sorties experience blue on blue air-to-air engagements.
M4	Percent	Of OA has complete air picture available.
M5	Percent	Of rotary wing sorties unable to complete mission because of lack of clearance.
M6	Percent	Of sorties interfered with by friendly ground fire.
M7	Percent	Of time, procedural control allowed positive control to be suspended for EMCON reasons.
M8	Percent	Of time, system outages forces use of procedural control.
M9	Percent	Of tracks cannot be Cross Told.

ST 6.1.3 Provide Requirements for Force Enhancement from Space-Based Assets

M1	Hours	To review space requirements as part of crisis response.
M2	Months	Since space requirements reviewed (in peacetime).
M3	Percent	Of requirements submitted to USSPACECOM, have on-orbit assets available for them.
M4	Percent	Of requirements submitted to USSPACECOM, require emergency measures to fill.
M5	Percent	Of requirements submitted to USSPACECOM, returned for lack of adequate information for processing and decision.
M6	Percent	Of spaceborne Force Enhancement requirements coordinated with appropriate agencies and scheduled before execution.
M7	Percent	Of time, a crisis results in significant degradation of peacetime coverage by on-orbit assets.

ST 6.1.4 Provide Theater Air Defense

M1	Percent	Of air defense assets moved into theater IAW established timelines.
M2	Percent	Of enemy aircraft reach weapons release range before being engaged.
M3	Percent	Of interceptor aircraft integrated into theater air defense system.
M4	Percent	Of interceptor bases respond to tasking with aircraft on alert.
M5	Percent	Of multi-role aircraft integrated into air defense system for alert or airborne divert.
M6	Percent	Of paired targets survive until they deliver ordnance.
M7	Percent	Of surface-to-air missile units can accept tasking because site on alert.
M8	Percent	Of surface-to-air missile units unable to respond to tasking because they have not reloaded missiles.
M9	Percent	Of targets require reattack before being destroyed.
M10	Percent	Of unknown targets, successfully intercepted and identified.

ST 6.1.5 Provide Theater Missile Defense

M1	Casualties/Day	Attributed to enemy missile attacks (host-nation civilian).
M2	Casualties/Day	Attributed to enemy missile attacks (military).
M3	Casualties/Day	Attributed to enemy missile attacks (non-belligerent nation civilian).
M4	Days	To destroy all known fixed launch sites.
M5	Minutes	Provided to targeted assets prior to threat arrival.
M6	Percent	Of daily decline in number of ballistic or cruise missiles launched from land based mobile launchers.

13 September 1996

M7	Percent	Of DAL (Defensible Asset List) locations, defensible against theater missile threat.
M8	Percent	Of launched air-to-surface missiles, destroyed before impact.
M9	Percent	Of launched ballistic missiles, destroyed before impact.
M10	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles, destroyed before impact.
M11	Percent	Of protected DAL locations, successfully defended.
M12	Percent	Of theater missile defense assets, moved into theater IAW established timelines.

ST 6.1.6 Support Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in AOR

M1	Instances	Of anomalous reports.
M2	Minutes	After launch, theater CINC provided assured warning of theater ballistic missile launch.
M3	Minutes	For a theater to receive event data over data circuits.
M4	Minutes	From initial notification until establishment of a Missile Event Conference.
M5	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches provided cueing for counterforce operations.

ST 6.2 Provide Protection for Theater Strategic Forces and Means

M1	Days	Delay in schedule for operation, because of requirement to remove hazards (e.g., mines, unexploded ordnance, obstacles).
M2	Hours	Before execution of mission, fully implemented and coordinated security plan in place and operational.
M3	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts), damaged.
M4	Percent	Of friendly aircraft, damaged or destroyed on ground.
M5	Percent	Of friendly communications, disrupted, delayed, or jammed by enemy actions.
M6	Percent	Of friendly ships, damaged or destroyed in port or anchorage.
M7	Percent	Of operational forces committed to removal of operational hazards.
M8	Percent	Of POD/POE facilities, destroyed by enemy action.
M9	Percent	Of time, lift activities at POD or POE facilities interrupted.
M10	Percent/week	Of friendly support installations, attacked and damaged (less aircraft and ships).

ST 6.2.1 Prepare Strategically Significant Defenses

M1	Incidents	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts), damaged or destroyed in previous week.
M2	Percent	Of critical assets and facilities, hardened.
M3	Percent	Of planned facility hardening, completed at execution.
M4	Percent	Of unhardened theater assets, damaged or destroyed.

ST 6.2.2 Remove Strategically Significant Hazards

M1	Hours	Delay in execution of scheme of maneuver, because clearing minefield (land or sea).
M2	Hours	Delay in execution of scheme of maneuver, because removing hazards (e.g., mines, unexploded ordnance, obstacles).
M3	Hours	Delay in execution of scheme of maneuver, because surveying OA for strategically significant hazards.
M4	Percent	Of identified strategically significant hazards, successfully removed or neutralized.

ST 6.2.3 Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum

M1	Hours	Of queuing for message traffic.
----	-------	---------------------------------

13 September 1996

M2	Percent	Of friendly communications, disrupted, delayed, or degraded by enemy actions.
M3	Percent	Of messages, sent by alternate routing.
M4	Percent	Of sorties experience meaconing events.

ST 6.2.4 Provide Acoustic Protection

M1	Percent	Of time action must be taken to curtail friendly activities to ensure optimal use of acoustic spectrum.
M2	db	Loss due to transit of friendly ships.
M3	Hours	To recover an optimal acoustic spectrum after passage of friendly ships.
M4	Hours	Search time lost due to enemy actions to degrade the acoustic spectrum.
M5	Percent	Of time units observe Acoustic Emission Plan

ST 6.2.5 Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Strategic Forces in Theater

M1	Incidents	Of friendly air forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M2	Incidents	Of friendly forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M3	Incidents	Of friendly subsurface forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M4	Incidents	Of friendly surface forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M5	Percent	Of allied nations and potential coalition partners in AOR have agreements on positive identification of friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces, inadvertently attacked by friendly fire.
M7	Percent	Of joint and Service forces, trained in AOR combat identification procedures.
M8	Percent	Of multinational forces in AOR have mutual agreements on aircraft identification.
M9	Percent	Of multinational forces in AOR have mutual agreements on force identification.
M10	Percent	Of nations in AOR have mutual agreements on aircraft identification
M11	Percent	Of aircrews know identification procedures for potential theater recovery bases.
M12	Percent	Of SOF in theater of war/JSOA have systems to identify themselves to friendly attacking forces.
M13	Percent	Of submarines operating in theater of war have systems or procedures to identify themselves to friendly ASW forces.
M14	Percent	Of theater of war friendly force combat casualties, because of friendly fire.
M15	Percent	Of villages, misidentified as friendly or hostile in MOOTW.
M16	Percent	Of friendly casualties caused by friendly weapon systems.

ST 6.2.6 Provide Security for Theater Forces and Means

M1	Hours	For reaction force to reach installation or facility under attack.
M2	Incidents	By terrorists against coalition forces in theater.
M3	Incidents	By terrorists against US forces in theater.
M4	Percent	Of aircraft sorties, delayed on ground because of enemy attack.
M5	Percent	Of aircraft, rendered inoperable or destroyed on ground.
M6	Percent	Of APOD and APOE facilities, destroyed by enemy action.
M7	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., PODs, command posts), destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by sabotage or insurgents or terrorist actions.
M8	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities, hardened or protected against hostile acts.
M9	Percent	Of ships delayed from sailing, because of enemy attack.

13 September 1996

M10	Percent	Of ships rendered inoperable or destroyed while on berth or at anchor.
M11	Percent	Of SPOD and SPOE facilities, destroyed by enemy action.

ST 6.2.6.1 Integrate Counter-Reconnaissance Theater-Wide

M1	Percent	Of movements of critical units or equipment, fully considered overhead reconnaissance system patterns.
M2	Percent	Of theater strategic movements and encampments, obscured during passage of on-orbit systems.
M3	Percent	Of theater strategic movements, conducted at night or in adverse weather to avoid overhead detection.

ST 6.2.6.2 Secure and Protect Theater Installations, Facilities, and Systems

M1	Casualties/week	To US non-combatants.
M2	Incidents	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts, ports), destroyed or damaged.
M3	Incidents	Of damage to APOD and APOE facilities by enemy action (impact scheme of maneuver).
M4	Incidents	Of damage to SPOD and SPOE facilities by enemy action (impact scheme of maneuver).
M5	Percent	Of attacking missiles, successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M6	Percent	Of CONUS civil government C2 assets, defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M7	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, defensible against theater missile threat.
M8	Percent	Of critical facilities, without available back-up or alternate facilities.
M9	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches, provided cueing for counterforce operations.

ST 6.2.6.3 Secure and Protect Theater Air, Land, and Sea LOCs

M1	Hours	For rapid reaction forces to reach point of a LOC attack.
M2	Hours	To restore LOC following interruption.
M3	Percent	Of traffic flow on LOCs (air, land, sea), interrupted by hostile action.
M4	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity, because of enemy attack in operational area.

ST 6.2.6.4 Integrate Theater-Wide Counterintelligence Requirements

M1	Hours	After CI EEI satisfied, collection asset retasked.
M2	Hours	To circulate new threat warnings and reports of evolving threats
M3	Incidents	Of strategic movements detected or attacked by enemy lethal/nonlethal means.
M4	Incidents	Of espionage, sabotage, or assassination.
M5	Percent	Of allies have joint Information Security agreements.
M6	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems, successful.
M7	Percent	Of CI personnel have access to theater plans and orders.
M8	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements, covered by collection plan.
M9	Percent	Of critical movements (conducted after onset of crisis or operation), under observation of non-friendly overhead assets.
M10	Percent	Of friendly trusted sources (systems and personnel), under suspicion of enemy influence.
M11	Percent	Of joint force operations, delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified because of successful enemy intelligence collection efforts.

13 September 1996

M12	Percent	Of planned activities to provide protection against espionage, sabotage, or assassinations, actually conducted.
M13	Percent	Of theater intelligence personnel, assigned to counterintelligence.
M14	Percent	Of adversary penetrations of friendly INFO systems, identified and targeted.

ST 6.2.7 Conduct Personnel Recovery in AOR

M1	Months	Since review of theater CSAR guidance.
M2	Percent	Of aircrews missing behind enemy lines, recovered.
M3	Percent	Of aircrews (that transmit their location), rescued within 24 hours of being shot down (in wartime).
M4	Percent	Of crew members from lost ship, recovered (in peacetime).
M5	Percent	Of escapees, recovered.
M6	Percent	Of man-overboard victims (not recovered by own ship), later recovered by theater search and rescue efforts.
M7	Percent	Of personnel from lost ship, rescued (in wartime).
M8	Percent	Of personnel missing behind enemy lines, recovered.
M9	Percent	Of personnel missing in aircraft accidents, ship sinkings, or field maneuvers, recovered (in peacetime).

ST 6.2.7.1 Operate Theater JSRC

M1	Hours	For JSRC capability to be established (after first forces deploy).
M2	Hours	For JSRC to have complete CSAR posture (after forces deploy into new area).
M3	Hours	To establish CSARTF (when appropriate).
M4	Minutes	For unit and RCC to notify JSRC (after receiving distress indicator).
M5	Minutes	To assign CSAR mission coordinator (when required).

ST 6.2.7.2 Provide Civil Search and Rescue

M1	Percent	Of crew members from lost ship recovered (in peacetime).
M2	Percent	Of man-overboard victims (not recovered by own ship), later recovered by theater search and rescue efforts.
M3	Percent	Of personnel missing in aircraft accidents, ship sinkings, or field maneuvers, recovered (in peacetime).

ST 6.2.7.3 Provide Combat Search and Rescue

M1	Percent	Of aircrews missing behind enemy lines, recovered.
M2	Percent	Of aircrews (that transmit their location), rescued within 24 hours of being shot down (in wartime).
M3	Percent	Of personnel from lost ship, rescued (in wartime).
M4	Percent	Of personnel missing behind enemy lines, recovered.

ST 6.2.7.4 Support Evasion and Escape in AOR

M1	Designated	SAFE areas or E and R areas, maintained by combatant command.
M2	Hours	For unit notification of JSSA and DIA POW/MIA by combatant command of isolation in hostile territory of individual with blood chit.
M3	Percent	Discrepancy in blood chit accounting during annual inventory (within AOR).
M4	Percent	Discrepancy in blood chit holdings (within AOR).
M5	Percent	Of combatant command evadee caches, compromised within six months of emplacement.
M6	Percent	Of combatant command isolated personnel have a completed EPA.
M7	Percent	Of combatant command personnel entered into assisted recovery system, subsequently returned to friendly control.

M8	Percent	Of combatant commander OPLANs and CONPLANs have evasion and recovery concepts.
M9	Percent	Of detainees in neutral nations within AOR, under cognizance of combatant commander.
M10	Percent	Of escapees on neutral territory within AOR, under cognizance of combatant commander.
M11	Percent	Of escapees, recovered.
M12	Percent	Of evadees in assisted recovery system, moved out of hostile territory.
M13	Percent	Of known evadees in AOR, supported in some form by combatant commander or subordinate organization.
M14	Percent	Of required blood chits, in theater.
M15	Percent	Of sensitive or covert E and R plans, procedures, operations programs or equipment, compromised through use or subsequent debriefings.

ST 6.2.8 Establish NBC Defense in Theater

M1	Hours	To decontaminate a theater base area attacked with chemical weapons.
M2	Hours	To inoculate theater personnel under a biological threat.
M3	Percent	Of enemy NBC facilities, identified before execution.
M4	Percent	Of personnel can be handled in an OA NBC mass casualty situation.
M5	Percent	Of theater base areas have dedicated NBC monitoring teams.
M6	Percent	Of time, NBC monitoring systems and associated personnel detect NBC threat.
M7	Percent	Of time, NBC monitoring systems and associated personnel give false alarm.

ST 6.2.9 Minimize Safety and Health Risks

M1	Incidents	Of Class A accidents (last 12 months).
M2	Incidents	Of Class B accidents (last 12 months).
M3	Days	Since inspection of local sources of subsistence items in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Days	To complete accident investigation and report.
M5	Days	To conduct preliminary investigation for endemic diseases, arthropod and rodent infestations, and water quality in theater of operations/JOA.
M6	Days	To coordinate preventive medicine procedures with allied forces and/or host nation in theater of operation/JOA.
M7	Fatalities	In last 12 months.
M8	Hours	To report Class A mishaps to combatant commander.
M9	Man-hours	Lost because of accidents (last six months).
M10	Percent	Of accidents attributed to human error (last 12 months).
M11	Percent	Of combat assets (by \$ value), lost to accidents (last 12 months).
M12	Percent	Of flying accidents attributed to human error (last 12 months).
M13	Percent	Of force lost to non battle injury or disease in theater of operation/JOA.
M14	Percent	Of people with lost time, because of contact with hazardous materials.
M15	Percent	Of people with lost time, because of non-work related accidents.
M16	Percent	Of people with lost time, because of work related accidents.
M17	Incidents	Of Class A flying mishaps per 100,000 flying hours.

ST 6.3 Secure Theater Systems and Capabilities

M1	Days	Since review of physical security plans for C4 facilities in theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Days	To conduct threat analysis for theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Days	To conduct vulnerability assessment of C4 systems.
M4	Days	To develop plan for restoring C4 system after attack.

M5	Hours	Since threat analysis updated for theater of operations/JOA.
M6	Hours	To detect attack on C4 system.
M7	Hours	To recover from attack on C4 system and to restore system to operation.

ST 6.3.1 Employ Theater Operations Security (OPSEC)

M1	Percent	Of force buildup, conducted covertly.
M2	Percent	Of media reports describe close-hold friendly actions.
M3	Percent	Of routine combat actions have timing or location changes at least weekly.
M4	Percent	Of routine actions of commander, staff, or communications (including courier), have timing or location changes at least biweekly.
M5	Percent	Of supply buildup, conducted covertly.

ST 6.3.2 Employ Theater Electronics Security

M1	Percent	Of time, command operates in restrictive EMCON condition.
M2	Instances	Of procedures to prevent or disrupt collection of ELINT by foreign intelligence agencies.
M3	Instances	Of procedures to reprogram noncommunications electromagnetic systems software in response to identified threats.
M4	Hours	To generate an operational change request message based on possible threat to noncommunications electromagnetic systems.
M5	Hours	To respond to operational change request on emergency basis.
M6	Days	To respond to operational change request on urgent basis.
M7	Months	To respond to operational change request on routine basis.

ST 6.3.3 Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC)

M1	Hours	Between changes of unit/activity call signs and frequencies.
M2	Hours	Since inventory of COMSEC equipment and documents.
M3	Days	To emergency issue new CEOI to US and Allied units operating together.
M4	Hours	To emergency issue new CEOI to US joint forces.
M5	Percent	Of friendly communications, sent via secure means.
M6	Percent	Of total communications circuits, use secure equipment.
M7	Percent	Of US and Allied units, operate from common CEOI
M8	Percent	Of US Joint Force units, operate from common CEOI.
M9	Percent	Of time, command operates in restrictive EMCON condition.

ST 6.3.4 Coordinate Concealment of Theater Forces/Facilities

M1	Days	Of covert buildup, conducted covertly.
M2	Days	Of covert buildup, sustained.
M3	Percent	Of C2 posts and critical facilities, protected from enemy observation.
M4	Percent	Of critical COMMZ facilities, protected from enemy observation.
M5	Percent	Of force buildup, conducted covertly.
M6	Percent	Of friendly communications, sent via secure means.
M7	Percent	Of units equipped with anti-surveillance sensor and sensor jamming devices.

ST 6.3.5 Protect Theater Information Systems

M1	Percent	Of command policies on information security, available.
M2	Days	To conduct risk assessment, based on results of vulnerability analysis.
M3	Days	To conduct threat analysis for theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Days	To conduct vulnerability analysis for own forces in theater of operations/JOA.

M5	Days	To develop OPSEC portion of OPLAN.
M6	Days	To select appropriate OPSEC measures (based on risk assessment) and incorporate into OPLAN.
M7	Hours	To coordinate OPSEC plan with PSYOP and Military Deception plan (as required).
M8	Hours	To restore primary LAN in command center.
M9	Percent	Of allies have joint Information Security agreements.
M10	Percent	Of Friendly EEL's, identified prior to start of operation.
M11	Percent	Of information systems, within high security area.
M12	Percent	Of System administrators have full OPSEC training.

ST 6.4 Conduct Deception in Support of Theater Strategy and Campaigns

M1	Days	After execution of protected plan, enemy still responding with some forces to deception.
M2	Days	After execution of theater of war deception operation, friendly forces still able to influence adversary action (or inaction).
M3	Hours	To develop theater deception analysis and deception COAs (during crisis).
M4	Percent	Of proposed theater of war deception plans, compromised by lack of enforcement of <i>need-to-know</i> .
M5	Percent	Of theater deception operations, terminated without target becoming aware of deception.
M6	Percent	Of theater deception plans, protected by deception plans.
M7	Percent	Of theater of war deceptions, cause third party (friendly or neutral) actions adverse to friendly campaign plan.

ST 6.4.1 Protect Details of Theater Strategy and Campaign Plans and Operations

M1	Instances	Of active measures employed to mislead enemy estimates of friendly intentions.
M2	Percent	Of personnel have approved <i>need-to-know</i> for plans.
M3	Percent	Reduction in compartments (including intelligence and special action programs (SAPs)) at or immediately after campaign operations commence.
M4	Personnel	Approved <i>need-to-know</i> for plans.
M5	Instances	Of active security compartmentalization (including intelligence and special action programs (SAPs)) for campaign planning.

ST 6.4.2 Misinform Adversary Regarding Conduct of Theater Strategy, Campaigns, and Unified Operations

M1	Days	After execution of protected plan, enemy still responding with some forces to deception.
M2	Percent	Of enemy forces, deployed to deal with deception threat.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces, prepared for actual operation.
M4	Percent	Of enemy movements, consistent with deception plan vs. actual plans.
M5	Percent	Of plans include deception plan.
M6	Percent	Of strategic plans, campaigns plans, and operations plans include deception plan.

ST 6.4.3 Assess Effect of Theater Deception Plan

M1	Days	Between updates on effectiveness of theater deception plan.
M2	Percent	Of deception program evaluators have access to all aspects of campaign plan.
M3	Percent	Of updates on effectiveness of theater deception plan, based on intercepts of enemy communications.

ST 7 Establish Theater Force Requirements And Readiness

M1	Percent	Of joint, combined or multinational doctrine changes originate in theater.
M2	Percent	Of theater force goals, supported by theater country teams.
M3	Percent	Of theater force apportionment requests, met in JSCP.
M4	Weeks	To complete TPFDD (for refinement conference).

ST 7.1 Recommend Warfighting and Other Requirements and Test Concepts

M1	Days	To develop and submit Mission Needs Statement for quick reaction response.
M2	Percent	Of Mission Needs Statement, accepted by JROC substantially as submitted.
M3	Weeks	To complete TPFDD (for refinement conference).
M4	Percent	Of TPFDD files need changes (at refinement conference).
M5	Weeks	To identify theater needs and submit to CJCS for integration with other R&D requirements.

ST 7.1.1 Provide OPLANs for Mobilization and Deployment Planning and Execution

M1	Requests	For additional information received after provision of OPLANs.
M2	Months	From request for OPLAN until transmitted.
M3	Percent	Of units sourced in OPLAN, dual apportioned.
M4	Months	In advance of effective date OPLAN provided.

ST 7.1.2 Determine Deployment Requirements

M1	Days	In advance of deployment when requirements submitted to USTRANSCOM.
M2	Percent	Of deployment requests have fatal errors.
M3	Percent	Of deployment requirements, adjusted within thirty days of sea movement.
M4	Percent	Difference between planned deployment requirements and actual requirements.
M5	Days	To develop deployment requirements.
M6	Percent	Of deployment requirements, adjusted within seven days of air movement.

ST 7.1.3 Tailor Joint Forces for Deployment

M1	Percent	Of OPLAN forces, rephased (at execution).
M2	Days	Of required wartime logistic support deploy with FDOs.
M3	Percent	Of required logistic support for deploying combat units deploy.
M4	Hours	To tailor allocated joint force.
M5	Days	To tailor apportioned joint force.
M6	Percent	Of joint force staff directorates and agencies submit TPFDD requirements by time specified by JPG.
M7	Hours	For components to source TPFDD.
M8	Hours	For supported CINC to accept supporting CINC's TPFDD.
M9	Hours	To identify theater needs and submit requests to CJCS.
M10	Hours	To modify TPFDD.
M11	Hours	To validate TPFDD.

ST 7.1.4 Determine and Validate Forces and Cargo to be Deployed or Redeployed

M1	Percent	Of movement requirements, rejected for missing information.
M2	Percent	Of TPFDD EADs/LADs match campaign plan.
M3	Hours	To generate revised TPFDD (during Crisis Action Planning).
M4	Months	To generate revised TPFDD (during Deliberate Planning).
M5	Months	To update theater force structure requirements (on receipt of mission change in peacetime).

13 September 1996

M6	Days	To update theater force structure requirements (on receipt of mission change, during crisis or in wartime).
M7	Percent	Of deployment requests with no fatal errors.
M8	Percent	Of deployment requirements, unchanged within seven days of air movement.
M9	Percent	Of deployment requirements, unchanged within thirty days of sea movement.
M10	Days	To identify theater needs and submit requests to supported CINC.
M11	Hours	To validate TPFDD to USCINTRANS.
M12	Hours	To modify TPFDD upon change to mission requirements.
M13	Hours	To source TPFDD.
M14	Incidents	Of fatal errors when transportation support forces entered into Supported CINC's TPFDD (by required date).
M15	Hours	Until USTRANSCOM issues deployment order or deployment pre-order to Transportation Component Commands (from receipt of supported CINC's deployment order).
M16	Hours	Until USTRANSCOM issues deployment order or deployment pre-order to Transportation Component Commands (from receipt of supported CINC's deployment order).
M17	Percent	Of short ton requirements, priorities, and adequate pallet positions for geospatial information and services stocks identified in TPFDD for initial deployment.
M18	Days	To adjust TPFDD to meet geospatial information and services stock movement for initial deployment.

ST 7.1.5 Determine Theater Warfighting and Other Needs, Solutions, and Concepts

M1	Percent	Of proposed new concepts, accepted by CJCS and Services.
M2	Weeks	To develop and provide concepts, requirements, or recommendations to CJCS.
M3	Weeks	To identify theater needs and submit to CJCS for integration with other R&D requirements.
M4	Weeks	To develop and submit Mission Needs Statement.
M5	Days	To develop and submit Mission Needs Statement for quick reaction response.
M6	Percent	Of Mission Needs Statements, accepted by JROC substantially as submitted.
M7	Percent	Of personnel constraints/shortfalls have alternatives.
M8	Percent	Of changes to joint, combined or multinational doctrine originate in theater.
M9	Percent	Of changes to organization, developed in theater.
M10	Months	For combatant command to develop and provide Mission Needs Statement to CJCS (after identification of requirement).
M11	Months	For combatant command update to theater list of needs and solutions.
M12	Percent	Of new concepts tested in theater by exercises.

ST 7.1.6 Determine Theater Force Size and Structure Requirements

M1	Options	For force mix examined.
M2	Percent	Of force manpower is combatants (tooth to tail).
M3	Percent	Of apportioned combat forces lack apportioned doctrinal support forces.
M4	Percent	Of requested forces apportioned for planning
M5	Weeks	To submit force requirement against proposed mission.
M6	Hours	To submit force requirement (after Warning Order).
M7	Percent	Of apportioned combat forces that lack doctrinal support forces have them requested.

ST 7.1.7 Establish Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)

M1	Percent	Of JMETs, evaluated.
----	---------	----------------------

M2	Weeks	To develop OPLAN associated METs (from OPLAN approval).
M3	Percent	Of service supporting plans have METs.
M4	Percent	Of theater JMETs common with and included in Joint Force Integrator JMETL.
M5	Months	Since OPLAN associated METs reviewed.
M6	Percent	Of OPLANs with associated METs.
M7	Percent	Of missions with associated METs.

ST 7.2 Maintain and Report Readiness of Theater Forces

M1	Percent	Of military authorizations, filled.
M2	Percent	Of civilian authorizations, filled.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commander's JMETL tasks, covered by annual training.
M4	Percent	Of deficiencies reported in an AAR noted in visit to same or other unit 180 days after submission of AAR.

ST 7.2.1 Determine and Report Force Readiness

M1	Hours	To conduct initial assessment of recently constituted joint task force staff.
M2	Hours	To submit first crisis action status reports (after unit notification).
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs address shortfalls resulting from comparison of requirements and assets estimated to be available during JSCP period.
M4	Percent	Of training data, current at execution.
M5	Days	To conduct full assessment of joint task force.
M6	Months	For potential JTF (Service Comp HQ) to brief CINC on assessment of JTF METL task capabilities and plan for addressing training deficiencies.
M7	Percent	Of assigned combat units participate in joint exercises.
M8	Percent	Of assigned support units participate in OPLAN exercises (annually).
M9	Percent	Of missions on which current readiness data is available.
M10	Percent	Of JMETL on which current (within 180 days) training data exists.
M11	Percent	Of units/organizations on which current readiness data is available.

ST 7.2.2 Assess and Report Theater Military Capability

M1	Percent	Of joint exercises have a formal evaluation program.
M2	Percent	Of deficiencies (noted by external inspector), successfully rebutted.
M3	Days	To conduct full assessment of joint task force.
M4	Months	Since comparison of CINC SITREP, CINC Integrated Priority List (IPL), and CINC Critical Items List (CIL).
M5	Percent	Of assessments, provided to Joint Staff by reporting date.
M6	Percent	Of assigned combat units participate in joint exercises.
M7	Months	For designated JTF headquarters to exercise as JTF HQ.
M8	Months	For potential JTF (Service Comp HQ) to brief CINC on assessment of JTF METL task capabilities and plan for addressing training deficiencies.
M9	Percent	Of assigned support units participate in joint exercises annually.

ST 7.2.3 Conduct Joint After Action Reporting

M1	Percent	Of joint exercises have Hot Wash-ups attended by CINC, DCINC or COS.
M2	Percent	Of deficiencies reported in AAR noted in visit to same or other unit 180 days after submission of AAR.
M3	Hours	To submit Immediate After Action Report (at end of operation or exercise).
M4	Days	To submit After Action Report (at end of operation or exercise).
M5	Percent	Completion of After Action Report (at submission date).

ST 8 Develop And Maintain Alliance And Regional Relations

M1	Percent	Of in-theater Ambassadors/DCMs have met CINC/DCINC.
M2	Percent	Of military operations have overt/covert US assistance.
M3	Percent	Of theater nations have military agreements with US.

ST 8.1 Foster Alliance and Regional Relations and Security Arrangements

M1	Instances	Of GO/FO visits to theater nation.
M2	Instances	Of initiating community action projects.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commander-sponsored joint exercises include allied forces.
M4	Percent	Of in-theater Ambassadors/DCMs have met CINC/DCINC.
M5	Percent	Of major end items have commonality with US systems in Allied nations.
M6	Percent	Of US vital interests in AOR threatened by regional nations.
M7	Weeks	Since official General Officer/Flag Officer visit to theater nation
M8	Percent	Of status of forces agreements (and other diplomatic arrangements and legal protocols), in effect.
M9	Percent	Participation in interagency working groups.
M10	Days	To establish interagency working group.
M11	Days	To resolve identified regional military issues with interagency coordination.

ST 8.1.1 Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations

M1	Days	For combatant command staff to respond to Country Team message.
M2	Hours	For combatant commander to respond to cable from US Ambassador.
M3	Incidents pa	Of liberty restricted or modified in response to host-nation religious or national event.
M4	Incidents/Month	Involving US Service personnel.
M5	Instances	Of Country Team sponsored bilateral events.
M6	Instances	Of GO/FO visits to theater nation.
M7	Instances	Of initiating community action projects.
M8	Days pa	Of liberty allowed by host-nation.
M9	Months	Since official General Officer/Flag Officer visit to theater nation.
M10	Percent	Of regional locations have US forces and SOFAs in place.

ST 8.1.2 Promote Regional Security and Interoperability

M1	Days	To determine supportability of allied support request.
M2	Days	To determine supportability of non-DOD US Agency support request.
M3	Months	Since review of existing plans involving agency or coalition participation.
M4	Percent	Of allied nations update their cooperative logistics agreement within five (5) years.
M5	Percent	Of allies have information sharing MOAs or LOAs with CINCs.
M6	Percent	Of joint force operations break down over sharing of intelligence.
M7	Percent	Of joint force operations modified by failure to share intelligence.
M8	Percent	Of national forces and agencies operating with US theater forces have intelligence sharing arrangement.
M9	Percent	Of Theater OPLANs and Contingency Plans supported by access and support arrangements with designated host-nations.

ST 8.1.3 Develop Headquarters or Organizations for Coalitions

M1	Days	To establish fully operational coalition headquarters.
M2	Hours	To establish coalition headquarters.
M3	Percent	Of coalition headquarters division chiefs filled by non-US officers.

13 September 1996

M4	Percent	Of General Officer/Flag Officer positions in coalition headquarters held by non-US officers.
M5	Instances	Of MOOTW in which US and allied headquarters staff officers work in same compound or area.
M6	Instances	Of MOOTW in which US and allied headquarters staff officers work in integrated staff office environment.
M7	Percent	Of OPLANs, campaigns, and operations developed as coalition efforts.
M8	Percent	Of US units (battalion, ship or squadron size or above) have allied LNOs assigned.

ST 8.1.4 Develop Multi-National Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure.

M1	Percent	Of allied nations with whom US has intelligence sharing agreements.
M2	Percent	Of allied nations sharing intelligence with US within the last year on a basis outside alliance intelligence channels.
M3	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with which US shared intelligence within the last year.
M4	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with whom US has intelligence sharing agreements.
M5	Percent	Of nations have counter-intelligence sharing agreements with Combatant Command concerning terrorism activities.
M6	Percent	Of nations have intelligence sharing agreements with Combatant Command concerning terrorism activities.
M7	Instances	Of nations sharing police information with US agencies or Unified Command.
M8	Instances	US Agencies have intelligence sharing automated data links with Unified Command.
M9	Percent	Of nations share police data with US military law enforcement agencies.
M10	Percent	Of unfiltered intelligence passed to host-nation counter-drug agencies.
M11	Percent	Of nations have counter-intelligence sharing agreements with Combatant Command concerning narcotics activities.
M12	Percent	Of nations have intelligence sharing agreements with Combatant Command concerning narcotics activities.

ST 8.2 Provide Support to Allies, Regional Governments, International Organizations or Groups

M1	Days	To deploy JTF disaster relief elements.
M2	Days	To respond to Country Team request for assistance.
M3	Hours	For US Country Team and combatant command to coordinate response to natural disaster.
M4	Hours	To establish liaison with Country Team, host-nation, and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces.
M5	Instances	Of insufficient logistical support provided to nations, groups, or agencies.
M6	Instances	Of insufficient personnel support provided to nations, groups, or agencies.
M7	Instances	Of personnel provided to support other nations, groups, or agencies.
M8	Instances	Of PVOs in OA maintaining liaison with commander.
M9	Instances	Of PVOs in OA receiving US military support.
M10	Instances	Of theater nations declining military assistance.
M11	Percent	Of funds provided for HCA, SA and MCA operations accounted for.
M12	Percent	Of allied nations update cooperative logistics agreement with USG within two years.
M13	Percent	Of approved projects completed.
M14	Percent	Of cooperative agreements with allied nations updated within two years.

M15	Percent	Of Country Teams' requests for military goods/services filled.
M16	Percent	Of designated foreign military students provided training.
M17	Percent	Of designated foreign military students trained.
M18	Percent	Of funds provided to HCA, SA, and MCA operations accounted for.
M19	Percent	Of nations have politico-military agreements with US.
M20	Percent	Of PVOs in OA maintain liaison with commander.
M21	Percent	Of PVOs in OA receive US military support.
M22	Percent	Of regional nations have signed non-proliferation treaty.
M23	Percent	Of supported nation movement requirements translated to meet RDD.
M24	Tons per day	Of supplies and materiel provided in assistance.
M25	Percent	Of NGOs in OA maintain liaison with commander.
M26	Percent	Of NGOs in OA receive US military support.
M27	Instances	Of NGOs in OA maintaining liaison with commander.
M28	Instances	Of NGOs in OA receiving US military support.
M29	Percent	Of requests by allies for Civil Military Support, met within required time frame.
M30	Percent	Of requests by allies for communications support, met within required time frame.
M31	Percent	Of requests by allies for logistics support, met within required time frame.
M32	Percent	Of requests by allies for Security Assistance support, met within required time frame.
M33	Percent	Of requests to release intelligence to allies, approved.

ST 8.2.1 Conduct Security Assistance Activities

M1	Weeks	To respond to request for assistance.
M2	Percent	Of coalition and peacekeeping forces with theater military participation have major weapons systems common with US systems.
M3	Percent	Of Country Teams' annual security assistance proposals (FMF/IMET) funded.
M4	Percent	Of Country Teams' requests for military goods/services supported.
M5	Percent	Of designated foreign military personnel trained.
M6	Percent	Of designated foreign military students trained.
M7	Percent	Of military goods/services/training purchased from the US.
M8	Percent	Of weapons common with US systems.
M9	Weeks	To respond to request for assistance with equipment in country during a security assistance surge.

ST 8.2.2 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater

M1	Days	Of lead-time to obtain RC CA.
M2	Days	To assess HN government organization, degree of effectiveness, and economic conditions of civilians.
M3	Hours	To provide CA staff augmentation to combatant command.
M4	Instances	Of liaison requirements with other DOD elements; US Government agencies; multinational forces; HN government officials; NGOs/PVO's.
M5	Instances	Of US government agencies in CMO.
M6	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled by host-nation forces.
M7	Percent	Of HNS contractor resources identified.
M8	Percent	Of OPLANs supported by an Annex G, CA area study, CA OPLAN, CA estimate to provide CA activities that facilitate mission accomplishment.
M9	Percent	Of US CA military involved.

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Disaster Relief

M1	Days	To deploy civil-military engineering units and begin engineering tasks.
M2	Days	To organize relief effort in country.
M3	Days	To reestablish communications in country.
M4	Hours	To assess situation and define assistance needed.
M5	Hours	To begin delivering disaster relief supplies into host country.
M6	Hours	To deliver critical material/supplies in crisis.
M7	Hours	To distribute supplies and services where needed.
M8	Hours	To insert disaster survey liaison team.
M9	Percent	Of natural disasters in allied theater nations.
M10	Days	To reestablish lines of communication in country.

ST 8.2.4 Provide Humanitarian Assistance

M1	Instances	Of units trained to perform HCA.
M2	Percent	Of project effort by host-nation personnel.
M3	Percent	Of forces available, trained and properly equipped to perform mission.
M4	Percent	Of HCA deployments support combatant commander's regional objectives.
M5	Percent	Of HCA project/deployments with some materials supplied by host-nation.
M6	Percent	Of procedures and restraints on use of US military resources in place before force deployment.
M7	Personnel	Trained to perform HCA.

ST 8.2.5 Provide Nation Assistance Support

M1	Days	To process and answer DOS or Country Team requests.
M2	Percent	Of each project allocated to host-nation personnel.
M3	Instances	Of projects deemed long term investments (e.g., continue to pay off five years after completion.)
M4	Percent	Of projects or deployments with materials supplied by host-nation.

ST 8.2.6 Provide Military Civic Action Assistance

M1	Days	To process and answer DOS or Country Team request.
M2	Percent	Of each project allocated to host-nation personnel.
M3	Percent	Of host-nation and US Military Civic Action Assistance mission objectives accomplished.
M4	Percent	Of Military Civic Action projects performed by units without primary training mission.
M5	Instances	Of projects deemed long term investments (e.g., continue to pay off five years after completion).
M6	Percent	Of projects or deployments with materials supplied by host-nation.
M7	Percent	Of required forces available, trained and properly equipped to perform civic action missions.
M8	Percent	Of MCA projects wins support for government objectives and for the military (from local population).

ST 8.2.7 Assist in Restoration of Order

M1	Hours	From first forces on ground until US personnel are secure.
M2	Hours	To begin arriving in the objective area (after receipt of Warning Order).
M3	Instances	Of foreign civilian casualties.
M4	Instances	Of foreign military casualties.
M5	Instances	Of US civilian casualties.
M6	Percent	Of US military casualties.

ST 8.2.8 Support Peace Operations in Theater

M1	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled by host-nation forces.
M2	Percent	Of contributing states with representation on staff proportional to troop contribution.
M3	Percent	Of nations operating under UN Command and Control.
M4	Percent	Of nations operating under US Command and Control.
M5	Percent	Of refugees receiving minimum nutrition.
M6	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

ST 8.2.8.1 Support Multilateral Peace Operations

M1	Hours	To begin arriving in the objective area, after receipt of Warning Order.
M2	Hours	To secure US personnel in country, after initial arrival of forces.
M3	Percent	Of contributing states with representation on staff proportional to troop contribution.
M4	Percent	Of law enforcement contingent provided by host-nation.
M5	Percent	Of nations operating under UN Command and Control.
M6	Percent	Of nations operating under US Command and Control.
M7	Percent	Of operations conducted exclude one or more national force contributions.
M8	Percent	Of refugees receive minimum nutrition.
M9	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

ST 8.2.8.2 Conduct Peacekeeping

M1	Hours	To begin arriving in the objective area (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Hours	To secure US personnel in country (after initial arrival of forces).
M3	Percent	Of contributing states with representation on staff proportional to their troop contribution.
M4	Percent	Of law enforcement contingent provided by host-nation.
M5	Percent	Of nations operating under UN Command and Control.
M6	Percent	Of nations operating under US Command and Control.
M7	Percent	Of operations conducted exclude one or more national force contributions.
M8	Percent	Of refugees receive minimum nutrition.
M9	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

ST 8.2.8.3 Conduct Peace Enforcement

M1	Hours	To begin arriving in objective area (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Hours	To secure US personnel in country (after initial arrival of forces).
M3	Instances	Of violations of imposed cease fire.
M4	Percent	Of casualties for peace enforcement forces per week.
M5	Percent	Of law enforcement contingent provided by host-nation.
M6	Percent	Of military forces submit to peace enforcement.
M7	Percent	Of refugees receive minimum nutrition.
M8	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

ST 8.2.9 Coordinate Theater Foreign Internal Defense Activities

M1	Instances	Of exchange of information on host nation between USDAOs and combatant commander's staff.
M2	Instances	Of meetings of combatant commander FID Advisory Committee in last year.
M3	Months	Since update of FID programs in combatant commander's vision and strategy.
M4	Percent	Accuracy in accounting for funds used in FID.
M5	Percent	Of agreement between SOA AIASA equipment requests and combatant command position on equipment to threatened nation.

13 September 1996

M6	Percent	Of FID funding later found to not be authorized in law.
M7	Percent	Of FID SA efforts in AOR supported by planned and executed military activities.
M8	Percent	Of ongoing FID efforts in line with current US national security policy and strategy.
M9	Percent	Of outstanding issues resolved at annual combatant command hosted Joint Service Program Management Review.
M10	Percent	Of POLAD chaired combatant commander FID Advisory Committee meetings.
M11	Percent	Of theater FID effort effectively absorbed by threatened nation.
M12	Percent	Of theater FID effort effectively absorbed by threatened nations in AOR.
M13	Percent	Of theater nations in AOR included in annual combatant commander's joint and combined exercises.
M14	Weeks	Since combatant commander contact with SOAs.

ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations Within AOR

M1	Hours	For combatant command staff to prepare response to coalition proposals during negotiations.
M2	Percent	Of coalition partners actively participate on joint force Headquarters Staff.
M3	Percent	Of coalition partners agree on common approach.
M4	Percent	Of coalition partners agree on common end state.
M5	Percent	Of coalition partners operate from common intelligence base.
M6	Percent	Of coalition partners operate from common logistics infrastructure.
M7	Percent	Of coalition partners read-on to overall OPLAN.
M8	Percent	Of demands of existing coalition partners anticipated by combatant command staff.
M9	Percent	Of demands of potential coalition partners anticipated by combatant command staff.
M10	Percent	Of nations whose forces operate under common and agreed command structure.

ST 8.2.11 Cooperate With and Support Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in AOR

M1	Hours	Before joint force personnel and NGOs meet (during a crisis).
M2	Hours	To contact in-theater NGOs.
M3	Hours	To respond to NGO requests under existing agreement.
M4	Percent	Difference between promised aid during planning and support of NGO's in execution.
M5	Percent	Of Humanitarian effort in which military effort is duplicative of NGO effort.
M6	Percent	Of joint force headquarters have NGO representation.
M7	Percent	Of joint force initiated programs sustainable by NGO or PVO organizations upon military departure.
M8	Percent	Of NGOs have relationship with combatant command in peacetime.
M9	Percent	Of NGOs have reciprocal agreements with combatant command in peacetime.

ST 8.2.12 Cooperate With and Support Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in AOR

M1	Hours	Before joint force personnel and PVOs meet (during a crisis).
M2	Hours	To contact in-theater PVOs.
M3	Hours	To respond to PVO requests under existing agreement.
M4	Percent	Difference between promised aid during planning and support to PVOs in execution.
M5	Percent	Of Humanitarian effort in which military effort duplicative of PVO effort.

M6	Percent	Of joint force headquarters has PVO representation.
M7	Percent	Of joint force initiated programs sustainable by NGO or PVO organizations upon military departure.
M8	Percent	Of PVOs have relationship with combatant command in peacetime.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs have reciprocal agreements with combatant command in peacetime.

ST 8.3 Obtain Support for US Forces and Interests

M1	Incidents	Of violation of host-nation flight rules, per 10,000 flights.
M2	Percent	Of overflight requests approved in last 12 months.
M3	Percent	Of peacetime support provided by allied host-nation
M4	Percent	Of portcall delays of military vessels.
M5	Percent	Of stationing costs born by allied host-nation
M6	Percent	Of US dependents living in substandard housing.

ST 8.3.1 Arrange Stationing for US Forces

M1	Incidents	Of US personnel injured/killed by terrorists.
M2	Incidents	Of US property damaged by terrorist incidents.
M3	Kilometers	To travel in-country for US Army brigades to reach their GDP positions.
M4	Percent	Of host-nation criminal cases involving US forces or dependents.
M5	Percent	Of US air forces deploy outside host-nation for training.
M6	Percent	Of US forces living in substandard barracks in peacetime.
M7	Percent	Of US ground forces deploy outside host-nation for training.
M8	Percent	Of US land based wartime fighter sorties aerial refuel to range their targets.
M9	Percent	Of US units deploy outside host-nation for their primary wartime mission.
M10	Weeks	To find permanent quarters in host-nation for US dependents.

ST 8.3.2 Establish Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements

M1	Percent	Of non-alliance nations have provided exercise commanders at some level of chain of command.
M2	Percent	Of non-alliance nations have conducted exercises with US within the last year.
M3	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with which US has communications agreements.
M4	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with whom US has cross-serving agreements.
M5	Months	To formalize MOA or other agreement.
M6	Percent	Of non-alliance nation's weapons can use US ammunition.
M7	Hours	To obtain authorization to release sensitive/classified information to allied forces.
M8	Percent	Of nations have agreements with US on mutual disaster relief.
M9	Percent	Of nations have extradition treaties with US, covering narcotics offenses.
M10	Percent	Of nations have extradition treaties with US, covering terrorism offenses.

ST 8.3.3 Arrange Sustainment Support for Theater Forces

M1	Days	Saved in closing TPFDD relative to C-day (using HNS).
M2	Days	To act on agreed support.
M3	Days	To initiate agreed upon support.
M4	Days	To obtain basing rights.
M5	Hours	To obtain overflight authorization.
M6	Instances	Of C4I capability damaged by enemy forces, repaired by host-nation damage control elements.
M7	Instances	Of interrogator/translator capability delays operations.
M8	Instances	Of issues resolved by liaison officers.
M9	Instances	Of modifications to existing plans upon execution.

13 September 1996

M10	Percent	Host-nation security and means increases availability of combat forces.
M11	Percent	Host-nation security and means increases availability of tactical forces.
M12	Percent	Host-nation infrastructure and damage control increase C3I capacity.
M13	Percent	Of combat service support personnel provided by host-nation.
M14	Percent	Of combat service support personnel requirement reduced by host-nation support.
M15	Percent	Of combat support personnel requirement reduced by host-nation support.
M16	Percent	Of equipment and personnel to remove strategically significant hazards provided by host-nation.
M17	Percent	Host-nation infrastructure increases communications capacity.
M18	Percent	Of JSCP assigned OPLANs identifying/projecting host-nation support resources.
M19	Percent	Of maintenance units trained to convert captured material to friendly use.
M20	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs without fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M21	Percent	Of peacetime support provided by host-nation.
M22	Percent	Of projected HNS responses identified by the joint force.
M23	Percent	Of significant hazards removed by host-nation.
M24	Percent	Of specialized maintenance units prepared to convert captured material to friendly use.
M25	Percent	Of stationing costs paid by host-nation.
M26	Percent	Of strategically significant hazard reduction provided by host-nation.
M27	Percent	Of total combat service support supplied by host-nation.
M28	Percent	Of total combat support supplied by host-nation.
M29	Percent	Of total cost of operation paid for by HN and third party nations.
M30	Percent	Of total cost of operation paid for by host-nation.
M31	Percent	Of total cost of operation paid for by third party nations.
M32	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M33	TONS	Of materiel reduced by use of HNS.
M34	Weeks	To begin receiving agreed upon support.
M35	Percent	Of support personnel requirement reduced by host-nation support.
M36	Percent	Of support personnel provided by host-nation.

ST 8.3.4 Obtain Multinational Support Against Nonmilitary Threats

M1	Incidents	Of US personnel injured or killed by terrorists.
M2	Incidents	Of US property damaged by terrorists.
M6	Percent	Of nations share police data with US military law enforcement agencies.

ST 8.4 Provide Theater Support to Other DOD and Government Agencies

M1	Hours	To respond to US Agency request for intelligence support.
M2	Hours	To respond to US Agency request for logistics support.
M4	Instances	Of US Agencies receiving C4 support from Unified Command.
M5	Instances	Of US Agencies receiving logistics support from Unified Command.
M6	Minutes	For NBC staff members to provide fallout hazard prediction.
M7	Minutes	From notification of nuclear/biological/chemical event to preparation and output of Environmental Hazard report to NFARS and NAFTOC subscribers.
M8	Minutes	To output NUDET information from ROCCs/SOCCs and forward to NFARS, NUDIS, NAFTOC subscribers.
M9	Minutes	To output NUDET information from sensors to NFARS, NUDIS, NAFTOC subscribers.

13 September 1996

M10	Months	Since review of support requirements to other agencies.
M11	Percent	Of CARDA/RECA requests processed.
M12	Percent	Of FAA/TC (aircraft in distress) assistance requests filled with an interceptor.
M13	Percent	Of hand-off of potential drug smuggling aircraft effected.
M14	Percent	Of incidents (e.g., terrorist, natural disaster) had coordination procedures with civil agencies to assist or conduct operations in place.
M15	Percent	Of requests by US agencies supported with command and control provided by Combatant Command.
M16	Percent	Of requests by US Agencies supported with logistics support.
M17	Percent	Of steaming hours dedicated to agency support operations.
M18	Percent	Of theater flying hours dedicated to agency support operations.
M19	Percent	Of theater forces conducted agency support operations.
M20	Percent	Of time reliable, uninterrupted air picture provided to other agencies.
M21	Percent	Of US Agencies have intelligence sharing agreements with Combatant Command for narcotics or terrorism offenses.
M22	Percent	Of US Agencies have intelligence support provided by Combatant Command.

ST 8.4.1 Advise and Support Counterdrug Operations in Theater

M1	Days	To process off-cycle country team requests by Combatant Command Headquarters.
M2	Hours	Of warning provided LEAs of arrival in United States of maritime drug shipments.
M3	Instances	Of host-nation personnel training with the US.
M4	Percent	Of country team requests handled outside normal planning cycle.
M5	Percent	Of effort provided under OPLAN vice O & M or other funding.
M6	Percent	Of US detection and monitoring capability transitioned to host-nation.
M7	Percent	Of US O & M capability transitioned to host-nation in last 12 months.
M8	Percent	Reduction of drug traffic into United States from combatant command AOR each year.

ST 8.4.2 Assist in Combating Terrorism

M1	Hours	To communicate terrorist threat change within theater.
M2	Hours	To generate an order to combat terrorism.
M3	Hours	To respond to combat terrorist response order.
M4	Instances	Anti/counter-terrorism exercises conducted per year.
M5	Instances	Host-nation security personnel have received US training in combating terrorism.
M6	Instances	Of terrorist activity in theater.
M7	Instances	Of terrorist attacks against US nationals per year.
M8	Instances	Of US owned or operated facilities damaged/destroyed as result of terrorist action.
M9	Percent	Of change in number of terrorist incidents per month.
M10	Percent	Of US casualties from terrorist action
M11	Percent	Of US facilities damaged.
M12	Percent	Of US personnel have received personal security measures training.

ST 8.4.3 Coordinate Evacuation and Repatriation of Noncombatants from Theater

M1	Days	To organize and deploy fully operational JTF.
M2	Hours	To evacuate noncombatants (once CINC directed to conduct evacuation).
M3	Hours	To evaluate situation and present recommendations to decision maker(s).

M4	Percent	Of US citizens and designated foreign nationals accounted for by name during evacuation.
M5	Percent	Of US citizens and designated foreign nationals accounted for.
M6	Percent	Of US citizens and designated foreign nationals evacuated.
M7	Percent	Of US citizens desiring, evacuated.
M8	Percent	Of evacuees available and desiring evacuation, moved (IAW OPLAN timelines).

ST 8.4.4 Counter Weapon and Technology Proliferation

M1	Percent	Change in number of nuclear powers in the last year.
M2	Percent	Of nations with biological weapon potential have actual or suspected biological development weapons program.
M3	Percent	Of nations with chemical warfare potential have actual or suspected chemical development weapons program.
M4	Percent	Of nations with nuclear potential have actual or suspected nuclear development program.
M5	Percent	Of nations accepted US help in controlling WMD technology proliferation.
M6	Percent	Of nations have ballistic missile program.
M7	Percent	Of nations have development program for a ballistic missile having a range of over 1500 NM.
M8	Percent	Of nations have sea based WMD deterrent force in development.
M9	Percent	Of nations have successfully mated WMD warheads to ballistic missiles.
M10	Percent	Of nations provided assistance to other nations in the transfer of critical weapons technology.

ST 8.4.5 Coordinate Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) in the United States

M1	Hours	For DOD to respond request from FEMA for assistance.
M2	Hours	To prepare briefing for NCA on nationalization of National Guard.
M3	Percent	Restoration of production when federal troops used to restore production after federal work stoppage.
M4	Hours	For DOD to respond to a State request for assistance to National Guard efforts to deal with disasters or disturbances.
M5	Hours	Before federal troops are present and responding to disaster or disturbance.

ST 8.5 Coordinate and Integrate Regional Interagency Activities

M1	Hours	To respond to Country Team request for assistance.
M2	Months	Since review of existing plans involving agency or coalition participation.
M3	Percent	Of international agencies have memorandums of agreement or letters of agreement with Combatant Commander.
M4	Percent	Of LNOs from national agencies, resident on CINC's staff.
M5	Percent	Of missions coordinated with theater, coalition HQ, NGOs, and host-nation governments.
M6	Percent	Of non-DOD and USG operations known by Combatant Commander.
M7	Percent	Of theater support in concert with published theater strategy and combatant commander's intent.

ST 8.5.1 Coordinate and Integrate Policy for the Conduct of Theater Operations

M1	Hours	To complete poll of appropriate Ambassadors as part of crisis assessment (after receipt of warning or alert order for combatant command staff).
M2	Hours	To designate interagency and NGO/PVO liaison points and coordinating mechanisms (after receipt of warning or alert order for combatant command staff).

13 September 1996

M3	Percent	Of combatant command OPLANs have Country Team agreements for involved HNs.
M4	Percent	Of NGOs in JOA establish agreed short-term objectives with combatant commander.
M5	Percent	Of organizational goals held in common across US Departments and Agencies, during a crisis response.
M6	Percent	Of PVOs in JOA establish agreed short-term objectives with combatant commander.
M7	Percent	Of involved US agencies for which objectives and COAs have been obtained and considered.
M8	Percent	Of US agencies identified during mission analysis and COA development as involved in crisis, contacted.
M9	Percent	Of USG crisis response participants have common long term goals.
M10	Percent	Of USG crisis response participants have common short term goals.

ST 8.5.2 Facilitate US Information Exchange in Region

M1	Months	Since combatant command hosted conference for AOR ambassadors or their representatives.
M2	Percent	Of AOR nations in which combatant commander has military intelligence activities link with the CIA, directly or through the Country Team.
M3	Percent	Of Country Teams in AOR have formal and frequent contacts from the combatant command POLAD.
M4	Percent	Of joint force commander CCIFs answered by NGOs and PVOs.
M5	Percent	Of nations and agencies have full access to information when involved in FID program.
M6	Percent	Of NGOs in AOR have established contact point for information exchange with combatant commander.
M7	Percent	Of NGOs in designated JOA have previously established contact point for information exchange with combatant commander.
M8	Percent	Of NGOs in JOA terminate associate relationship because of appearance of being combatant command intelligence source.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs in AOR have established contact point for information exchange with combatant commander.
M10	Percent	Of PVOs in designated JOA have previously established contact point for information exchange with the combatant commander.
M11	Percent	Of PVOs in JOA terminate associate relationship because of appearance of being combatant command intelligence source.

ST 8.5.3 Establish Theater Interagency Cooperation Structure

M1	Hours	To define coordinating relationships and lines of authority after HAST arrives in country.
M2	Hours	To establish initial combatant commander liaison structure, after appointment of Special representative of the President for an area within JOA.
M3	Hours	To establish initial combatant commander liaison structure, after appointment of United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy.
M4	Hours	To initiate liaison after arrival of both HAST and DART.
M5	Percent	Of command levels with NGO/PVO representation.
M6	Percent	Of Country Teams in AOR have participation with combatant commander (or subordinate unified commander).
M7	Percent	Of host nation internal defense and development (IDAD) programs in AOR have major SA or CMO levels with a special management program.

M8	Percent	Of NGOs in designated JOA have established liaison and coordinating mechanisms with combatant commander.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs in designated JOA have established liaison and coordinating mechanisms with combatant commander.
M10	Percent	Of US Departments and Agencies, including DOD Agencies in designated JOA have established liaison and coordinating mechanisms with combatant commander.

ST 8.5.4 Perform Theater Consequence Management

M1	Hours	To coordinate through OSD and Joint Staff with DOS during crisis action procedures.
M2	Percent	Agreement between combatant command and interested Country Teams on end state and exit criteria.
M3	Percent	Of DOS or Country Team identified conditions that could produce mission failure addressed before execution.
M4	Percent	Of NGO's concerns regarding end state, exit criteria and transition plan formally addressed.
M5	Percent	Of PVOs concerns regarding end state, exit criteria and transition plan formally addressed.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL TASK MEASURES**OP 1 Conduct Operational Movement And Maneuver**

M1	Percent	Of transportation provided, compared to planned.
M2	Percent	Of allocated forces in place at campaign or major operation execution.

OP 1.1 Conduct Operational Movement

M1	Hours	Delay in opening APOD or SPOD (due to late arrival of port personnel).
M2	Percent	Of airborne tanker requirements and utilization optimized.
M3	Percent	Of planned cargo delivered.
M4	Percent	Of forces close into positions on OPLAN/OPORD time lines.
M5	Percent	Of movement requirements rejected.
M6	Percent	Of deployment requirements adjusted within seven day TPFDD projection window.
M7	Percent	Of units closed on or before CJTF's RDD.
M8	Knots	Rate of Movement

OP 1.1.1 Formulate Request for Strategic Deployment to Theater of Operations /JOA

M1	Percent	Of accurate deployment orders and notification requirements disseminated within reporting criteria.
M2	Percent	Of deployment requirements adjusted within seven days of movement by air.
M3	Percent	Of deployment requirements adjusted within thirty days of movement by sea.
M4	Percent	Of time airborne tanker requirements and utilization optimized.
M5	Percent	Of total unit type capabilities required in first request.
M6	Percent	Of ULNs close by RDD.
M7	Percent	Of units close by RDD.
M8	Hours	To prepare transportation request.
M9	Hours	To review request, with decision by JFC (prior to dispatch).

OP 1.1.2 Conduct Intratheater Deployment and Redeployment of Forces Within Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of cargo requested delivered.
M2	Percent	Of casualties en route.
M3	Percent	Of forces closed at planned completion time.
M4	Percent	Of guides indigenous.
M5	Percent	Of movement orders requiring revision.
M6	Percent	Of transport force utilized.
M7	Percent	Of units closed on or before RDD.
M8	Hours	To deploy transportation and security forces.
M9	Hours	To estimate lift and security requirements.
M10	Minutes	To pass command authority of in-transit forces.
M11	Hours	To prepare movement orders.
M12	Hours	To select routes, assembly and dispersal points.
M13	Hours	To close joint force into joint force designated assembly area.
M14	Minutes	Delay in passing of command authority of in-transit forces.
M15	Percent	Of TPFDD personnel requirements sourced prior to C-Day.
M16	Percent	Of unit and non-unit personnel who moved as scheduled POEs.
M17	Percent	Of unit/personnel requirements provided at D-Day.
M18	Percent	Of units arrive at POD later than RDD.

13 September 1996

OP 1.1.3 Conduct Theater of Operations/JOA Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)

M1	Hours	For JLOTS to discharge cargo from ship.
M2	Hours	Necessary to clear APOD of chalk's cargo.
M3	Hours	Necessary to clear APOD of chalk's personnel.
M4	Hours	Necessary to clear SPOD of personnel landing administratively.
M5	Hours	Necessary to clear SPOD of ship's cargo.
M6	Percent	Of time airfield MOG'd out.
M7	Percent	Of unit personnel and equipment assembled when transferred to tactical commander.
M8	Total	Personnel per day moved by host-nation support to marshaling areas.
M9	Days	Ship remains in vicinity of port awaiting discharge of cargo.
M10	Hours	To clear frustrated cargo from APOD.
M11	Hours	To clear frustrated cargo from SPOD.
M12	Hours	To match personnel arriving by air with equipment arriving by sea.
M13	Hours	To match personnel arriving by air with equipment pre-positioned.
M14	Days	To begin unloading of ships upon arrival in theater
M15	Percent	Of APOD/SPODs available for possible evacuation operations

OP 1.2 Conduct Operational Maneuver

M1	Percent	Of maneuver force attacked prior to transition to battle formation.
M2	Percent	Of maneuver force concentrated at decisive point prior to detection.
M3	Percent	Of supporting force concentrated at desired point prior to detection.
M4	Kph	Rate of movement.
M5	Knots	Rate of movement.

OP 1.2.1 Transition Joint Forces to and from Tactical Battle Formations

M1	Hours	For joint force to transition to or from operational battle formation.
M2	Hours	From planned execution time force transitions to or from operational battle formation.
M3	Hours	To move operational joint forces into locations to facilitate tactical commanders' plans for implementing subordinate campaign plan.
M4	Percent	Of operational force moved into position to facilitate tactical commander's plans.
M5	Percent	Required logistics in place on schedule.

OP 1.2.2 Posture Joint Forces for Operational Formations

M1	Hours	To assign multinational forces to operational formations (after acceptance into joint force).
M2	Hours	To assign forces to components (after receipt of Warning or Activation Order).
M3	Hours	Until component units prepared to send and receive data and do parallel planning (after receipt of Warning Order).
M4	Percent	Of joint force sequenced physically to execute campaign plan's operational maneuver.
M5	Percent	Units close on or before specified date and time.

OP 1.2.3 Concentrate Forces in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of required logistics stockpiled/positioned (prior to campaign or major operation D-day).
M2	Percent	Of designated forces mass in designated assembly area according to planned times.

13 September 1996

M3	Hours	To mass joint force forces at decisive points, intact and combat effective (after transition to battle formation).
M4	Hours	To complete joint force movement to assembly area (from which to maneuver).

OP 1.2.4 Conduct Operations in Depth

M1	Percent	Of enemy forces and materiel destroyed or disrupted by friendly force offensive action.
M2	Percent	Of enemy LOC capacity degraded by friendly force offensive operations.
M3	Tons	Of enemy logistics flow reduced by friendly offensive operations, compared to prior to attack.
M4	Percent	Of enemy surrender (and desert) per day (after attack in depth).
M5	Instances	Of operations branches formerly closed to friendly forces as options opened (now feasible or acceptable).
M6	Instances	Of operations branches formerly open to enemy as options closed (no longer feasible, suitable or acceptable).
M7	Percent	Of enemy force interdicted sufficiently to allow friendly control of timing and tempo of campaign or major operation.
M8	Percent	Of enemy force operationally isolated.
M9	Percent	Of enemy forces and materiel diverted from offensive to defensive action.
M10	Percent	Of enemy forces isolated by joint force maneuver operation.
M11	Percent	Of enemy ground forces cut off from combat zone by joint force maneuver operation.
M12	Percent	Reduction in volume of enemy signals throughout JOA.

OP 1.2.4.1 Plan and Execute Show of Force

M1	Hours	Before indications target nation aware, at highest decision making levels, of show of force.
M2	Days	Before target nation begins to modify targeted behavior.
M3	Percent	Of undesirable actions by target nation changed to acceptable after show of force.
M4	Days	Show of force can be sustained without additional forces or dedicated Sustainment.

OP 1.2.4.2 Plan and Execute Demonstration

M1	Days	Demonstration holds attention of targeted enemy forces.
M2	Hours	Before indications target nation aware, at highest decision making levels, of demonstration.
M3	Percent	Enemy forces drawn away from main thrust by demonstration.
M4	Percent	Of enemy force diverted from targeted behavior or area of intended friendly action.
M5	Percent	Of friendly force committed to demonstration.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces becoming actively engaged with enemy as result of demonstration.
M7	Percent	Of Joint Force combat power required for demonstration.
M8	Percent	Of Joint Force combat power required for show of force.
M9	Percent	Of targeted enemy forces displace toward demonstration after start.
M10	Days	Demonstration can be sustained without additional forces or dedicated Sustainment.
M11	Percent	Of undesirable actions by target nation changed to acceptable after demonstration.

OP 1.2.4.3 Conduct Forcible Entry: Airborne, Amphibious, and Air Assault

M1	Days	Until APOD/SPOD infrastructure will support introduction of follow-on forces IAW operations time lines (after initial insertion).
M2	Days	Until APOD/SPOD secured from direct fire and observed indirect fire for follow-on forces (after initial insertion).
M3	Hours	To seizing lodgment area (after initial insertion).
M4	Percent	Friendly casualties
M5	Percent	Of early entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M6	Percent	Of forcible entry force arrives at objective as planned.
M7	Percent	Of lodgment area controlled on D-day.
M8	Percent	Of enemy forces caught by surprise.
M9	Days	Until early entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M10	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force.
M11	Hours	Additional to planned, to seize lodgment.
M12	Percent	Of initial forcible entry force arrives at lodgment at planned TOT.
M13	Percent	Of objective, secured.

OP 1.2.4.4 Reinforce and Expand Lodgment

M1	Days	Until APOD/SPOD has air and missile defense(after initial insertion).
M2	Hours	Until APOD/SPOD infrastructure supports introduction of follow-on forces (after initial insertion).
M3	Hours	Until APOD/SPOD secured from direct fire and observed indirect fire for follow on forces (after initial insertion).
M4	Hours	Until lodgment secured from direct fire and observed indirect fire (after initial insertion).
M5	Hours	For multinational and interagency linkages to be established (after initial entry).
M6	Hours	For remainder of force to close into lodgment area (after initial entry).
M7	Hours	For required expansion of lodgment (after initial entry).
M8	Percent	Of entry force casualties daily
M9	Percent	Of entry forces available for follow on missions.
M10	Percent	Of forcible entry force arrives at objective as planned.
M11	Percent	Of SPOD/APOD capacity being used.
M12	Days	Until early entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M13	Percent	Of required follow-on forces accommodated by adequate APODs/SPODs in lodgment area.

OP 1.2.4.5 Conduct Raids in JOA

M1	Hours	Between desired and actual time in position.
M2	Minutes	Between planned and actual time of target attack.
M3	Hours	From completion of task until friendly forces successfully withdraw from enemy area.
M4	Hours	From initiation of action until decisive point or high value target(s) destroyed.
M5	Hours	From initiation of action until mission completed.
M6	Percent	Of direct action missions achieve aim.
M7	Percent	Of enemy targets successfully attacked by friendly forces.
M8	Percent	Of enemy units confused by friendly action.
M9	Percent	Of missions with fully prepared alternate target.
M10	Instances	Of operations compromised during exfiltration.
M11	Instances	Of operations compromised during infiltration and execution.
M12	Instances	Of operations compromised prior to infiltration.

13 September 1996

M13	Percent	Of raid requires forces external to executing unit.
M14	Percent	Of raids striking correct target.
M15	Percent	Of recovery missions result in recovery of target and mission personnel to friendly control, alive.
M16	Percent	Of recovery missions where planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area successful.
M17	Days	To arrange joint service support for raid party operation.
M18	Hours	To select and prepare a force for a raid.
M19	Days	To select raid targets in Theater of Operations/JOA.
M20	Days	To select, form, and train raiding party.
M21	Hours	From completion of task until friendly forces successfully withdraw from target area.

OP 1.2.4.6 Conduct Penetration, Direct Assault, and Turning Movements

M1	Hours	Between planned and actual entry.
M2	Days	Between planned and actual exit.
M3	Hours	For multinational and interagency linkages to be established (after initial entry).
M4	Days	For remainder of force to close into lodgment area (after initial entry).
M5	Days	For required expansion of lodgment (after initial entry).
M6	Percent	Of forces operating in depth remain within range of friendly supporting firepower.
M7	Percent	Of operations for which appropriate force employed.
M8	Percent	Of operations for which full coordination and deconfliction accomplished.
M9	Percent	Of operations with logistic preparations complete prior to infiltration.
M10	Percent	Of proposed missions rejected due to insufficient preparation time.
M11	Hours	Required to adjust original plan for decisive operations after recognizing planning assumptions invalid
M12	Days	To identify location of enemy flank.
M13	Hours	To reach critical check points and blocking positions.

OP 1.2.4.7 Conduct Direct Action in JOA

M1	Hours	Between desired and actual time in position.
M2	Meters	Between planned and actual drop off point.
M3	Minutes	Between planned and actual exfiltration.
M4	Hours	Between planned and actual infiltration.
M5	Minutes	Between planned and actual time of target attack.
M6	Hours	From completion of task until wounded personnel provided needed medical treatment.
M7	Hours	From initiation of action until decisive point or high value target(s) destroyed.
M8	Hours	From initiation of action until target personnel seized/captured.
M9	Percent	Of DA recovery mission planned withdrawals from immediate objective area successful.
M10	Percent	Of DA recovery mission with recovery of target and mission personnel to friendly control, alive.
M11	Percent	Of direct action missions achieve aim.
M12	Percent	Of forces operating in depth remain within range of friendly supporting firepower.
M13	Percent	Of friendly personnel recovered uninjured.
M14	Percent	Of friendly personnel successfully recovered.
M15	Percent	Of missions with fully prepared alternate target.

M16	Instances	Of operations compromised during exfiltration.
M17	Instances	Of operations compromised during infiltration and execution.
M18	Instances	Of operations compromised prior to infiltration.
M19	Percent	Of operations for which appropriate force employed.
M20	Percent	Of operations for which complete rehearsal conducted prior to infiltration.
M21	Percent	Of operations for which full coordination and deconfliction accomplished.
M22	Percent	Of Operations striking correct target.
M23	Percent	Of proposed DA missions rejected due to insufficient preparation time.
M24	Days	To identify potential target(s) for Direct Action in theater of operations/JOA.

OP 1.2.4.8 Conduct Unconventional Warfare in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of indigenous and surrogate forces adequately trained and equipped to conduct UW operations/subordinate campaign.
M2	Personnel	Of indigenous and surrogate forces organized to conduct UW operations/subordinate campaign.
M3	Percent	Of indigenous population recruited to support friendly UW plan/subordinate campaign.
M4	Percent	Of isolation phase required time available.
M5	Percent	Of linkups at infiltration successful.
M6	Percent	Of operational and strategic objectives successfully achieved by friendly force UW action.
M7	Percent	Of SOF personnel tasked to theater of operations/JOA trained in theater peculiar requirements.
M8	Percent	Of theater deep zone has active UW, trained and conducting operations.
M9	Percent	Of US personnel committed to theater of operations/JOA fluent in local languages and familiar with local culture.
M10	Percent	Of UW cadre fully trained in UW, to include language in area.
M11	Percent	Of UW forces remaining clandestine or covert.
M12	Percent	Of UW operations include a fully executed PSYOP preparation.
M13	Days	To conduct assessment of indigenous forces in theater of operations/JOA.
M14	Days	To identify requirements for US support.

OP 1.2.5 Conduct Offensive Operations in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Friendly casualties.
M2	Percent	Of decisive targets damaged or destroyed by offensive action
M3	Percent	Of enemy centers of gravity destroyed or neutralized by offensive action.
M4	Percent	Of enemy force surprised at initiation of offensive action.
M5	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces achieve check points on time.
M7	Percent	Of friendly combat units effective after operation.
M8	Percent	Of joint force prepared to conduct offensive at H-hour
M9	Percent	Of major combat systems effective after attack.
M10	Percent	Of operational objectives achieved by friendly offensive action
M11	Percent	Of supplies and munitions remaining (at end of operation).
M12	Percent	Of supporting fires provided as planned.
M13	Percent	Of preparation time allowed for rehearsals.
M14	Days	To prepare to continue offensive operations (after pause).
M15	Hours	To prepare hasty defenses.
M16	Days	To seize objectives.
M17	Minutes	To transfer command to new command post.

M18	Hours	Until joint force prepared to conduct offensive operations, (after Warning Order).
-----	-------	--

OP 1.2.6 Conduct Defensive Operations in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of decisive targets damaged or destroyed by defensive action
M2	Percent	Of force in reserve.
M3	Percent	Of friendly force surprised at initiation of enemy offensive action.
M4	Percent	Of joint force prepared to conduct defensive at time of enemy attack
M5	Percent	Of operational friendly decisive points destroyed or damaged as result of enemy offensive action
M6	Hours	For enemy to breach deliberate fortifications.
M7	Hours	To commit reserve to battle.
M8	Minutes	To deliver fires on preplanned targets.
M9	Hours	To initiate spoiling attack/counter attack.
M10	Hours	To prepare defensive positions.
M11	Hours	To reposition to counter enemy's main effort/attack in theater of operations/JOA.
M12	Hours	To resume offensive operations from defensive operations.
M13	Minutes	To transfer command to new command post.
M14	Hours	Until joint force prepared to conduct defensive operations, after warning order.

OP 1.2.7 Conduct Retrograde Operations in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	Between planning and withdrawal execution.
M2	Hours	Difference between planned and actual completion of withdrawal.
M3	Percent	Of decisive targets/points preserved by retrograde action
M4	Percent	Of friendly centers of gravity preserved by friendly retrograde action.
M5	Percent	Of friendly force lost during withdrawal (missing, casualty).
M6	Percent	Of friendly force surprised at initiation of enemy offensive action.
M7	Percent	Of joint force already conducted or prepared to conduct retrograde at time of enemy attack
M8	Percent	Of logistics support activities relocated prior to commencing retrograde operations.
M9	Percent	Of new positions with quartering party in place prior unit arrival.
M10	Percent	Of operational friendly decisive points destroyed or damaged by enemy offensive action
M11	Percent	Of units with marked and secure withdrawal routes.
M12	Percent	Of withdrawals planned as not under pressure conducted not under pressure.
M13	Percent	Of withdrawing force for which full rehearsal conducted.
M14	Percent	Of withdrawing force which moves to prepared positions.
M15	Percent	Of withdrawing units for which guides in place at time of withdrawal.
M16	Percent	That actual enemy threat differs at time of execution from projected.
M17	Hours	To designate covering force.
M18	Days	To develop deception plan to support retrograde operations.
M19	Minutes	To transfer command to new location.
M20	Hours	Until joint force prepared to conduct retrograde operations, from warning order.

OP 1.3 Provide Operational Mobility

M1	Hours	That joint force operational airlift/sealift delayed due to obstacles.
M2	Hours	To breach barrier to allow operational forces to penetrate to rear of enemy operational forces.

M3	Days	To clear mine field to allow amphibious landing.
M4	Days	To clear port and restore to full capacity.
M5	Days	To clear port to allow discharge of cargo.
M6	Hours	To restore ground LOC after closure due to heavy rain and flooding.
M7	Hours	To restore ground LOC after closure, due to rock slide or avalanche.
M8	Percent	Of mine countermeasure operations provide needed freedom of movement.

OP 1.3.1 Overcome Operationally Significant Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines

M1	Hours	Enemy-emplaced obstacles delay movement of friendly forces.
M2	Hours	For joint force staff to disseminate obstacle data to joint force subordinate units, after discovery.
M3	Hours	Joint force operations delayed for insufficient engineer support.
M4	Percent	Net growth in mined channels and seas.
M5	Percent	Of day required channels kept swept.
M6	Percent	Of lanes kept open by mine sweeping.
M7	Percent	Of operationally significant obstacles for which branch had been previously identified.
M8	Hours	To sweep a channel.

OP 1.3.2 Enhance Movement of Operational Forces

M1	NM	Between two most distant airfields or LZs in combat zone.
M2	NM	Between two most distant airfields, LZs, or EZs in combat zone.
M3	MOG	For LZ for C-130 aircraft.
M4	Percent	Increase in APOD/SPOD capacity for operational movement.
M5	Hours	Land LOCs (road, rail) delayed for repair.
M6	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with approved approaches compatible with intratheater airlift and OAS aircraft.
M7	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with approved non-precision approaches.
M8	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with approved precision approaches.
M9	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with at least a 2 x C-130 MOG.
M10	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with at least a 2 x C-5 MOG.
M11	Percent	Of LZs in JOA with approved approaches compatible with intratheater airlift and OAS aircraft.
N12	Percent	Of LZs in JOA with approved non-precision approaches.
M13	Percent	Of LZs in JOA with approved precision approaches.
M14	Percent	Of required follow-on forces accommodated by adequate APODs/SPODs in lodgment area.
M15	Hours	Strategic airlift/sealift diverted or canceled because airfields/seaports not prepared sufficiently.
M16	Days	To achieve POD throughput to allow meeting of RDDs.

OP 1.3.3 Coordinate Water Space Management

M1	Incidents	Where proper water space management inadequate.
M2	Incidents	Where proper coordination of movement not adequate.
M3	Percent	Of Notices to Mariners published in timely fashion to ALCON agencies.
M4	Incidents	Of collision at sea.

OP 1.4 Provide Operational Countermobility

M1	Percent	Enemy avenues of approach closed as maneuver possibilities by friendly barriers, obstacles, or mines.
M2	Percent	Monthly reduction in civil populace opinion of target nation central government.
M3	Percent	Reduction in estimated potential enemy COAs after taking countermobility action in JOA.
M4	Percent	Reduction in target nation external trade.
M5	Percent	Reduction in target nation GDP.

OP 1.4.1 Employ Operational System of Obstacles

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly force lines of communication after obstacle emplacement.
M2	Percent	Of available enemy LOCs and PODs interdicted by friendly obstacles.
M3	Percent	Of hostile external surface communication absorbed by other LOCs after barrier emplacement.
M4	Percent	Of hostile internal surface communication absorbed by other LOCs after barrier emplacement.
M5	Percent	Reduction in hostile military surface communications after barrier emplacement.
M6	Percent	Reduction in hostile overall surface communications after barrier emplacement.
M7	Percent	Reduction in potential enemy COAs after obstacle emplacement.
M8	Days	Until hostile forces unable to sustain offensive operations.
M9	Percent	Increase in incidence of disease in target nation during quarantine or embargo.

OP 1.4.2 Plan and Execute Sanctions/Embargo

M1	Percent	Increase in malnutrition in target nation during quarantine or embargo.
M2	Percent	Of joint force maritime assets, including air force and assigned SOF, tied down by quarantine or embargo operations.
M3	Percent	Of known scheduled and unscheduled transport carrying targeted materials not allowed to enter or leave quarantine area.
M4	Percent	Reduction in target nation armaments production.
M5	Percent	Reduction in targeted economic area in target nation.
M6	Percent	Increase in incidence of disease in target nation during quarantine or embargo.

OP 1.4.3 Plan and Execute Blockade

M1	Percent	Monthly decline in target nation Central Government popularity in the civil populace.
M2	Percent	Monthly reduction in target nation GDP.
M3	Percent	Of enemy military force movement still maintained through alternative routes.
M4	Percent	Of enemy military force prevented from entering or leaving blockade area.
M5	Percent	Of known scheduled and unscheduled transport prevented from entering or leaving blockade area.
M6	Percent	Of pre-action trade being maintained (through alternative routes).
M7	Percent	Reduction in flow of all supplies to (or from) target nation.
M8	Percent	Reduction in target nation armaments production.
M9	Percent	Reduction in target nation GDP.
M10	Percent	Reduction in target nation sophisticated armaments production.
M11	Percent	Reduction in target nation sophisticated armaments readiness.
M12	Percent	Reduction in target nation WMD production.

OP 1.4.4 Plan and Execute Maritime Interception

M1	Percent	Of pre-action smuggling maintained.
M2	Percent	Of vessels boarded.
M3	Percent	Of vessels diverted had contraband.
M4	Percent	Reduction in flow of contraband to (or from) target nation
M5	Percent	Reduction in flow of refugees to (or from) target nation
M6	Refugees	Diverted daily to receiving station
M7	Refugees	Found on vessels
M8	Hours	To process and divert refugees to receiving station
M9	Vessels	Boarded.
M10	Vessels	Diverted due to (suspected) contraband.
M11	Percent	Of pre-action smuggling maintained through alternative routes.

OP 1.5 Control or Dominate Operationally Significant Area

M1	Percent	Of host-nation population under control of civil government.
M2	Percent	Of identified decisive points within OA under friendly control.
M3	Percent	Of joint force forces operating within areas under control of friendly ground forces.
M4	Percent	Of naval operations delayed within maritime superiority area (due to enemy action).
M5	Percent	Of operationally significant areas controlled by friendly forces
M6	Percent	Of operations delayed or canceled (due to lack of an air superiority umbrella).
M7	Percent	Operationally significant areas currently contested by opposing forces.
M8	Days	With complete control over operationally significant area.

OP 1.5.1 Control Operationally Significant Land Area

M1	Days	Between enemy attacks on areas controlled by friendly forces.
M2	Percent	Critical terrain features under control of friendly forces.
M3	Percent	Of air operations in JOA delayed or canceled (due to enemy ground actions during execution).
M4	Percent	Of force engaged in rear area security.
M5	Percent	Of forces operating within areas under control of friendly ground forces.
M6	Percent	Of identified decisive points and enemy geographic centers of gravity under friendly control.
M7	Percent	Of naval operations delayed or canceled (due to enemy ground attack).
M8	Percent	Of population under civilian government control.
M9	Percent	Of identified decisive points under friendly control.
M10	Casualties	Suffered during control of area.
M11	Percent	Of critical terrain features, under control of friendly forces.
M12	Percent	Of designated land area, controlled within time specified.

OP 1.5.2 Gain and Maintain Maritime Superiority in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Operations	By naval forces delayed.
M2	Percent	Of naval operations delayed or canceled.
M3	Percent	Of personnel and equipment coming through SLOCs experiencing no delay, disruption or cancellation (due to enemy naval action).
M4	Percent	Of joint force operating within maritime superiority area.
M5	Percent	Of time friendly forces operating within, or onshore from, a maritime superiority area.
M6	Percent	Supplies and materiel lost en route on SLOC to enemy surface, subsurface, or air action.

OP 1.5.3 Gain and Maintain Air Superiority in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Friendly attrition rate per sortie
M2	Percent	Friendly ground force losses due to enemy air activity.
M3	Percent	Friendly surface force losses due to enemy air activity.
M4	Percent	Of enemy units detected, engaged.
M5	Percent	Of enemy units engaged, downed.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces operating under air superiority umbrella.
M7	Percent	Of time with air superiority over operational area.

OP 1.5.4 Isolate Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of critical routes controlled or blocked.
M2	Percent	Of force required to isolate key sector.
M3	Percent	Reduction in movement of supplies into theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Days	To isolate key sector of theater of operations/JOA.

OP 1.5.5 Assist Host Nation in Populace and Resource Control

M1	Days	Between occurrences of civil unrest
M2	Percent	Of normal public services maintained during operation
M3	Percent	Of joint force personnel assigned to perform basic public services in host-nation
M4	Percent	Of joint force personnel assigned to perform police functions in host-nation.
M5	Percent	Of friendly force, engaged in refugee care and handling.

OP 2 Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance

M1	Days	In advance of collection intelligence requirements identified.
M2	Percent	Of PIRs collected in time to meet current operational needs.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs included in collection plan.
M4	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M5	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M6	Hours	Since most current intelligence information was last collected.
M7	Hours	Turnaround time to process new intelligence data.
M8	Hours	Warning time for significant enemy actions

OP 2.1 Plan and Direct Operational Intelligence Activities

M1	Hours	To disseminate PIRs to subordinate elements of joint force (after collection).
M2	Hours	Between updates of PIRs.
M3	Days	In advance of collection, intelligence requirements identified.
M4	Percent	Of Events accurately dealt with by Operating Instructions (OIs), Checklists and Threat Reference Materials.
M5	Instances	Of PIRs identified during execution not previously identified during Crisis Action Planning.
M6	Percent	Of total PIRs identified during execution.
M7	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.

OP 2.1.1 Determine and Prioritize Operational Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)

M1	Hours	Average age of intelligence data on high priority PIRs.
M2	Days	Before next phase of a campaign, joint force commander PIRs validated or updated.
M3	Days	In advance of collection, intelligence requirements identified.
M4	Instances	Of open joint force commander PIRs (at any one time).
M5	Percent	Of PIRs addressed in intelligence update.
M6	Percent	Of PIRs covered by a Collection Plan.
M7	Instances	Of PIRs identified after collection begins.
M8	Percent	Of unvalidated PIRs resubmitted.
M9	Percent	Of validated PIRs have collection effort.
M10	Hours	Since last update of PIRs.
M11	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M12	Hours	To prioritize intelligence collection requirements.
M13	Days	To provide current information for PIR.

OP 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize Operational Information Requirements (IR)

M1	Hours	Needed to create usable Information Requirements to support newly designated PIRs.
M2	Percent	Of joint force Information Requirements relate to a current PIR.
M3	Percent	Of joint force subordinate command PIRs supported by joint force IRs.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs have multiple information requests.

OP 2.1.3 Prepare Operational Collection Plan

M1	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements covered by collection plan.
M2	Percent	Of operations by enemy intelligence discovered in time to respond.
M3	Percent	Of PCCIRs (identified during Crisis Action Planning) covered by more than one collection asset.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs (identified during Crisis Action Planning) covered by a collection asset or request for information.

M5	Percent	Of PIRs outstanding.
M6	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) filled.
M7	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) have more than one type of collection asset or resource assigned.
M8	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) included in collection plan.
M9	Hours	To coordinate a "No Strike" target with joint force headquarters J-3.
M10	Hours	To prepare CI requirement (after becoming aware of CI collection effort).
M11	Hours	To prepare collection request for newly identified PIR.

OP 2.1.4 Allocate Intelligence Resources in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	For joint force J-2 to receive report of organic collection assets from components (after arrival).
M2	Hours	To retask collection asset (After PIR satisfied).
M3	Percent	Of requests for collection or production validated.
M4	Hours	To prepare report on available collection assets.
M5	Hours	To request support from national or allied nations when joint force assets not available.

OP 2.2 Collect Operational Information

M1	Hours	To retask collection asset (After PIR satisfied).
M2	Percent	Of PIRs collected in time to meet current operational needs.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information.
M5	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M6	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M7	Percent	Of time operational decisions supported by information covered by collection plan.
M8	Hours	Since most current intelligence information collected.

OP 2.2.1 Collect Information on Operational Situation

M1	Hours	To retask collection asset (after CI PIR satisfied).
M2	Hours	For CRM to retask collection asset to outstanding PIR or PIP (after PIR satisfied).
M3	Hours	Between taskings to collection assets on new HPTs.
M4	Hours	From receipt of tasking until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond.
M5	Percent	Of collection requirements filled by joint force assets.
M6	Percent	Of collection requirements filled.
M7	Percent	Of collection which could benefit from "cross-cueing" and "tip-off," do so benefit.
M8	Percent	Of commander's area has required reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M9	Percent	Of disease non battle injury (DNBI) incurred in first month of deployment from lack of collection of medical information.
M10	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M11	Percent	Of high-payoff targets accurately located.
M12	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery for aircrews have it before flight briefing.
M13	Percent	Of non-aviation missions requiring current imagery have it prior to execution.
M14	Percent	Of PIRs covered by collection asset or request for information.
M15	Percent	Of PIRs identified during planning process covered by collection asset or request for information.
M16	Percent	Of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information.

M17	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information.
M18	Percent	Of PIRs covered by more than one collection asset.
M19	Percent	Of potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M20	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M21	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M22	Percent	Of time operational decisions required information not covered by collection plan.
M23	Instances	Of times commander made decisions without sufficient information (due to failure to collect).
M24	Percent	Of PIRs on situation outstanding.
M25	Hours	Since high priority targets were last detected, identified and located.
M26	Hours	Since most current intelligence information was collected.
M27	Hours	To fill requests for information on new HPTs during execution.
M28	Hours	To identify shortfalls in reconnaissance platforms (after development of collection plan).
M29	Percent	Of commander's area has reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M30	Minutes	To determine raid size.
M31	Minutes	For ballistic missile to be detected (after launch).
M32	NM	Beyond engagement range aircraft detected.
M33	NM	Difference between plotted and actual position of target.
M34	NM	From sensor enemy air raid detected.
M35	NM	From sensor single enemy aircraft detected.
M36	Seconds	From target detection until height confirmed.
M37	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow weapons employment.
M38	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow second engagement.
M39	Percent	Of enemy aircraft passing through coverage area detected.
M40	Percent	Of friendly returning aircraft detected.
M41	Percent	Of raids detected.
M42	Percent	Of targets lost after detection.
M43	Percent	Of targets undetected in ground clutter.
M44	Minutes	To build air picture after radar comes on line.
M45	Percent	Of targets have combat assessment data available from more than one collection platform.
M46	Percent	Of targets have more than one type of system available to perform assessment.
M47	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority One geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M48	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M49	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

OP 2.2.2 Directly Support Theater Strategic Surveillance and Reconnaissance Requirements

M1	Percent	Of combatant commander and national level collection requirements satisfied by piggybacking on existing collection mission on non-interference basis.
M2	Hours	To provide theater of operations/JOA collected data to combatant command or national analysts.
M3	Hours	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet new collection requirement.

13 September 1996

M4	Hours	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet overriding combatant commander or national new collection requirement.
----	-------	--

OP 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Operational Information

M1	Percent	Of intelligence personnel completing annual re-certification training.
M2	Percent	Raw information correctly prepared for production phase.
M3	Hours	Turnaround time to process new intelligence data.
M4	Percent	Of collected information which can be, processed in theater of operations/JOA.

OP 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Increase in processing time when exploitation is concurrent with processing.
M2	Percent	Of collected information which can be, processed in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of collected information processed within 24 hours.
M4	Hours	To provide intelligence analysts hard copy formal report of information obtained in processing.
M5	Minutes	To provide intelligence analysts voice or electronic mail report of information.
M6	Minutes	To read wet film (after recover of aircraft or other photo system).

OP 2.3.2 Collate Information

M1	Percent	Of analysis actions returned by joint force all source analyst for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of joint force intelligence products lack adequate correlation of information to provide insight into joint implications of subject.
M3	Percent	Of time joint force intelligence products updated with available information not previously correlated.

OP 2.3.3 Correlate Information

M1	Data Points	Assembled on single subject.
M2	Percent	Of joint force reported information graded as credible.
M3	Percent	Of joint force reported information graded as highly reliable.
M4	Percent	Of available separate sources used by joint force J-2 analysts to increase credibility of information.

OP 2.4 Produce Operational Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products

M1	Hours	To produce and disseminate joint force DISUM (after arrival in joint operations area).
M2	Hours	To produce and disseminate component INTSUMs (after arrival in joint operations area).
M3	Minutes	To brief operations Command Duty Officer (after issuing an Advisory Report).
M4	Minutes	To disseminate an Advisory Report (after observation of activity).
M5	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.

OP 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret Operational Information

M1	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged accurate in light of event.
M2	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged complete, based upon requests for clarification or expansion.
M3	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged relevant to military situation.
M4	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged timely by users.
M5	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged useable by users.

13 September 1996

OP 2.4.1.1 Identify Operational Issues and Threats

M1	Hours	For information on APOD/SPOD capacity to be available to planners (after activation of joint force).
M2	Hours	To disseminate Advisory Report (after observation of significant event).
M3	Hours	Between joint force updates of enemy order of battle.
M4	Hours	Between joint force updates of friendly force status.
M5	Hours	To reassess new information on operational area.
M6	Instances	Of civil disturbances requiring intervention or disrupting operations anticipated by joint force.
M7	Percent	Of joint force mapping and terrain data base that is accurate.
M8	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified due to unforeseen information about operational area.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment capability deployed to theater of operations/JOA redundant with that readily available on local economy.
M10	Hours	To reassess new threat information.
M11	Days	Since last joint force assessment of information on operational area completed.
M12	Hours	Since last joint force assessment of threat information completed.

OP 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Operational Capabilities, Course of Action, and Intentions

M1	Percent	Of Enemy operational centers of gravity correctly identified.
M2	Percent	Of enemy operational branches and sequels correctly identified (during planning).
M3	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified.
M4	Percent	Of enemy targets or vulnerabilities identified within targeting cycle.
M5	Percent	Of false alarms in forecasting significant enemy actions.
M6	Percent	Of joint force attacks on enemy vulnerabilities have projected effect.
M7	Percent	Of joint force identified target categories produce desired result on enemy.
M8	Percent	Of joint force operations with correctly identified enemy operational and tactical center of gravity (prior to selection of COA).
M9	Percent	Of new processed intelligence data integrated within targeting cycle.
M10	Hours	Required to identify enemy operational and tactical center of gravity.

OP 2.4.2 Prepare Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To request organic collection asset reports (after assignment of unit to JTF/joint force).
M2	Hours	To prepare and submit initial organic collection report (after designation of JTF/joint force).
M3	Percent	Of time intelligence summary preparation delayed until late for Crisis Action Planning Phase 6.
M4	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.
M5	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M6	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M7	Percent	Of Priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M8	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M9	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.

13 September 1996

M10	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
-----	---------	---

OP 2.4.2.1 Provide Indications and Warning for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	Between receipt of significant information and updates of indications and warning conditions.
M2	Hours	Lead time in joint force prediction of enemy actions.
M3	Percent	Of Commander's Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) and Attack Warnings issued and disseminated.
M4	Percent	Of enemy actions with joint force provided warning.
M5	Percent	Of Threat Indicators maintained and evaluated during declared DEFCON increases accurate.
M6	Minutes	Required to transmit indication or warning within JOA after identification or receipt.
M7	Minutes	To submit intelligence portion of Commander's Situation Report (SITREP).

OP 2.4.2.2 Provide Current Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of Intelligence Reports (INTREPs) submitted within established criteria.
M2	Percent	Of INTREPs submitted with accuracy of event location, times, and synopsis to allow proper action.
M3	Minutes	To brief operations Command Duty Officer (after issuing an Advisory Report).
M4	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.
M5	Hours	To produce and disseminate component INTSUMs (after arrival).
M6	Hours	To produce and disseminate joint force DISUM (after arrival).
M7	Percent	Of weather support provided to assigned and gained units accurate.

OP 2.4.2.3 Provide General Military Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA.

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Days	Between hard copy updates of reports on enemy military capabilities.
M3	Percent	Difference between actual enemy military strength, compared to that reported in intelligence reports.
M4	Percent	Of enemy units identified in combat, compared to units identified in intelligence reports.
M5	Percent	Of forces incapacitated at least once by weather conditions not previously identified.
M6	Percent	Of forces incapacitated by disease not identified.
M7	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces answered by data in joint force intelligence data bases.

OP 2.4.2.4 Provide Target Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified by joint force targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of high priority targets (HPTs) mensurated coordinates allow attack without visual update.
M3	Percent	Of high priority targets (HPTs) with correct location data.
M4	Percent	Of selected joint force High Priority Targets (HPTs) have mensurated coordinates available.
M5	Percent	Of sorties diverted to higher priority targets discovered inside execution cycle.
M6	Percent	Of target locations verified by joint force before next targeting cycle.
M7	Hours	To provide intelligence update to SOF on target situation.
M8	Percent	Targets correctly located and identified.
M9	Percent	Of enemy command posts known and located sufficiently to permit lethal attack.

13 September 1996

M10	Percent	Of enemy command posts known and located sufficiently to permit non-lethal attack.
M11	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems identified by friendly forces.

OP 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate Operational Intelligence

M1	Percent	Of time intelligence summaries disseminated late to joint force CAT during Crisis Action Planning, Phase 6.
M2	Minutes	To disseminate Advisory Report (after observation of activity).
M3	Hours	To disseminate intelligence updates (upon completion of assessment).
M4	Minutes	To pass prepared intelligence to joint force commander and staff.
M5	Minutes	To prepare intelligence for joint force commander and staff.
M6	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M7	Percent	Of required Priority Two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M8	Percent	Of required Priority Three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.

OP 2.5.1 Provide Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of responses to Requests for Information (RFIs) provide needed information to required accuracy.
M2	Percent	Of time mission essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established criteria.
M3	Percent	Of time intelligence summaries disseminated late to joint force CAT during Crisis Action Planning, Phase 6.
M4	Minutes	To disseminate Advisory Report (after observation of activity).
M5	Hours	To disseminate intelligence updates (upon completion of assessment).
M6	Minutes	To pass prepared intelligence to joint force commander and staff.
M7	Minutes	To prepare intelligence for joint force commander and staff.

OP 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to Theater of Operations/JOA Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Hours	For joint force intelligence producers to follow-up or contact customers during planning or execution.
M2	Percent	Of joint force intelligence producers have recorded or posted their customer organization, name and phone number or EMail address.
M3	Percent	Of time joint force intelligence producer spends on direct contact with his or her customer.
M4	Hours	Since intelligence producer last contacted or spoke with his or her customer (during a crisis).
M5	Minutes	To clarify issues in intelligence products furnished by joint force intelligence producers
M6	Hours	To disseminate updates upon completion of assessment.
M7	Hours	To provide supplemental information to users for new issues prompted by a joint force intelligence product.

OP 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of comments critical of joint force J-2 performance represent repeat comments.
M2	Percent	Of customer complaints result in change within joint force J-2 or explanation to customer of why no change.
M3	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations for improvement implemented by joint force J-2 within 90 days.

M4	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations specifically directed to individual responsible for implementing suggested changes.
M5	Percent	Of intelligence training materials certified accurate by Unit Chief of Intelligence.
M6	Percent	Of joint force intelligence production programs include a customer survey.
M7	Percent	Of joint force J-2 offices with self inspection program.
M8	Days	Since customer comments or observations last passed to joint force J-2 organizations and personnel by DJ-2 or J-2 inspectors.

OP 3 Employ Operational Firepower

M1	Minutes	To attack target after most recent information on target provided.
M2	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M3	Percent	Of missiles, rockets, and other long range attack systems successfully engaged targets.

OP 3.1 Conduct Joint Force Targeting

M1	Hours	To develop attack plan after identification of HPT.
M2	Hours	To issue CJTF's HPT categories (after CINC's Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To issue CJTF's Prohibited Target Guidance (after CINC's Warning Order).
M4	Hours	To issue FSC Measures Guidance (after CINC's Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To pass JTCB Guidance to targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC) (before ATO-cycle begins).
M6	Hours	To produce Joint Force Commander apportionment guidance (after CINC's Warning Order).
M7	Percent	Of desired results achieved (by expected conclusion of given phase or time line).
M8	Percent	Of desired results achieved by theater operational firepower (within specified time/phase).
M9	Percent	Of JTCB target priorities differ from CJTF, CINC and NCA Guidance.
M10	Percent	Of selected targets for which accurate coordinates available.
M11	Percent	Of JTCB selected targets reviewed for political ramifications.
M12	Percent	Of targets susceptible to non-lethal kill allocated to non-lethal attack systems.
M13	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems targeted by friendly forces.

OP 3.1.1 Establish Joint Force Targeting Guidance

M1	Days	In advance of attack, targeting strategy established.
M2	Percent	Of desired results achieved (by expected conclusion of given phase or time line).
M3	Percent	Of HPTs assigned to more than one type attack system.

OP 3.1.2 Assign Joint/Multinational Operational Firepower Resources

M1	Hours	To assign firepower resources, once targets identified during planning phase.
M2	Hours	To complete targeting cycle planning.
M3	Instances	Of theater strategic firepower assignments appealed to JFC.
M4	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by joint forces as non-ATO targets.
M5	Percent	Of HPTs covered by at least one attack system.
M6	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified awaiting firepower support.
M7	Percent	Of land, air, and sea delivery systems' targets of opportunity coordinated by JTCB.
M8	Percent	Of attacking systems must penetrate to target to deliver ordnance.

OP 3.1.3 Develop Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To select targets for attack (once intelligence data available) (during planning phase).
M2	Percent	Of decisive points discovered within execution cycle evaluated.
M3	Percent	Of effort diverted by JFACC or Joint Force Commander to higher priority category.

OP 3.1.4 Prioritize High-Payoff and High-Value Targets

13 September 1996

M1	Hours	To complete prioritization (once intelligence data considered).
M2	Percent	Of effort diverted by JFACC or Joint Force Commander to higher priority category discovered after allocation, but inside execution cycle.
M3	Percent	Of operational HPTs discovered within execution cycle result in reprioritized target list.

OP 3.1.5 Publish Tasking Order(s) for Employment of Air Assets and Other Means

M1	Hours	To assign firepower resources (once targets identified).
M2	Instances	Of SAPs not integrated with non-SAP systems.
M3	Percent	Of ATO addressees receive ATO on time.
M4	Percent	Of ATO missions contain errors.
M5	Percent	Of attacks deconflicted with friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs attacked with inappropriate munitions.
M7	Percent	Of mismatch between target sets and assigned strike assets.

OP 3.1.6 Conduct Operational Combat Assessment

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute restrike, awaiting combat assessment .
M2	Hours	To complete combat assessment.
M3	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M4	Minutes	To provide initial combat assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M6	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of effectiveness.
M7	Percent	Of targets have combat assessment data available.
M8	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.

OP 3.1.6.1 Assess Battle Damage on Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute reattack (following receipt of assessment).
M2	Hours	To complete full assessment of attacks after TOT.
M3	Hours	To make initial assessment of attacks after TOT.
M4	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Minutes	To provide initial battle damage assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M7	Percent	Of targets have BDA based on more than one type of system.
M8	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.
M9	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of effectiveness.

OP 3.1.6.2 Assess Munitions Effects on Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute reattack (following receipt of munitions effects (ME) assessment).
M2	Hours	To complete munitions effects assessment after attack.
M3	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M4	Minutes	To provide initial munitions effects assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs require reattack.
M7	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M8	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of munitions effectiveness.

M9	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.
----	---------	--------------------------------------

OP 3.1.6.3 Assess Reattack Requirement

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute other options.
M2	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M3	Minutes	To assess reattack requirement (after attack).
M4	Minutes	To provide initial reattack assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Percent	Of HPT attacks unsuccessful.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M7	Percent	Of HPTs require reattack.
M8	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M9	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of reattack requirement..
M10	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.

OP 3.1.7 Develop Fire Support Coordination Measures

M1	Instances	Of collateral damage.
M2	Instances	Of fratricide.
M3	Percent	Of high payoff targets destroyed subsequently attacked by another component.
M4	Percent	Of SOF missions executed with required notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M5	Percent	Of target attacks violate coordination measures or procedures.

OP 3.2 Attack Operational Targets

M1	Minutes	To get ordnance on target after initiation of task
M2	Percent	Execution of missions requested by components.
M3	Percent	Of high priority missions executed within specified time.
M4	Percent	Of maneuver forces secure assigned objectives.
M5	Percent	Of missions flown/fired achieve desired target damage.
M6	Percent	Of operational fires on time in support of maneuver forces.
M7	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked during operation.
M8	Percent	On time of missions with given times on target.
M9	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems engaged/destroyed by friendly forces.

OP 3.2.1 Attack Operational Land/Maritime Targets

M1	Minutes	To complete attack after target identification.
M2	Percent	Of attacking systems deliver ordnance.
M3	Percent	Of enemy desert per day.
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded.
M5	Percent	Of enemy troops surrender.
M6	Percent	Of friendly COAs altered or discarded.

OP 3.2.2 Conduct Nonlethal Attack on Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To initiate PSYOP activities (after warning order.).
M2	Minutes	To complete non-lethal attack on target (after initiation.).
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions consistent with IW plan objectives.
M4	Percent	Of joint force targets attacked with lethal means also attacked with PSYOP.
M5	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked.
M6	Percent	Of PSYOP objectives accomplished.

M7	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (after implementation of EW plan).
M8	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (at implementation of EW plan).
M9	Total	Enemy troops per day surrender, defect, or desert.

OP 3.2.2.1 Employ PSYOP in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	To initiate PSYOP campaign (after warning order).
M2	Hours	For psychological operations units to arrive in theater (after joint force activation).
M3	Hours	For PSYOP campaign to begin (after joint force activation).
M4	Percent	Of JOA covered by friendly force mass media.
M5	Percent	Of PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host-nation.
M6	Percent	Of selected targets for which other attack systems were integrated with PSYOP (e.g., PSYOP and Offensive Air Operations).
M7	Percent	Of target audience exhibits behavior in accordance with joint force commander's desires.
M8	Percent	Of target audience reached by more than one media in PSYOP campaign.

OP 3.2.2.2 Employ Electronic Attack (EA) in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To initiate electronic attack (after ordered).
M2	Percent	Of electronic attacks achieve desired effects on enemy.
M3	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks conducted.
M4	Percent	Reduction in enemy communications emissions (after EW attack).
M5	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (after implementation of EW plan).
M6	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (at implementation of EW plan).
M7	Percent	Of enemy air defense capabilities neutralized by nonlethal means.

OP 3.2.2.3 Employ Information Attack in Theater of Operations/JOA.

M1	Percent	Of OPLANS, OPORDERS, and component plans, have integrated plan for attack of adversary information system.
M2	Percent	Of operational phases, include information system attack plan.
M3	Percent	Of all information system targets evaluated as candidates for attack.
M4	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information system targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M5	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems without fratricide on friendly systems.
M6	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems integrated into daily ATO.
M7	Percent	Of adversary information systems included in target lists.
M8	Percent	Of adversary backup and alternate information systems attacked concurrent with attacks on primary systems.
M9	Percent	More time than allocated in campaign plan, needed to achieve desired damage levels on adversary information systems.
M10	Percent	Degradation in enemy information processing capacity after attack.
M11	Hours	For impact of information system attack to be reflected in enemy operation.
M12	Hours	Results of information system attack can be sustained by friendly forces.

OP 3.2.2.4 Conduct Nonlethal Attack on Personnel, Equipment, and Installations.

M1	Percent	Of OPLANS, OPORDERS, and component plans, have integrated nonlethal plan.
M2	Percent	Of all targets evaluated as candidates for nonlethal attack.

13 September 1996

M3	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks on selected targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M4	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks on selected targets, achieve desired nonlethal effect.
M5	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks integrated into daily ATO.
M6	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks without lethal results.
M7	Hours	Until nonlethal attack options developed (from Warning Order).
M8	Percent	Of decrease in support for adversary activity in country of operation resulting from nonlethal efforts.
M9	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks require lethal support.
M10	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks result in death or injury to friendly employing forces.

OP 3.2.3 Attack Aircraft and Missiles (Offensive Counterair)

M1	Percent	Of attacking systems deliver ordnance.
M2	Percent	Of enemy air actions require discard of friendly COAs.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded.
M4	Percent	Of HPT attacks lack integration of fires assets.
M5	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked.
M6	Missiles	Launched per day from enemy land-based mobile launchers.

OP 3.2.4 Suppress Enemy Air Defenses

M1	Percent	Of enemy air defenses destroyed.
M2	Percent	Of friendly air losses to enemy air defenses.
M3	Percent	Of friendly air sorties attacked by enemy air defense.

OP 3.2.5 Interdict Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces
M2	Percent	Disruption of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M3	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M4	Percent	Of attacks having collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander.
M5	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed (before effective use against friendly forces).
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.
M10	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed by joint force interdiction outside JOA/theater of operations.

OP 3.2.5.1 Conduct Air Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Disruption of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M3	Percent	Of attacks have collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander.
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M5	Percent	Of enemy material diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

13 September 1996

M10	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces
-----	---------	---

OP 3.2.5.2 Conduct Surface/Subsurface Firepower Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M2	Percent	Of attacks having collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed by joint force interdiction outside JOA/theater of operations.
M5	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M6	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M7	Percent	Of targets attacked achieve desired effects .
M8	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

OP 3.2.5.3 Conduct Special Operations Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M3	Percent	Of attacks have collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M5	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed outside JOA/theater of operations.
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

OP 3.2.6 Provide Firepower in Support of Operational Maneuver

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M2	Percent	Of operational maneuvers with faulty operational fire support.
M3	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M4	Percent	Of target attacks in support of operational maneuver cause fratricide.

OP 3.2.7 Synchronize Operational Firepower

M1	Hours	To reattack operational target.
M2	Percent	Of assets used for short notice retargeting (flexibility) in support of maneuver.
M3	Percent	Of attacks deconflicted with friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of attacks on enemy targets achieve desired effects.
M5	Percent	Of attacks on HPT's lack integration of fires assets.
M6	Percent	Of destroyed HPTs subsequently engaged by fires from another component.
M7	Percent	Of friendly casualties by fratricide.
M8	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by joint force as non-ATO targets.
M9	Percent	Of operational targets attacked by lethal and non-lethal together.
M10	Percent	Of SOF missions executed with appropriate notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M11	Percent	Of strategic national missions require theater/JOA support.
M12	Percent	Satisfaction of theater/JOA support for strategic national missions.

OP 4 Provide Operational Support

M1	Days	From request until requested item received in theater
M2	Tons	Of backlogged support requirements
M3	Percent	Of required logistics in place to support campaign.
M4	Days	Of supply in theater.

OP 4.1 Coordinate Supply of Arms, Ammunition, and Equipment in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	After CJCS Warning Order to determine availability of suitable munitions within theater.
M2	Days	After required date that replenishment stocks delivered.
M3	Hours	To develop replenishment concept (after receipt of Warning Order).
M4	Percent	Of fire missions with munitions available on schedule.
M5	Percent	Of high priority targets with preferred munitions available.
M6	Percent	Of major equipment shortfalls cause unit mission delays.
M7	Percent	Of minimum safety level of build up stocks maintained at staging areas.
M8	Percent	Of required reception and onward movement support available.

OP 4.2 Synchronize Supply of Fuel in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To develop replenishment concept (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Gallons per day	Of fuel delivered to theater.
M3	Percent	Of available host-nation POL replenishment and distribution assets integrated into operational planning.
M4	Percent	Of destroyed fuel deliveries anticipated and compensated for.
M5	Percent	Of planning reflect petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) concepts of operations.
M6	Percent	Of refueling capability available at time and place needed.
M7	Percent	Of total refueling assets available to support operational forces.
M8	Days	Operational delay (due to fuel shortages).
M9	Days	Supply of required fuel in place to support campaign.
M10	Percent	Of fuel delivery capacity available.

OP 4.3 Provide for Maintenance of Equipment in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	To develop maintenance concept and policies (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Hours	For maintenance facilities to be available in theater of operations/JOA rear area (after receipt of Warning Order).
M3	Percent	Of enemy material collected, classified and properly disposed.
M4	Percent	Of damaged equipment salvaged.
M5	Percent	Of equipment failures successfully repaired.
M6	Percent	Of equipment repaired at appropriate level with evacuation to higher level.
M7	Percent	Of operations address collection, classification, and disposition of salvage.
M8	Percent	Of operations address collection, classification, and disposition of enemy material.
M9	Percent	Of support policies and procedures were completed prior to execution.
M10	Hours	To obtain needed parts for repairs.
M11	Hours	To obtain replacement parts.
M12	Hours	To repair equipment.

OP 4.4 Coordinate Support for Forces in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of personnel replacement requirements not met.
M2	Percent	Of personnel support can be contracted.
M3	Percent	Of replacements adequately trained to perform assigned duties.

13 September 1996

M4	Percent	Of units whose actual manning meets or exceeds authorized levels.
M5	Days	To identify personnel replacement requirements.
M6	Days	To obtain replacement personnel and assign to unit.

OP 4.4.1 Coordinate Field Services Requirements

M1	Days	Between access to laundry and bath facilities.
M2	Days	Between delivery of mail to unit level.
M3	Days	Delay in search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel (due to lack of graves registration system, units).
M4	Percent	Of operations include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M5	Percent	Of personal daily water requirement being provided.
M6	Percent	Of personnel provided with required individual clothing and equipment.
M7	Percent	Of personnel receiving at least one hot meal per day.
M8	Months	To establish R&R facilities in protracted operation.
M9	Weeks	To establish Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO).
M10	Days	To establish theater of operations/JOA R&R policy (from recognition of need).

OP 4.4.1.1 Coordinate Theater of Operations/JOA Support for Personnel

M1	Percent	Difference between components in providing field services for personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Percent	Difference between planned field services requirements and actual requirements, in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of planned capacity of field services (bath and laundry) achieved in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Percent	Of required production rate of potable water achieved in theater of operations/JOA.
M5	Percent	Personnel hospitalized for dehydration in theater of operations/JOA.
M6	Days	To coordinate bath and laundry operations with medical authorities.
M7	Days	To estimate non-material support requirements for military, DOD civilian, qualifying contractor, and other personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M8	Hours	To rig equipment or supplies for airdrop in theater of operations/JOA.
M9	Days	To update field service requirements based on changes in theater population.
M10	Personnel	Can be rigged for a single airdrop.
M11	Tons	Of equipment can be rigged for a single airdrop.

OP 4.4.1.2 Manage Mortuary Affairs in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Accuracy in maintaining records of deceased/missing personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Percent	Accuracy in maintaining records of personal effects in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Accuracy in processing personal effects of deceased/missing in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Days	Delay in disposition of remains while awaiting decision on Mortuary Affairs policy.
M5	Percent	Of instances of release of identification of deceased/missing held up until NOK notified
M6	Percent	Of operations include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M7	Instances	Of release of identification of deceased/missing before NOK notified.
M8	Percent	Of remains correctly identified.

M9	Percent	Of remains re-identified after disposition.
M10	Days	To coordinate transportation support to return remains to CONUS.
M11	Days	To establish temporary interment facilities.
M12	Days	To identify remains at unit level.
M13	Days	To identify remains of recently deceased unidentified personnel at Theater Mortuary Evacuation Point (TMEP).
M14	Days	To inter remains in temporary sites in theater of operations/JOA (after recovery and identification).
M15	Percent	Of Joint Mortuary Affairs Office tasks included in planning.
M16	Days	To process remains from recovery through evacuation to CONUS.
M17	Days	To recover remains at end of firefight/battle.
M18	Months	To recover remains commencing at end of hostilities.
M19	Months	To recover remains from temporary interment sites in theater of operations/JOA and evacuate to CONUS (after end of operations in theater).
M20	Days	To search for, recover, identify, care for, and evacuate or inter deceased personnel (without graves registration units).

OP 4.4.2 Provide for Personnel Services

M1	Days	To establish procedures with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for handling, treatment and transfer of POWs (after Warning Order).
M2	Days	For Joint Force Chaplain to research and interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to JOA.
M3	Percent	Of military personnel receiving pay on schedule.
M4	Percent	Of military personnel with access to R&R facilities.
M5	Percent	Of required aerial mail terminals and military post offices established within planned timelines.
M6	Percent	Of required component personnel services capabilities in place and operational.
M7	Days	To obtain legal services upon request.
M8	Hours	To provide legal review of proposed HNS agreement or modification.
M9	Days	For review of CA plan by competent legal authority

OP 4.4.3 Provide for Health Services in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of personnel in treatment pipeline accounted for.
M2	Percent	Of casualties returned to duty.
M3	Percent	Of casualties die.
M4	Per/day	Provided medical treatment.
M5	Hours	To begin surgery after receiving a wound or injury.
M6	Hours	Turnaround time for medical lab serology and other technical lab testing results.

OP 4.4.3.1 Manage Joint Blood Program in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Of accuracy in submitting Blood Reports to ASBPO (based on daily estimates of theater requirements).
M2	Units	Of required blood products per initial admission maintained in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of daily Blood Reports submitted from AJBPO to JBPO by prescribed times.
M4	Percent	Of daily Blood Reports submitted from JBPO to ASBPO by prescribed times.
M5	Percent	Of required blood product on hand.
M6	Days	To coordinate initial activities between area Joint Blood Program Office(s) and Armed Services Blood Program Office.
M7	Days	To establish Area Joint Blood Program offices as required in Theater of Operations/JOA.

M8	Hours	To establish Blood Transshipment Center(s) in Theater of Operations/JOA (after organizational C-Day).
M9	Days	To establish system for collection, storage, and distribution of blood products in Theater of Operations/JOA.
M10	Days	To initially coordinate blood requirements and distribution of blood and blood products to support all BSUs and MTFs within AJBPO area (regardless of service component).
M11	Percent	Of blood products in system which must be disposed.

OP 4.4.3.2 Manage Flow of Casualties in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Of GPMRC generated plans and schedules modified to meet requirements of theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Percent	Of patients not evacuated within theater evacuation policy time limit.
M3	Days	To establish Theater Patient Movement Requirement Center (TPMRC) in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Hours	To formulate and recommend patient evacuation policy.
M5	Days	To initially coordinate patient evacuation activities among components.
M6	Days	To initially coordinate patient evacuation activities between TPMRC and Global Patient Movement Requirement Center (GPMRC).
M7	Percent	Of US joint force personnel awaiting emergency aeromedical in operations area received it.

OP 4.4.3.3 Manage Health Services Resources in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Difference in bed space and level of medical supplies among joint force components.
M2	Percent	Of civilian internees assisted by joint force medical units.
M3	Percent	Of DPs assisted by joint force medical units.
M4	Percent	Of EPWs assisted by joint force medical units.
M5	Percent	Of injured or incapacitated personnel returned to duty.
M6	Percent	Of personnel admitted to an MTF on a given day remain at MTF until RTD.
M7	Percent	Of personnel incapacitated by non combat injuries and illness.
M8	Percent	Of required patient bed spaces actually available.
M9	Percent	Of US national private citizens needing emergency medical assistance receive it.
M10	Hours	To establish liaison between Joint Force Surgeon and joint force component surgeons.
M11	Days	To expand MTFs to full capacity.
M12	Days	To publish estimates of medical sustainment and anticipated resupply requirements (after arrival of Joint Force HQ medical staff).

OP 4.4.4 Reconstitute Forces

M1	Days	Necessary to reconstitute combat attrited unit.
M2	Percent	Of reorganized/regenerated organizational personnel fully trained and qualified.
M3	Percent	Of salvage and battle damage repair conducted with in-theater forces.

OP 4.4.5 Train Joint Forces and Personnel

M1	Days	For unit to begin training (upon arrival in theater).
M2	Hours	To establish required training program (from mission change).
M3	Percent	Of METL, on which unit is proficient.
M4	Months	Since commander's JMETL last updated.
M5	Hours	To submit first crisis action status reports after unit notification.

13 September 1996

OP 4.4.6 Provide Religious Ministry Support in JOA

M1	Percent	Of deviation from Service criteria for assignment of chapel assistants.
M2	Percent	Of major military locations with services for all major denominations available on weekly basis.
M3	Percent	Of authorized chaplains assigned and present for duty.
M4	Percent	Of chaplains time spent with military personnel in work areas.
M5	Percent	Of civilian internees receive ministry and care.
M6	Percent	Of deceased in mass casualty event receive final ministry.
M7	Percent	Of deployed personnel with access to counseling by clergy.
M8	Percent	Of deployed personnel with access to religious services.
M9	Percent	Of EPWs receiving religious ministrations.
M10	Percent	Of hospital casualties seen weekly or more by Chaplains.
M11	Instances	Of hospital death without chaplain presence.
M12	Percent	Of injured in a mass casualty event receive ministry.
M13	Percent	Of joint force personnel unable to celebrate major religious holidays.
M14	Percent	Of joint force religious activities being adequately supplied.
M15	Percent	Of memorial services conducted within JOA vice home station
M16	Percent	Of NGOs which Joint Force Chaplain has established liaison.
M17	Percent	Of PVOs which Joint Force Chaplain has established liaison.
M18	Percent	Of religious faith groups in joint force receiving balanced coverage throughout JOA.
M19	Months	Since last Command Chaplain survey of morale within joint force in JOA.
M20	Hours	To receive counseling, support and comfort from time of request.

OP 4.5 Manage Logistic Support in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of ammo availability compared to requirements.
M2	Percent	Of required support material distributed at time and place required.
M3	Percent	Of supplies available compared to requirements.
M4	Percent	Of total fuel available compared to requirements.
M5	Percent	Of total supplies moved in JOA.

OP 4.5.1 Provide for Movement Services in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	ACL filled for in-theater airlift sorties (not including staging and backhaul).
M2	Hours	For JMC (Joint Movement Center) to begin operation (upon arrival in theater).
M3	Percent	Of airfields with material handling equipment (MHE).
M4	Percent	Of in-theater airlift sorties (not including staging and backhaul) flying at 90% ACL or better.
M5	Percent	Of LZs with material handling equipment (MHE).
M6	Percent	Of scheduled transport movements accomplished on schedule.
M7	Ton miles	Of supplies and equipment transported per day.
M8	PAX/day	Transported in support of operations.

OP 4.5.2 Supply Operational Forces

M1	Days	To develop concept of replenishment requirements (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Days	In advance of shortfalls constrain identified.
M3	Percent	Of replenishment stocks delivered on time.
M4	Percent	Of shortfalls in supply have acceptable alternatives.
M5	Percent	Of required supplies delivered.
M6	Percent	Of required reception and onward movement support available at time and place required.

13 September 1996

M7	Percent	Of required supplies assured to be available when and where need.
M8	Days	Of supplies stockpiled to support campaign.
M9	Days	Of sustainment supply supported by available facilities.
M10	Tons/Day	Supplies delivered to operational forces.
M11	Days	To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels (of supply).
M12	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M13	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M14	Percent	Of Priority Three geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).

OP 4.5.3 Recommend Evacuation Policy and Procedures for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of US joint force personnel evacuated in 24 hour. period
M2	Weeks	Since evacuation plans were updated for OA

OP 4.5.4 Coordinate Recovery and Salvage

M1	Percent	Of total losses, items recovered.
M2	Percent	Of items of hazardous material disposed of IAW appropriate regulations.
M3	Weeks	To appropriately disposed of hazardous material.
M4	Percent	Of items recovered salvaged for further use.
M5	Percent	Of items returned to rear areas for additional salvage work.
M6	Percent	Of increase in combat capability.
M7	Weeks	To conduct salvage.

OP 4.6 Build and Maintain Sustainment Bases

M1	Days	Between arrival of building supplies and equipment and construction of sustainment facilities.
M2	Percent	Of facilities adequately maintained.
M3	Percent	Of overall cargo and equipment deliveries accommodated by sustainment base.
M4	Square feet/day	Of permanent facilities emplaced or constructed.
M5	Percent	Of required installation throughput capacity available at execution.
M6	Percent	Of supplies under weatherproof cover at sustainment bases.
M7	Square feet/day	Of temporary facilities emplaced or constructed.
M8	Days	To complete construction of sustainment facilities.
M9	Days	To initiate construction of facilities (from final project approval and authorization).

OP 4.6.1 Determine Number and Location of Sustaining Bases in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of required sustainment personnel and equipment in place to maintain logistics support.
M2	Percent	Of required sustainment facilities available at execution.
M3	Percent	Of required supplies actually delivered at execution.
M4	Percent	Of theater level sustainment equipment and supplies protected from elements.
M5	Hours	Required to provide information on sustainment bases to combatant commander, upon request.

OP 4.6.2 Provide Civil-Military Engineering

M1	Percent	Of supplies under weatherproof cover.
M2	Percent	Of tasks correctly assigned (correct engineers/location/time).
M3	Percent	Of theater level maintenance facilities protected from elements.

13 September 1996

M4	Days	To construct theater field hospital after forces identified and marshaled.
M5	Days	To reestablish damaged LOCs.
M6	Days	To restore essential utilities in rear areas.
M7	Days	To restore APOD to handle required shipping.
M8	Days	To restore SPOD to handle required shipping.

OP 4.6.3 Expand Capacity of PODs and Allocate Space in the Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Tons/Day	Increase in POD throughput capacity (to support current operation).
M2	Days	To achieve required POD clearance capacity.
M3	Days	To expand POD throughput capacity to meet required levels.

OP 4.6.4 Provide Law Enforcement and Prisoner Control

M1	Casualties/day	Among EPWs detained by friendly forces.
M2	EPWs	Detained by friendly forces awaiting final disposition.
M3	Instances/ Week	Involving off-duty US military personnel that also involve alcohol or drugs.
M4	Instances/ Week	Of accidents involving military vehicles.
M5	Instances/ Week	Of crimes reported.
M6	Percent	Of crimes/incidents resolved within 30 days.
M7	Percent	Of EPW compounds guarded by security forces versus combat troops.
M8	Percent	Of EPW movements to collection points conducted by security versus combat unit personnel.
M9	Percent	Of felony cases cleared within first month.
M10	Percent	Of requests for rail and road movement escorts met.
M11	Percent	Of security units performing in secondary role as infantry.
M12	Percent	Of security force requirement available to meet operational needs.
M13	Months	Since EPW policy last reviewed by legal personnel.
M14	Hours	EPWs detained for final disposition.
M15	Instances	Of law and order incidents not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.

OP 4.6.5 Provide for Real Estate Management

M1	Percent	Change in quality of local environmental conditions from Joint Force solid and liquid waste management.
M2	Percent	Of commercial price paid for real estate transaction.
M3	Percent	Of difference between market value of real estate and cost paid by US forces.
M4	Percent	Of real estate/real property acquired by lease or Host Nation donation versus short term rental .
M5	Percent	Of real estate/real property assets acquired to support operational campaign later found to be unsuitable or inappropriate to original purpose.
M6	Percent	Of records and titles for real estate acquired by joint force cleared by end of Joint Force operation.
M7	Percent	Of Service components with authority to conduct real estate transactions.
M8	Days	To coordinate (within joint force headquarters) component requests for use of real estate in support of operational campaign.
M9	Days	To correlate component requests for real estate purchases to eliminate component duplication of effort.
M10	Days	To prioritize component requests for real estate purchases in support of operational campaign

13 September 1996

M11	Days	To prioritize component requests for use of real property assets in support of operational campaign.
-----	------	--

OP 4.6.6 Manage Contracts and Contract Personnel

M1	Weeks	Delay in providing support services to theater forces (awaiting finalization of contracts).
M2	Weeks	Delay in providing support services to theater forces (awaiting required changes to contracts or award of new contracts).
M3	Percent	Increase in contract costs in crisis or conflict.
M4	Percent	Addition to military/DOD civilian personnel monitoring contractor performance in active theater of operations/JOA (crisis or conflict).
M5	Percent	Of contracting officers deploy with appropriate warrants.
M6	Percent	Of contracts terminated for cause (after issuance of more than one cure notice).
M7	Percent	Of contracts with more than one current cure notice against them.
M8	Percent	Of theater support resources required to support individual contractor personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M9	Days	To include contractor representatives in theater of operations/JOA sustainment planning.
M10	Days	To modify existing contract deliverables and scope(s) of effort to support crisis or conflict requirements.
M11	Weeks	To receive and review contractor comments on theater sustainment plans and adequacy of existing contracts to meet theater sustainment requirements in peacetime.
M12	Hours	To receive and review contractor comments on theater sustainment plans and adequacy of existing contracts to meet theater sustainment requirements in crisis or war.
M13	Hours	To review existing contracts for adequacy in supporting requirement in theater of operations/JOA in a crisis.

OP 4.7 Provide Politico-Military Support to Other Nations, Groups, and Government Agencies

M1	Percent	Of funds provided for HCA, SA and MCA operations accounted for.
M2	Hours	After declaration of disaster (FEMA or DOS/OFDA) to initiate deployments.
M3	Percent	Of approved assistance projects completed.
M4	Hours	For joint force to establish liaison with Country Team, host-nation, other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces.
M5	Instances	Of insufficient support provided to other nations, groups, or agencies.
M6	Percent	Of NGOs receiving US military support.
M7	Percent	Of NGOs with liaison with joint force .
M8	Percent	Of PVOs receiving US military support.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs with liaison with joint force.
M10	Instances	Of shortfall in supplies and materiel provided in response to requests by nations, agencies, or groups.
M11	Tons/day	Of supplies and materiel provided in assistance.
M12	Personnel	Provided to support other nations, groups, or agencies.
M13	Hours	To respond to Country Team request for assistance.

OP 4.7.1 Provide Security Assistance in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Personnel	From allied nations enrolled in US provided military training.
M2	Percent	Of valid requests for security assistance met.
M3	Days	To respond to request for security assistance.

OP 4.7.2 Conduct CMO in Theater of Operations/JOA

13 September 1996

M1	Hours	To establish CMOC or JCMOTF (after arrival).
M2	Hours	To establish liaison with appropriate foreign nation civilian government officials (after mission assignment).
M3	Hours	To establish liaison with Country Team, host-nation and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces (after standing up joint force).
M4	Hours	To provide completed Annex G (after Warning Order).
M5	Days	To deploy civil-military engineering units.
M6	Hours	To distribute supplies and services.
M7	Days	To organize relief effort in country.
M8	Hours	To assess situation and define assistance needed.

OP 4.7.3 Provide Support to DOD and Other Government Agencies

M1	Percent	Of governmental requests for support met by joint force.
M2	Percent	Of DOD and other US governmental requests for support not tied to joint force assigned mission met by joint force.
M3	Percent	Of DOD and other US governmental requests for support resolved without involving joint force commander.
M4	Hours	To respond to Defense Agency formal request for assistance.
M5	Hours	To respond to US civil agency request for support.
M6	Hours	To respond to in-theater request for support from Ambassador or Country Team.
M7	Days	To respond to request for support.
M8	Percent	Of potential drug smuggling aircraft coordinate with appropriate law enforcement agencies.
M9	Percent	Of reports on aircraft scramble and intercept-monitor or ID of potential drug smuggling aircraft forwarded IAW directives.
M10	Percent	Of special tracks Forward Told IAW directives.
M11	Percent	Of airspace management issues/requirements coordinated with FAA.
M12	Percent	Of potential/imminent terrorist actions/situations coordinated with local law enforcement agencies.
M13	Percent	Of hijacking and defecting aircraft events coordinated and reported with appropriate civil, military and government agencies IAW directives and procedures.
M14	Percent	Of Region/Sector checklists, guides, Operating Instructions and Plans provide proper guidance on coordination and reporting (with other DOD and government agencies).

OP 4.7.4 Plan and Transition to Civil Administration

M1	Percent	Of CA planning (e.g. Annex G, CA area study, CA estimate) completed by execution of CA mission.
M2	Percent	Of essential services/facilities damaged/destroyed during hostilities returned to operation prior to transition from US military administration.
M3	Percent	Of US forces CA personnel required to remain in country to coordinate post transition activities with local government/UN administration.
M4	Percent	Of US forces redeployed prior to transition to local government/UN administration.
M5	Percent	Of US forces, other than CA assets, retained in theater to support civil administration after transition from military administration.
M6	Days	To coordinate transition between US forces and local government/UN administration.
M7	Days	To determine US post conflict policy objectives.

M8	Days	To properly account for funds and equipment expended during military administration and to close outstanding claims against military administration.
M9	Hours	To receive direction or approval from NCA to become directly involved in executive, judiciary, or legislative functions of host nation government.

OP 4.7.5 Coordinate Politico-Military Support

M1	Days	From submission of plan for coordination until final concurrence.
M2	Percent	Of CS and CSS assets dedicated to CMO employment in theater operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of support requirements filled at execution.
M4	Percent	Of USG Organizations, Foreign Governments and NGOs that support operation through to completion.
M5	Days	To transition facilities and operations from US forces to host nation authorities.
M6	Days	To establish CMOC to establish liaison and coordination with other USG agencies and friendly government/groups in theater of operations/JOA.
M7	Days	To identify CA requirements and resources to support USG agency operations in theater of operations/JOA.
M8	Days	To plan for redeployment of US forces not required to support transition activities in theater of operations/JOA.

OP 4.7.6 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	For review of CA plan by competent legal authority
M2	Days	Lead-time to mobilize RC personnel to support CA mission.
M3	Percent	Of local populace able to maintain normal activities.
M4	Percent	Of local populace able to remain in their homes.
M5	Percent	Of personnel conducting civil affairs tasks drawn from Reserve Components
M6	Percent	Of total US military forces involved in any form of civil affairs activities in theater of operation/JOA.
M7	Percent	Of US military supplies and resources used in civil affairs activities in theater of operation/JOA.
M8	Days	To achieve agreement with local authorities on maintaining local populace.
M9	Days	To determine requirements for CA assets.
M10	Days	To establish CMOC to conduct liaison with and to coordinate activities with NGO's and PVO's in theater of operations/JOA.
M11	Days	To establish liaison with allied military forces.
M12	Days	To identify and integrate CA support and appropriate CA EEI into command intelligence programs.
M13	Days	To include comments of Country Team review in revised civil affairs plan.
M14	Days	To prepare estimates of impact of military operations on civilian environment in theater of operations/JOA.
M15	Days	To submit plan for civil affairs operations to Country Team for review and comment.
M16	Days	To determine specific CA assets required to support subordinate joint and Service component headquarters and forces.

OP 5 Exercise Operational Command And Control

M1	Hours	Prior to execution, plan published and delivered.
M2	Percent	Of communications nodes in place.
M3	Percent	Of units receive orders in time to plan and execute.

OP 5.1 Acquire and Communicate Operational Level Information and Maintain Status

M1	Hours	Since latest information collected.
M2	Hours	To establish connectivity with component intelligence agencies, Unified Command and national intelligence agencies (after arrival).
M3	Minutes	To process and disseminate status information (to subordinate units).
M4	Percent	Of available information examined and considered in latest status reporting.
M5	Percent	Of critical information acquired and disseminated to subordinate commanders.
M6	Percent	Of organizations or units receiving latest information.
M7	Percent	Of subordinate commanders with uninterrupted communication with joint force headquarters.
M8	Percent	Of subordinate commanders in communication with joint force headquarters.
M9	Percent	Of C4 systems, operational.
M10	Percent	Of C4 systems meet command reliability standards.
M11	Percent	Of combatant command plans, reports, and other information, passed error free.
M12	Percent	Of equipment, down for unscheduled maintenance.
M13	Percent	Of information, not passed to or received by allies (lack of equipment interoperability).
M14	Percent	Of traffic, sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.
M15	Percent	Saturation of DOD communications channels.
M16	Percent	Of time required expansion into other Sectors accomplished.

OP 5.1.1 Communicate Operational Information

M1	Hours	After approval, all orders and plans received by components and adjacent units.
M2	Minutes	Queuing time for messages.
M3	Percent	Accuracy of data transmitted/disseminated.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of deployment orders and notification requirements transmitted/disseminated within reporting criteria.
M5	Percent	Of addressees received message.
M6	Percent	Of time, information passed within established time criteria.
M7	Percent	Of time, information on CCIRs passed within established time criteria.
M8	Percent	Of time, mission essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established time criteria.
M9	Percent	Of Service and functional component addressees received critical planning messages (e.g. Warning Order).
M10	Hours	For LNOs to communicate new orders or information to allies and friendly elements of force.
M11	Percent	Of messages sent outside proper channels for message classification.
M12	Percent	Of messages go outside normal communications channels.

OP 5.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Operational Information

M1	Days	To integrate new headquarters into existing GCCS network.
M2	Hours	For ad hoc joint force HQ to be connected to GCCS (after arrival at HQ facility).

M3	Hours	For ad hoc joint force HQ to be connected to INTERNET (after arrival at HQ facility).
M4	Hours	To establish integrated communications system.
M5	Percent	Of communications equipment, circuits, and connectivity with status accurately displayed.
M6	Percent	Of C2 nodes possess required communications capabilities.
M7	Percent	Of required C4I resources identified.
M8	Percent	Of communications outages had adequate backup communications paths.
M9	Percent	Of essential JTF C4I systems accessible from all locations.
M10	Percent	Of time, essential JTF C4I systems accessible from all locations.
M11	Percent	Of information system interfaces require information scanning, retyping, reformatting, or other non-direct translation methods.
M12	Percent	Of joint force classified systems networked together.
M13	Percent	Of joint force headquarters LANs capable of interoperating (e.g., CTAPS, GCCS, JDISS, DJTFAC).
M14	Percent	Of OPLANs address existing terminals and lines of communications and known or estimated throughput capability.
M15	Percent	Of time, accurate radar picture maintained within Sector/Region.
M16	Percent	Of time, communication and radar equipment maintained within established systems reliability and maintenance criteria.
M17	Percent	Of time, communications connectivity maintained with all units.
M18	Percent	Of time, communications networks fully operational.
M19	Percent	Of time, voice and data communications (unsecure and secure) maintained.
M20	Percent	Of equipment interoperability problems result in late or lost data.
M21	Percent	Of information, not passed or received (lack of equipment interoperability).
M22	Percent	Of message transmissions fail at equipment interface.
M23	Hours	To establish both data and voice communication with Unified Command and its components.
M24	Percent	Of messages go outside normal communications channels.
M25	Percent	Of time, joint force subordinate commanders in communication with joint force headquarters.

OP 5.1.3 Determine Commander's Critical Information Requirements

M1	CCIRs	Active.
M2	Percent	Of CCIRs are answered.
M3	Hours	Since CCIR last update.
M4	Percent	Of CCIRs Initiated by JFC.
M5	Percent	Of CCIRs Initiated by Joint Staff.
M6	Percent	Of CCIRs Initiated by Components.
M7	Hours	To promulgate CCIR for collection during.
M8	Weeks	Into the future CCIRs look.

OP 5.1.4 Maintain Operational Information and Force Status

M1	Hours	Lag between joint force common picture of battlespace and real world situation.
M2	Instances	Of incoming information (which could affect outcome of operation) not getting to person responsible for action.
M3	Instances	Of critical information not reaching person responsible for action.
M4	Minutes	To post unit reports to appropriate databases or pass to work centers (from receipt).
M5	Minutes	To access and display shared remote databases.

13 September 1996

M6	Minutes	To enter most current information on force status.
M7	Percent	Accuracy of information on essential logistics, maintenance, aircraft, missile and personnel requirements and reports.
M8	Percent	Accuracy of information on deployment bases and deployment options.
M9	Percent	Accuracy of information regarding subordinate unit deployments.
M10	Percent	Accuracy of Intelligence Situation Displays maintained with mission essential information.
M11	Percent	Accuracy of mission essential information maintained on Situation Displays.
M12	Percent	Accuracy of data used by operations staff.
M13	Percent	Accuracy of subordinate unit aircraft and missile status.
M14	Percent	Of decisions delayed awaiting appropriate data.
M15	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel with current status known.
M16	Percent	Of information gets to appropriate people.
M27	Percent	Of time, data presented to decision maker in suitable format.
M18	Percent	Of operational data displays are current.
M19	Percent	Of reinforcing or supporting forces, JFC has accurate information.
M20	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to all agencies within time limits.
M21	Percent	Of reports have no errors.
M22	Percent	Accuracy of information in essential logistics, maintenance, aircraft, missile and personnel reports.
M23	Seconds	To access and display shared local databases.

OP 5.1.5 Monitor Strategic Situation

M1	Hours	Lag in currency of information on adjacent military forces or non-DOD agencies.
M2	Incidents	Where commander surprised by critical/emerging political or military event (not briefed).
M3	Instances	Of commander learning of emerging theater political event from source outside his staff.
M4	Minutes	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.
M5	Percent	Of time, commander learns of emerging theater political event from staff.

OP 5.1.6 Preserve Historical Documentation of Joint Operations or Campaigns

M1	Months	Before documents available for DOD analysis or research.
M2	Percent	Of decision documents with pre-decisional material available.
M3	Percent	Of key leaders interviewed after the event.
M4	Percent	Of key staff members interviewed after the event.
M5	Percent	Of official documentation (maps, orders, photos) preserved in historical accounts.
M6	Percent	Of operations have enemy versions or accounts available.
M7	Percent	Of records retired or retained (rather than destroyed).
M8	Percent	Of SF 135s properly completed.
M9	Weeks	From termination of major event until all key personnel interviewed.
M14	Percent	Of battles and engagements with photographic images and electronic documentation available.
M15	Months	Before documents available for Lessons Learned analysis.

OP 5.1.7 Coordinate Combat Camera Activities

M1	Hours	To dual hat Combat Camera det commander as member of JIB.
M2	Hours	To process media and produce imagery for short notice tasking (within JOA).
M3	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in theater.

M4	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in US.
M5	Hours	To respond to and be on scene for short notice tasking (within JOA).
M6	Hours	To review selected Combat Camera materials for release, until release.
M7	Percent	Of presented coverage deemed suitable by customer (i.e., audience attention and share).
M8	Percent	Of subject coverage requests filled.

OP 5.2 Assess Operational Situation

M1	Hours	For joint force to review or develop flexible deterrent options (after request or occurrence).
M2	Hours	Lag between appreciation of battlespace and real situation.
M3	Hours	Since update of joint force situation.
M4	Minutes	For commander to forward and disseminate crisis assessment.
M5	Minutes	To access current situation and formulate plan of action:
M6	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M7	Percent	Of time, commander/senior staff made aware of emerging political event (which could impact theater) from outside source.
M8	Percent	Of time, theater political event of interest occurs without options available.
M9	Hours	For commander to formulate crisis assessment.
M10	Weeks	Before OPLAN submitted, JFC develops FDOs.

OP 5.2.1 Review Current Situation (Project Branches)

M1	Days	Into future, planning branches have been developed.
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches.
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations affected course of battle, but not forecast.
M4	Percent	Of forecast branches appeared at execution.

OP 5.2.2 Formulate Crisis Assessment

M1	Hours	Following voice report, hard copy OPREP 3 (PINNACLE) report submitted.
M2	Hours	From receipt of intelligence to complete analysis of situation.
M3	Hours	To identify forces available.
M4	Hours	To send voice report to unified commander (after occurrence of crisis).
M5	Hours	To send voice report to commander (upon request).
M6	Minutes	To forward and disseminate crisis assessment.
M7	Percent	Of available forces identified.
M8	Time	To formulate crisis assessment:

OP 5.2.3 Project Future Campaigns and Major Operations (Sequels)

M1	Days	Of future planning is completed and available.
M2	Percent	Of decision points have sequels.
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M4	Percent	Of identified sequels with COAs developed.
M5	Percent	Of possible follow-on operations have preplanned sequels.

OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders

M1	Hours	After constitution of JPG (or equivalent) to publish joint force HQ "daily battle rhythm."
M2	Hours	To adjust original plan for decisive operations (after recognizing planning assumptions invalid).
M3	Hours	To compile QUICKLOOK reports.

M4	Hours	To issue joint force commander's intent (after CJCS or combatant commander's Warning Order).
M5	Minutes	To generate and forward Commander's Situation Reports (SITREP).
M6	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M7	Seconds	To respond to emergency aircraft.
M8	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to provide commander's intent.
M9	Minutes	To dispatch EAM.
M10	Minutes	To receive and respond to Emergency Action Message (EAM).
M11	Percent	Accuracy of information in Region/Sector and gained unit supplemental plans.
M12	Percent	Currency of information in Region/Sector and gained unit supplemental plans.
M13	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to provide concept of operations.

OP 5.3.1 Conduct Operational Mission Analysis

M1	Percent	Of critical intelligence reports and AOR-related intelligence estimates reviewed prior to mission analysis/end state assessment.
M2	Percent	Of available planning time allowed for subordinate planning (after COA selected).
M3	Percent	Of commander's mission essential tasks identified by subordinate commander for execution.
M4	Percent	Of essential tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M5	Percent	Of identified risks have written risk assessment.
M6	Percent	Of implied tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M7	Percent	Of stated tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M8	Percent	Of units available to joint force included in review of forces by JFC.

OP 5.3.2 Issue Planning Guidance

M1	Days	In advance of execution, planning guidance issued to subordinate commands.
M2	Hours	After being notified of mission, JFC issued or approved initial Planning Guidance.
M3	Hours	From request for change to ROE until approval/denial.
M4	Instances	Of amendments issued to Planning Guidance (due to requests for clarification).
M5	Incidents	Of misunderstood ROE.
M6	Instances	Of requests for clarification of Planning Guidance/commander's guidance received from subordinate headquarters.
M7	Percent	Completeness of commander's guidance (i.e., coverage of functional areas).
M8	Percent	Of planning time used by higher HQ to issue guidance.
M9	Percent	Of ROE clearly understood.

OP 5.3.3 Determine Operational End State

M1	Days	To pass control of operations area to local government or appointed transitional administrative authority (after achieving end state).
M2	Days	Delay in turnover of control of operations area to legitimate or transitional administrative authorities.
M3	Days	To transition control of operations area to civil authority.
M4	Instances	Of revisions to end state conditions.
M5	Percent	Of commanders accept end state conditions without requests for clarification.

OP 5.3.4 Develop Courses of Action/Prepare Staff Estimates

M1	Instances	Of COAs developed.
M2	Percent	Of non-selected COAs considered for deception.
M3	Percent	Of available planning time allotted for subordinate planning.
M4	Percent	Of COAs acceptable.
M5	Percent	Of COAs distinguishable.
M6	Percent	Of COAs feasible.
M7	Percent	Of COAs presented to commander were suitable, feasible, acceptable and distinct from one another.
M8	Percent	Of COAs suitable.

OP 5.3.5 Analyze Courses of Action

M1	Instances	Of limitations (ultimately identified during execution) identified during analysis.
M2	Percent	Of branches and sequels experienced identified in COAs.
M3	Percent	Of capabilities ultimately required identified in planning.
M4	Percent	Of COAs wargamed against potential enemy COAs.

OP 5.3.6 Compare Courses of Action

M1	Percent	Of comparison criteria eliminated before comparison.
M2	Percent	Of comparison criteria eventually used, defined and weighted before comparison began.

OP 5.3.7 Select or Modify Course of Action

M1	Days	In advance of execution, COAs selected.
M2	Days	Since COAs reviewed.

OP 5.3.8 Issue Commander's Estimate

M1	Hours	Before execution, commander's concept and intent issued.
M2	Hours	Before execution, commander's estimate issued.
M3	Hours	To issue commander's estimate (after receipt of Warning Order).
M4	Percent	Of planning time available, used to issue commander's concept and intent.

OP 5.3.9 Prepare Campaign or Major Operations and Related Plans and Orders

M1	Days	Prior to hostilities, SOF forces allowed to conduct cross-border operations.
M2	Hours	For complete set of executable operational plans and orders (following receipt of commander's estimate).
M3	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (following execute order).
M4	Hours	To prepare plans and orders (after deciding on mission concept and intent).
M5	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes identified in OPLAN.
M6	Percent	Of functional areas covered in OPLAN.
M7	Percent	Of operations in plan conform to US and International Law.

OP 5.4 Command Subordinate Operational Forces

M1	Percent	Accuracy of information in plans and orders issued and disseminated to subordinate units.
M2	Percent	Of completed planning documents (e.g., mission analysis, COA decision, synchronization matrix) passed to components to allow parallel planning
M3	Percent	Of planning time joint force allows components.
M4	Percent	Of subordinate commands clear about their immediate objectives.
M5	Percent	Of time, JFC positioned to best affect accomplishment of operational end state for each operational phase.

M6	Percent	Of time, joint force staff issued "battle rhythm" SOP for planning use of available time.
M7	Percent	Of time, mission essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established criteria.
M8	Percent	Of time, during Crisis Action Procedures, execution orders initiated or warning relayed.
M9	Percent	Of units visited personally by commander to convey concept and intent.
M10	Minutes	To issue and disseminate Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) and Attack Warnings.
M11	Percent	Of time, required expansion into other Sectors accomplished.
M12	Minutes	To dispatch deployed Weapons Teams (DWDs).

OP 5.4.1 Approve Plans and Orders

M1	Hours	To complete plan or campaign plan review and approval.
M2	Hours	To obtain approval of plans and orders.
M3	Instances	Of OPLAN conflicting with standards under Conduct of War and International Convention.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of information in Commander's operations plan to meet established objectives.
M5	Percent	Of accurate deployment orders and notification requirements disseminated within reporting criteria.

OP 5.4.2 Issue Plans and Orders

M1	Hours	To issue plan or order (after approved).
M2	Minutes	For commander to forward and disseminate plan of action.
M3	Minutes	To initiate or relay warning or execution order.
M4	Percent	Of Commander's Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) and Attack Warnings issued and disseminated.

OP 5.4.3 Provide Rules of Engagement

M1	Days	Prior to hostilities, SOF forces allowed to conduct cross-border operations.
M2	Hours	From receipt of warning order to submission of ROE request.
M3	Hours	To develop general order regarding prohibited and permitted actions for deploying joint force.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of information in Rules of Engagement (ROE) changes.
M5	Percent	Of ROE exception determinations followed all procedures.
M6	Percent	Of target attacks violate rules of engagement.

OP 5.4.4 Synchronize/Integrate Operations

M1	Hours	Delay in initiating phase of operation.
M2	Hours	Prior to execution, joint force has execution matrix with sequence and timing of each component task throughout operation.
M3	Incidents	Of operational missions (e.g., SOF, PSYOP, Deception) executed without coordinating with operating forces in target area.
M4	Incidents	Of potential cross component boundary fratricide identified and eliminated by joint force headquarters.
M5	Percent	Of friendly forces actively contributing to conduct of operation.
M6	Percent	Of joint force or component missions carried out as planned.
M7	Percent	Of subordinate missions executed with requested joint force or component support.

13 September 1996

M8	Percent	Of subordinate orders reviewed by joint force staff for compliance with JFC's intent.
----	---------	---

OP 5.4.5 Coordinate/Integrate Components, Theater, and Other Support

M1	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media in AOR nations addressed in OPLAN or other document.
M2	Percent	Of policies and procedures for establishment and coordination of logistics, maintenance, and transportation support completed using JOPES.
M3	Percent	Of requests for support sent directly to CINC's Service component.

OP 5.5 Organize a Joint Force Headquarters

M1	Hours	For joint force Commander to request DOT TOR of USCG (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Hours	To form joint force staff (from activation order).
M3	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of staff augmentees.
M4	Percent	Of joint force augmentees received and integrated into joint force staff IAW established procedure.
M5	Days	From activation order until headquarters fully staffed.
M6	Percent	Of joint force key billets, distributed on proportionate basis with major forces assigned.
M7	Days	To approve augmentation to newly formed joint staff.
M8	Days	To determine and approve JTF structure.
M9	Days	To establish and approve C2 architecture for JTF.
M10	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to determine and approve joint force command arrangements.

OP 5.5.1 Develop a Joint Force Command and Control Structure

M1	Days	Until joint force headquarters staff augmented and in full operation (from Alert Order).
M2	Days	To issue joint force OPORDER or plan (from Alert Order).
M3	Hours	For joint force to identify elements and boards to establish within headquarters.
M4	Hours	For joint force staff to select specialized equipment required from joint force establishing Commander.
M5	Hours	For joint force staff to select specialized personnel required from joint force establishing Commander.
M6	Hours	To complete notification of joint force core staff (after Alert Order).
M7	Hours	To establish joint force headquarters boards, centers, cells, and bureaus.
M8	Hours	To form Joint Planning Group (after alert order).
M9	Hours	To form joint force staff.
M10	Hours	To issue tasking to initial augmentees for newly formed joint task force.
M11	Hours	To obtain approval of joint force command and control OPLAN/OPORD Annex.
M12	Hours	To obtain approval of joint force command and control structure.
M13	Hours	Until joint force headquarters staff, to include boards, cells, centers, and committees, augmented and in full operation (after Alert Order).
M14	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed because of unclear relationships within HQ.
M15	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed.
M16	Incidents	Of modifications to command structure taking place during execution (combat attrition excepted).
M17	Instances	Of new sections and boards established within joint force (after initial organization).

13 September 1996

M18	Minutes	For new joint force staff sections and boards to establish initial communication with opposite numbers on CINC staff and in Supporting commands.
M19	Percent	Of required augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M20	Percent	Of combined force headquarters staff composed of non-US personnel.
M21	Percent	Of components with allocated or apportioned forces, suitably represented on combined force staff.
M22	Percent	Of components, involved foreign governments, and NGOs/PVOs (suitably) represented on designated joint force staff.
M23	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of augmentees.
M24	Percent	Of joint force headquarters staff composed of augmentees.
M25	Percent	Of joint force primary subordinate commander's and functional commander's responsibilities identified prior to Phase 5 of Crisis Action Planning.
M26	Percent	Of joint force staff elements, represent force makeup as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank among concerned Services making up joint force.
M27	Percent	Of non-DOD agencies and forces participating in operation, identified in command and control annex of joint force OPORDER.
M28	Percent	Of required staff positions filled.
M29	Percent	Of required subordinate joint force staff positions filled.
M30	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees.
M31	Percent	Of employment of E-3 and NORAD Airborne Battle Staff (NABS) operations conforms to established directives.
M33	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees in same position.

OP 5.5.2 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure

M1	Hours	Until joint force liaison structure established (from Alert Order).
M2	Hours	Since LNOs attached to joint force HQ last received situation update from own unit.
M3	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed.
M4	Minutes	For joint force HQ LNOs to contact joint force HQ on behalf of unit to which sent.
M5	Minutes	For joint force staff sections to contact LNO attached to joint force HQ.
M6	Minutes	For parent unit to contact their LNO.
M7	Percent	Of adjacent units or agencies with liaison to joint force.
M8	Percent	Of joint force liaison personnel have required security clearances and identification credentials.
M9	Percent	Of unit or agency information missing or late.

OP 5.5.3 Integrate Joint Force Staff Augmentees

M1	Days	Before joint task force HQ prepared to release DJTFAC.
M2	Percent	Of augmentee requests issued during execution for immediate augmentation to fill unforeseen needs.
M3	Percent	Of required augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M4	Percent	Of required staff positions filled.

OP 5.5.4 Deploy Joint Force Headquarters Advance Element

M1	Hours	For joint force headquarters ADVON to establish in-country communications with host-nation and US DOS representatives (after arrival at deployed site).
M2	Hours	For joint force headquarters advance element to establish communication links up, down, across (after arrival in operational area).

M3	Hours	For joint force headquarters to issue joint force OPORDER (from receipt of Alert Order).
M4	Hours	To deploy forward and establish in theater joint force headquarters element.

OP 5.5.5 Establish Command Transition Criteria and Procedures

M1	Hours	Before beginning of transition and redeployment to publish redeployment plan.
M2	Hours	Before execution, command transition plans provided to units.
M3	Percent	Of transitioning units have no gaps in command.

OP 5.5.6 Establish or Participate in Task Forces

M1	Days	For joint force to be dissolved (following achievement of end state).
M2	Days	To recommend organizations to fund various aspects of joint force.
M3	Hours	For functional (multinational) task force to be prepared to conduct operations (from decision to stand up).
M4	Hours	For functional or joint task force to be prepared to conduct operations (from decision to stand up).
M5	Hours	To appoint joint force commander
M6	Hours	To define JOA.
M7	Hours	To name commander (after decision taken to stand up subordinate functional or single Service task force).
M8	Hours	To provide directive or mission (after decision taken to stand up subordinate functional or single Service or task force).
M9	Hours	To provide directive with purpose, in terms of desired effect and scope of action required.
M10	Percent	Change in initial HQ manning allocation for functional or single Service task force, without change in mission.

OP 5.6 Employ Operational Information Warfare (IW)

M1	Percent	Degradation of adversary air defense C4 prior to penetration operations by air.
M2	Percent	Of adversary C2 assets have both lethal and non-lethal attacks developed.
M3	Percent	Of attacks on adversary C2, concurrently target primary and alternate C2 assets.
M4	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems, successful.
M5	Percent	Of attempted penetrations of adversary information systems successful and apparently not detected.
M6	Percent	Of C2W targets included in joint targeting plans.
M7	Percent	Of enemy operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified (because of C2W attack).
M8	Percent	Of friendly C2W operations employ three or more elements of C2W.
M9	Percent	Of friendly operations carried out as planned.
M10	Percent	Of friendly operations disrupted (because of enemy's interference with friendly information systems).
M11	Percent	Of successful penetrations of adversary info systems detected.
M12	Percent	Of C2W efforts, support IW plan.
M13	Percent	Of adversary penetrations of friendly info systems, source identified and targeted.

OP 5.6.1 Plan and Integrate Operational IW

M1	Hours	To issue IW policy (after crisis onset).
M2	Percent	Of indigenous media, available to IW cell.
M3	Percent	Of Public Affairs releases, coordinated with IW planners.

M4	Percent	Of US and Allied forces, pursued common IW plans.
M5	Percent	Of work sessions had Public Affairs representation.

OP 5.6.2 Plan and Integrate Operational C2W

M1	Percent	Of C2W targets included in joint targeting plans.
M2	Percent	Of enemy operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified.
M3	Percent	Of friendly operations carried out when and as planned.
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs include deception plan.
M5	Percent	Of C2W elements, represented on C2W cell.
M6	Percent	Of C2W Staff hold SCI clearances.

OP 5.6.3 Control IW Operations

M1	Hours	After identifying new enemy C2 target, target attacked.
M2	Hours	To change C2W plan upon receiving status updates.
M3	Percent	Of C2W targets included in joint targeting plans.
M4	Percent	Of enemy operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified.

OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support

M1	Days	For joint force to successfully integrate coalition force doctrinal differences.
M2	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M3	Hours	To establish coordination process with AMEMBASSY and allied coalition partners (after establishment of joint force).
M4	Percent	Of agencies found in operations area at execution, known to joint force during planning.
M5	Percent	Of allied support requirements filled at time of execution.
M6	Percent	Of allies/coalition partners or other government agencies, participate in operation.

OP 5.7.1 Ascertain National or Agency Agenda

M1	Instances	Of coalition nation or non-DOD agency goals, of which joint force commander was unaware.
M2	Incidents	Of refusal by coalition or agency partner to support operation.
M3	Percent	Of allied and coalition support requirements identified at (or after) execution.
M4	Percent	Of allies or coalition partners provide their proposed end state.
M5	Percent	Of US government agencies provide their proposed end state.

OP 5.7.2 Determine National/Agency Capabilities and Limitations

M1	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M2	Percent	Of allies/coalition partners or other government agencies actively contributing to conduct of operation.
M3	Percent	Of execution taskings to coalition partners or agencies accepted.
M4	Percent	Of allies or coalition partners or other US government agencies, share their concept of operations and plans with joint force.

OP 5.7.3 Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure

M1	Days	From receipt of request for support from allies to determination of releasability.
M2	Days	From receipt of request for support from non-DOD US Agencies to determination of releasability.
M3	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M4	Days	To obtain commitment of support from non-DOD US Agency (after submitting request).
M5	Percent	Of intelligence information shared among all multinational partners.

13 September 1996

M6	Percent	Of intelligence information shared with one multinational partner shared with all partners.
M7	Percent	Of national forces and agencies operating with JTF have intelligence sharing arrangement.
M8	Percent	Of needed information, not passed to allies (because of classification).

OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations

M1	Days	Before execution, plans released to coalition members.
M2	Days	From determination of releasability to actual receipt of information by allies.
M3	Days	From receipt of request for support from allies to determination of releasability.
M4	Days	From receipt of request for support from non-DOD US Agencies to determination of releasability.
M5	Days	To respond to request for support from allies.
M6	Percent	Of agencies in operations area at execution known to joint force during planning.
M7	Percent	Of coalition partners reviewed plans prior to publication.
M8	Percent	Of validated allied support requirements filled at execution.

OP 5.7.5 Coordinate Host Nation Support

M1	Hours	For HNS response to request for support under existing agreement.
M2	Percent	Of DOD time standard, taken by HNS to accomplish job.
M3	Percent	Of joint force support personnel administer HNS (e.g., trainers, supervisors, security).
M4	Percent	Of joint force support requirements met by HNS.
M5	Percent	Of requests for HNS rejected.
M6	Percent	Of available host-nation maintenance supply replenishment and distribution assets integrated into meeting operational requirement.
M7	Percent	Of replenishment requirements met by host-nation support.
M8	Personnel	Supplied by host-nation to support facilities construction.
M9	Percent	Of lease/rental costs of real estate/real property assets paid by Host Nation.
M10	Percent	Of real estate acquired by HNS, lease or rent.
M11	Days	To coordinate for host nation support in providing facilities and real estate in support of operational campaign.

OP 5.7.6 Coordinate Coalition Support

M1	Hours	Since coalition nation last reported force status.
M2	Percent	Of coalition nations accurately reporting force locations.
M3	Percent	Of coalition nations allowing audit of force status or capability reporting.
M4	Percent	Of coalition nations fully reporting force capability.
M5	Percent	Of coalition nations fully reporting force status.

OP 5.7.7 Coordinate Civil Administration Operations

M1	Days	To establishment of military government (after occupation of area).
M2	Hours	To develop request for NCA guidance.
M3	Hours	Before required, NCA guidance or direction requested.
M4	Months	To prepare plan for local self-government.
M5	Months	To prepare populace for local self-government.
M6	Percent	Nutrition improvement in civil populace in hostile territory, after establishment of military government.
M7	Percent	Of children attending school.
M8	Percent	Of day under curfew.

13 September 1996

M9	Percent	Of indigenous forces trained to conduct civil administration within contested areas.
M10	Percent	Of joint force dedicated to Civil Administration activities.
M11	Percent	Of population under curfew.

OP 5.8 Provide Public Affairs in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	In advance to provide PAG for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	After event to release news.
M3	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (after execute order).
M4	Hours	To obtain agreement on PAG from other coalition forces with whom joint force working.
M5	Hours	To obtain approval of PAG from Unified Command and any non-DOD agencies with whom joint force directly working.
M6	Hours	To provide an initial theater position on breaking news story.
M7	Hours	To provide PAG (after crisis event).
M8	Hours	To transmit print journalist stories during crisis or combat (from receipt).
M9	Percent	Of releases contain fallacies.
M10	Instances	Of information classified or withheld from press to avoid embarrassment.
M11	Minutes	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or major event.
M12	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media researched and included in planning.
M13	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials accepted.
M14	Percent	Of media support requests answered.
M15	Percent	Of plan phases have incorporated Public Affairs strategy.
M16	Percent	Of press operational access rules and security procedures incorporated in OPLAN.
M17	Percent	Of releases containing incorrect information.
M18	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M19	Percent	Of OPLAN's PA guidance coordinated with J-3 Operations and PSYOP and deception sections.
M20	Percent	Of unclassified units, media personnel allowed access.
M21	Press Releases	Per week.

OP 5.8.1 Manage Press Relations in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	Since last National Media Pool classified briefing.
M2	Days	To close required media equipment (e.g. CNN ground station) to JOA.
M3	Days	To get DOD media pool into JOA.
M4	Hours	For staff to turn answers to media questions.
M5	Hours	In advance of deployment, media guidance developed and distributed.
M6	Hours	Prior to deployment, media policy established and disseminated.
M7	Hours	To develop public opinion baseline.
M8	Hours	To develop PA Mission Analysis.
M9	Hours	To issue interim media guidance.
M10	Hours	To stand up JIB.
M11	Instances/Week	Of meetings among PA, PSYOP, CA and IW representatives.
M12	Minutes	To provide an initial briefing to media on "Bad News" story.
M13	Percent	Favorability rating of US operations in local mass media since crisis/operations began.
M14	Percent	Of accredited media have appropriate field gear, quarters and rations.
M15	Percent	Of indigenous and locally available international mass media favorable or neutral to joint force operations.

M16	Percent	Of international mass media favorable or neutral to joint force operations.
M17	Percent	Of JOA personnel submitted Home Town News Release.
M18	Percent	Of joint force and component senior officials offered predeployment media relations refresher course.
M19	Percent	Of media in JOA accredited.
M20	Percent	Of media in JOA attend JIB course on military terms and doctrine.
M21	Percent	Of media in JOA sign agreement to follow ground rules.
M22	Percent	Of media personnel, JIB has location data.
M23	Percent	Of PA objectives focus on behavior desired from target audience(s).
M24	Percent	Of Q&A submitted arrive OSD(PA) by deadline.

OP 5.8.2 Coordinate Command/Internal Information Programs.

M1	Days	To deploy AFRTS capability to JOA.
M2	Days	To deploy and distribute AFRTS palletized receivers into JOA.

OP 5.8.3 Plan and Conduct Community Relations Program.

M1	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M2	Percent	Of OPLAN's PA guidance has been coordinated with J-3 Operations and PSYOP and deception sections.

OP 6 Provide Operational Protection

M1	Percent	Of friendly communications hardened or redundant.
M2	Percent	Reduction in friendly LOC capacity.

OP 6.1 Provide Operational Aerospace and Missile Defense

M1	Errors	In performance of air surveillance, identification and track monitor procedures.
M2	Hours	Since last enemy attack.
M3	Minutes	To scramble fighters.
M4	Minutes	To tell air tracks to appropriate echelons.
M5	Percent	Disruption of friendly centers of gravity.
M6	Percent	Of attacking aircraft penetrate air defense network.
M7	Percent	Of attacking enemy aircraft destroyed.
M8	Percent	Of fighters directed against declared hostile aircraft.
M9	Percent	Of hostile aircraft and missiles engaged and destroyed.
M10	Percent	Of incoming SSMs penetrate defenses.
M11	Percent	Of joint operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M12	Percent	Of Threat Warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate.
M13	Percent	Of tracks told to appropriate echelons.
M14	Percent	Of units arrive at point of employment later than planned.
M15	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity.
M16	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems identified, targeted, and engaged/destroyed by friendly forces.
M17	Percent	Of losses caused by hostile air activities.
M18	Hours	To dispatch Deployed Weapons Teams (DWDs).
M19	Percent	Of Battle Staff and Operations Control Center personnel completing annual re-certification training.
M20	Percent	Of E-3 and NORAD Airborne Battle Staff (NABS) operations directed in optimum fashion.
M21	Percent	Of time required expansion into other Sectors accomplished.
M22	Percent	Of Battle Staff and Operations Control Center decisions accurately discussed in checklists, guides, Operating Instructions and Plans.

OP 6.1.1 Process/Allocate Operational Aerospace Targets

M1	Minutes	Of early warning provided joint force of imminent aerospace attack.
M2	Percent	Of enemy offensive air threats to which friendly forces assigned.
M3	Percent	Of enemy air attacks for which early warning provided.
M4	Percent	Of joint force aerospace defense system successfully negates incoming enemy aerospace targets.
M5	Percent	Of joint force has early warning of incoming missiles or aircraft to allow initiation of passive air defense.
M6	Percent	Of time joint force early warning system and nodes operational.

OP 6.1.2 Integrate Joint/Multinational Operational Aerospace Defense

M1	Hours	To designate AADC and ACA (upon recognition of a significant air threat and prior to employment of forces).
M2	Minutes	For AADC to pass targeting allocation decisions to designated systems and units.
M3	Minutes	To provide early warning indication of enemy air attack.

M4	Minutes	To task friendly attack systems to new aerospace target.
M5	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to air component.
M6	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to land component.
M7	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to sea component.
M8	Percent	Of allocated aerospace defense assets assigned to enemy targets.
M9	Percent	Of target information received by air defense systems and units in theater of operations/joint operations area.
M10	Percent	Of time AADC and ACA designated upon recognition of a significant air threat and prior to employment of forces.

OP 6.1.3 Provide Airspace Control

M1	Attacks/Day	By enemy air forces.
M2	Incidents	Of air-to-air mishaps in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Kills/Day	By friendly weapons systems.
M4	Percent	Of fixed wing sorties receive clearances needed to complete mission.
M5	Percent	Of friendly air sorties interfered with by friendly ground fires.
M6	Percent	Of operational area for which a complete air picture available.
M7	Percent	Of rotary wing sorties receive clearances needed to complete mission.
M8	Percent	Of tracks Cross Told.

OP 6.1.3.1 Employ Positive Control Measures

M1	Hours	Since last publication of Air Control Orders.
M2	Hours	To establish Airspace Control Authority (upon entry in theater).
M3	Percent	Of air defense operations did not interfere with other operations.

OP 6.1.3.2 Employ Procedural Control Measures

M1	Percent	Of friendly aircraft not positively identified as friendly.
M2	Percent	Of friendly aircraft respond to friendly IFF interrogation.
M3	Percent	Of time AWACS monitors airspace to positively identify friendly aircraft.

OP 6.1.4 Counter Enemy Air Attack in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	To notify friendly counterair forces (to gain intercept position).
M2	Percent	Of COMMZ in which friendly freedom of movement allowed.
M3	Percent	Of enemy air attacks detected early enough to allow engagement.
M4	Percent	Of enemy air defense targets successfully engaged.
M5	Percent	Of enemy aircraft penetrate air defenses.
M6	Percent	Of first-shot kills by friendly fighters in air-to-air combat.

OP 6.1.5 Conduct Operational Area Missile Defense

M1	Casualties	To civilians attributed to missile attack.
M2	Casualties	To military personnel attributed to missile attack.
M3	Minutes	Warning provided to friendly assets prior to threat arrival.
M4	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses.
M5	Percent	Of launched air-to-surface missiles destroyed before impact.
M6	Percent	Of launched ballistic missiles destroyed before impact.
M7	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles destroyed before impact.
M8	Percent	Of theater assets defensible against theater missile threat.
M9	Percent	Of TMD capability damaged by incoming missile attacks.

OP 6.1.6 Conduct Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	To forward and disseminate Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (TW&AA) reports.
M2	Minutes	To forward Threat Warning Estimates after attack determination.
M3	Percent	Deviation from actual of Threat Warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers.
M4	Percent	Of Estimated Probability of Arrival Time (EPAT) calculations provided on air tracks are correct.
M5	Minutes	To plot or brief EPATs after information received.

OP 6.2 Provide Protection for Operational Forces, Means, and Noncombatants

M1	Casualties	To military personnel.
M2	Casualties	To US non-combatants.
M3	Incidents	Of damage to APOD and APOE facilities by enemy action (that impact scheme of maneuver).
M4	Incidents	Of friendly aircraft damaged or destroyed on the ground.
M5	Incidents	Of friendly ships damaged or sunk in port (not in action).
M6	Minutes	To construct simplified fallout prediction and calculate Zone I/II distance.
M7	Minutes	To construct simplified fallout prediction and plot ground zero.
M8	Minutes	To determine Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) yield in kilotons.
M9	Minutes	To Orient simplified fallout prediction.
M10	Minutes	To provide NBC I Nuclear report/series of reports or NORAD Form 46.
M11	Minutes	To relay to units warning of expected NUDET contamination
M12	Percent	Actual nuclear damage exceeds assessment.
M13	Percent	Actual radiation dose exceeds calculated current/expected total dose.
M14	Percent	Actual radiation levels exceed limited radiological survey.
M15	Percent	nuclear vulnerability exceeds analysis.
M16	Percent	NUDET decay rates exceed estimates.
M17	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M18	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly weapon systems.

OP 6.2.1 Prepare Operationally Significant Defenses

M1	Percent	Of critical fixed facilities hardened.
M2	Percent	Of fixed facilities in JOA with prepared defensive fighting positions with cleared fields of fire.
M3	Percent	Of JOA fixed base external communications hardened.
M4	Percent	Of JOA fixed base external communications have redundant backup.
M5	Percent	Of JOA fixed base internal communications hardened.
M6	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with an integrated sensor and obstacle physical perimeter defense.
M7	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with hardened storage of ammunition, food, water and medical supplies.
M8	Percent	Of planned facility hardening completed (at execution).
M9	Weeks	Since last review of fixed base physical security in JOA.
M10	Days	To prepare fortified positions, battlements, shelters.
M11	Percent	Of rear area facilities secure from attack.

OP 6.2.2 Remove Operationally Significant Hazards

M1	Casualties	Caused by operationally significant hazards (per week).
M2	Hours	Delay in executing scheme of maneuver.

M3	Percent	Of casualties attributed to operationally significant hazards.
M4	Percent	Of identified strategically significant hazards successfully removed or neutralized.
M5	Percent	Of joint force exposed to or affected by operationally significant hazard.
M6	Percent	Of operationally significant hazards identified by joint force staff.

OP 6.2.3 Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Incidents	Of electronic fratricide.
M2	Instances	Of meaconing, intrusion, and jamming events detected and reported by components.
M3	Minutes	Queuing time for message traffic.
M4	Percent	Of communications systems and assets supporting joint force in JOA destroyed by enemy action.

OP 6.2.4 Protect Use of the Acoustic Spectrum in Theater of Operations/JOA.

M1	Percent	Of time action must be taken to curtail friendly activities to ensure optimal use of acoustic spectrum.
M2	db	Loss due to transit of friendly ships.
M3	Hours	To recover an optimal acoustic spectrum after passage of friendly ships.
M4	Hours	Search time lost due to enemy actions to degrade the acoustic spectrum.
M5	Percent	Of time units observe Acoustic Emission Plan.

OP 6.2.5 Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces Within Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	Before enemy begins to mimic identification or recognition procedure.
M2	Minutes	To confirm identity of unidentified friendly target.
M3	Percent	Of coalition nations accurately reporting force locations.
M4	Percent	Of force with passive identification interrogation capability employing capability.
M5	Percent	Of friendly aircraft destroyed by friendly air defense.
M6	Percent	Of friendly aircraft destroyed by friendly fire.
M7	Percent	Of friendly casualties from friendly fire.
M8	Percent	Of friendly fire incidents cross-national.
M9	Percent	Of friendly fire incidents cross-service.
M10	Percent	Of friendly forces with procedures or equipment to allow positive identification, employ such procedures or equipment.
M11	Percent	Of positive identification false negatives (friendly identified as enemy).
M12	Percent	Of positive identification false positives (enemy identified as friendly).
M13	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly weapon systems.

OP 6.2.6 Conduct Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	To return NEO JTF to normal duties and readiness following evacuation of evacuees.
M2	Days	To transfer evacuees from US Navy ship to land based safe haven.
M3	Hours	After JTF formed or notified of NEO before FCE in place.
M4	Hours	Before all evacuees afforded medical attention (after evacuation).
M5	Hours	Before designated CJTF in direct contact with concerned Ambassador.
M6	Hours	Between evacuation departure and arrival at temporary safe haven.
M7	Hours	For force to initially respond to NEO tasking (ready to depart home station).
M8	Percent	Of AMCITs and designated foreign nationals accounted for by name during evacuation.

13 September 1996

M9	Percent	Of baggage approved for movement with evacuees delivered to temporary safe haven.
M10	Percent	Of evacuees reporting or located and agreeing to evacuation successfully evacuated.
M11	Percent	Of known AMCITs not reporting for evacuation located by search squad operations.
M12	Plans	Developed as NEO alternatives.
M13	Hours	Difference between actual execution time and EXORD scheduled start time.
M14	Percent	Of volunteering American citizens and designated third country nationals, evacuated safely.
M15	Percent	Of evacuees (requiring medical or other care), receive adequate care.
M16	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force (opposed).
M17	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force (unopposed).
M18	Percent	Of objectives seized within planned times.
M19	Percent	Degradation of mission effectiveness (lack of equipment interoperability).

OP 6.2.7 Establish Disaster Control Measures

M1	Days	To restore normal ground lines of communication following hostile action or disaster.
M2	Days	To restore public utilities to pre-event levels, following hostile action or disaster.
M3	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day for human consumption.
M4	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day for livestock consumption.
M5	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day to support sanitation measures.
M6	Minutes	Fire-fighting response at fixed bases in JOA.
M7	Percent	Difference in disease incidence in affected civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M8	Percent	Difference in mortality rates in affected civil populace, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M9	Percent	Difference in water availability to individuals in affected civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M10	Percent	Of affected civil populace displaced, as consequence of hostile action or disaster.
M11	Percent	Of affected civil populace without access to normal markets, to buy or sell, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M12	Percent	Of affected civil populace without public utilities, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M13	Percent	Of casualties to civil populace joint force prepared to treat (without impacting operational tempo).
M14	Percent	Of casualties to civil populace joint force prepared to treat.
M15	Percent	Of fires being covered by initial fire-fighting response at fixed base in JOA.
M16	Percent	Of fixed installations in JOA with fire-fighting equipment.
M17	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with backup energy sources which survive hostile action or natural disaster.
M18	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with backup energy sources.

OP 6.2.8 Establish NBC Protection in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	After initial NBC use to detect and warn friendly forces.
M2	Hours	After NBC attack to recover operational capability.
M3	Minutes	For joint force to issue downwind hazard warnings of NBC attack.
M4	Percent	Of friendly units employing NBC monitoring equipment.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Of NBC contaminated sites had decontamination operations initiated by joint forces.
M6	Percent	Of NBC contaminated sites had decontamination operations completed by joint forces.

OP 6.2.9 Coordinate and Conduct Personnel Recovery

M1	Hours	To reach area of isolated personnel after go decision.
M2	Hours	To rescue aircrew after ejection or bailout.
M3	Minutes	From notification person missing until rescue units prepared to authenticate identify of isolated personnel.
M4	Percent	Of aircrews missing behind enemy lines recovered.
M5	Percent	Of aircrews shot down rescued.
M6	Percent	Of escapees recovered.
M7	Percent	Of ground personnel declared missing later recovered.
M8	Percent	Of isolated personnel enter UAR system.
M9	Percent	Of personnel missing behind enemy lines recovered.
M10	Percent	Of personnel sending SAR/CSAR distress signal rescued.

OP 6.2.9.1 Provide Civil Search and Rescue

M1	Hours	From initial action until individual returned to friendly control.
M2	Minutes	To respond to request for civil SAR assistance by Host Nation.
M3	Minutes	For initial action (From awareness of emergency situation which might require search and rescue).
M4	Minutes	From initial action in potential search and rescue until planning allows sending SRVs to scene.
M5	Percent	Of joint force commander initiated civil SAR for joint force personnel or dependents protested by Host Nation.

OP 6.2.9.2 Provide Combat Search and Rescue

M1	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated aircrews and passengers downed beyond FLOT.
M2	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated ground force personnel (less those in aircraft beyond FLOT).
M3	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated individual.
M4	Minutes	For Component RCC to respond to report of downed or isolated individual (commence search and rescue effort).
M5	Minutes	For unit to respond to report of isolated unit member (commence search and rescue effort).
M6	Percent	Of isolated personnel returned to friendly control and their previous duties.
M7	Percent	Of isolated personnel returned to friendly control.
M8	Percent	Of joint force ACC resources tasked to support CSAR.
M9	Percent	Of aircrews transmitting location rescued within 24 hours (of being shot down).

OP 6.2.9.3 Support Evasion and Escape in JOA

M1	NM	Distance between two most distant evadee caches.
M2	Percent	Of caches compromised within six months of emplacement.
M3	Percent	Of identified evadees beyond range of pickup systems provided resupply by cache or air-delivered package.
M4	Percent	Of identified evadees captured at cache locations.
M5	Percent	Of personnel entered into Assisted Evasion subsequently returned to friendly control.
M6	Weeks	After outbreak of hostilities cache system established.

13 September 1996

OP 6.2.10 Develop and Execute Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials

M1	Cubic Yards	Of earth cleaned/replaced.
M2	Days	Delay in operation.
M3	Days	River closed as source of drinking water.
M4	Days	River closed to traffic.
M5	Dollars	For hazardous material removal or disposal.
M6	Dollars	To complete spill recovery.
M7	Gallons	Of hazardous material spilled.
M8	Instances	Of species endangered as result of pollution or spill.
M9	People	With newly polluted drinking water.
M10	Percent	Of operations canceled or delayed.
M11	Percent	Of population with newly polluted drinking water.
M12	Percent	Of wildlife killed as a result of pollution/spill.
M13	Pounds	Of hazardous material spilled.
M14	Spills	Reported per week.
M15	Wildlife	Killed as result of pollution/spill.

OP 6.3 Secure Systems and Capabilities in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Increase in security violations on command nets over time.
M2	Percent	Of adversary's trusted sources (systems and personnel) under friendly control.
M3	Percent	Of allies with which joint Information Security agreements exist.
M4	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems successful.
M5	Percent	Of enemy's sensor coverage known
M6	Percent	Of information systems within high security area.
M7	Percent	Of protect and deception operations with user cooperation.
M8	Percent	Of System Administrators with full OPSEC training.
M9	Percent	That source of adversary penetrations of friendly information systems identified and targeted.

OP 6.3.1 Employ Operations Security (OPSEC) in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	Since senior officers and officials changed daily movement patterns.
M2	Days	To complete OPSEC assessment.
M3	Hours	Before joint force knows of possible compromise of EEFI.
M4	Hours	To conduct preliminary assessment of OPSEC efforts.
M5	Hours	To develop critical info list from EEFI.
M6	Hours	To identify EEFI for an operation.
M7	Instances	A friendly attack pattern repeated (consecutively).
M8	Items	Of information (pieces or types) commander needs to make decision listed as FFIR.
M9	Items	Of information (pieces or types) commander needs to make decision listed as PIR.
M10	Items	Of information (pieces or types) joint force needed to protect itself listed as EEFI.
M11	Percent	Of critical information items covered by two or more measures.
M12	Percent	Of enemy attacks on previously identified (EEFI) joint force vulnerabilities.
M13	Percent	Of enemy capabilities not covered by OPSEC measures covered by other elements (i.e., PSYOP, deception, EW).
M14	Percent	Of friendly plan determined from self monitoring of EEFI.
M15	Percent	Of identified friendly vulnerabilities exploited by enemy action.
M16	Percent	Of joint operations disrupted as result of enemy detection and response.

13 September 1996

M17	Percent	Of operational movements conducted outside enemy overhead surveillance.
M18	Percent	Of operational support facilities protected from enemy observation.
M19	Percent	Of OPSEC and Deception coordinated at measure level of detail.
M20	Percent	Of OPSEC measures previously assessed unsatisfactory improved based on assessment.
M21	Percent	Of OPSEC Measures selected tied to Vulnerability Analysis.
M22	Percent	Of OPSEC planners accommodate measures required to protect trusted agent planning (e.g., given access).
M23	Percent	Of OPSEC planners have access to compartmented planning efforts.
M24	Percent	Of OPSEC planners input to and receive guidance and results from higher HQ OPSEC plans and surveys.
M25	Percent	Of OPSEC Surveys reflected in OPSEC Plans.
M26	Percent	Of routine actions with timing or location changed at least weekly.
M27	Percent	Of units equipped with anti-surveillance sensor and sensor jamming devices.
M28	Percent	Of vulnerabilities tied to specific enemy capabilities by planners.
M29	Percent	Of vulnerability items covered by two or more OPSEC measures.

OP 6.3.2 Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC)

M1	Percent	Of communications encrypted.
M2	Percent	Of communications sent by secure transmission means.
M3	Percent	Of joint force required to maintain more than one encryption system.
M4	Percent	Of time in restrictive EMCON condition.
M5	Percent	Of friendly emitters known to have been exploited by enemy.
M6	Teams	Fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
M7	Instances	Of frequency allocation or frequency management failing to prevent signal fratricide.
M8	Instances	Of interceptions of friendly communications during planning and execution.
M9	Percent	Of friendly communications sent via secure means.
M10	Percent	Of multinational units operating from a common CEOI.
M11	Percent	Of US Joint Force units operating from common CEOI.

OP 6.3.3 Employ Theater Electronics Security for Operational Forces

M1	Percent	Of time in restrictive EMCON condition.
M2	Percent	Of friendly emitters known to have been exploited by enemy.
M3	Teams	Fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
M4	Instances	Of procedures to prevent or disrupt the collection of ELINT by foreign intelligence agencies.
M5	Instances	Of procedures to reprogram noncommunications electromagnetic systems software in response to identified threats.
M6	Hours	To generate an operational change request message based on possible threat to noncommunications electromagnetic systems.
M7	Hours	To respond to operational change request on emergency basis.
M8	Days	To respond to operational change request on urgent basis.
M9	Months	To respond to operational change request on routine basis.

OP 6.3.4 Protect Information Systems in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To restore primary LAN in command center.
M2	Percent	Of adversary's trusted sources (systems and personnel) under friendly control.
M3	Percent	Of adversary penetrations of friendly info systems identified and targeted.
M4	Percent	Of allies with which joint information security agreements exist.
M5	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems successful.

M6	Percent	Of info systems within high security area.
M7	Percent	Of personnel familiar with command policies on information security.
M8	Percent	Of System Administrators with full OPSEC training.

OP 6.4 Conduct Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations

M1	Percent	Of desired time deception plan holds enemy's attention.
M2	Percent	Of EEFI/Critical Information addressed in deception plan.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces deployed to deal with deception threat.

OP 6.4.1 Develop Operational Deception Plan

M1	Hours	To provide deception plan to support evolving branch or sequel (during campaign execution).
M2	Instances	Discrepancies between operational deception story and targets and tactical deception story and targets.
M3	Instances	Of reinforcing Indicators with deception plan.
M4	Percent	Discrepancies between joint force deception plan and other joint force operational concepts (e.g., concept of operations, logistics support).
M5	Percent	Discrepancies between strategic deception story and targets and operational deception story and targets.
M6	Percent	Of tactical forces not available for major operations.
M7	Percent	Of time a deception operation uses an asymmetric application of force.
M8	Weeks	To fully coordinate a Deception Annex in peacetime.

OP 6.4.2 Conduct Operational Deception

M1	Hours	After actual operation H-Hour enemy identifies deception.
M2	Hours	Before enemy effectively reacts to actual operation.
M3	Hours	To implement pre-planned deception plan.
M4	Hours	To plan and implement ad hoc deception plan.
M5	Percent	Of enemy force decoyed away from main attack.
M6	Instances	Of news stories report deception operation as legitimate.
M7	Percent	Of staff knows campaign plan execution details from planning stage.
M8	Percent	Of time enemy takes desired action/inaction or reaction (or lack thereof).
M9	Percent	Of time joint force deception operation results in enemy mis-allocating resources (in time, place, quantity and /or effectiveness).
M10	Percent	Of time joint force incorporates deception in campaigns and major operations.

OP 6.4.3 Assess Effect of Operational Deception Plan

M1	Days	To complete deception assessment.
M2	Hours	To conduct preliminary assessment to determine if deception target received and acted upon desired perception..
M3	Percent	Of deception actions for which criteria were developed.
M4	Percent	Of deception measures assessed unsatisfactory, successfully employed later, after adjustment based upon assessment.

OP 6.5 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means

M1	Incidents	By enemy troops, or partisans, affecting security of force and means in joint operations area.
M2	Percent	Of LOCs secure.
M3	Percent	Of total troops used to secure critical facilities and LOCs in COMMZ.

OP 6.5.1 Provide Counter-Reconnaissance in Theater of Operations/JOA

13 September 1996

M1	Instances	Of compromise of friendly intentions (causing joint operations to be delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified).
M2	Percent	Of components that receive a counter-reconnaissance plan prior to execution.
M3	Percent	Of joint operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M4	Percent	Of impending joint operations in which enemy takes no counter-action.
M5	Percent	Of joint operations judged not compromised (based upon EPW interrogations or captured documents).
M6	Percent	Of requirements for priority intelligence assigned to counter-reconnaissance elements.
M7	Percent	Of time operational actions taken to disrupt enemy reconnaissance.

OP 6.5.2 Protect and Secure Flanks, Rear Areas, and COMMZ in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Casualties	Attributed to enemy actions (including terrorist attacks) in rear area.
M2	Instances	Of rear area attacks graded as Level III (which delay, disrupt, cancel or modify an operation in joint operations area).
M3	Instances	Of threats to joint force flanks, rear areas, or COMMZ by enemy forces.
M4	Percent	Of tactical units diverted to deal with rear area threat.
M5	Percent	Of total troops used to secure critical facilities and LOCs in operational area.

OP 6.5.3 Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations, Facilities, and Systems

M1	Hours	For reaction force to reach installation or facility under attack.
M2	Instances	Of operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M3	Instances	Of terrorists acts against coalition forces in OA.
M4	Instances	Of terrorists acts against US forces in OA.
M5	Percent	Of communications in operational area supporting operation hardened.
M6	Percent	Of communications in operational area supporting operation with alternate paths.
M7	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., PODs, command posts) destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by sabotage or insurgents or terrorist actions.
M8	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities hardened or protected against hostile acts.
M9	Percent	Of terrorist attacks penetrate security in operational area.
M10	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity resulting from enemy attacks.

OP 6.5.4 Protect and Secure Air, Land, and Sea LOCs in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To restore LOC following interruption.
M2	Minutes	For rapid reaction forces to reach point of LOC attack.
M3	Percent	Of traffic flow on LOCs (air, land, sea) interrupted by hostile action.
M4	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity (resulting from enemy attack in operational area).

OP 6.5.5 Integrate Host Nation Security Forces and Means

M1	Hours	Delay between requisitioning agreed support and receiving it.
M2	Hours	Delay in host-nation response awaiting translator or liaison officer.
M3	Incidents	Involving US forces and host-nation security personnel (per week).
M4	Instances	Of C4I capability, damaged by enemy forces, being repaired by host-nation damage control elements.
M5	Incidents	Require liaison officer to resolve (per week).
M6	Minutes	Delay in host-nation response awaiting translator or LNO.
M7	Minutes	Difference in response time between host-nation and US fire and rescue forces.
M8	Minutes	Difference in response time between US and host-nation forces.
M9	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled by host-nation forces without US backup.

M10	Percent	Increase in availability of combat forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M11	Percent	Increase in availability of tactical forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M12	Percent	Increase in availability of Air Force forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M13	Percent	Increase in tactical force strength by using host-nation to fulfill security in joint plans.
M14	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled jointly by host-nation forces and US forces.
M15	Percent	Of communications capacity from host-nation infrastructure.
M16	Percent	Of host-nation incident responses require liaison officer or NCO.
M17	Percent	Of requirements delayed or disrupted.
M18	Percent	Of significant hazards removed by host-nation.
M19	Percent	Of total combat service support supplied by host-nation.
M20	Percent	Of total combat support supplied by host-nation.
M21	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M22	Percent	Reduction in loss of C3I capability after addition of host-nation damage control elements.
M23	Personnel	Of total number of combat service support personnel reduced by host-nation support.
M24	Percent	Reduction in combat service support personnel through host-nation support.
M25	Percent	Of C3I capacity provided by host-nation damage control and restoral.
M26	Percent	Of communications redundancy from host-nation common infrastructure.
M28	Percent	Of C3I capacity provided by host-nation infrastructure.

SECTION 4

MEASURES FOR JOINT TASKS

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

MEASURES FOR JOINT TASKS

1. Introduction. This section contains measures of performance for every task contained in the UJTL. The CINCs and their staffs will use these measures to establish standards of performance based on their assigned missions. These measures are a common language and reference system for joint force commanders, operations planners, and trainers. They are also useful to analysts and planners for understanding and integrating joint operations. The link between planners and trainers should ensure that forces truly train the way they will fight.

2. Definition of Standards. A standard provides a way of expressing the degree to which a joint organization or force must perform a joint task under a specified set of conditions. A standard consists of one or more measures for a task and a criterion for each measure. The terms "measure" and "criterion" are defined below.

a. A measure provides the basis for describing varying levels of joint task performance. A measure is directly related to a task. For example, take the task, OP 5.1.1, *Communicate Operational Information*, which refers to the sending and receiving of information from one unit or organization to another by any means. Measures of performance for this task include the speed with which information is transmitted (queuing time for message transmission) and the accuracy of communications (percent of messages sent to the right addresses with the right content).

b. The second parameter of a standard is the "criterion". A criterion defines acceptable levels of performance. It is often expressed as a minimum acceptable level of performance. The combination of the measure and the criterion comprise the standard for a task.

3. Setting Standards. The standard for a joint task is set within the framework of the combatant commander's mission and in the context of the conditions that are linked to those missions. Thus, the standard(s) for a joint task can only be set when (1) the mission analysis is complete, (2) the linked conditions have been identified and described, and (3) measures have been selected that reflect the task contribution to mission accomplishment. This means that standards are tied to missions. That is, just because a joint task has a particular standard on one mission does not mean that the same standard will apply to other missions. A task standard could be the same across missions, but it could also be different for each mission.

a. Each joint task can have a standard using one or more measures. A standard can be set using any measure(s) that apply to a task. In some situations, one measure may be sufficient. However, in most situations, a commander may have to specify a standard using more than one measure to fully define a required level of performance.

For example, in specifying a standard for engaging enemy targets (OP 3.2.6, *Provide Firepower in Support of Operational Maneuver*), under the condition of overwhelming threat land forces (C 2.9.6.1), measures for both the time to engage (M1, Minutes to complete

13 September 1996

attack after target identification) and the accuracy of the engagement (M4, Percent of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded) may be needed to fully define a required level of performance. The resulting tasks, conditions, and standards will comprise the joint mission capability requirements for a combatant commander.

b. A standard for a single joint task does not normally have to be met by a single joint force component. In many cases in joint operations, several elements of the force (system types, component commands, coalition members) will be assigned responsibility for a joint task. Therefore, the assessment of performance will often reflect the aggregated capabilities of multiple force elements.

c. Joint task standards reflect the combatant commander's understanding of required capabilities based on his assigned missions (and the associated concept of operations) and the conditions likely to be experienced in carrying out that mission. Joint task standards also should be established with cognizance of friendly force capabilities (i.e., do not expect a division to be as capable as a corps, a single ship to be as effective as a carrier battle group).

d. Joint task standards should be traceable across levels of command. A commander who has established task standards based on an analysis of assigned missions must assume some level of performance for organizations performing command-linked and supporting tasks. For example, in a strategic deployment mission, assume that a functional combatant commander establishes a standard for moving forces to the theater (SN 1.2.5, *Move Forces from POE to POD*). To perform this task successfully, a geographic combatant commander must meet a performance standard on a command-linked task (ST 7.1.4, *Determine Forces and Cargo to be Deployed*). Also, a component command of the functional combatant command must meet a performance standard on a supporting task (SN 1.2.7, *Coordinate Global Strategic Refueling*). As a result, when each of these commands establishes its joint task standards for a mission, it must be aware of the relationship between its own task performance and that of the command(s) with whom it operates.

4. Development of Measures. Measures were developed using the guidelines in this paragraph. These guidelines should be used to develop proposed changes to UJTL measures.

a. Measure should reflect understanding of task. Carefully read the task definition to understand the scope of the task and what activities it comprises.

b. Measure should reflect how task contributes to mission success. Measures are selected to establish standards based on the context of a mission. The mission establishes the requirement to perform a task, provides the context for task performance (including the conditions under which a task must be performed), determines where a task is performed (one or more locations), determines when a task must be performed, determines the degree to which a task must be performed (implied in the concept of the operation), and provides a way to understand precisely how the performance of a task contributes to mission success.

c. Measures should be sensitive to the impact of conditions on task performance. Examining conditions that can impair task performance during a mission can provide clues as to the key dimensions of performance that should be measured. For example, if the primary targets of intelligence collection are fixed sites (i.e., condition of target mobility), the currency of intelligence data would not seem to be a critical aspect of performance on the other hand, if the targets at which intelligence collection is aimed are highly mobile, the currency of the collected intelligence data would seem to be a key measure of performance.

d. Measures should reflect key dimensions of task performance. Every task has multiple dimensions of performance that can be measured. At a minimum, most tasks can be measured in terms of the time required to initiate or to complete a task (i.e., response time), the rate at which progress is being made (e.g., rate of movement), an overall level of completion or success (e.g., percent of targets correctly identified, hit rate), size of deviation (e.g., proximity of fires to target), in terms of power (e.g., engagement range), lethality (e.g., rate of kills given a hit), or success (e.g., percent of messages accurately transmitted). Measures should not simply indicate a level of activity (e.g., sortie rate as measure of air interdiction), but must reflect varying levels of real success in task performance.

e. Measures should be developed that distinguish among multiple levels of performance. Good measures distinguish among multiple levels of performance (as opposed to a go/no go measure). This can be accomplished most easily using either an absolute numerical scale (e.g., applicable to number, time, or distance) or a relative scale (e.g., proportion of number, time, or distance).

f. Measures should focus on the outputs or results of performance rather than on the process. In identifying dimensions of task performance, focus on the outputs or results of performance as opposed to either the inputs/resources applied (e.g., the number of aircraft involved in conducting air interdiction) or the process followed (e.g., number or percentage of substeps performed correctly or in the correct sequence). The dimensions of task performance should not be peculiar to a specific means for performing task; rather, they should apply to all means that can be employed to perform task.

g. Maximize use of context independent measures. Performance measures that are highly context-dependent require detailed information on the mission/scenario to interpret a performance outcome. While no measure is completely independent of its mission context, there is wide variability among measures in this regard. Measures of the time it takes to perform a task (like collect intelligence on targets) are fairly context independent. Measures of rate (like the rate of movement of ships from one location to another) can also be fairly context independent. On the other hand, a measure of the percent of forces deployed by D-Day requires knowledge of the mission or scenario timeline to fully understand the level of performance involved.

h. Take advantage of the strengths of both absolute and relative scales. Absolute scales are those that, beginning from a start point (usually zero), measure the number of occurrences, the amount of time, or the movement across distance. The advantage of absolute scales is

that the result or output is clearly specified. The disadvantage is the lack of information about the adequacy of any particular value (from simply looking at the measure) on the absolute scale. Relative scales are those that compare a particular value to the total and are often expressed as a proportion or percentage (e.g., percent complete). The advantage of relative measures is that they clearly indicate the degree of completion of a task. The main disadvantage is that such measures do not indicate the size or scope of effort on the task.

i. Keep measures simple. A simple measure requires only a single measurement (e.g., hours to develop an operations order). These measures may be the easiest for operators to understand. A more complex measure might involve a ratio (e.g., ratio of enemy targets destroyed to friendly losses). Such complex measures, while attempting to be more meaningful, actually tend to reflect contributions of more than one task (e.g., number of targets destroyed is related to engaging enemy targets while friendly losses is related to protecting friendly forces and systems).

j. Take advantage of existing task performance data. If two task performance measures are similar in other respects, always pick the one for which performance data is readily available.

5. Organization of Measures. The measures for each UJTL task are listed under that task and are numbered sequentially beginning with M1, M2, etc. Some tasks may have only a few measures while others may have ten or more.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL TASK MEASURES

SN 1 Conduct Strategic Deployment And Redeployment

M1	Percent	Of sealifted units close by LAD.
M2	Percent	Of TPFDD airlifted units close by LAD.
M3	Percent	Of units close by LAD.
M4	Percent	Of sustainment movement requirements met by available sealift (during execution).

SN 1.1 Determine Transportation Infrastructure and Resources

M1	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility.
M2	Hours	To identify available common user lift assets worldwide to support critical, short-notice requirements in support of national or theater military strategies.
M3	Hours	To identify demand for lift assets (in crisis situation).
M4	Months	From approval of JSCP to approved OPLAN/TPFDD.
M5	Percent	Of airlift requirements miss LAD because of unforeseen lack of en route support.
M6	Percent	Of requirements close between EAD and LAD.
M7	Percent	Of requirements planned to close between EAD and LAD.
M8	Percent	Of sealift requirements have adequate en route support.
M9	Weeks	Since demands on common-user and organic lift assets last verified.
M10	Y/N	In crisis action planning, USTRANSCOM can determine transportation feasibility in time to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's commander's estimate for submission to the CJCS.
M11	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from Warning Order).
M12	Y/N	USTRANSCOM will determine if an OPLAN or CONPLAN with TPFDD is transportation feasible NLT the final TPFDD refinement conference.
M13	Percent	Of OPLANs and CONPLANs determined transportation feasible NLT final TPFDD Refinement Conference.

SN 1.1.1 Determine Transportation and Support Availability

M1	Days	To update and modify an assessment.
M2	Hours	To determine commercial transport industry response times and asset availability (from execution).
M3	Hours	To ascertain current state of CRAF and SRP and RRF assets.
M4	Hours	To identify SPOEs (after CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To identify transportation availability data for combatant command Course of Action development or analysis (for CONUS)
M6	Hours	To verify availability of all sourced civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) aircraft and crews.
M7	Hours	To verify en route support facilities available, functioning at projected level or capable of reaching required operational levels with sourced deploying en route support equipment and personnel.
M8	Hours	To verify impact of current and forecast weather on transit times.
M9	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircraft.

13 September 1996

M10	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced deploying en route support personnel (during Crisis Action Planning).
M11	Hours	To verify overflight and landing rights.
M12	Hours	To verify transit times with respect to weather.
M13	Minutes	To identify APOE/APOD current and predicted throughput capacity (after CJCS Warning Order).
M14	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircraft (during Crisis Action Planning).
M15	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircrews (during Crisis Action Planning).
M16	Months	Since last theater on-site capability assessment.
M17	Percent	Of CONUS installation outloading capability available at execution, compared to DD Form 1726 Reports.
M18	Percent	Of POE/POD capacity employed.
M19	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated rail capacity from point of origin to port of embarkation, actually in place.
M20	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for installation, actually achieved.
M21	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for POD, actually achieved.
M22	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for POE, actually achieved.
M23	Hours	To identify transportation availability data for combatant command Course of Action development or analysis (for OCONUS/hostile).
M24	Hours	To verify OPLAN/CONPLAN transit times with respect to current and forecast weather (assuming overflight rights, landing rights, en route support facilities, and critical common-user lift assets are available).
M25	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced deploying en route support equipment.
M26	Y/N	Planned throughput does not exceed capacity of any POE/POD used
M27	Percent	Of POE/POD with planned throughput exceeding capacity.

SN 1.1.2 Coordinate and Match Transportation Resources and Requirements

M1	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M2	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M3	Hours	To reallocate strategic lift assets IAW JTB decisions.
M4	Hours	To justify and obtain change in lift allocation (during Crisis Action Planning).
M5	Hours	To provide CONOPS and estimate of lift capability in relationship to apportioned airlift assets (during Crisis Action Planning).
M6	Hours	To reallocate strategic lift assets IAW JTB decisions.
M7	Hours	To recommend change in lift allocation (during Crisis Action Planning).
M8	Percent	Of planning time, used to determine transportation feasibility.
M9	Percent	Of unique deployable criteria, addressed.
M10	Y/N	USTRANSCOM will determine if an OPLAN or CONPLAN with TPFDD is transportation feasible NLT the final TPFDD refinement conference.
M11	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from Warning Order).
M12	Percent	Of TPFDD LADs planned with sufficient transportation resources for stated requirements during deliberate planning.
M13	Hours	Deviation from supported commander's CAP TPFDD closure and USTRANSCOM's evaluation.

SN 1.1.3 Determine Possible Closure Times

M1	Days	Deviation between LAD and RDD for self-deploying Service and component forces.
----	------	--

13 September 1996

M2	Days	Deviation from LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M3	Days	Deviation from LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M4	Percent	Of ULNs, close after their LAD (improperly calculated closure times).
M5	Y/N	USTRANSCOM can determine initial closure times in time to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's Commander's Estimate for submission to the CJCS (in Crisis Action Planning)
M6	Percent	Of planning time USTRANSCOM uses to determine initial closure times.
M7	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from Warning Order).
M8	Y/N	In Deliberate Planning, USTRANSCOM can project closure dates at the end of the final TPFDD Refinement Conference.
M9	Percent	Of time USTRANSCOM projects closure dates by end of final TPFDD Refinement Conference.
M10	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M11	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M12	Percent	Of ULNs close after LAD (due to improperly calculated closure times).

SN 1.1.4 Provide for En route Support and Clearances

M1	Airframe-Days	Lost en route maintenance.
M2	Airframe-Days	Lost to indirect routing.
M3	Days	To post changes to DOD Foreign Clearance Guide.
M4	Hours	Before C-Day and L-Hour, support teams available.
M5	Hours	Until support teams available (after C-Day and L-Hour).
M6	Hours	To be prepared to request priority diplomatic clearance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M7	Hours	To verify overflight and landing rights needed for deployment execution (during crisis).
M8	Hours	Until support teams available (after L-Hour).
M9	Percent	Decrease in ship sailings because of non-availability of staging bases, bunkering, or routing.
M10	Percent	Of airlift/tanker sorties diverted or canceled.
M11	Percent	Of airlift/tanker sorties overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of base, fuel, support facilities, or ramp space).
M12	Percent	Of DCS movements, jeopardized by overflight/layovers in nation not covered by SOFA or other agreements.
M13	Percent	Of HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements, provided to supported CINC before he submits his commander's estimate.
M14	Percent	Of ship sailings, delayed, diverted, or canceled (lack of Diplomatic Clearance).
M15	Percent	Of sorties containing courier material, diverted or canceled.
M16	Percent	Of support, clearance, and overflight permit requests, filled using current references/SOPs.
M17	Percent	Of tanker sorties, diverted or canceled.
M18	Percent	Of tanker sorties overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of POL, support facilities, or ramp space).
M19	Percent	Of TPFDD airlift sorties have required Diplomatic Clearances.
M20	Percent	Of unique deployable criteria, addressed.
M21	Ship-Days	Lost because of ship husbanding or repair facilities en route.
M22	Steaming-Days	Lost because of lack of available ship handling and repair facilities en route.
M23	Y/N	USTRANSCOM identifies HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements to support Course of Action analysis (in Crisis Action Planning).

13 September 1996

M24	Percent	Of HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements identified (to support COA analysis).
M25	Hours	To identify HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements (to support COA analysis).
M26	Y/N	USTRANSCOM identifies HNS, en route support, intermediate staging bases, and diplomatic clearance requirements to support given COAs and provide this information to the supported CINC prior to his submission of the commander's estimate.
M27	Hours	To identify HNS, en route support, intermediate staging bases, and diplomatic clearance requirements (to support COA analysis).
M28	Instances	Of airlift sorties which must overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of POL, support facilities, or ramp space).
M29	Hours	From last update J-2 provides updated information on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment operations.

SN 1.1.5 Determine Impact of Threat, Climate, and Geography on Deployment

M1	Hours	Since distribution of last combatant command classified weekly INTEL summary.
M2	Hours	From action by threat until an update presented to CAT by J-2.
M3	Hours	From identification of event until Contingency Planning Document (CPD) or Theater Planning Document, disseminated.
M4	Hours	To reroute airlift flow around new threats.
M5	Minutes	To verify OPLAN/CONPLAN transit times with respect to current and forecast weather.
M6	Percent	Of airborne strategic airlift/tanker deployment missions, delayed, diverted, re-routed, or canceled.
M7	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker assets lost, delayed, or diverted (due to unpredicted threats).
M8	Percent	Of strategic airlift assets, on schedule.
M9	Percent	Of strategic airlift, changed or canceled.
M10	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker deployment aircraft, destroyed by hostile enemy action.
M11	Percent	Of strategic lift assets, on schedule.
M12	Percent	Of strategic lift, delayed, diverted, changed or canceled.
M13	Percent	Of strategic sealift assets, on schedule.
M14	Percent	Of strategic sealift, delayed, diverted, changed or canceled.
M15	Percent	Of strategic sealift vessels, destroyed by hostile enemy action.
M16	Percent	Of transit time computations include factors for historical data on adverse weather.
M17	Percent	Of strategic sealift assets lost, delayed, or diverted (due to unpredicted threats).
M18	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker sorties changed or canceled (due to unanticipated geographic considerations).
M19	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker sorties changed or canceled (due to unanticipated climatic considerations).
M20	Percent	Of strategic sealift changed or canceled (due to unanticipated climatic considerations).
M21	Percent	Of essential elements of information are collected.
M22	Days	Projection of weather by METOC for Daily presentation to CAT.

SN 1.2 Conduct Deployment and Redeployment

M1	Hours	To evaluate validated TPFDD force modules and pass to components.
M2	Percent	Of available ship-days, lost awaiting cargo.

M3	Percent	Of cargo planned for delivery, delivered.
M4	Percent	Of ULNs close by LAD.
M5	Percent	Of ULNs closed within EAD/LAD window.
M6	Ship-Days	Lost awaiting cargo.

SN 1.2.1 Integrate Deployment Systems

M1	Days	Delay of frustrated cargo.
M2	Hours	Delay in DCS material because of faulty prioritization procedures.
M3	Hours	To modify TPFDD.
M4	Hours	Maximum Lag in high priority cargo In-Transit Visibility (ITV).
M5	Hours	Lag in High Priority Cargo In-Transit Visibility (ITV).
M6	Hours	To account for all rolling stock.
M7	Hours	To generate, transmit, and centralize movement information from source systems.
M8	Hours	To generate, transmit, and centralize movement information from various sources and input to GTN.
M9	Hours	To locate specific personnel or cargo en route.
M10	Hours	To review feasibility for supported commander's high priority cargo versus available lift assets (after supported commander's Warning Order).
M11	Incidents	Of DCS cargo not placed in "move ahead of all others" status because of lack of USTC prior coordination with supported CINC.
M12	Minutes	To identify 90 percent of complex issues.
M13	Minutes	To obtain selective GTN query responses (by type, mode, geographic area, date, IB/OB, on-hand waiting).
M1	Percent	Accuracy in generated movement information for GTN.
M15	Percent	Completeness in generated movement information for GTN.
M16	Percent	Of DCS material, delayed more than 24 hours (faulty prioritization procedures).
M17	Percent	In-Transit Visibility (ITV) accuracy.
M18	Percent	Of ADP systems interface or have work-around.
M19	Percent	Of available airframe days, lost awaiting cargo.
M20	Percent	Of cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M21	Percent	Of generated movement information for GTN, current.
M22	Percent	Of supported commander's high priority cargo, identified.
M23	Y/N	During Planning and execution no data transfer between networked stations is responsible for a supporting command failing to meet a request/requirement.
M24	Percent	Percent of currency in generated movement information in GTN.

SN 1.2.2 Provide Forces and Mobility Assets

M1	Days	For railroad cargo support to reach full capacity.
M2	Hours	Prior to first planned aircraft arrival time, deploying en route support elements, in place.
M3	Hours	To alert deploying en route support elements, prior to planned departure time.
M4	Hours	To load aircraft.
M5	Hours	To load/unload ship.
M6	Hours	To reconfigure commercial aircraft to support military operations (down time).
M7	Hours	To unload aircraft.
M8	Percent	Of aircraft, loaded within CONOPS specified time.
M9	Percent	Of aircraft, unloaded within CONOPS specified time.
M10	Percent	Of APOD throughput capacity, available prior to first EAD.
M11	Percent	Of cargo, damaged.

13 September 1996

M12	Percent	Of en route support bases, fully operational prior to first planned aircraft arrival.
M13	Percent	Of FSS, MPS, RRF ships met activation schedule.
M14	Ship-Days	Lost because of ship maintenance problems.
M15	Percent	Of assigned APODs, operating at EAD.
M16	Percent	Of allocated/apportioned transportation assets, available for movement of forces and cargo.
M17	Percent	Of required transportation assets meet ALD/RLD (in proper configuration and operational status).
M18	Percent	Of sourced airlift aircraft, mission capable by C-day.
M19	Percent	Of sourced tanker aircraft, mission capable by planned deployment date.
M20	Percent	Of sourced units report equipment readiness levels at C2 or better.
M21	Percent	Of SPOEs and SPODs reach required operational capability NLT first ALD.
M22	Percent	Of tasked units receive valid tasking in time to meet ALD.
M23	Percent	Ships load/unload on schedule.
M24	Percent	Of allocated/apportioned transportation assets, provided by USTRANSCOM.
M25	Percent	Of transportation assets meet ALD/RLD.
M26	Ship-days	Lost for sailing.
M27	Ship-days	To make ships fully operationally ready (down time).
M28	Hours	For carrier providing AE aircraft to divert aircraft to support maintenance facility (to reconfigure).
M29	Hours	For carriers to supply aircraft (after call up).

SN 1.2.3 Provide Terminal Operations

M1	Days	For APOEs to reach full operating capability.
M2	Days	For theater SPODs to reach full operating capability.
M3	Days	For theater SPODs to reach initial operating capability.
M4	Days	For theater SPODs/APODs to reach full operating capability.
M5	Days	For theater SPOEs to reach full operating capability.
M6	Percent	Of theater SPODs, open before required time.
M7	Hours	Delay in opening of APOD or SPOD because of late arrival of port personnel.
M8	Hours	For TPFDD-identified theater APOD to reach initial operating capability (IOC).
M9	Hours	Maximum Port hold time for TP2 and 3 air channel cargo.
M10	Hours	Port hold time for TP2 and 3 air channel cargo.
M11	Hours	Maximum Port hold time for Transportation Priority 1 air channel cargo.
M12	Hours	Port hold time for Transportation Priority 1 air channel cargo.
M13	Hours	To determine location of all sealift assets.
M14	Percent	Of aircraft, loaded at APOE within CONOPS/specified time.
M15	Percent	Of APOE throughput capacity achieved prior to first ready to load (RTL) date.
M16	Percent	Of cargo unloaded at POE incorrectly manifested.
M17	Percent	Of cargo, damaged during terminal operations.
M18	Days	To move cargo from reception area.
M19	Percent	Of cargo frustrated by shortfall in reception capability.
M20	Percent	Of cargo, visible during terminal operations.
M21	Percent	Of POEs and PODs reach required operational capability IAW TPFDD NLT first ALD.
M22	Percent	Of required APODs, operating at EAD to support mission mobility requirements.
M23	Percent	Of Standard Ship unload times, achieved.

13 September 1996

M24	Percent	Of support element, fully operational at APOD 24 hours prior to first scheduled aircraft arrival.
M25	Percent	Of theater APODs, open before required time.
M26	Y/N	Sufficient APODs operating at EAD to support mission mobility requirements by time and phase
M27	Percent	Of required APODs operating at EAD.

SN 1.2.4 Provide Movement to POE and Port Support Services

M1	Hours	Between unit's C-Day and L-Hour and unit's departure from HS for POE.
M2	Hours	To validate location of DOD-owned prepositioned transport assets.
M3	Months	Since last review of port call process timelines.
M4	Percent	Of cargo arrived at POE at its TPFDD RLD.
M5	Percent	Of DFB alignments to installations and units, still valid at execution.
M6	Percent	Of DOD organic transport and DOD commercial capability meet TPFDD RLD/ALDs.
M7	Percent	Of DOD-owned prepositioned transport assets have valid location held at L-Hour.
M8	Percent	Of movements delayed by late port calls.
M9	Percent	Of movements rerouted because of lack of waivers for hazardous materials.
M10	Percent	Of ports have Port Support Services in place at time first load arrives.
M11	Percent	Of TPFDD RLD/ALDs met by DOD organic transport and/or DOD commercial capability (during execution).
M12	Percent	Of units arriving at POE, properly configured to load.
M13	Percent	Of units arriving at POE, properly documented.
M14	Percent	Of waivers and permits, granted in time to preclude cargo delays (during execution).

SN 1.2.5 Move Forces from POE to POD

M1	Percent	Of air cargo, damaged en route.
M2	Percent	Of cargo closed before JFC EAD without any place to offload or store.
M3	Percent	Of combat forces closed within supported combatant commander's EAD/LADs.
M4	Percent	Of sea cargo, damaged en route.
M5	Percent	Of strategic mobility and support assets, in place to move forces IAW validated TPFDD.
M6	Percent	Of ULNs closed within LADs.
M7	Percent	Of validated requirements (ULNs) closed within supported combatant commander's EAD/LAD window.
M8	Percent	Of combat support and combat service support units closed within Supported Combatant Commander's EAD/LADs.
M9	Percent	Of support units closed within Supported Combatant Commander's EAD/LADs.
M10	Percent	Of Army combat support and combat service support units closed within Supported Combatant Commander's EAD/LADs.

SN 1.2.6 Backhaul Personnel and Equipment from Theater

M1	Days	Cargo (other than major end items) awaits backhaul.
M2	Days	Delay for major end items await backhaul.
M3	Hours	Delay for personnel awaiting movement.
M4	Percent	Of backhaul requirements, matched to available and capable backhaul assets.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Of cargo aircraft leave theater below capacity (with items awaiting transport).
M6	Percent	Of passengers and cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of ships closed within supported combatant commander's LADs.
M8	Percent	Of validated requirements (ULNs) closed within supported combatant commander's LAD window.
M9	Percent	Of sealift leave theater below capacity (with items awaiting transport).
M10	Hours	For USTRANSCOM to validate incoming short notice requirements for air refueling and notifies component (after receipt).
M11	Y/N	Validate air refueling requirements for direct support to strategic aircraft deployments and air bridge operations prior to final TPFDD Refinement conference
M12	Y/N	Validate air refueling requirements for direct support to strategic aircraft deployments and air bridge operations in time for supported CINC's commander's estimate (In Crisis Action Planning).
M13	Hours	To validate air refueling requirements for direct support to strategic aircraft deployments and air bridge operations in support of CINC's commander's estimate (In Crisis Action Planning).
M14	Percent	Of receivers diverted (due to lack of refueling).

SN 1.2.7 Coordinate Global Strategic Refueling

M1	Days	For ship's transit.
M2	Hours	To provide supported CINC feasibility study on short notice requirement for air refueling assets.
M3	Percent	Of aircraft, diverted from planned destination (missed aerial refueling).
M4	Percent	Of airlift sorties must stop en route because of lack of tanker support.
M5	Percent	Of bomber combat missions, diverted or canceled for lack of tanker support.
M6	Percent	Of combatant UNREPs (for fuel), conducted by gray bottoms.
M7	Percent	Of fighter deployments (USAF, USN, or USMC) must use en route stops (lack of tanker support).
M8	Percent	Of receiver aircraft must divert (tankers missing ARCTs).
M9	Percent	Of tanker packages (ULNs) meet complete scheduled offload.
M10	Percent	Of tanker packages, which support strategic AR (ULNs), meet LAD.
M11	Percent	Of air refueling requirements, validated prior to final TPFDD refinement conference.

SN 1.2.8 Provide Global Patient Movement Aeromedical Evacuation

M1	Days	For Aeromedical Evacuation airfield staging facility to be operational.
M2	Days	Recycle time for AE or MTF provided medical equipment to be returned.
M3	Days	Supply of medications, special diets, and consumable supplies.
M4	Days	To deploy Aeromedical Evacuation OT to Theater of War or Theater of Operations locations.
M5	Hours	Delay for Aeromedical Evacuees awaiting transportation.
M6	Hours	Aeromedical Evacuees remain on ground during intermediate stops awaiting fuel or repairs.
M7	Hours	For Aeromedical Evacuation CRAF aircraft to be available (once activated).
M8	Hours	For Aeromedical Evacuee to be moved bed-to-bed.
M9	Hours	For departure of first aircraft scheduled (after validated requirement in an emergency).
M10	Hours	For deployable TPMC to be available for deployment.
M11	Hours	For deployable TPMC to be in place and operating (after designation of unit C-Day and L-Hour).

M12	Hours	For Joint Movement Center and TPMC to adjudicate disconnects in patient movement.
M13	Hours	To reconfigure an airlift aircraft for Aeromedical Evacuation use.
M14	Kilometers	From E4 MTF to designated Aeromedical Evacuation point.
M15	Minutes	Aeromedical Evacuees remain on aircraft at destination awaiting movement to treatment facilities.
M16	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuation flights have flight surgeon or medical attendant on board.
M17	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees' condition worsens during MedEvac flight.
M18	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees, determined to have not been suitable patients for movement by air.
M19	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees, moved within 24 hours of being available.
M20	Percent	Of Aeromedical Evacuees can be tracked through ITV.
M21	Percent	Of originating attending MO patients, refused AE (lack of suitable medical equipment, reusable items or consumable supplies).
M22	Percent	Of patients have no loss of personal effects during transfer.
M23	Percent	Of patient records, available at destination medical facility with or before patient arrival.
M24	Percent	Of patients (scheduled for strategic evacuation), actually evacuated.
M25	Percent	Of special needs patients have medical attendants assigned to them for AE.
M26	Percent	Of time, in MOOTW theater medical assets, reduced below planned levels to support AE.
M27	Personnel	An ASF can decontaminate at one time.
M28	Weeks	For OSIA charges to be posted
M29	Percent	Of patients scheduled for strategic evacuation (IAW Evacuation Policy).
M30	Percent	Of patient movement by retrograde aircraft (aircraft do not deviate from schedule missions).

SN 2 Develop Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance

M1	Days	Of Warning time (of actual enemy action).
M2	Days	Of Warning time (of potential enemy action).
M3	Months	To update assessments of overall regional threats.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs with new intelligence data.

SN 2.1 Plan and Direct Strategic Intelligence Activities

M1	Percent	Of new requirements not previously met.
M2	Percent	Of PIRs with supporting intelligence data.

SN 2.1.1 Develop National Strategic Intelligence Policy

M1	Days	Since intelligence data on PIRs last collected.
M2	Hours	In advance of collection, deployment intelligence collection requirements identified.
M3	Instances	Of identified threats, en route or at PODs, resulted in diverted or delayed sealift missions.
M4	Instances	Of PIRs identified after collection begins.
M5	Percent	Of new requirements not previously met.
M6	Percent	Of PIRs covered by Collection Plan.
M7	Percent	Of supporting combatant commander PIRs contained in Theater Collection Plan
M8	Percent	Of supporting combatant commander PIRs satisfied (in time to support deployment planning).
M9	Percent	Of theater PODs where actual throughput capacity matched TPFDD planned capacity.
M10	Percent	Of validated PIRs have no collection effort.
M11	Percent	Of duplicate PIRs eliminated (during validation).
M12	Months	Since information on theater OPLAN PODs and transportation infrastructures updated.
M13	Percent	Of duplicate PIRs (during validation).
M14	Percent	Of essential elements of information are collected.

SN 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize National Strategic Intelligence Requirements

M1	Hours	In advance of collection, intelligence requirements identified.
M2	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M3	Hours	To prioritize requirements.
M4	Percent	Of prior PIRs require modification or deletion.

SN 2.1.3 Prepare National Strategic Collection Plan

M1	Hours	To create Collection Plan.
M2	Hours	To revise Collection Plan.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs not covered by Collection Plan

SN 2.1.4 Allocate National Intelligence Resources Worldwide

M1	Augmentees	Provided by National and Defense Agencies
M2	Percent	Of collection plan satisfied.
M3	Percent	Of collection plan satisfied by assigned theater assets.
M4	Percent	Of validated PIRs denied collection effort by national level.
M5	Hours	Range in overtime worked in DOD intelligence organizations.

M6	Hours	Range in overtime worked in DOD intelligence organizations (during non-crisis period).
----	-------	--

SN 2.1.5 Determine National Strategic Intelligence Issues

M1	Percent	Of collected material backlogged.
M2	Percent	Of validated PIRs with no collection effort.

SN 2.2 Collect Strategic Information

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Feet	Horizontal and vertical geolocation accuracy.
M4	Hours	For C2 structure to receive threat warning (from identification of threat to combatant command resources).
M5	Hours	Since data last collected.
M6	Hours	To disseminate data to users.
M7	Percent	Level of assuredness.
M8	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M9	Percent	Of PIRs satisfied.
M10	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M11	Percent	Of unit support tailored to meet validated joint force requirements.
M12	Targets/Day	Collected.
M13	Targets/Day	Detected, classified and identified.

SN 2.2.1 Collect Information on Strategic Situation Worldwide

M1	Feet	Of horizontal/vertical accuracy of national military and theater strategic geographical location data.
M2	Hours	To provide strategic intelligence data in support of operational commander (from receipt of request).
M3	Hours	For reconnaissance or surveillance assets to respond (from receipt of tasking).
M4	Hours	Since high priority targets last detected, identified and located.
M5	Hours	To prepare CI collection effort before becoming aware of CI requirement.
M6	Hours	Until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond (from receipt of tasking).
M7	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M8	Instances	Of unit support tailored to meet validated CTF requirements.
M9	Instances/Day	Of information collected on strategic targets in support of operational commander.
M10	Months	Since available meteorology, oceanography, topography/mapping, charting and geodesy data updated (at crisis outbreak).
M11	Months	Since information on OPLAN theater strategic situation updated.
M12	Percent	Of commander's geographic area has required reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
M13	Percent	Of counter intelligence PIRs satisfied.
M14	Percent	Of counter-intelligence PIRs filled.
M15	Percent	Of disease non battle injury (DNBI) (from unanticipated medical threats).
M16	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery have current imagery before flight briefing.
M17	Percent	Of outstanding PIRs (on situation).
M18	Percent	Of PIRs where at least one source yielded intelligence information.
M19	Percent	Of PIRs where more than one source yielded intelligence information.

M20	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one collection source.
M21	Percent	Of potential high-payoff targets accurately located.
M22	Percent	Of PIRs collected.
M23	Percent	Of proposed potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M24	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M25	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M26	Percent	Of targets detected, identified, located and classified in detail IAW Defense intelligence guidance.
M27	Years	Since most current map data updated.
M28	Hours	After PIR satisfied CRM retasks collection asset to outstanding PIR.
M29	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority One geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M30	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M31	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

SN 2.2.2 Support Combatant Commander's Surveillance and Reconnaissance Requirements

M1	Percent	Of national asset capability untasked with combatant commanders having validated requirements.
----	---------	--

SN 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Strategic Information

M1	Percent	Of multiple sources integrated and deconflicted.
M2	Days	To provide initial assessment of captured enemy materiel from in-country.

SN 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation of Strategic Information

M1	Hours	To process raw material (from receipt).
M2	Hours	To decode messages (for which keys exist).
M3	Minutes	To read wet film after recovery of aircraft or other photo system.
M4	Minutes/Page	To translate foreign national security material into English.
M5	Percent	Of collected information processed within 24 hours.
M6	Percent	Of intelligence collection data correctly processed for further exploitation.
M7	Percent	Of national asset collection of raw data processed within one year.
M8	Weeks	To provide final assessment of captured enemy materiel.

SN 2.3.2 Collate National Strategic Information

M1	Percent	Of packages returned to all source analyst for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of unincorporated items of information identified as critical after intelligence produced.

SN 2.3.3 Correlate National Strategic Information

M1	Data Points	Assembled on single subject.
M2	Percent	Of reported information graded credible based upon number of pieces of data combined and associated.
M3	Percent	Of reported information which graded High Reliability.
M4	Sources	Provided information.

SN 2.4 Produce Strategic Intelligence

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
----	------	---

M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Hours	For newly received intelligence to be passed to components or joint force.
M4	Hours	Until completion of initial analysis of raw information (from receipt).
M5	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M6	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M7	Percent	Of recipients received information in timely manner (as defined by customer requirements).
M8	Percent	Of strategic intelligence collection and dissemination capability in place prior to D-Day.

SN 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze and Interpret Information

M1	Hours	To report change in enemy condition (e.g., disposition, order of battle).
M2	Percent	Of PIRs have complete data.
M3	Days	Since last review of critical intelligence data.
M4	Days	Since last vulnerability assessment.
M5	Hours	To review critical intelligence data.
M6	Days	To review intelligence data.
M7	Days	Since last review of intelligence data.

SN 2.4.1.1 Identify Global and Regional Issues and Threats

M1	Hours	To report change in enemy condition (disposition, order of battle).
M2	Months	Before fielding, new formations or weapons systems identified.
M3	Days	Since last review of critical intelligence data.
M4	Days	Since last review of intelligence data.
M5	Hours	To review critical intelligence data.

SN 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Global Capabilities and Strategic Courses of Action

M1	Percent	Of joint force(s) identified enemy decisive points and HVTs being monitored.
M2	Days	Less warning than predicted warning period.
M3	Days	Warning of war.
M4	Months	Leadtime in identifying emerging threats to the nation.
M5	Percent	Of enemy decisive points and HVTs identified.

SN 2.4.1.3 Determine Enemy's Centers of Gravity

M1	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified and addressed.
M2	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of crisis action planning).
M3	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of crisis).
M4	Instances	Of centers of gravity not identified.
M5	Instances	Of emerging or new centers of gravity correctly identified.
M6	Percent	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of hostilities).
M7	Percent	Of recommended counters to enemy centers of gravity are accepted.
M8	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified and addressed in detailed planning.

SN 2.4.2 Prepare National Strategic Intelligence Products

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Hours	For intelligence to be passed to components or joint force (from receipt).
M4	Hours	Until initial analysis of raw information complete (from receipt).
M5	Percent	Of distributed copies of finished intelligence product are read by at least one person (from a sample).

13 September 1996

M6	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M7	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M8	Days	Projection of weather by METOC for Daily presentation to CAT.
M9	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M10	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M11	Percent	Of Priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M12	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M13	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M14	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.

SN 2.4.2.1 Provide Worldwide National Strategic Indications and Warning

M1	Days	Less than predicted warning period for deliberate planning.
M2	Days	Less warning, than predicted warning period.
M3	Days	Since indicators last reviewed (in peacetime).
M4	Hours	For first update after designation of warning problem.
M5	Percent	Of indicators developed, reported.
M6	Percent	Of warnings issued result in diplomatic, economic, or military action.
M7	Days	Warning of war.

SN 2.4.2.2 Provide Current Intelligence to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Hours	Lag between breaking events and dissemination to NMCC CAT planning personnel.
M2	Minutes	After breaking events of national strategic importance to prepare briefing for decision makers.
M3	Minutes	Intelligence briefing length.
M4	Minutes	Since last J-2 update to CAT on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment.
M5	Percent	Of basic background facts adjusted between initial and next subsequent briefing.
M6	Percent	Of METOC meteorological/oceanographic updates in time for next day's planning.
M7	Hours	Hours from last update J-2 provides updated information on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment operations.

SN 2.4.2.3 Provide General Military Intelligence to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of Joint Staff J-2 reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Percent	Of actual enemy military strength (number of people, equipment or sustainment) compared to Joint Staff J-2 estimate.
M3	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces answered by data in DIA, Service, or other national data bases.
M4	Days	Between hard copy updates of defense intelligence reports on enemy military capabilities.

13 September 1996

SN 2.4.2.4 Provide Intelligence for National Strategic Targeting

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified by JSTPS targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of failed attacks on national strategic HPTs (attributed to incorrect location data).
M3	Percent	Of national strategic HPTs have correct location data.
M4	Percent	Of possible national strategic targets have mensurated coordinates available.
M5	Percent	Of target locations verified by JSTPS or component intelligence before launch of follow-on missions.

SN 2.4.2.5 Provide Scientific and Technical Intelligence for R&D and Force Planning

M1	Months	Lead time provided on foreign developments in applied research.
M2	Months	Lead time provided on foreign developments in basic research.
M3	Months	Lead time provided on IOC of non-US strategic weapons systems.
M4	Months	Lead time provided on IOC of non-US weapons systems.
M5	Percent	Of weapons system's actual characteristics relative to predicted.
M6	Percent	Of weapons system's actual capabilities relative to predicted.

SN 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate National Strategic Intelligence

M1	Days	To evaluate threat estimates for potential threat nations.
M2	Hours	To disseminate data to users in support of operational commander.
M3	Hours	To prepare, publish, and disseminate intelligence report.
M4	Instances	Of commander making decision without sufficient information.
M5	Minutes	After major change in threat to update intelligence.
M6	Months	Since last review and update of strategic and operational centers of gravity of national threats.
M7	Months	To update evaluation of overall threats to combatant commander's assets and operations.
M8	Percent	Of significant new formations or fielded weapons systems were correctly anticipated.
M9	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M10	Percent	Of required Priority Two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M11	Percent	Of required Priority Three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.

SN 2.5.1 Provide Finished Intelligence Products to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Days	For all combatant commands to receive hard copy product (after printing run).
M2	Days	For Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) to arrive in theater and be operational.
M3	Days	For distribution of hard copy intelligence products (from final copy).
M4	Days	To provide customer pull on demand capability.
M5	Days	To provide intelligence in appropriate form and suitable means to consumer
M6	Hours	To post electronic copy of intelligence products (from final copy).
M7	Hours	To convert compartmented intelligence updates to intelligence annexes and briefings
M8	Minutes	To respond to request for information on threats to and status of inter/intra-theater transportation infrastructures and PODs.
M9	Percent	Of finished intelligence products distributed by user preferred means.
M10	Percent	Of intelligence consumer requests requiring clarification

13 September 1996

M11	Percent	Of intelligence watch leaders with authority to sanitize, summarize, and interpret highly classified information and intelligence
M12	Percent	Of joint force intelligence organizations or higher echelons with pull-on-demand capability for national intelligence data base.
M13	Percent	Of major headquarters (joint and component) with installed SCI intelligence chatter nets
M14	Percent	Of planners and decision makers with need to know receive finished intelligence products.
M15	Percent	Of plans and orders have updated intelligence products

SN 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Days	To evaluate new threat estimates for potential threat nations.
M2	Percent	Of crisis response products have active follow-up.
M3	Percent	Of routine products have active follow-up.
M4	Percent	Of significant new formations or fielded weapon systems, correctly anticipated.

SN 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities

M1	Hours	To provide initial feedback (after evaluation of national strategic intelligence activities).
M2	Percent	Of combatant command intelligence evaluations reviewed for applicability to national strategic level intelligence activities.
M3	Percent	Of deficiencies noted in national strategic intelligence activities incorporated in joint lessons learned system.
M4	Percent	Of evaluator observations of joint intelligence activities validated.
M5	Percent	Of intelligence evaluator feedback recommendations adopted.
M6	Percent	Of respondent's time consumed by evaluator interviews and data collection.
M7	Percent	Of the five intelligence tenets evaluated in examining national strategic intelligence activities.
M8	Percent	Of users of national strategic intelligence products surveyed in given year.
M9	Percent	Of users of national strategic intelligence products surveyed in last five years.
M10	Weeks	To provide feedback after evaluation of national strategic intelligence activities.

SN 3 Employ Forces

M1	Days	From decision to employ national strategic firepower until desired damage levels achieved.
M2	Time	From event detection to data receipt by NORAD.
M3	Minutes	From initial notification until establishment of a Missile Event Conference.
M4	Percent	Of potential multi-crisis situations (requiring apportionment of national assets), wargamed.
M5	Percent	Of space and missile launch events detected.
M6	Days	To designate a primary theater in a multi-crisis situation (requiring apportionment of forces or assets).

SN 3.1 Coordinate Forward Presence of Forces in Theaters

M1	Days	For interagency coordination of theater SOFAs or bilateral political agreements.
M2	Percent	Of stationing costs in AOR supported by host nation(s).

SN 3.1.1 Station Forces Forward in Theaters

M1	Percent	Of annual commitments to host-nations or IOs satisfied.
M2	Percent	Of housing for unaccompanied personnel meets CONUS housing standards.
M3	Percent	Of stationing costs provided by host-nation funding.
M4	Man-days	Spent annually collecting, coordinating, and submitting to Congress mandated overseas troop strength data.
M5	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments), ceded to US.

SN 3.1.2 Coordinate Periodic and Rotational Deployments, Port Visits, and Military Contacts

M1	Percent	Of periodic deployment costs, provided by host-nation funding.
M2	Percent	Of port visit costs, provided by host-nation funding or services.
M3	Percent	Of rotational deployment costs, provided by host-nation funding.
M4	Percent	Of scheduled port visits, delayed or canceled because of a lack of coordination.
M5	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments), ceded to US.

SN 3.1.3 Support Establishment of Access and Storage Agreements

M1	Percent	Of all AOR countries have treaties, executive agreements, and memoranda of understandings with US.
M2	Percent	Of stationing costs for selected US equipment and supplies, provided by host-nation funding.
M3	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments), ceded to US.

SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Multinational Exercises

M1	Percent	Of exercise costs, provided through host-nation funding.
M2	Percent	Of exercise forces, provided by non-US forces.
M3	Percent	Of exercises conducted primarily for access purposes.
M4	Percent	Of exercises conducted primarily for training purposes.

SN 3.1.5 Acquire Host Nation Support (HNS)

M1	Dollars	Offset payment (in dollars or dollar value of equipment) for each host-nation support manpower position provided or promised.
M2	Dollars	Offset payment (in dollars or dollar value of equipment) for each HNS manpower position provided or promised.

M3	Time	Delay between requisitioning agreed support and receiving it.
M4	Percent	Of existing plans have fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M5	Percent	Increase in availability of tactical forces through use of host-nation security and means in JF plans.
M6	Percent	Of JSCP assigned OPLANs identify or project host-nation support resources.
M7	TONS	Of material provided by HNS.
M8	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs, with fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M9	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs without fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M10	Percent	Of peacetime support provided by host-nation.
M11	Percent	Of specialized maintenance units, prepared to convert captured material to friendly use.
M12	Percent	Of stationing costs, paid by host-nation.
M13	Percent	Of total combat service support, supplied by host-nation.
M14	Percent	Of total combat support, supplied by host-nation.
M15	Percent	Of total cost of an operation paid for by HN and third party nations.
M16	Percent	Of total cost of an operation paid for by third party nations.
M17	Percent	Reduction in combat service support personnel, because of host-nation support.
M18	Percent	Of total support, supplied by host-nation.
M19	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M20	Days	Saved in closing TPFDD (relative to C-day) because of HNS.
M21	Percent	Of strategic deployment requirements reduced by HNS.
M22	Time	To obtain basing rights.
M23	Time	To obtain overflight authorization.

SN 3.2 Develop National Strategic Firepower

M1	Percent	Of alert forces obtain directed LERTCON/Posture status within timelines specified in EAP-STRAT series publications.
M2	Percent	Of available forces generated and dispersed within planned time.
M3	Percent	Of enemy strategic space assets destroyed/degraded.
M4	Percent	Of targets reviewed for collateral damage, DE, casualties and political ramifications.
M5	Percent	Planned casualties exceeds guidance.
M6	Percent	Planned collateral damage exceeds guidance.
M7	Percent	Planned Damage Expectancy (DE) exceeds guidance.
M8	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD available).
M9	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD not available).
M10	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD available).
M11	Hours	To construct a Directed Planning Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD not available).
M12	Hours	To construct a Theater Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD available).
M13	Hours	To construct a Theater Option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD not available).
M14	Hours	To construct Theater Option of one weapon against one target (TDD not available).

M15	Hours	To coordinate TLAM-N plan.
M16	Days	To process, apportion, and integrate firepower resources based on <i>major</i> SIOP/JSCP doctrine, policy, or guidance changes.
M17	Days	To process, apportion, and integrate firepower resources based on <i>routine</i> SIOP/JSCP doctrine, policy, or guidance changes.

SN 3.2.1 Process Strategic Targets

M1	Percent	Of national strategic High Priority Targets (HPTs) discovered within execution cycle are reprioritized.
M2	Percent	Of selected HPTs have measured coordinates available.
M3	Percent	Of selected target components can be attacked (sufficient delivery systems and munitions available).
M4	Percent	Of selected targets have critical components identified.
M5	Hours	To develop a target for attack (after identification as a strategic decisive point).

SN 3.2.2 Generate and Disperse Strategic Forces

M1	Hours	To achieve horizontal dispersion.
M2	Hours	To achieve vertical dispersal.
M3	Minutes	To pass vertical dispersal message.
M4	Days	To achieve specific force generation level.
M5	Time	For last until to reach safe separation distance from point of departure.

SN 3.2.3 Manage Strategic Force Readiness Levels

M1	Days	Longest maximum readiness can be maintained.
M2	Hours	To generate forces to new readiness level.
M3	Hours	To re-obtain readiness level after a missile goes off alert unexpectedly.
M4	Hours	To re-obtain readiness level after an aircraft goes off alert unexpectedly.
M5	Hours	To re-obtain readiness level after an SSBN goes off alert unexpectedly.

SN 3.2.4 Manage Strategic Weapon Stockpile Allocation

M1	Percent	Of inspected units, pass Nuclear Assessment Program.
M2	Percent	Of units receive Nuclear Assessment Program inspection within program timelines.
M3	Months	Since formal review of world-wide nuclear asset availability.
M4	Weeks	Since update of geographic combatant command nuclear weapons requirements.
M5	Months	To reconstitute TLAM(N) capability at sea (assessed).

SN 3.2.5 Determine National Strategic Targeting Policy

M1	Percent	Of collateral damage (under proposed targeting policy), to non-military targets.
M2	Man-Months	To develop proposed targeting policy.
M3	Percent	Of enemy nuclear forces form a secure reserve after US retaliation under proposed targeting policy.
M4	Percent	Of nominated targets have weapons available (under proposed targeting policy).
M5	Percent	Probability of success for pre-emptive attacks on minor nuclear powers (under proposed targeting policy).
M6	Months	Since damage criteria study published.
M7	Percent	Success expected from proposed targeting policy.
M8	Percent	Success expected from published targeting policy.
M9	Months	To develop, coordinate, and publish proposed targeting policy.

SN 3.3 Apply National Strategic Firepower

13 September 1996

M1	Incidents	Of errors in crew force response when force execution directed by President.
M2	Incidents	Of errors in crew force validation and authentication.
M3	Incidents	Of errors in EAM preparation and transmission.
M4	Incidents	Of errors in EAM preparation and transmission; crew force validation and authentication; and crew force response when force execution directed by President

SN 3.3.1 Attack Strategic Targets

M1	Percent	Of failed HPT attacks attributed to lack of integration.
M2	Percent	Of national strategic firepower missions flown/fired without requested theater support.
M3	Percent	Of SAPs cannot be integrated with non-SAP systems for security reasons.
M4	Percent	Of strategic SOF missions executed without notification of non-SOF operating forces.

SN 3.3.2 Synchronize Strategic Attacks

M1	Percent	Of planned targets, hit on time.
M2	Percent	Of uncovered targets, attacked by regenerated forces.
M3	Percent	Of units receive execute order through primary system.

SN 3.3.3 Demonstrate National Military Capabilities

M1	Hours	Before clear indications that target government has modified its position.
M2	Incidents	Involving loss of non-US life
M3	Incidents	Involving loss of US life.

SN 3.3.4 Apply National Nonlethal Capabilities

M1	Percent	Of CINC's PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host-nation.
M2	Percent	Of PSYOP efforts begin within first 1/3 of hours between Warning Order and H-hour.
M3	Hours	To provide JCS approval of CINC's PSYOP campaign.

SN 3.3.5 Conduct National Combat Assessment

M1	Percent	Difference between DIAC and NPIC combat assessment.
M2	Percent	Difference between DIAC/NPIC combat assessment and combatant commander assessment.
M3	Hours	For DIAC to provide attack assessment to combatant commander of his attacks.
M4	Hours	For NPIC to provide attack assessment to combatant commander of his attacks.
M5	Percent	Of DGZs assessed in first 24 hours of nuclear response.
M6	Hours	To provide retargeting information to USSTRATCOM.
M7	Hours	To report to NCA on success of Direction Action mission.

SN 3.4 Protect Strategic Forces and Means

M1	Visits	For staff assistance and liaison conducted each year to Federal and State Emergency Management Offices.
M2	Percent	Of enemy manned air breathing vehicles successfully penetrate friendly airspace.
M3	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of critical US Government command and control facilities, hardened against nuclear, biological, and chemical attack.

13 September 1996

M6	Percent	Of defense-wide deception operations (in approved OPLANs) contradict deception operations in other plans or national deception operations.
M7	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles(of all types), destroyed before impact.
M8	Percent	Of national strategic operations have a deception plan.
M9	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.
M10	Months	Since last update meeting between FEMA and DOD to review potential strategic threats to US.

SN 3.4.1 Provide Strategic Air Defense

M1	Percent	Of enemy attacks were successful.
M2	Percent	Of military casualties were from enemy attacks.
M3	Percent	Of penetrations of US airspace by enemy manned air breathing vehicles were successful.
M4	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.
M5	Percent	Of US non-combatant casualties were from enemy attacks.

SN 3.4.2 Provide Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment

M1	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US, Attack Assessment issued.
M2	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US forces, Attack Assessment issued to TBM forces.
M3	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US forces, Threat Warning issued to TBM forces.
M4	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US, Threat Warning issued.
M5	Percent	Of Threat Warnings to TBM forces are false.
M6	Incidents	Of false Threat Warnings.
M7	Minutes	To determine objectives of attack.

SN 3.4.3 Provide Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense

M1	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M2	Percent	Of CONUS civil government command and control assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M3	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches, provide cueing for counterforce operations.

SN 3.4.4 Protect National Strategic Capabilities

M1	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M2	Percent	Of CONUS civil government command and control assets are defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M3	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets are defensible against a ballistic missile threat.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, are defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Incidents	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts, ports) destroyed or damaged.
M6	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches provided cueing for counterforce operations.
M7	Incidents	Of penetrations of US airspace by enemy manned air breathing vehicles.
M8	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.

13 September 1996

M9	Incidents	Of US POE facilities being damaged or destroyed by enemy terrorist action.
M10	Casualties/ Week	To US non-combatants.

SN 3.4.5 Coordinate and Conduct Strategic Operations Security

M1	Percent	Of key personnel change timing and route of their routine movements on a weekly basis.
M2	Percent	Of media reports described close-hold friendly actions.
M3	Percent	Of movements of critical units or equipment made even though threat reconnaissance systems overhead.

SN 3.4.6 Protect National Strategic Information, Information-Based Processes, and Information Systems

M1	Percent	Of commands have adequate information processing hardware and software.
M2	Percent	Of commands have current processes and programs to protect information systems, processes, and networks.
M3	Percent	Of commands have fully trained and manned information systems management and operating personnel.
M4	Instances	Of confirmed loss of classified data from penetrations.
M5	Instances	Of detected penetrations of command information systems.
M6	Percent	Of time, command joint information systems down.
M7	Instances	Of penetrations of multiple command information systems.
M8	Minutes	To detect attempted penetration of information system.
M9	Minutes	To restore major information system after attack.
M10	Minutes	To switch to an alternate system after attack on major information system.

SN 3.4.7 Provide Security for Strategic Forces and Means

M1	Hours	After CI EEI satisfied, collection asset retasked.
M2	Percent	Change in sabotage incidents, per month, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M3	Percent	Change in terrorism incidents, per month, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M4	Total	Facilities (e.g., command posts), destroyed.
M5	Hours	For a reaction force to reach an installation or facility under attack.
M6	Percent	Of CONUS based aircraft and ships, damaged or destroyed on the ground/in port prior to declaration of war or C-Day.
M7	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements covered by collection plan.
M8	Percent	Of critical CONUS facilities (e.g., command posts), destroyed or damaged.
M9	Percent	Of critical movements (e.g., nuclear weapons transfers), conducted under observation of non-friendly overhead assets.
M10	Percent	Of critical movements conducted after declaration of war, C-Day, or national emergency, under observation of non-friendly overhead assets.
M11	Percent	Of DOD personnel assigned to counterintelligence.
M12	Instances	Of first strategic movements attacked by enemy lethal or non-lethal forces.
M13	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified because of successful enemy intelligence collection efforts.
M14	Instances	Of sabotage or terrorism, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M15	Instances	Of strategic movements detected or attacked by enemy lethal/nonlethal means.

13 September 1996

M16	Instances	Of terrorism, per month, in CONUS after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M17	Hours	Since most current intelligence information collected.

SN 3.4.8 Provide for Nuclear Surety

M1	Months	Since last review of overall launch platforms firing circuit inspection program.
M2	Months	Since last review of overall SAS inspection program.
M3	Months	Since most recent DOD/DOE assessment of current nuclear weapons programs and procedures was conducted.
M4	Percent	Of nuclear capable systems which have firing circuitry which is current and certified
M5	Percent	Of recommendations from most recent DOD/DOE assessment implemented within 60 days.
M6	Percent	Of units all nuclear capable units which have received a DNSI within the last year.
M7	Percent	Of units receiving a DNSI (Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection) in last year receive a satisfactory or better grade.
M8	Percent	Of units receiving a Nuclear Weapons Assessment Inspection (NWAII) pass on the first inspection.
M9	Percent	Of units receiving a Personnel reliability Program inspection receive a satisfactory or better grade.
M10	Percent	Of units receiving an NTPI receive a satisfactory or better grade.
M11	Percent	Passed Defense Nuclear Agency inspections of the USSTRATCOM Personnel Reliability Program with a Satisfactory or better.
M12	Percent	Passed Nuclear Weapon Tech Inspections of Service Component Command capability to handle, store, and maintain nuclear weapons with a Sat or better.
M13	Percent	Passed Service Weapon Systems inspections with Satisfactory or better results.
M14	Days	Since last Annual report and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile.
M15	Months	Delay to initiate underground nuclear testing, if directed by the President.
M16	Percent	Of nuclear weapons components which can be tested through sub-critical tests.
M17	Percent	Of nuclear weapons deemed one point safe.
M18	Percent	Of nuclear weapons inventory exceeding design life (to include extensions of design life).
M19	Percent	Of US hydronuclear tests exceeding a yield of four pounds.
M20	Percent	Overall degradation of nuclear weapons stockpile from original weapons production capability.
M21	Percent	Of stockpile currently certified to not produce a nuclear yield if dropped or fired safe.
M22	Percent	Of stockpile currently certified to properly function upon release.
M23	Percent	Of sub-critical nuclear weapons tests result in a self-sustaining nuclear reaction.
M24	Percent	Of sub-critical nuclear weapons tests result in the release of nuclear materials to the atmosphere.

SN 3.4.9 Support Personnel Recovery Worldwide

M1	Percent	Of aircrews that transmit their location, rescued within 24 hours of being shot down.
----	---------	---

M2	Percent	Of escapees, recovered.
M3	Percent	Of isolated personnel, enter UAR system.
M4	Percent	Of known POW/MIA families made aware of DOD support.
M5	Months	Since defense-wide SERE training updated.
M6	Months	Since inter-agency operating agreements updated.
M7	Months	Since national policy supporting SERE requirements reviewed.

SN 3.4.10 Protect the National Sea Frontiers

M1	Days	Between hostile actions against strategic shipping.
M2	Days	Between pollution or toxic waste events that impact strategic shipping.
M3	Man-days/year	To clean-up marine pollution or toxic waste spills.
M4	Ship Days	Lost by commercial shipping because of marine pollution or toxic waste.
M5	Dollars	Negative impact on national economy because of marine pollution or toxic waste spills.
M6	Percent	Of strategic shipping lost because of hostile action.
M7	Instances/week	Of attacks on coastal shipping.
M8	Percent	Of fisheries closed because of marine pollution or toxic waste.
M9	Percent	Of military operations delayed or disrupted by explosive ordnance incidents.
M10	Percent	Of Military operations delayed or disrupted by hostile action.
M11	Percent	Of military operations delayed or disrupted by marine pollution or toxic waste.
M12	Instances/week	Of significant damage to forces, materiel, or equipment.

SN 3.5 Provide National Space Capabilities

M1	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth (peacetime).
M2	Percent	Decrease in support of combatant commander or joint force commander because of surge in national level requirements.
M3	Percent	Degradation of space capability over one year.
M4	Days	Delay in theater operations because of saturation of on orbit capabilities.
M5	Percent	Of DOD required space capability, owned by DOD.
M6	Percent	Of DOD required space capability, owned by the US Federal Government.
M7	Percent	Of promised on orbit capability provided to combatant commander or joint force commander.
M8	Percent	Of TENCAP capability used each year.
M9	Percent	Of TENCAP requests filled each year.
M10	Months	To design, produce, and constitute on orbit a new generation of a particular existing space capability.
M11	Years	To design, produce, and constitute on orbit a new space capability.
M12	Months	To reconstitute a space capability after loss through attack (wartime).
M13	Hours	To respond to a combatant commander or joint force commander request for change in support from on orbit assets.
M14	Months	To restore to a combatant commander or joint force commander on orbit capability lost because of system failure (peace time).
M15	Weeks	To restore to a combatant commander or joint force commander on orbit capability lost because of hostile action (crisis or war).

SN 3.5.1 Provide Space Support

M1	Days	To restack a launch platform to carry a new and different specific space platform.
----	------	--

M2	Hours	To move on-orbit assets from support of one theater to support of another.
M3	Minutes	For maximum ground facility operations capability "red" time (per 24-hour period).
M4	Minutes	To report the functional loss of a major space platform (mission loss).
M5	Minutes	To report the functional loss of a major system of a space platform (mission loss).
M6	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth.
M7	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from on-orbit (assuming on-orbit assets).
M8	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth.
M9	Months	To produce a space platform for launch.
M10	Percent	Of a space platform's efficiency lost because too close to other platforms.
M11	Percent	Of a space platform's overall effectiveness lost because too close to other platforms.
M12	Percent	Of launches are delayed after preparations begin, due to scheduling conflicts.
M13	Percent	Of launches successfully place space platforms on orbit.
M14	Percent	Of successful launches (total).
M15	Percent	Of successful launches within seven days of original schedule ("Successful Launch" includes inserting satellite into proper orbit).
M16	Percent	Of successful satellite communications supports (each system).
M17	Total	Number (maximum) of emergency satellite supports (per 24-hour period).
M18	Weeks	To produce a launch platform.
M19	Percent	Of space platforms orbits must be adjusted from original orbit plans because of conflicts with other space objects.

SN 3.5.2 Provide Space Control

M1	Hours	To assemble and dispatch Space Support Team
M2	Percent	Of first contingency requirements for space support met.
M3	Percent	Of second contingency requirements for space support met.
M4	Hours	To deploy Joint Space Support Teams (JSSTs) (after initial request).
M5	Hours	For JSST to direct combatant commander's request for specific space support to appropriate USSPACECOM or component office.

SN 3.5.3 Provide Space Force Enhancement

M1	Percent	Of enemy space capability destroyed/degraded/disrupted (as ordered by NCA).
M2	Percent	Of items in near space, fully catalogued.
M3	Percent	Of space platforms orbits must be adjusted from original orbit plans because of conflicts with other space objects.
M4	Percent	Of US military satellite communications capability destroyed/degraded.
M5	Percent	Of US satellite navigation capability destroyed/degraded.
M6	Percent	Of US space-based environmental monitoring capability destroyed/degraded.
M7	Percent	Of US space-based intelligence capability destroyed/degraded.
M8	Percent	Of US space-based missile warning capability destroyed/degraded.
M9	Days	To fully analyze new space debris and determine its on orbit characteristics.
M10	Days	To fully analyze new space platforms and determine their on orbit characteristics.

SN 4 Provide Sustainment

M1	Line Items	Backlogged.
M2	Percent	Of planned sustainment delivered to theater during operations.
M3	Percent	Of regional nations forces integrated into logistics plan.
M4	Percent	Of required logistics in place to support national objectives.
M5	Tons	Of backlogged support requirements.
M6	Months	To fully establish new sustainment infrastructure.
M7	Percent	Of cargo booked and available misses ship sailing.
M8	Percent	Of requirements for Defense Fuel Supply Center documented in plans.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment movement requirements met by available sealift (during execution).

SN 4.1 Acquire and Distribute Personnel

M1	Days	From recruitment to commencement of basic training.
M2	Dollars	To recruit new service member.
M3	Percent	Of inductees have at least a high school diploma.
M4	Percent	Of inductees successfully complete basic training.
M5	Percent	Of military inductees qualify for security clearance.
M6	Percent	Of new DOD civilians qualify for security clearance.
M7	Percent	Of officer inductees have at least a bachelors degree.
M8	Percent	Of recruitment goals met during preceding year.
M9	Percent	Of recruits are female.
M10	Percent	Of recruits from racial or ethnic minority.

SN 4.1.1 Determine Human Resource Requirements

M1	Days	To consider and approve change in manning document.
M2	Percent	Of total DOD civilians are SES.
M3	Percent	Of total DOD manning are civilians.
M4	Percent	Of total military personnel are officers.
M5	Percent	Of total officer manning are GOs/FOs.
M6	Weeks	To approve manpower change requests (backlogged).
M7	Days	In advance of need manpower requirements identified.

SN 4.1.2 Acquire, Train, Supply, and Transport Personnel

M1	Days	Between completion of training and arrival at unit of assignment.
M2	Dollars	For basic training per individual.
M3	Percent	Of Air Force personnel are college graduates.
M4	Percent	Of Army personnel are college graduates.
M5	Percent	Of civilian authorizations filled (have personnel assigned).
M6	Percent	Of Marine personnel are college graduates.
M7	Percent	Of military authorizations filled (have personnel assigned).
M8	Percent	Of Navy personnel are college graduates.
M9	Percent	Of personnel receive assignment to unit prior to completion of initial training.
M10	Weeks	Initial training rate achieved.

SN 4.2 Provide for Base Support and Services

M1	Days	To let procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M2	Percent	Of average commercial market costs paid for DOD Non-Developmental Items (NDI).
M3	Percent	Of pre-positioned WRM required to support TPFDD, pending resupply.

M4	Weeks	To let procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.
----	-------	---

SN 4.2.1 Determine National Military Support Infrastructure

M1	Days	To determine necessary support infrastructure.
M2	Percent	Of actual operations worldwide for which sustainment base/infrastructure adequate.
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs have assigned logistic support responsibilities to Service components and other commands.
M4	Percent	Of required infrastructure in place prior to crisis.
M5	Percent	Of support infrastructure capable of supporting surge requirements.
M6	Percent	Of sustainment facilities relocated to support particular contingency.

SN 4.2.2 Provide Depot Supply and Maintenance

M1	Days	For depot system to issue TCTO/MWO (after problem identified to depot system).
M2	Days	Of supply on-hand to support executed OPLAN.
M3	Months	To outfit below-the-line or new units with table of equipment allowance.
M4	Months	To respond to tasked CINC's industrial activities.
M5	Percent	Of days when ammunition (Class V) distribution is adequate to support operations.
M6	Percent	Of days when ammunition (Class V) distribution is adequate to support operations in primary theater.
M7	Percent	Of days when fuel (Class III) distribution is adequate to support operations.
M8	Percent	Of major end items have surge repair capacity in CONUS.
M9	Percent	Of OPLAN's scheduled requirements for supplies provided.
M10	Percent	Of personnel in training with clothing and equipment they will need in their assigned units.
M11	Percent	Of planned ammunition (Class V) delivered to theater forces at execution.
M12	Percent	Of repair facility's capacity in operation.
M13	Percent	Of required work force available to perform overhaul.
M14	Percent	Of theater personnel have full issue of clothing and protective gear.
M15	Days	To complete major overhaul of equipment.

SN 4.2.3 Control National Inventories and Movements

M1	Man-days	Lost per month because personnel in casual status (awaiting transportation).
M2	Percent	Of end items completely depleted under expected usage rates before industry reopens production.
M3	Percent	Of inventory items (valued from \$101 to \$5,000), lost.
M4	Percent	Of inventory items (valued under \$100 each), lost.
M5	Percent	Of inventory stock line items exceed expected five year usage.
M6	Percent	Of items in transit (valued over \$100,000) have in transit visibility (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of Service and CINC requirements in inventory stocks.
M8	Days	In advance of shortage possible shortage identified.

SN 4.2.4 Develop Sustainment Base

M1	Dollars	To prepare CONUS base for return to civil use.
M2	Months	To expand CONUS port facilities to handle container or breakbulk ships.
M3	Percent	Of construction material acquired or produced locally.
M4	Percent	Of military confinement facilities meet standards.
M5	Weeks	To build CONUS sustainment base facility.
M6	Years	Average age of sustaining base facilities.

M7	Years	Average age of telecommunications infrastructure.
M8	Years	Average age of transportation infrastructure.
M9	Percent	Of total CONUS sustainment requirements met.

SN 4.2.5 Provide Defensewide Base Operations Support

M1	Days	To identify and marshal forces to restore unused standard runway to full operations.
M2	Percent	Of total procurement costs in contract administrative costs.
M3	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$100,001 to \$500,000.
M4	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$2,501 to \$100,000.
M5	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts over \$500,001.
M6	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts under \$2500 (micro-purchases).
M7	Months	To let procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.
M8	Percent	Of planned administrative support services available.
M9	Percent	Of planned capacity to process and issue supplies available.
M10	Percent	Of planned electronic communications links available.
M11	Percent	Of planned transportation available.
M12	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard fighter/attack suitable runway.
M13	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard intratheater airlift suitable runway.
M14	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard runway.
M15	Weeks	To let procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M16	Percent	Of planned geospatial products available.
M17	Months	To generate new geospatial products.
M18	Percent	Of geospatial products meet user requirements.

SN 4.2.6 Provide Management Headquarters

M1	Dollars	To maintain combatant command HQ, including personnel, systems, and rent (annually).
M2	Percent	Of manpower assigned to HQ meet all personnel requirements.
M3	Percent	Of Joint Headquarters located within their theater.
M4	Percent	Of Joint Headquarters manpower positions participating in DOD PPBS process.
M5	Weeks	To establish joint force headquarters.
M6	Percent	Of theater force assigned to headquarters.

SN 4.2.7 Coordinate Defensewide Legal Support

M1	Days	To provide legal opinion on international MOU, LOA, or Executive Agreement.
M2	Hours	For legal review of ROE change request.
M3	Percent	Of legal professionals are in deployable units.
M4	Weeks	To provide legal opinion on treaty.
M5	Percent	Of instances where access to legal support avoids delays in legal action.

SN 4.2.8 Establish Prisoner Control Policy

M1	Hours	To evacuate EPWs from initial capture to their final EPW compounds.
M2	Instances	Of law and order policy not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.
M3	Instances	Of shortfalls in EPW processing sites.
M4	Months	Since EPW policy last reviewed by legal personnel.
M5	Percent	Of EPW compounds cited for serious deficiencies by International Red Cross.

M6	Percent	Of EPW compounds guarded by security forces (versus combat troops).
M7	Percent	Of military confinement facilities certified by civilian certifying agency.
M8	Percent	Of EPWs for whom prison control policy is clear.

SN 4.3 Provide for Personnel Support

M1	Percent	Of personnel-complete initial service/contract obligation.
M2	Percent	Difference between assigned strength and authorized strength (military and civilian).
M3	Percent	Of authorized strength filled by assigned personnel (military and civilian).
M4	Percent	Of difference between authorized/assigned strength and present for duty strength.
M5	Percent	Of DOD positions filled by civilian employees or contractors.
M6	Percent	Of losses replaced by new personnel.
M7	Percent	Of personnel assigned to organization fully qualified according to individual position descriptions.
M8	Percent	Of personnel in CONUS qualified for assignment outside of CONUS
M9	Percent	Of personnel retained beyond initial service/contract obligation.
M10	Percent	Of personnel, in critical/essential occupational areas retained in service (military and civilian).
M11	Percent	Of positions filled by qualified personnel.
M12	Days	To replace personnel.

SN 4.3.1 Provide Personnel Management and Morale Support

M1	Percent	Of personnel involved in educational programs.
M2	Percent	Of personnel- complete initial service/contract obligation.
M3	Percent	Of personnel retained beyond initial service/contract obligation.
M4	Percent	Of personnel, in critical/essential occupational areas retained in service (military and civilian).

SN 4.3.2 Coordinate Defensewide Religious Support

M1	Percent	Of military member faith groups below DOD average for chaplain representation.
M2	Percent	Of religious faiths, accredited to minister to DOD, with no ministers on active duty.
M3	Percent	Of military personnel with access to religious services in their faith.

SN 4.3.3 Provide Defensewide Health Services

M1	Days	For CONUS hospital facilities to accommodate returning wounded and injured service members.
M2	Percent	Of military personnel, fit for duty.
M3	Percent	Personnel deployed meeting preparation for overseas movement requirements.
M4	Hours	For casualty to obtain "stabilizing" medical care.
M5	Days	For casualty to obtain "recuperative" medical care.

SN 4.4 Reconstitute National Forces and Means

M1	Days	To develop post-SIOP plan to support NMS.
M2	Days	To reconstitute post-SIOP force.
M3	Months	From S/T/M-Day, for recalled Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units to be certified prepared for combat.
M4	Months	From S/T/M-Day, for recalled Reserve Component combat units to be certified prepared for combat.
M5	Months	From S/T/M-Day, to field cadre division.

M6	Months	From S/T/M-Day, to recommission naval vessels recalled from mothball fleet.
M7	Months	To field last Army combat unit (with laid-up military assets).
M8	Months	To field last US Air Force combat squadron (with laid-up military assets).
M9	Months	To field last US Marine Corps combat unit (with laid-up military assets).
M10	Percent	Of OPLANs with reconstitution provisions.

SN 4.5 Set Sustainment Priorities

M1	Days	To designate primary theater.
M2	Days	To provide combatant commanders apportionment of below the line forces.
M3	Percent	Of below the line forces dual apportioned in JSCP.
M4	Percent	Of CS and CSS assignments to primary theater match combat forces.
M5	Percent	Of reviewed theater OPLANs with major deficiencies in sustainment (during planning cycle OPLAN review).
M6	Percent	Of strategic lift dual apportioned in JSCP.

SN 5 Provide Strategic Direction And Integration

M1	Days	To answer Combatant Command requests for guidance.
M2	Days	To revise and issue TPFDD after change in OPLAN at CINC level. .
M3	Hours	To publish changes by executing units after changes in OPLAN at JFC level. .
M4	Months	To update national (or multinational) published strategy after major shift in US midterm strategy.
M5	Months	To update national or multinational published strategy.
M6	Percent	Of national (or multinational) suggested changes to JSR, NMS, or other strategy development and strategy documents accepted.

SN 5.1 Operate and Manage Global Strategic Communications and Information Systems

M1	Minutes	To begin Decision Making (DM) Conference.
M2	Minutes	To begin transmitting FD EAM to bombers, tankers (PCL only) (availability of individual NCCS C4I systems).
M3	Minutes	To begin transmitting FM messages to bombers/tankers/ICBM's (availability of NMCS and CINC C4I systems).
M4	Minutes	To begin transmitting FM messages to bombers/tankers/ICBMs (availability of bomber/tanker/ICBM NCCS C4I systems).
M5	Minutes	To begin transmitting Situation Monitoring (SM), Threat Warning (TW), and Attack Assessment (AA) messages (availability of NCCS C4I systems).
M6	Minutes	To process and authenticate EAM for execution of preplanned options against fixed SIOP targets (ICBM/SSBN/Bomber crews).
M7	Minutes	To process RECORD COPY Emergency Action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M8	Minutes	To process VOICE Emergency action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M9	Minutes	To transmit EAM to Bombers for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M10	Minutes	To transmit EAM to ICBMs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M11	Minutes	To transmit EAM to SSBNs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M12	Percent	Of addressees received messages.

SN 5.1.1 Communicate Strategic Decisions/Information

M1	Minutes	To begin sending messages (Queuing time delay).
M2	Minutes	To process RECORD COPY Emergency Action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M3	Minutes	To process VOICE Emergency action Message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M4	Minutes	To transmit EAM to Bombers for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M5	Minutes	To transmit EAM to ICBMs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M6	Minutes	To transmit EAM to SSBNs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M7	Percent	Of addressees received messages.
M8	Percent	Of messages obtained outside normal communications channels.
M9	Percent	Of classified messages sent via channels with less than required level of security.
M9	Percent	Of data received (within established timelines).

M10	Hours	For C2 systems to transmit order worldwide.
M11	Y/N	During Planning and execution no data transfer between networked stations is responsible for a supporting command failing to meet a request/requirement.
M12	Percent	Of involved units are listed addressees.

SN 5.1.2 Manage National Military C4 Systems Worldwide for Communicating Strategic Information

M1	Minutes	To begin Decision Making (DM) Conference.
M2	Minutes	To begin transmitting FD EAMs to bombers/tankers (Positive Control Launch only) and ICBMs (availability of individual NCCS C4I systems).
M3	Minutes	To begin transmitting Force Management (FM) messages to bombers/tankers and ICBMs (availability of bomber/tanker/ICBM NCCS C4I systems).
M4	Minutes	To begin transmitting Force Management (FM) messages to bombers/tankers and ICBMs (delay in availability of NMCS and CINC C4I systems).
M5	Minutes	To begin transmitting Situation Monitoring (SM) Threat Warning (TW)/Attack Assessment(AA) messages (availability of NCCS C4I systems).
M6	Minutes	To transmit FLASH message traffic to recipients.
M7	Percent	Of articles on netted system available in heavy demand environment.
M8	Percent	Of C2 nodes have minimum required communications capabilities.
M9	Percent	Of communications networks critical to operations fully operational.
M10	Percent	Of communications outages equipped with adequate redundant communications paths to ensure timely receipt of record traffic.
M11	Percent	Of communications systems provide access by intelligence personnel to consumers
M12	Percent	Of communications systems remain operational during Intelligence Cycle
M13	Percent	Of DOD long-haul communications channels saturated.
M14	Percent	Of information system interfaces require information scanning, retyping, reformatting, or other non-direct translation methods.
M15	Percent	Of operational C4 networks and nodes available.
M16	Percent	Of operational C4 networks and nodes reliable.
M17	Percent	Of surge capacity available in DOD long haul communications.
M18	Percent	Of traffic sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.

SN 5.1.3 Maintain Global Strategic Military Information and Force Status

M1	Minutes	To access and display shared local data bases.
M2	Minutes	To access and display shared remote data bases.
M3	Minutes	To distribute reports to required organizations (after initial receipt).
M4	Minutes	To enter most current information on status of forces.
M5	Minutes	To process status information and disseminate (turnaround time).
M6	Percent	Of audited reports accurate.
M7	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel show current status.
M8	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to agencies within specified time limits.
M9	Percent	Percent of currency in generated movement information in GTN.

SN 5.1.4 Monitor Worldwide Strategic Situation

M1	Hours	To update information on other joint force, other military forces, and non-DOD agencies operating adjacent to crisis area.
M2	Instances	Of CJCS learning of emerging Pol-Mil event from source outside joint staff.
M3	Minutes	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.

M4	Minutes	To respond to a request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M5	Percent	Of joint staff POL-Mil specialists and subspecialists focus primarily on worldwide rather than theater strategic situations.

SN 5.2 Reassess Worldwide and Regional Strategic Environment

M1	Days	To complete JSR after submission of combatant commander's input.
M2	Hours	To develop strategic options (after convening CAT).
M3	Instances	Of major deficiencies (from a theater perspective) in Defense Planning Guidance.
M4	Months	To complete review of strategic options.
M5	Months	To update regional security strategy .
M6	Percent	Of combatant commander's inputs to JSR accepted by The Joint Staff.
M7	Percent	Of international agreements expired in past year for failure to review.
M8	Percent	Of political events occur with available options.

SN 5.2.1 Conduct Joint Military Net Assessments

M1	Percent	Of above-the-line forces covered by JMNA.
M2	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M3	Months	To update the JMNA (when required).

SN 5.2.2 Conduct National Military Strategy Review

M1	Days	Delay publishing Defense Planning Guidance.
M2	Instances	Of crises where NMS guidance not adequate.
M3	Percent	Of CINC recommendations forwarded for additions to areas covered by NMS.
M4	Percent	Of enemy actions, operations, or campaigns accurately forecasted.
M5	Percent	Of identified strategic sequels had developed COAs.
M6	Percent	Of issues generated by CINCs in JSR.
M7	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M8	Percent	Of theater identified major deficiencies, corrected in national military strategy review.
M9	Weeks	To prepare and forward proposal to change strategic forces and force postures (after issuance of NIE).
M10	Weeks	To review and respond to a JSR.
M11	Instances	Of National Military Strategy not adequately translating policy guidance into national military objectives.

SN 5.2.3 Review Operation Plans

M1	Hours	To provide strategic options (after CJCS issues Warning Order).
M2	Percent	Of OPLANs have identified assets shortfalls.
M3	Weeks	To propose changes to strategic forces and force postures (after issuance of NIE).

SN 5.2.4 Decide on Need for Military Action or Change

M1	Days	To promulgate Execute Order (after transmittal of CJCS Warning Order or Alert Order).
M2	Hours	To complete Phase II (Crisis Assessment) when combatant commander considers crisis time sensitive.
M3	Instances	Of CAP returning to Phase I from Phase II or canceled, only to return to Phase II.
M4	Incidents	Of international events, soliciting US military response, occur without a preplanned option.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Of expected (preplanned) I&W warning period available to combatant commander (after issuance of warning or alert order).
M6	Percent	Of political events occur with options available.

SN 5.3 Determine National Military Strategic Direction

M1	Hours	To complete accepted Staff estimate (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels (during execution).

SN 5.3.1 Issue Strategic Planning Guidance

M1	Hours	To complete accepted Staff estimate (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (during execution).

SN 5.3.2 Develop and Analyze Multinational and National Military Strategy Options

M1	Hours	To approve or deny requests for changes to ROE.
M2	Incidents	Of misunderstood ROE.
M3	Days	To submit COA's (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M4	Percent	Of accepted COA's have feasible alternatives submitted.

SN 5.3.3 Select or Modify Multinational and National Military Strategy, Plans, and Other Strategic Actions

M1	Hours	To complete accepted Staff Estimate (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (during execution).

SN 5.3.4 Review Strategic Options and Recommendations with NCA and Other Officials and Adjust

M1	Days	To submit COA's (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M2	Hours	To complete review of strategic options.
M3	Hours	To develop and provide strategic options (after CJCS issues Warning Order).
M4	Months	To complete review of strategic options.
M5	Percent	Of accepted COA's have feasible alternatives submitted.

SN 5.3.5 Set Worldwide Priorities and Allocate Resources

M1	Alternatives	Provided to the President.
M2	Alternatives	Wargamed against projected threat(s).
M3	Months	To update SecDef "Forces For" Paper.
M4	Percent	Change in defense budget for costliest alternative.
M5	Percent	Difference between optimum support force structure and actual support structure.
M6	Percent	Of amendments attached to allocation of national and Service resources, respond to clarification requests.
M7	Percent	Of current budget, actually required to support least costly alternative.
M8	Percent	Of subordinate headquarters traffic to Joint Staff J-3 requested clarification of allocation guidance.
M9	Weeks	To allocate national and Service resources (after receipt of NCA/JCS guidance).
M10	Weeks	Delay in publishing JSCP.
M11	Weeks	Delay in publishing NMS.
M12	Years	To achieve capabilities being programmed.

SN 5.3.5.1 Produce a National Military Strategy

M1	Alternatives	Provided to the President.
----	--------------	----------------------------

13 September 1996

M2	Alternatives	Wargamed against projected threat(s).
M3	Percent	Change in defense budget for costliest alternative.
M4	Percent	Difference between optimum support force structure and actual support structure.
M5	Percent	Of combatant commander's strategic issues addressed in NMS.
M6	Percent	Of unclassified NMS in agreement with classified NMS.
M7	Percent	Of current budget, actually required to support least costly alternative.
M8	Weeks	Delay in publishing NMS.
M9	Months	To complete new draft of NMS (after receipt of NCA strategic guidance or Defense policy guidance).
M10	Years	To achieve capabilities being programmed.

SN 5.3.5.2 Produce a Capabilities-Based National Strategic Plan and Assign Forces

M1	Days	To deliver draft "Forces For" Paper to OSD.
M2	Instances	Of error-based changes issued to SecDef "Forces For" Paper.
M3	Months	To produce final OPLANs based (on last JSCP).
M4	Months	To update SecDef "Forces For" Papers.
M5	Percent	Of JSCP forces dual apportioned to major planning tasks.
M6	Percent	Of JSCP tasked plans call for deterrent force option.
M7	Percent	Of JSCP tasked plans require more than SelRes callup of RC.
M8	Weeks	Delay in publishing JSCP.

SN 5.3.5.3 Allocate Forces and Resources at Execution

M1	Hours	To produce force allocation.
M2	Percent	Of amendments (attached to allocation of national and Service resources) respond to requests for clarification.
M3	Percent	Of initial combatant commander's force requests met.
M4	Percent	Of initial force allocation modified at end of first week.
M5	Percent	Of subordinate headquarters traffic to Joint Staff J-3, requested clarification of allocation guidance.
M6	Weeks	To allocate national and Service resources (after receipt of NCA/CJCS guidance).

SN 5.4 Provide Strategic Direction to Forces Worldwide

M1	Hours	To provide strategic direction to combatant commands, after receipt of Warning Order (in crisis planning).
M2	Percent	Of assigned and supporting forces commence operations on time.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commands request clarification of strategic direction.
M4	Percent	Of issued changes caused by missing or incorrect data or entries.

SN 5.4.1 Prepare and Issue Strategic Estimates, Priorities, and Joint Operation Plans

M1	Days	To develop, coordinate, and promulgate guidance and policy complying with National Guidance and Presidential directives.
M2	Hours	SOF forces conduct cross-border operations (prior to commencement of hostilities).
M3	Hours	To identify USTC controlled forces and issue Warning Order (following receipt of CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	To issue USTC Deployment Order to TCCs (following CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To issue USTC Deployment Pre-Order to TCCs (following CJCS Warning Order).
M6	Hours	To submit strategic direction for approval (after receipt of Warning Order).

13 September 1996

M7	Months	To develop combatant commander's OPLANs/OPORDs in accordance with Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
M8	Months	To develop Emergency Actions Procedures (EAP)--USSTRATCOM in support of annual EAP-CJCS revision.
M9	Months	To develop Theater Support Plans.
M10	Percent	Of operations in OPLAN conform to US and International Law.
M11	Percent	Of ROE conform to requirements.
M12	Percent	Of ROE consistent with current policy.
M13	Instances	Of ROE exceptions determined outside established procedures.

SN 5.4.2 Coordinate Support for Unified, Joint, and Multinational Operations

M1	Days	To refine TPFDD (in Crisis Action Planning).
M2	Months	To complete OPLAN coordination, from Draft OPLAN to final approval (in Deliberate Planning).

SN 5.4.3 Synchronize and Manage Global Operations and Resources

M1	Hours	To produce feasible TPFDD, after issuance of Warning Order.
M2	Months	To complete approved OPLAN with TPFDD on shelf, after issuance of JSCP.
M3	Months	To establish rotation policy.
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs reviewed within last 24 months.
M5	Percent	Of TPFDD units arrive IAW RDD.

SN 5.4.4 Prepare and Issue CJCS Orders

M1	Hours	To promulgate alert order to subordinate headquarters.
M2	Hours	To promulgate CJCS execute orders to subordinate headquarters.
M3	Hours	To promulgate warning order to subordinate headquarters.

SN 5.5 Coordinate Worldwide Information Warfare (IW)

M1	Days	To reach agreement within interagency on IW plan (after onset of a crisis).
M2	Hours	To issue IW policy (after onset of crisis).
M3	Percent	Of friendly operations disrupted.
M4	Percent	Of integrated IW operations completed as planned.

SN 5.6 Provide Public Affairs (PA) Worldwide

M1	Days	To provide Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or defense major newsworthy event.
M3	Hours	To provide Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) after crisis event.
M4	Hours	To provide to press initial DOD or Service position on breaking news story.
M5	Instances	Of errors in released information.
M6	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials accepted.
M7	Percent	Of media support requests answered.
M8	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M9	Hours	To answer requests for information from organizations, media, and private citizens.
M10	Hours	To answer requests for information from organizations.
M11	Hours	To answer requests for information from media.
M12	Days	To answer requests for information from private citizens.

M5	Percent	Of PIRs outstanding.
M6	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) filled.
M7	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) have more than one type of collection asset or resource assigned.
M8	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) included in collection plan.
M9	Hours	To coordinate a "No Strike" target with joint force headquarters J-3.
M10	Hours	To prepare CI requirement (after becoming aware of CI collection effort).
M11	Hours	To prepare collection request for newly identified PIR.

OP 2.1.4 Allocate Intelligence Resources in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	For joint force J-2 to receive report of organic collection assets from components (after arrival).
M2	Hours	To retask collection asset (After PIR satisfied).
M3	Percent	Of requests for collection or production validated.
M4	Hours	To prepare report on available collection assets.
M5	Hours	To request support from national or allied nations when joint force assets not available.

OP 2.2 Collect Operational Information

M1	Hours	To retask collection asset (After PIR satisfied).
M2	Percent	Of PIRs collected in time to meet current operational needs.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information
M5	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M6	Percent	Of targets accurately located
M7	Percent	Of time operational decisions supported by information covered by collection plan.
M8	Hours	Since most current intelligence information collected.

OP 2.2.1 Collect Information on Operational Situation

M1	Hours	To retask collection asset.(after CI PIR satisfied)
M2	Hours	For CRM to retask collection asset to outstanding PIR or PIP (after PIR satisfied).
M3	Hours	Between taskings to collection assets on new HPTs.
M4	Hours	From receipt of tasking until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond.
M5	Percent	Of collection requirements filled by joint force assets.
M6	Percent	Of collection requirements filled.
M7	Percent	Of collection which could benefit from "cross-cueing" and "tip-off," do so benefit.
M8	Percent	Of commander's area has required reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M9	Percent	Of disease non battle injury (DNBI) incurred in first month of deployment from lack of collection of medical information.
M10	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M11	Percent	Of high-payoff targets accurately located.
M12	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery for aircrews have it before flight briefing.
M13	Percent	Of non-aviation missions requiring current imagery have it prior to execution.
M14	Percent	Of PIRs covered by collection asset or request for information.
M15	Percent	Of PIRs identified during planning process covered by collection asset or request for information.
M16	Percent	Of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information.

M17	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information.
M18	Percent	Of PIRs covered by more than one collection asset.
M19	Percent	Of potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M20	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M21	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M22	Percent	Of time operational decisions required information not covered by collection plan.
M23	Instances	Of times commander made decisions without sufficient information (due to failure to collect).
M24	Percent	Of PIRs on situation outstanding.
M25	Hours	Since high priority targets were last detected, identified and located.
M26	Hours	Since most current intelligence information was collected.
M27	Hours	To fill requests for information on new HPTs during execution.
M28	Hours	To identify shortfalls in reconnaissance platforms (after development of collection plan).
M29	Percent	Of commander's area has reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M30	Minutes	To determine raid size.
M31	Minutes	For ballistic missile to be detected (after launch).
M32	NM	Beyond engagement range aircraft detected.
M33	NM	Difference between plotted and actual position of target.
M34	NM	From sensor enemy air raid detected.
M35	NM	From sensor single enemy aircraft detected.
M36	Seconds	From target detection until height confirmed.
M37	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow weapons employment.
M38	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow second engagement.
M39	Percent	Of enemy aircraft passing through coverage area detected.
M40	Percent	Of friendly returning aircraft detected.
M41	Percent	Of raids detected.
M42	Percent	Of targets lost after detection.
M43	Percent	Of targets undetected in ground clutter.
M44	Minutes	To build air picture after radar comes on line.
M45	Percent	Of targets have combat assessment data available from more than one collection platform.
M46	Percent	Of targets have more than one type of system available to perform assessment.
M47	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority One geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M48	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M49	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) Priority Three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

OP 2.2.2 Directly Support Theater Strategic Surveillance and Reconnaissance Requirements

M1	Percent	Of combatant commander and national level collection requirements satisfied by piggybacking on existing collection mission on non-interference basis.
M2	Hours	To provide theater of operations/JOA collected data to combatant command or national analysts.
M3	Hours	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet new collection requirement.

M4	Hours	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet overriding combatant commander or national new collection requirement.
----	-------	--

OP 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Operational Information

M1	Percent	Of intelligence personnel completing annual re-certification training.
M2	Percent	Raw information correctly prepared for production phase.
M3	Hours	Turnaround time to process new intelligence data.
M4	Percent	Of collected information which can be, processed in theater of operations/JOA.

OP 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Increase in processing time when exploitation is concurrent with processing.
M2	Percent	Of collected information which can be, processed in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of collected information processed within 24 hours.
M4	Hours	To provide intelligence analysts hard copy formal report of information obtained in processing.
M5	Minutes	To provide intelligence analysts voice or electronic mail report of information.
M6	Minutes	To read wet film (after recover of aircraft or other photo system).

OP 2.3.2 Collate Information

M1	Percent	Of analysis actions returned by joint force all source analyst for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of joint force intelligence products lack adequate correlation of information to provide insight into joint implications of subject.
M3	Percent	Of time joint force intelligence products updated with available information not previously correlated.

OP 2.3.3 Correlate Information

M1	Data Points	Assembled on single subject.
M2	Percent	Of joint force reported information graded as credible.
M3	Percent	Of joint force reported information graded as highly reliable.
M4	Percent	Of available separate sources used by joint force J-2 analysts to increase credibility of information.

OP 2.4 Produce Operational Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products

M1	Hours	To produce and disseminate joint force DISUM (after arrival in joint operations area).
M2	Hours	To produce and disseminate component INTSUMs (after arrival in joint operations area).
M3	Minutes	To brief operations Command Duty Officer (after issuing an Advisory Report).
M4	Minutes	To disseminate an Advisory Report (after observation of activity).
M5	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.

OP 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret Operational Information

M1	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged accurate in light of event.
M2	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged complete, based upon requests for clarification or expansion.
M3	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged relevant to military situation.
M4	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged timely by users.
M5	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged useable by users.

OP 2.4.1.1 Identify Operational Issues and Threats

M1	Hours	For information on APOD/SPOD capacity to be available to planners (after activation of joint force).
M2	Hours	To disseminate Advisory Report (after observation of significant event).
M3	Hours	Between joint force updates of enemy order of battle.
M4	Hours	Between joint force updates of friendly force status.
M5	Hours	To reassess new information on operational area.
M6	Instances	Of civil disturbances requiring intervention or disrupting operations anticipated by joint force.
M7	Percent	Of joint force mapping and terrain data base that is accurate.
M8	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled , or modified due to unforeseen information about operational area.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment capability deployed to theater of operations/JOA redundant with that readily available on local economy.
M10	Hours	To reassess new threat information.
M11	Days	Since last joint force assessment of information on operational area completed.
M12	Hours	Since last joint force assessment of threat information completed.

OP 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Operational Capabilities, Course of Action, and Intentions

M1	Percent	Of Enemy operational centers of gravity correctly identified.
M2	Percent	Of enemy operational branches and sequels correctly identified (during planning).
M3	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified.
M4	Percent	Of enemy targets or vulnerabilities identified within targeting cycle.
M5	Percent	Of false alarms in forecasting significant enemy actions.
M6	Percent	Of joint force attacks on enemy vulnerabilities have projected effect.
M7	Percent	Of joint force identified target categories produce desired result on enemy.
M8	Percent	Of joint force operations with correctly identified enemy operational and tactical center of gravity (prior to selection of COA).
M9	Percent	Of new processed intelligence data integrated within targeting cycle.
M10	Hours	Required to identify enemy operational and tactical center of gravity.

OP 2.4.2 Prepare Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To request organic collection asset reports (after assignment of unit to JTF/joint force).
M2	Hours	To prepare and submit initial organic collection report (after designation of JTF/joint force).
M3	Percent	Of time intelligence summary preparation delayed until late for Crisis Action Planning Phase 6.
M4	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.
M5	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M6	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M7	Percent	Of Priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M8	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M9	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.

13 September 1996

M10	Percent	Of Priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
-----	---------	---

OP 2.4.2.1 Provide Indications and Warning for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	Between receipt of significant information and updates of indications and warning conditions.
M2	Hours	Lead time in joint force prediction of enemy actions.
M3	Percent	Of Commander's Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) and Attack Warnings issued and disseminated.
M4	Percent	Of enemy actions with joint force provided warning.
M5	Percent	Of Threat Indicators maintained and evaluated during declared DEFCON increases accurate.
M6	Minutes	Required to transmit indication or warning within JOA after identification or receipt.
M7	Minutes	To submit intelligence portion of Commander's Situation Report (SITREP).

OP 2.4.2.2 Provide Current Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of Intelligence Reports (INTREPs) submitted within established criteria.
M2	Percent	Of INTREPs submitted with accuracy of event location, times, and synopsis to allow proper action.
M3	Minutes	To brief operations Command Duty Officer (after issuing an Advisory Report).
M4	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.
M5	Hours	To produce and disseminate component INTSUMs (after arrival).
M6	Hours	To produce and disseminate joint force DISUM (after arrival).
M7	Percent	Of weather support provided to assigned and gained units accurate.

OP 2.4.2.3 Provide General Military Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA.

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Days	Between hard copy updates of reports on enemy military capabilities.
M3	Percent	Difference between actual enemy military strength, compared to that reported in intelligence reports.
M4	Percent	Of enemy units identified in combat, compared to units identified in intelligence reports.
M5	Percent	Of forces incapacitated at least once by weather conditions not previously identified.
M6	Percent	Of forces incapacitated by disease not identified.
M7	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces answered by data in joint force intelligence data bases.

OP 2.4.2.4 Provide Target Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified by joint force targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of high priority targets (HPTs) mensurated coordinates allow attack without visual update.
M3	Percent	Of high priority targets (HPTs) with correct location data.
M4	Percent	Of selected joint force High Priority Targets (HPTs) have mensurated coordinates available.
M5	Percent	Of sorties diverted to higher priority targets discovered inside execution cycle.
M6	Percent	Of target locations verified by joint force before next targeting cycle.
M7	Hours	To provide intelligence update to SOF on target situation.
M8	Percent	Targets correctly located and identified.
M9	Percent	Of enemy command posts known and located sufficiently to permit lethal attack.

M10	Percent	Of enemy command posts known and located sufficiently to permit non-lethal attack.
M11	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems identified by friendly forces.

OP 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate Operational Intelligence

M1	Percent	Of time intelligence summaries disseminated late to joint force CAT during Crisis Action Planning, Phase 6.
M2	Minutes	To disseminate Advisory Report (after observation of activity).
M3	Hours	To disseminate intelligence updates (upon completion of assessment).
M4	Minutes	To pass prepared intelligence to joint force commander and staff.
M5	Minutes	To prepare intelligence for joint force commander and staff.
M6	Percent	Of required Priority One geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M7	Percent	Of required Priority Two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M8	Percent	Of required Priority Three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.

OP 2.5.1 Provide Intelligence for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of responses to Requests for Information (RFIs) provide needed information to required accuracy.
M2	Percent	Of time mission essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established criteria.
M3	Percent	Of time intelligence summaries disseminated late to joint force CAT during Crisis Action Planning, Phase 6.
M4	Minutes	To disseminate Advisory Report (after observation of activity).
M5	Hours	To disseminate intelligence updates (upon completion of assessment).
M6	Minutes	To pass prepared intelligence to joint force commander and staff.
M7	Minutes	To prepare intelligence for joint force commander and staff.

OP 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to Theater of Operations/JOA Planners and Decision Makers

M1	Hours	For joint force intelligence producers to follow-up or contact customers during planning or execution.
M2	Percent	Of joint force intelligence producers have recorded or posted their customer organization, name and phone number or EMail address.
M3	Percent	Of time joint force intelligence producer spends on direct contact with his or her customer.
M4	Hours	Since intelligence producer last contacted or spoke with his or her customer (during a crisis).
M5	Minutes	To clarify issues in intelligence products furnished by joint force intelligence producers
M6	Hours	To disseminate updates upon completion of assessment.
M7	Hours	To provide supplemental information to users for new issues prompted by a joint force intelligence product.

OP 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of comments critical of joint force J-2 performance represent repeat comments.
M2	Percent	Of customer complaints result in change within joint force J-2 or explanation to customer of why no change.
M3	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations for improvement implemented by joint force J-2 within 90 days.

M4	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations specifically directed to individual responsible for implementing suggested changes.
M5	Percent	Of intelligence training materials certified accurate by Unit Chief of Intelligence.
M6	Percent	Of joint force intelligence production programs include a customer survey.
M7	Percent	Of joint force J-2 offices with self inspection program.
M8	Days	Since customer comments or observations last passed to joint force J-2 organizations and personnel by DJ-2 or J-2 inspectors.

OP 3 Employ Operational Firepower

M1	Minutes	To attack target after most recent information on target provided.
M2	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M3	Percent	Of missiles, rockets, and other long range attack systems successfully engaged targets.

OP 3.1 Conduct Joint Force Targeting

M1	Hours	To develop attack plan after identification of HPT.
M2	Hours	To issue CJTF's HPT categories (after CINC's Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To issue CJTF's Prohibited Target Guidance (after CINC's Warning Order).
M4	Hours	To issue FSC Measures Guidance (after CINC's Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To pass JTCB Guidance to targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC) (before ATO-cycle begins).
M6	Hours	To produce Joint Force Commander apportionment guidance (after CINC's Warning Order).
M7	Percent	Of desired results achieved (by expected conclusion of given phase or time line).
M8	Percent	Of desired results achieved by theater operational firepower (within specified time/phase).
M9	Percent	Of JTCB target priorities differ from CJTF, CINC and NCA Guidance.
M10	Percent	Of selected targets for which accurate coordinates available.
M11	Percent	Of JTCB selected targets reviewed for political ramifications.
M12	Percent	Of targets susceptible to non-lethal kill allocated to non-lethal attack systems.
M13	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems targeted by friendly forces.

OP 3.1.1 Establish Joint Force Targeting Guidance

M1	Days	In advance of attack, targeting strategy established.
M2	Percent	Of desired results achieved (by expected conclusion of given phase or time line).
M3	Percent	Of HPTs assigned to more than one type attack system.

OP 3.1.2 Assign Joint/Multinational Operational Firepower Resources

M1	Hours	To assign firepower resources, once targets identified during planning phase.
M2	Hours	To complete targeting cycle planning.
M3	Instances	Of theater strategic firepower assignments appealed to JFC.
M4	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by joint forces as non-ATO targets.
M5	Percent	Of HPTs covered by at least one attack system.
M6	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified awaiting firepower support.
M7	Percent	Of land, air, and sea delivery systems' targets of opportunity coordinated by JTCB.
M8	Percent	Of attacking systems must penetrate to target to deliver ordnance.

OP 3.1.3 Develop Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To select targets for attack (once intelligence data available) (during planning phase).
M2	Percent	Of decisive points discovered within execution cycle evaluated.
M3	Percent	Of effort diverted by JFACC or Joint Force Commander to higher priority category.

OP 3.1.4 Prioritize High-Payoff and High-Value Targets

M1	Hours	To complete prioritization (once intelligence data considered).
M2	Percent	Of effort diverted by JFACC or Joint Force Commander to higher priority category discovered after allocation, but inside execution cycle.
M3	Percent	Of operational HPTs discovered within execution cycle result in reprioritized target list.

OP 3.1.5 Publish Tasking Order(s) for Employment of Air Assets and Other Means

M1	Hours	To assign firepower resources (once targets identified).
M2	Instances	Of SAPs not integrated with non-SAP systems.
M3	Percent	Of ATO addressees receive ATO on time.
M4	Percent	Of ATO missions contain errors.
M5	Percent	Of attacks deconflicted with friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs attacked with inappropriate munitions.
M7	Percent	Of mismatch between target sets and assigned strike assets.

OP 3.1.6 Conduct Operational Combat Assessment

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute restrike, awaiting combat assessment .
M2	Hours	To complete combat assessment.
M3	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M4	Minutes	To provide initial combat assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M6	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of effectiveness.
M7	Percent	Of targets have combat assessment data available.
M8	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.

OP 3.1.6.1 Assess Battle Damage on Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute reattack (following receipt of assessment).
M2	Hours	To complete full assessment of attacks after TOT.
M3	Hours	To make initial assessment of attacks after TOT.
M4	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Minutes	To provide initial battle damage assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M7	Percent	Of targets have BDA based on more than one type of system.
M8	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.
M9	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of effectiveness.

OP 3.1.6.2 Assess Munitions Effects on Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute reattack (following receipt of munitions effects (ME) assessment).
M2	Hours	To complete munitions effects assessment after attack.
M3	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M4	Minutes	To provide initial munitions effects assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs require reattack.
M7	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M8	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of munitions effectiveness.

M9	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.
----	---------	--------------------------------------

OP 3.1.6.3 Assess Reattack Requirement

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute other options.
M2	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M3	Minutes	To assess reattack requirement (after attack).
M4	Minutes	To provide initial reattack assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Percent	Of HPT attacks unsuccessful.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M7	Percent	Of HPTs require reattack.
M8	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M9	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of reattack requirement..
M10	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.

OP 3.1.7 Develop Fire Support Coordination Measures

M1	Instances	Of collateral damage.
M2	Instances	Of fratricide.
M3	Percent	Of high payoff targets destroyed subsequently attacked by another component.
M4	Percent	Of SOF missions executed with required notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M5	Percent	Of target attacks violate coordination measures or procedures.

OP 3.2 Attack Operational Targets

M1	Minutes	To get ordnance on target after initiation of task
M2	Percent	Execution of missions requested by components.
M3	Percent	Of high priority missions executed within specified time.
M4	Percent	Of maneuver forces secure assigned objectives.
M5	Percent	Of missions flown/fired achieve desired target damage.
M6	Percent	Of operational fires on time in support of maneuver forces.
M7	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked during operation.
M8	Percent	On time of missions with given times on target.
M9	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems engaged/destroyed by friendly forces.

OP 3.2.1 Attack Operational Land/Maritime Targets

M1	Minutes	To complete attack after target identification.
M2	Percent	Of attacking systems deliver ordnance.
M3	Percent	Of enemy desert per day.
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded.
M5	Percent	Of enemy troops surrender.
M6	Percent	Of friendly COAs altered or discarded.

OP 3.2.2 Conduct Nonlethal Attack on Operational Targets

M1	Hours	To initiate PSYOP activities (after warning order.).
M2	Minutes	To complete non-lethal attack on target (after initiation.).
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions consistent with IW plan objectives.
M4	Percent	Of joint force targets attacked with lethal means also attacked with PSYOP.
M5	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked.
M6	Percent	Of PSYOP objectives accomplished.

M7	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (after implementation of EW plan).
M8	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (at implementation of EW plan).
M9	Total	Enemy troops per day surrender, defect, or desert.

OP 3.2.2.1 Employ PSYOP in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	To initiate PSYOP campaign (after warning order).
M2	Hours	For psychological operations units to arrive in theater (after joint force activation).
M3	Hours	For PSYOP campaign to begin (after joint force activation).
M4	Percent	Of JOA covered by friendly force mass media.
M5	Percent	Of PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host-nation.
M6	Percent	Of selected targets for which other attack systems were integrated with PSYOP (e.g., PSYOP and Offensive Air Operations).
M7	Percent	Of target audience exhibits behavior in accordance with joint force commander's desires.
M8	Percent	Of target audience reached by more than one media in PSYOP campaign.

OP 3.2.2.2 Employ Electronic Attack (EA) in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To initiate electronic attack (after ordered).
M2	Percent	Of electronic attacks achieve desired effects on enemy.
M3	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks conducted.
M4	Percent	Reduction in enemy communications emissions (after EW attack).
M5	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (after implementation of EW plan).
M6	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (at implementation of EW plan).
M7	Percent	Of enemy air defense capabilities neutralized by nonlethal means.

OP 3.2.2.3 Employ Information Attack in Theater of Operations/JOA.

M1	Percent	Of OPLANS, OPORDERS, and component plans, have integrated plan for attack of adversary information system.
M2	Percent	Of operational phases, include information system attack plan.
M3	Percent	Of all information system targets evaluated as candidates for attack.
M4	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information system targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M5	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems without fratricide on friendly systems.
M6	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems integrated into daily ATO.
M7	Percent	Of adversary information systems included in target lists.
M8	Percent	Of adversary backup and alternate information systems attacked concurrent with attacks on primary systems.
M9	Percent	More time than allocated in campaign plan, needed to achieve desired damage levels on adversary information systems.
M10	Percent	Degradation in enemy information processing capacity after attack.
M11	Hours	For impact of information system attack to be reflected in enemy operation.
M12	Hours	Results of information system attack can be sustained by friendly forces.

OP 3.2.2.4 Conduct Nonlethal Attack on Personnel, Equipment, and Installations.

M1	Percent	Of OPLANS, OPORDERS, and component plans, have integrated nonlethal plan.
M2	Percent	Of all targets evaluated as candidates for nonlethal attack.

13 September 1996

M3	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks on selected targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M4	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks on selected targets, achieve desired nonlethal effect.
M5	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks integrated into daily ATO.
M6	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks without lethal results.
M7	Hours	Until nonlethal attack options developed (from Warning Order).
M8	Percent	Of decrease in support for adversary activity in country of operation resulting from nonlethal efforts.
M9	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks require lethal support.
M10	Percent	Of nonlethal attacks result in death or injury to friendly employing forces.

OP 3.2.3 Attack Aircraft and Missiles (Offensive Counterair)

M1	Percent	Of attacking systems deliver ordnance.
M2	Percent	Of enemy air actions require discard of friendly COAs.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded.
M4	Percent	Of HPT attacks lack integration of fires assets.
M5	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked.
M6	Missiles	Launched per day from enemy land-based mobile launchers.

OP 3.2.4 Suppress Enemy Air Defenses

M1	Percent	Of enemy air defenses destroyed.
M2	Percent	Of friendly air losses to enemy air defenses.
M3	Percent	Of friendly air sorties attacked by enemy air defense.

OP 3.2.5 Interdict Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces
M2	Percent	Disruption of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M3	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M4	Percent	Of attacks having collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander.
M5	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed (before effective use against friendly forces).
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.
M10	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed by joint force interdiction outside JOA/theater of operations.

OP 3.2.5.1 Conduct Air Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Disruption of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M3	Percent	Of attacks have collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander.
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M5	Percent	Of enemy material diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

M10	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces
-----	---------	---

OP 3.2.5.2 Conduct Surface/Subsurface Firepower Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M2	Percent	Of attacks having collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed by joint force interdiction outside JOA/theater of operations.
M5	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M6	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M7	Percent	Of targets attacked achieve desired effects .
M8	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

OP 3.2.5.3 Conduct Special Operations Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets

M1	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M3	Percent	Of attacks have collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or theater commander
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M5	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed outside JOA/theater of operations.
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

OP 3.2.6 Provide Firepower in Support of Operational Maneuver

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M2	Percent	Of operational maneuvers with faulty operational fire support.
M3	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M4	Percent	Of target attacks in support of operational maneuver cause fratricide.

OP 3.2.7 Synchronize Operational Firepower

M1	Hours	To reattack operational target.
M2	Percent	Of assets used for short notice retargeting (flexibility) in support of maneuver.
M3	Percent	Of attacks deconflicted with friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of attacks on enemy targets achieve desired effects.
M5	Percent	Of attacks on HPT's lack integration of fires assets.
M6	Percent	Of destroyed HPTs subsequently engaged by fires from another component.
M7	Percent	Of friendly casualties by fratricide.
M8	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by joint force as non-ATO targets.
M9	Percent	Of operational targets attacked by lethal and non-lethal together.
M10	Percent	Of SOF missions executed with appropriate notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M11	Percent	Of strategic national missions require theater/JOA support.
M12	Percent	Satisfaction of theater/JOA support for strategic national missions.

OP 4 Provide Operational Support

M1	Days	From request until requested item received in theater
M2	Tons	Of backlogged support requirements
M3	Percent	Of required logistics in place to support campaign.
M4	Days	Of supply in theater.

OP 4.1 Coordinate Supply of Arms, Ammunition, and Equipment in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	After CJCS Warning Order to determine availability of suitable munitions within theater.
M2	Days	After required date that replenishment stocks delivered.
M3	Hours	To develop replenishment concept (after receipt of Warning Order).
M4	Percent	Of fire missions with munitions available on schedule.
M5	Percent	Of high priority targets with preferred munitions available.
M6	Percent	Of major equipment shortfalls cause unit mission delays.
M7	Percent	Of minimum safety level of build up stocks maintained at staging areas.
M8	Percent	Of required reception and onward movement support available.

OP 4.2 Synchronize Supply of Fuel in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To develop replenishment concept (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Gallons per day	Of fuel delivered to theater.
M3	Percent	Of available host-nation POL replenishment and distribution assets integrated into operational planning.
M4	Percent	Of destroyed fuel deliveries anticipated and compensated for.
M5	Percent	Of planning reflect petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) concepts of operations.
M6	Percent	Of refueling capability available at time and place needed.
M7	Percent	Of total refueling assets available to support operational forces.
M8	Days	Operational delay (due to fuel shortages).
M9	Days	Supply of required fuel in place to support campaign.
M10	Percent	Of fuel delivery capacity available.

OP 4.3 Provide for Maintenance of Equipment in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	To develop maintenance concept and policies (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Hours	For maintenance facilities to be available in theater of operations/JOA rear area (after receipt of Warning Order).
M3	Percent	Of enemy material collected, classified and properly disposed.
M4	Percent	Of damaged equipment salvaged.
M5	Percent	Of equipment failures successfully repaired.
M6	Percent	Of equipment repaired at appropriate level with evacuation to higher level.
M7	Percent	Of operations address collection, classification, and disposition of salvage.
M8	Percent	Of operations address collection, classification, and disposition of enemy material.
M9	Percent	Of support policies and procedures were completed prior to execution.
M10	Hours	To obtain needed parts for repairs.
M11	Hours	To obtain replacement parts.
M12	Hours	To repair equipment.

OP 4.4 Coordinate Support for Forces in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of personnel replacement requirements not met.
M2	Percent	Of personnel support can be contracted.
M3	Percent	Of replacements adequately trained to perform assigned duties.

13 September 1996

M4	Percent	Of units whose actual manning meets or exceeds authorized levels.
M5	Days	To identify personnel replacement requirements.
M6	Days	To obtain replacement personnel and assign to unit.

OP 4.4.1 Coordinate Field Services Requirements

M1	Days	Between access to laundry and bath facilities.
M2	Days	Between delivery of mail to unit level.
M3	Days	Delay in search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel (due to lack of graves registration system, units).
M4	Percent	Of operations include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M5	Percent	Of personal daily water requirement being provided.
M6	Percent	Of personnel provided with required individual clothing and equipment.
M7	Percent	Of personnel receiving at least one hot meal per day.
M8	Months	To establish R&R facilities in protracted operation.
M9	Weeks	To establish Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO).
M10	Days	To establish theater of operations/JOA R&R policy (from recognition of need).

OP 4.4.1.1 Coordinate Theater of Operations/JOA Support for Personnel

M1	Percent	Difference between components in providing field services for personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Percent	Difference between planned field services requirements and actual requirements, in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of planned capacity of field services (bath and laundry) achieved in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Percent	Of required production rate of potable water achieved in theater of operations/JOA.
M5	Percent	Personnel hospitalized for dehydration in theater of operations/JOA.
M6	Days	To coordinate bath and laundry operations with medical authorities.
M7	Days	To estimate non-material support requirements for military, DOD civilian, qualifying contractor, and other personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M8	Hours	To rig equipment or supplies for airdrop in theater of operations/JOA.
M9	Days	To update field service requirements based on changes in theater population.
M10	Personnel	Can be rigged for a single airdrop.
M11	Tons	Of equipment can be rigged for a single airdrop.

OP 4.4.1.2 Manage Mortuary Affairs in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Accuracy in maintaining records of deceased/missing personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Percent	Accuracy in maintaining records of personal effects in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Accuracy in processing personal effects of deceased/missing in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Days	Delay in disposition of remains while awaiting decision on Mortuary Affairs policy.
M5	Percent	Of instances of release of identification of deceased/missing held up until NOK notified
M6	Percent	Of operations include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M7	Instances	Of release of identification of deceased/missing before NOK notified.
M8	Percent	Of remains correctly identified.

M9	Percent	Of remains re-identified after disposition.
M10	Days	To coordinate transportation support to return remains to CONUS.
M11	Days	To establish temporary interment facilities.
M12	Days	To identify remains at unit level.
M13	Days	To identify remains of recently deceased unidentified personnel at Theater Mortuary Evacuation Point (TMEP).
M14	Days	To inter remains in temporary sites in theater of operations/JOA (after recovery and identification).
M15	Percent	Of Joint Mortuary Affairs Office tasks included in planning.
M16	Days	To process remains from recovery through evacuation to CONUS.
M17	Days	To recover remains at end of firefight/battle.
M18	Months	To recover remains commencing at end of hostilities.
M19	Months	To recover remains from temporary interment sites in theater of operations/JOA and evacuate to CONUS (after end of operations in theater).
M20	Days	To search for, recover, identify, care for, and evacuate or inter deceased personnel (without graves registration units).

OP 4.4.2 Provide for Personnel Services

M1	Days	To establish procedures with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for handling, treatment and transfer of POWs (after Warning Order).
M2	Days	For Joint Force Chaplain to research and interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to JOA.
M3	Percent	Of military personnel receiving pay on schedule.
M4	Percent	Of military personnel with access to R&R facilities.
M5	Percent	Of required aerial mail terminals and military post offices established within planned timelines.
M6	Percent	Of required component personnel services capabilities in place and operational.
M7	Days	To obtain legal services upon request.
M8	Hours	To provide legal review of proposed HNS agreement or modification.
M9	Days	For review of CA plan by competent legal authority

OP 4.4.3 Provide for Health Services in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of personnel in treatment pipeline accounted for.
M2	Percent	Of casualties returned to duty.
M3	Percent	Of casualties die.
M4	Per/day	Provided medical treatment.
M5	Hours	To begin surgery after receiving a wound or injury.
M6	Hours	Turnaround time for medical lab serology and other technical lab testing results.

OP 4.4.3.1 Manage Joint Blood Program in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Of accuracy in submitting Blood Reports to ASBPO (based on daily estimates of theater requirements).
M2	Units	Of required blood products per initial admission maintained in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of daily Blood Reports submitted from AJBPO to JBPO by prescribed times.
M4	Percent	Of daily Blood Reports submitted from JBPO to ASBPO by prescribed times.
M5	Percent	Of required blood product on hand.
M6	Days	To coordinate initial activities between area Joint Blood Program Office(s) and Armed Services Blood Program Office.
M7	Days	To establish Area Joint Blood Program offices as required in Theater of Operations/JOA.

13 September 1996

M8	Hours	To establish Blood Transshipment Center(s) in Theater of Operations/JOA (after organizational C-Day).
M9	Days	To establish system for collection, storage, and distribution of blood products in Theater of Operations/JOA.
M10	Days	To initially coordinate blood requirements and distribution of blood and blood products to support all BSUs and MTFs within AJBPO area (regardless of service component).
M11	Percent	Of blood products in system which must be disposed.

OP 4.4.3.2 Manage Flow of Casualties in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Of GPMRC generated plans and schedules modified to meet requirements of theater of operations/JOA.
M2	Percent	Of patients not evacuated within theater evacuation policy time limit.
M3	Days	To establish Theater Patient Movement Requirement Center (TPMRC) in theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Hours	To formulate and recommend patient evacuation policy.
M5	Days	To initially coordinate patient evacuation activities among components.
M6	Days	To initially coordinate patient evacuation activities between TPMRC and Global Patient Movement Requirement Center (GPMRC).
M7	Percent	Of US joint force personnel awaiting emergency aeromedical in operations area received it.

OP 4.4.3.3 Manage Health Services Resources in Theater of Operation/JOA

M1	Percent	Difference in bed space and level of medical supplies among joint force components.
M2	Percent	Of civilian internees assisted by joint force medical units.
M3	Percent	Of DPs assisted by joint force medical units.
M4	Percent	Of EPWs assisted by joint force medical units.
M5	Percent	Of injured or incapacitated personnel returned to duty.
M6	Percent	Of personnel admitted to an MTF on a given day remain at MTF until RTD.
M7	Percent	Of personnel incapacitated by non combat injuries and illness.
M8	Percent	Of required patient bed spaces actually available.
M9	Percent	Of US national private citizens needing emergency medical assistance receive it.
M10	Hours	To establish liaison between Joint Force Surgeon and joint force component surgeons.
M11	Days	To expand MTFs to full capacity.
M12	Days	To publish estimates of medical sustainment and anticipated resupply requirements (after arrival of Joint Force HQ medical staff).

OP 4.4.4 Reconstitute Forces

M1	Days	Necessary to reconstitute combat attrited unit.
M2	Percent	Of reorganized/regenerated organizational personnel fully trained and qualified.
M3	Percent	Of salvage and battle damage repair conducted with in-theater forces.

OP 4.4.5 Train Joint Forces and Personnel

M1	Days	For unit to begin training (upon arrival in theater).
M2	Hours	To establish required training program (from mission change).
M3	Percent	Of METL, on which unit is proficient.
M4	Months	Since commander's JMETL last updated.
M5	Hours	To submit first crisis action status reports after unit notification.

OP 4.4.6 Provide Religious Ministry Support in JOA

M1	Percent	Of deviation from Service criteria for assignment of chapel assistants.
M2	Percent	Of major military locations with services for all major denominations available on weekly basis.
M3	Percent	Of authorized chaplains assigned and present for duty.
M4	Percent	Of chaplains time spent with military personnel in work areas.
M5	Percent	Of civilian internees receive ministry and care.
M6	Percent	Of deceased in mass casualty event receive final ministry.
M7	Percent	Of deployed personnel with access to counseling by clergy.
M8	Percent	Of deployed personnel with access to religious services.
M9	Percent	Of EPWs receiving religious ministrations.
M10	Percent	Of hospital casualties seen weekly or more by Chaplains.
M11	Instances	Of hospital death without chaplain presence.
M12	Percent	Of injured in a mass casualty event receive ministry.
M13	Percent	Of joint force personnel unable to celebrate major religious holidays.
M14	Percent	Of joint force religious activities being adequately supplied.
M15	Percent	Of memorial services conducted within JOA vice home station
M16	Percent	Of NGOs which Joint Force Chaplain has established liaison.
M17	Percent	Of PVOs which Joint Force Chaplain has established liaison.
M18	Percent	Of religious faith groups in joint force receiving balanced coverage throughout JOA.
M19	Months	Since last Command Chaplain survey of morale within joint force in JOA.
M20	Hours	To receive counseling, support and comfort from time of request.

OP 4.5 Manage Logistic Support in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of ammo availability compared to requirements.
M2	Percent	Of required support material distributed at time and place required.
M3	Percent	Of supplies available compared to requirements.
M4	Percent	Of total fuel available compared to requirements.
M5	Percent	Of total supplies moved in JOA.

OP 4.5.1 Provide for Movement Services in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	ACL filled for in-theater airlift sorties (not including staging and backhaul).
M2	Hours	For JMC (Joint Movement Center) to begin operation (upon arrival in theater).
M3	Percent	Of airfields with material handling equipment (MHE).
M4	Percent	Of in-theater airlift sorties (not including staging and backhaul) flying at 90% ACL or better.
M5	Percent	Of LZs with material handling equipment (MHE).
M6	Percent	Of scheduled transport movements accomplished on schedule.
M7	Ton miles	Of supplies and equipment transported per day.
M8	PAX/day	Transported in support of operations.

OP 4.5.2 Supply Operational Forces

M1	Days	To develop concept of replenishment requirements (after receipt of Warning Order).
M2	Days	In advance of shortfalls constrain identified.
M3	Percent	Of replenishment stocks delivered on time.
M4	Percent	Of shortfalls in supply have acceptable alternatives.
M5	Percent	Of required supplies delivered.
M6	Percent	Of required reception and onward movement support available at time and place required.

M7	Percent	Of required supplies assured to be available when and where need.
M8	Days	Of supplies stockpiled to support campaign.
M9	Days	Of sustainment supply supported by available facilities.
M10	Tons/Day	Supplies delivered to operational forces.
M11	Days	To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels (of supply).
M12	Percent	Of Priority One geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M13	Percent	Of Priority Two geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M14	Percent	Of Priority Three geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).

OP 4.5.3 Recommend Evacuation Policy and Procedures for Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of US joint force personnel evacuated in 24 hour. period
M2	Weeks	Since evacuation plans were updated for OA

OP 4.5.4 Coordinate Recovery and Salvage

M1	Percent	Of total losses, items recovered.
M2	Percent	Of items of hazardous material disposed of IAW appropriate regulations.
M3	Weeks	To appropriately disposed of hazardous material.
M4	Percent	Of items recovered salvaged for further use.
M5	Percent	Of items returned to rear areas for additional salvage work.
M6	Percent	Of increase in combat capability.
M7	Weeks	To conduct salvage.

OP 4.6 Build and Maintain Sustainment Bases

M1	Days	Between arrival of building supplies and equipment and construction of sustainment facilities.
M2	Percent	Of facilities adequately maintained.
M3	Percent	Of overall cargo and equipment deliveries accommodated by sustainment base.
M4	Square feet/day	Of permanent facilities emplaced or constructed.
M5	Percent	Of required installation throughput capacity available at execution.
M6	Percent	Of supplies under weatherproof cover at sustainment bases.
M7	Square feet/day	Of temporary facilities emplaced or constructed.
M8	Days	To complete construction of sustainment facilities.
M9	Days	To initiate construction of facilities (from final project approval and authorization).

OP 4.6.1 Determine Number and Location of Sustaining Bases in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Of required sustainment personnel and equipment in place to maintain logistics support.
M2	Percent	Of required sustainment facilities available at execution.
M3	Percent	Of required supplies actually delivered at execution.
M4	Percent	Of theater level sustainment equipment and supplies protected from elements.
M5	Hours	Required to provide information on sustainment bases to combatant commander, upon request.

OP 4.6.2 Provide Civil-Military Engineering

M1	Percent	Of supplies under weatherproof cover.
M2	Percent	Of tasks correctly assigned (correct engineers/location/time).
M3	Percent	Of theater level maintenance facilities protected from elements.

13 September 1996

M4	Days	To construct theater field hospital after forces identified and marshaled.
M5	Days	To reestablish damaged LOCs.
M6	Days	To restore essential utilities in rear areas.
M7	Days	To restore APOD to handle required shipping.
M8	Days	To restore SPOD to handle required shipping.

OP 4.6.3 Expand Capacity of PODs and Allocate Space in the Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Tons/Day	Increase in POD throughput capacity (to support current operation).
M2	Days	To achieve required POD clearance capacity.
M3	Days	To expand POD throughput capacity to meet required levels.

OP 4.6.4 Provide Law Enforcement and Prisoner Control

M1	Casualties/day	Among EPWs detained by friendly forces.
M2	EPWs	Detained by friendly forces awaiting final disposition.
M3	Instances/ Week	Involving off-duty US military personnel that also involve alcohol or drugs.
M4	Instances/ Week	Of accidents involving military vehicles.
M5	Instances/ Week	Of crimes reported.
M6	Percent	Of crimes/incidents resolved within 30 days.
M7	Percent	Of EPW compounds guarded by security forces versus combat troops.
M8	Percent	Of EPW movements to collection points conducted by security versus combat unit personnel.
M9	Percent	Of felony cases cleared within first month.
M10	Percent	Of requests for rail and road movement escorts met.
M11	Percent	Of security units performing in secondary role as infantry.
M12	Percent	Of security force requirement available to meet operational needs.
M13	Months	Since EPW policy last reviewed by legal personnel.
M14	Hours	EPWs detained for final disposition.
M15	Instances	Of law and order incidents not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.

OP 4.6.5 Provide for Real Estate Management

M1	Percent	Change in quality of local environmental conditions from Joint Force solid and liquid waste management.
M2	Percent	Of commercial price paid for real estate transaction.
M3	Percent	Of difference between market value of real estate and cost paid by US forces.
M4	Percent	Of real estate/real property acquired by lease or Host Nation donation versus short term rental .
M5	Percent	Of real estate/real property assets acquired to support operational campaign later found to be unsuitable or inappropriate to original purpose.
M6	Percent	Of records and titles for real estate acquired by joint force cleared by end of Joint Force operation.
M7	Percent	Of Service components with authority to conduct real estate transactions.
M8	Days	To coordinate (within joint force headquarters) component requests for use of real estate in support of operational campaign.
M9	Days	To correlate component requests for real estate purchases to eliminate component duplication of effort.
M10	Days	To prioritize component requests for real estate purchases in support of operational campaign

M11	Days	To prioritize component requests for use of real property assets in support of operational campaign.
-----	------	--

OP 4.6.6 Manage Contracts and Contract Personnel

M1	Weeks	Delay in providing support services to theater forces (awaiting finalization of contracts).
M2	Weeks	Delay in providing support services to theater forces (awaiting required changes to contracts or award of new contracts).
M3	Percent	Increase in contract costs in crisis or conflict.
M4	Percent	Addition to military/DOD civilian personnel monitoring contractor performance in active theater of operations/JOA (crisis or conflict).
M5	Percent	Of contracting officers deploy with appropriate warrants.
M6	Percent	Of contracts terminated for cause (after issuance of more than one cure notice).
M7	Percent	Of contracts with more than one current cure notice against them.
M8	Percent	Of theater support resources required to support individual contractor personnel in theater of operations/JOA.
M9	Days	To include contractor representatives in theater of operations/JOA sustainment planning.
M10	Days	To modify existing contract deliverables and scope(s) of effort to support crisis or conflict requirements.
M11	Weeks	To receive and review contractor comments on theater sustainment plans and adequacy of existing contracts to meet theater sustainment requirements in peacetime.
M12	Hours	To receive and review contractor comments on theater sustainment plans and adequacy of existing contracts to meet theater sustainment requirements in crisis or war.
M13	Hours	To review existing contracts for adequacy in supporting requirement in theater of operations/JOA in a crisis.

OP 4.7 Provide Politico-Military Support to Other Nations, Groups, and Government Agencies

M1	Percent	Of funds provided for HCA, SA and MCA operations accounted for.
M2	Hours	After declaration of disaster (FEMA or DOS/OFDA) to initiate deployments.
M3	Percent	Of approved assistance projects completed.
M4	Hours	For joint force to establish liaison with Country Team, host-nation, other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces.
M5	Instances	Of insufficient support provided to other nations, groups, or agencies.
M6	Percent	Of NGOs receiving US military support.
M7	Percent	Of NGOs with liaison with joint force .
M8	Percent	Of PVOs receiving US military support.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs with liaison with joint force.
M10	Instances	Of shortfall in supplies and materiel provided in response to requests by nations, agencies, or groups.
M11	Tons/day	Of supplies and materiel provided in assistance.
M12	Personnel	Provided to support other nations, groups, or agencies.
M13	Hours	To respond to Country Team request for assistance.

OP 4.7.1 Provide Security Assistance in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Personnel	From allied nations enrolled in US provided military training.
M2	Percent	Of valid requests for security assistance met.
M3	Days	To respond to request for security assistance.

OP 4.7.2 Conduct CMO in Theater of Operations/JOA

13 September 1996

M1	Hours	To establish CMOC or JCMOTF (after arrival).
M2	Hours	To establish liaison with appropriate foreign nation civilian government officials (after mission assignment).
M3	Hours	To establish liaison with Country Team, host-nation and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces (after standing up joint force).
M4	Hours	To provide completed Annex G (after Warning Order).
M5	Days	To deploy civil-military engineering units.
M6	Hours	To distribute supplies and services.
M7	Days	To organize relief effort in country.
M8	Hours	To assess situation and define assistance needed.

OP 4.7.3 Provide Support to DOD and Other Government Agencies

M1	Percent	Of governmental requests for support met by joint force.
M2	Percent	Of DOD and other US governmental requests for support not tied to joint force assigned mission met by joint force.
M3	Percent	Of DOD and other US governmental requests for support resolved without involving joint force commander.
M4	Hours	To respond to Defense Agency formal request for assistance.
M5	Hours	To respond to US civil agency request for support.
M6	Hours	To respond to in-theater request for support from Ambassador or Country Team.
M7	Days	To respond to request for support.
M8	Percent	Of potential drug smuggling aircraft coordinate with appropriate law enforcement agencies.
M9	Percent	Of reports on aircraft scramble and intercept-monitor or ID of potential drug smuggling aircraft forwarded IAW directives.
M10	Percent	Of special tracks Forward Told IAW directives.
M11	Percent	Of airspace management issues/requirements coordinated with FAA.
M12	Percent	Of potential/imminent terrorist actions/situations coordinated with local law enforcement agencies.
M13	Percent	Of hijacking and defecting aircraft events coordinated and reported with appropriate civil, military and government agencies IAW directives and procedures.
M14	Percent	Of Region/Sector checklists, guides, Operating Instructions and Plans provide proper guidance on coordination and reporting (with other DOD and government agencies).

OP 4.7.4 Plan and Transition to Civil Administration

M1	Percent	Of CA planning (e.g. Annex G, CA area study, CA estimate) completed by execution of CA mission.
M2	Percent	Of essential services/facilities damaged/destroyed during hostilities returned to operation prior to transition from US military administration.
M3	Percent	Of US forces CA personnel required to remain in country to coordinate post transition activities with local government/UN administration.
M4	Percent	Of US forces redeployed prior to transition to local government/UN administration.
M5	Percent	Of US forces, other than CA assets, retained in theater to support civil administration after transition from military administration.
M6	Days	To coordinate transition between US forces and local government/UN administration.
M7	Days	To determine US post conflict policy objectives.

M8	Days	To properly account for funds and equipment expended during military administration and to close outstanding claims against military administration.
M9	Hours	To receive direction or approval from NCA to become directly involved in executive, judiciary, or legislative functions of host nation government.

OP 4.7.5 Coordinate Politico-Military Support

M1	Days	From submission of plan for coordination until final concurrence.
M2	Percent	Of CS and CSS assets dedicated to CMO employment in theater operations/JOA.
M3	Percent	Of support requirements filled at execution.
M4	Percent	Of USG Organizations, Foreign Governments and NGOs that support operation through to completion.
M5	Days	To transition facilities and operations from US forces to host nation authorities.
M6	Days	To establish CMOC to establish liaison and coordination with other USG agencies and friendly government/groups in theater of operations/JOA.
M7	Days	To identify CA requirements and resources to support USG agency operations in theater of operations/JOA.
M8	Days	To plan for redeployment of US forces not required to support transition activities in theater of operations/JOA.

OP 4.7.6 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	For review of CA plan by competent legal authority
M2	Days	Lead-time to mobilize RC personnel to support CA mission.
M3	Percent	Of local populace able to maintain normal activities.
M4	Percent	Of local populace able to remain in their homes.
M5	Percent	Of personnel conducting civil affairs tasks drawn from Reserve Components
M6	Percent	Of total US military forces involved in any form of civil affairs activities in theater of operation/JOA.
M7	Percent	Of US military supplies and resources used in civil affairs activities in theater of operation/JOA.
M8	Days	To achieve agreement with local authorities on maintaining local populace.
M9	Days	To determine requirements for CA assets.
M10	Days	To establish CMOC to conduct liaison with and to coordinate activities with NGO's and PVO's in theater of operations/JOA.
M11	Days	To establish liaison with allied military forces.
M12	Days	To identify and integrate CA support and appropriate CA EEI into command intelligence programs.
M13	Days	To include comments of Country Team review in revised civil affairs plan.
M14	Days	To prepare estimates of impact of military operations on civilian environment in theater of operations/JOA.
M15	Days	To submit plan for civil affairs operations to Country Team for review and comment.
M16	Days	To determine specific CA assets required to support subordinate joint and Service component headquarters and forces.

OP 5 Exercise Operational Command And Control

M1	Hours	Prior to execution, plan published and delivered.
M2	Percent	Of communications nodes in place.
M3	Percent	Of units receive orders in time to plan and execute.

OP 5.1 Acquire and Communicate Operational Level Information and Maintain Status

M1	Hours	Since latest information collected.
M2	Hours	To establish connectivity with component intelligence agencies, Unified Command and national intelligence agencies (after arrival).
M3	Minutes	To process and disseminate status information (to subordinate units).
M4	Percent	Of available information examined and considered in latest status reporting.
M5	Percent	Of critical information acquired and disseminated to subordinate commanders.
M6	Percent	Of organizations or units receiving latest information.
M7	Percent	Of subordinate commanders with uninterrupted communication with joint force headquarters.
M8	Percent	Of subordinate commanders in communication with joint force headquarters.
M9	Percent	Of C4 systems, operational.
M10	Percent	Of C4 systems meet command reliability standards.
M11	Percent	Of combatant command plans, reports, and other information, passed error free.
M12	Percent	Of equipment, down for unscheduled maintenance.
M13	Percent	Of information, not passed to or received by allies (lack of equipment interoperability).
M14	Percent	Of traffic, sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.
M15	Percent	Saturation of DOD communications channels.
M16	Percent	Of time required expansion into other Sectors accomplished.

OP 5.1.1 Communicate Operational Information

M1	Hours	After approval, all orders and plans received by components and adjacent units.
M2	Minutes	Queuing time for messages.
M3	Percent	Accuracy of data transmitted/disseminated.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of deployment orders and notification requirements transmitted/disseminated within reporting criteria.
M5	Percent	Of addressees received message.
M6	Percent	Of time, information passed within established time criteria.
M7	Percent	Of time, information on CCIRs passed within established time criteria.
M8	Percent	Of time, mission essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established time criteria.
M9	Percent	Of Service and functional component addressees received critical planning messages (e.g. Warning Order).
M10	Hours	For LNOs to communicate new orders or information to allies and friendly elements of force.
M11	Percent	Of messages sent outside proper channels for message classification.
M12	Percent	Of messages go outside normal communications channels.

OP 5.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Operational Information

M1	Days	To integrate new headquarters into existing GCCS network.
M2	Hours	For ad hoc joint force HQ to be connected to GCCS (after arrival at HQ facility).

M3	Hours	For ad hoc joint force HQ to be connected to INTERNET (after arrival at HQ facility).
M4	Hours	To establish integrated communications system.
M5	Percent	Of communications equipment, circuits, and connectivity with status accurately displayed.
M6	Percent	Of C2 nodes possess required communications capabilities.
M7	Percent	Of required C4I resources identified.
M8	Percent	Of communications outages had adequate backup communications paths.
M9	Percent	Of essential JTF C4I systems accessible from all locations.
M10	Percent	Of time, essential JTF C4I systems accessible from all locations.
M11	Percent	Of information system interfaces require information scanning, retyping, reformatting, or other non-direct translation methods.
M12	Percent	Of joint force classified systems networked together.
M13	Percent	Of joint force headquarters LANs capable of interoperating (e.g., CTAPS, GCCS, JDISS, DJTFAC).
M14	Percent	Of OPLANs address existing terminals and lines of communications and known or estimated throughput capability.
M15	Percent	Of time, accurate radar picture maintained within Sector/Region.
M16	Percent	Of time, communication and radar equipment maintained within established systems reliability and maintenance criteria.
M17	Percent	Of time, communications connectivity maintained with all units.
M18	Percent	Of time, communications networks fully operational.
M19	Percent	Of time, voice and data communications (unsecure and secure) maintained.
M20	Percent	Of equipment interoperability problems result in late or lost data.
M21	Percent	Of information, not passed or received (lack of equipment interoperability).
M22	Percent	Of message transmissions fail at equipment interface.
M23	Hours	To establish both data and voice communication with Unified Command and its components.
M24	Percent	Of messages go outside normal communications channels.
M25	Percent	Of time, joint force subordinate commanders in communication with joint force headquarters.

OP 5.1.3 Determine Commander's Critical Information Requirements

M1	CCIRs	Active.
M2	Percent	Of CCIRs are answered.
M3	Hours	Since CCIR last update.
M4	Percent	Of CCIRs Initiated by JFC.
M5	Percent	Of CCIRs Initiated by Joint Staff.
M6	Percent	Of CCIRs Initiated by Components.
M7	Hours	To promulgate CCIR for collection during.
M8	Weeks	Into the future CCIRs look.

OP 5.1.4 Maintain Operational Information and Force Status

M1	Hours	Lag between joint force common picture of battlespace and real world situation.
M2	Instances	Of incoming information (which could affect outcome of operation) not getting to person responsible for action.
M3	Instances	Of critical information not reaching person responsible for action.
M4	Minutes	To post unit reports to appropriate databases or pass to work centers (from receipt).
M5	Minutes	To access and display shared remote databases.

13 September 1996

M6	Minutes	To enter most current information on force status.
M7	Percent	Accuracy of information on essential logistics, maintenance, aircraft, missile and personnel requirements and reports.
M8	Percent	Accuracy of information on deployment bases and deployment options.
M9	Percent	Accuracy of information regarding subordinate unit deployments.
M10	Percent	Accuracy of Intelligence Situation Displays maintained with mission essential information.
M11	Percent	Accuracy of mission essential information maintained on Situation Displays.
M12	Percent	Accuracy of data used by operations staff.
M13	Percent	Accuracy of subordinate unit aircraft and missile status.
M14	Percent	Of decisions delayed awaiting appropriate data.
M15	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel with current status known.
M16	Percent	Of information gets to appropriate people.
M27	Percent	Of time, data presented to decision maker in suitable format.
M18	Percent	Of operational data displays are current.
M19	Percent	Of reinforcing or supporting forces, JFC has accurate information.
M20	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to all agencies within time limits.
M21	Percent	Of reports have no errors.
M22	Percent	Accuracy of information in essential logistics, maintenance, aircraft, missile and personnel reports.
M23	Seconds	To access and display shared local databases.

OP 5.1.5 Monitor Strategic Situation

M1	Hours	Lag in currency of information on adjacent military forces or non-DOD agencies.
M2	Incidents	Where commander surprised by critical/emerging political or military event (not briefed).
M3	Instances	Of commander learning of emerging theater political event from source outside his staff.
M4	Minutes	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.
M5	Percent	Of time, commander learns of emerging theater political event from staff.

OP 5.1.6 Preserve Historical Documentation of Joint Operations or Campaigns

M1	Months	Before documents available for DOD analysis or research.
M2	Percent	Of decision documents with pre-decisional material available.
M3	Percent	Of key leaders interviewed after the event.
M4	Percent	Of key staff members interviewed after the event.
M5	Percent	Of official documentation (maps, orders, photos) preserved in historical accounts.
M6	Percent	Of operations have enemy versions or accounts available.
M7	Percent	Of records retired or retained (rather than destroyed).
M8	Percent	Of SF 135s properly completed.
M9	Weeks	From termination of major event until all key personnel interviewed.
M14	Percent	Of battles and engagements with photographic images and electronic documentation available.
M15	Months	Before documents available for Lessons Learned analysis.

OP 5.1.7 Coordinate Combat Camera Activities

M1	Hours	To dual hat Combat Camera det commander as member of JIB.
M2	Hours	To process media and produce imagery for short notice tasking (within JOA).
M3	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in theater.

M4	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in US.
M5	Hours	To respond to and be on scene for short notice tasking (within JOA).
M6	Hours	To review selected Combat Camera materials for release, until release.
M7	Percent	Of presented coverage deemed suitable by customer (i.e., audience attention and share).
M8	Percent	Of subject coverage requests filled.

OP 5.2 Assess Operational Situation

M1	Hours	For joint force to review or develop flexible deterrent options (after request or occurrence).
M2	Hours	Lag between appreciation of battlespace and real situation.
M3	Hours	Since update of joint force situation.
M4	Minutes	For commander to forward and disseminate crisis assessment.
M5	Minutes	To access current situation and formulate plan of action:
M6	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M7	Percent	Of time, commander/senior staff made aware of emerging political event (which could impact theater) from outside source.
M8	Percent	Of time, theater political event of interest occurs without options available.
M9	Hours	For commander to formulate crisis assessment.
M10	Weeks	Before OPLAN submitted, JFC develops FDOs.

OP 5.2.1 Review Current Situation (Project Branches)

M1	Days	Into future, planning branches have been developed.
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches.
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations affected course of battle, but not forecast.
M4	Percent	Of forecast branches appeared at execution.

OP 5.2.2 Formulate Crisis Assessment

M1	Hours	Following voice report, hard copy OPREP 3 (PINNACLE) report submitted.
M2	Hours	From receipt of intelligence to complete analysis of situation.
M3	Hours	To identify forces available.
M4	Hours	To send voice report to unified commander (after occurrence of crisis).
M5	Hours	To send voice report to commander (upon request).
M6	Minutes	To forward and disseminate crisis assessment.
M7	Percent	Of available forces identified.
M8	Time	To formulate crisis assessment:

OP 5.2.3 Project Future Campaigns and Major Operations (Sequels)

M1	Days	Of future planning is completed and available.
M2	Percent	Of decision points have sequels.
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M4	Percent	Of identified sequels with COAs developed.
M5	Percent	Of possible follow-on operations have preplanned sequels.

OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders

M1	Hours	After constitution of JPG (or equivalent) to publish joint force HQ "daily battle rhythm."
M2	Hours	To adjust original plan for decisive operations (after recognizing planning assumptions invalid).
M3	Hours	To compile QUICKLOOK reports.

13 September 1996

M4	Hours	To issue joint force commander's intent (after CJCS or combatant commander's Warning Order).
M5	Minutes	To generate and forward Commander's Situation Reports (SITREP).
M6	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M7	Seconds	To respond to emergency aircraft.
M8	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to provide commander's intent.
M9	Minutes	To dispatch EAM.
M10	Minutes	To receive and respond to Emergency Action Message (EAM).
M11	Percent	Accuracy of information in Region/Sector and gained unit supplemental plans.
M12	Percent	Currency of information in Region/Sector and gained unit supplemental plans.
M13	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to provide concept of operations.

OP 5.3.1 Conduct Operational Mission Analysis

M1	Percent	Of critical intelligence reports and AOR-related intelligence estimates reviewed prior to mission analysis/end state assessment.
M2	Percent	Of available planning time allowed for subordinate planning (after COA selected).
M3	Percent	Of commander's mission essential tasks identified by subordinate commander for execution.
M4	Percent	Of essential tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M5	Percent	Of identified risks have written risk assessment.
M6	Percent	Of implied tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M7	Percent	Of stated tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M8	Percent	Of units available to joint force included in review of forces by JFC.

OP 5.3.2 Issue Planning Guidance

M1	Days	In advance of execution, planning guidance issued to subordinate commands.
M2	Hours	After being notified of mission, JFC issued or approved initial Planning Guidance.
M3	Hours	From request for change to ROE until approval/denial.
M4	Instances	Of amendments issued to Planning Guidance (due to requests for clarification).
M5	Incidents	Of misunderstood ROE.
M6	Instances	Of requests for clarification of Planning Guidance/commander's guidance received from subordinate headquarters.
M7	Percent	Completeness of commander's guidance (i.e., coverage of functional areas).
M8	Percent	Of planning time used by higher HQ to issue guidance.
M9	Percent	Of ROE clearly understood.

OP 5.3.3 Determine Operational End State

M1	Days	To pass control of operations area to local government or appointed transitional administrative authority (after achieving end state).
M2	Days	Delay in turnover of control of operations area to legitimate or transitional administrative authorities.
M3	Days	To transition control of operations area to civil authority.
M4	Instances	Of revisions to end state conditions.
M5	Percent	Of commanders accept end state conditions without requests for clarification.

OP 5.3.4 Develop Courses of Action/Prepare Staff Estimates

M1	Instances	Of COAs developed.
M2	Percent	Of non-selected COAs considered for deception.
M3	Percent	Of available planning time allotted for subordinate planning.
M4	Percent	Of COAs acceptable.
M5	Percent	Of COAs distinguishable.
M6	Percent	Of COAs feasible.
M7	Percent	Of COAs presented to commander were suitable, feasible, acceptable and distinct from one another.
M8	Percent	Of COAs suitable.

OP 5.3.5 Analyze Courses of Action

M1	Instances	Of limitations (ultimately identified during execution) identified during analysis.
M2	Percent	Of branches and sequels experienced identified in COAs.
M3	Percent	Of capabilities ultimately required identified in planning.
M4	Percent	Of COAs waged against potential enemy COAs.

OP 5.3.6 Compare Courses of Action

M1	Percent	Of comparison criteria eliminated before comparison.
M2	Percent	Of comparison criteria eventually used, defined and weighted before comparison began.

OP 5.3.7 Select or Modify Course of Action

M1	Days	In advance of execution, COAs selected.
M2	Days	Since COAs reviewed.

OP 5.3.8 Issue Commander's Estimate

M1	Hours	Before execution, commander's concept and intent issued.
M2	Hours	Before execution, commander's estimate issued.
M3	Hours	To issue commander's estimate (after receipt of Warning Order).
M4	Percent	Of planning time available, used to issue commander's concept and intent.

OP 5.3.9 Prepare Campaign or Major Operations and Related Plans and Orders

M1	Days	Prior to hostilities, SOF forces allowed to conduct cross-border operations.
M2	Hours	For complete set of executable operational plans and orders (following receipt of commander's estimate).
M3	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (following execute order).
M4	Hours	To prepare plans and orders (after deciding on mission concept and intent).
M5	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes identified in OPLAN.
M6	Percent	Of functional areas covered in OPLAN.
M7	Percent	Of operations in plan conform to US and International Law.

OP 5.4 Command Subordinate Operational Forces

M1	Percent	Accuracy of information in plans and orders issued and disseminated to subordinate units.
M2	Percent	Of completed planning documents (e.g., mission analysis, COA decision, synchronization matrix) passed to components to allow parallel planning
M3	Percent	Of planning time joint force allows components.
M4	Percent	Of subordinate commands clear about their immediate objectives.
M5	Percent	Of time, JFC positioned to best affect accomplishment of operational end state for each operational phase.

M6	Percent	Of time, joint force staff issued "battle rhythm" SOP for planning use of available time.
M7	Percent	Of time, mission essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established criteria.
M8	Percent	Of time, during Crisis Action Procedures, execution orders initiated or warning relayed.
M9	Percent	Of units visited personally by commander to convey concept and intent.
M10	Minutes	To issue and disseminate Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) and Attack Warnings.
M11	Percent	Of time, required expansion into other Sectors accomplished.
M12	Minutes	To dispatch deployed Weapons Teams (DWDs).

OP 5.4.1 Approve Plans and Orders

M1	Hours	To complete plan or campaign plan review and approval.
M2	Hours	To obtain approval of plans and orders.
M3	Instances	Of OPLAN conflicting with standards under Conduct of War and International Convention.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of information in Commander's operations plan to meet established objectives.
M5	Percent	Of accurate deployment orders and notification requirements disseminated within reporting criteria.

OP 5.4.2 Issue Plans and Orders

M1	Hours	To issue plan or order (after approved).
M2	Minutes	For commander to forward and disseminate plan of action.
M3	Minutes	To initiate or relay warning or execution order.
M4	Percent	Of Commander's Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) and Attack Warnings issued and disseminated.

OP 5.4.3 Provide Rules of Engagement

M1	Days	Prior to hostilities, SOF forces allowed to conduct cross-border operations.
M2	Hours	From receipt of warning order to submission of ROE request.
M3	Hours	To develop general order regarding prohibited and permitted actions for deploying joint force.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of information in Rules of Engagement (ROE) changes.
M5	Percent	Of ROE exception determinations followed all procedures.
M6	Percent	Of target attacks violate rules of engagement.

OP 5.4.4 Synchronize/Integrate Operations

M1	Hours	Delay in initiating phase of operation.
M2	Hours	Prior to execution, joint force has execution matrix with sequence and timing of each component task throughout operation.
M3	Incidents	Of operational missions (e.g., SOF, PSYOP, Deception) executed without coordinating with operating forces in target area.
M4	Incidents	Of potential cross component boundary fratricide identified and eliminated by joint force headquarters.
M5	Percent	Of friendly forces actively contributing to conduct of operation.
M6	Percent	Of joint force or component missions carried out as planned.
M7	Percent	Of subordinate missions executed with requested joint force or component support.

M8	Percent	Of subordinate orders reviewed by joint force staff for compliance with JFC's intent.
----	---------	---

OP 5.4.5 Coordinate/Integrate Components, Theater, and Other Support

M1	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media in AOR nations addressed in OPLAN or other document.
M2	Percent	Of policies and procedures for establishment and coordination of logistics, maintenance, and transportation support completed using JOPES.
M3	Percent	Of requests for support sent directly to CINC's Service component.

OP 5.5 Organize a Joint Force Headquarters

M1	Hours	For joint force Commander to request DOT TOR of USCG (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Hours	To form joint force staff (from activation order).
M3	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of staff augmentees.
M4	Percent	Of joint force augmentees received and integrated into joint force staff IAW established procedure.
M5	Days	From activation order until headquarters fully staffed.
M6	Percent	Of joint force key billets, distributed on proportionate basis with major forces assigned.
M7	Days	To approve augmentation to newly formed joint staff.
M8	Days	To determine and approve JTF structure.
M9	Days	To establish and approve C2 architecture for JTF.
M10	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to determine and approve joint force command arrangements.

OP 5.5.1 Develop a Joint Force Command and Control Structure

M1	Days	Until joint force headquarters staff augmented and in full operation (from Alert Order).
M2	Days	To issue joint force OPORDER or plan (from Alert Order).
M3	Hours	For joint force to identify elements and boards to establish within headquarters.
M4	Hours	For joint force staff to select specialized equipment required from joint force establishing Commander.
M5	Hours	For joint force staff to select specialized personnel required from joint force establishing Commander.
M6	Hours	To complete notification of joint force core staff (after Alert Order).
M7	Hours	To establish joint force headquarters boards, centers, cells, and bureaus.
M8	Hours	To form Joint Planning Group (after alert order).
M9	Hours	To form joint force staff.
M10	Hours	To issue tasking to initial augmentees for newly formed joint task force.
M11	Hours	To obtain approval of joint force command and control OPLAN/OPORD Annex.
M12	Hours	To obtain approval of joint force command and control structure.
M13	Hours	Until joint force headquarters staff, to include boards, cells, centers, and committees, augmented and in full operation (after Alert Order).
M14	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed because of unclear relationships within HQ.
M15	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed.
M16	Incidents	Of modifications to command structure taking place during execution (combat attrition excepted).
M17	Instances	Of new sections and boards established within joint force (after initial organization).

13 September 1996

M18	Minutes	For new joint force staff sections and boards to establish initial communication with opposite numbers on CINC staff and in Supporting commands.
M19	Percent	Of required augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M20	Percent	Of combined force headquarters staff composed of non-US personnel.
M21	Percent	Of components with allocated or apportioned forces, suitably represented on combined force staff.
M22	Percent	Of components, involved foreign governments, and NGOs/PVOs (suitably) represented on designated joint force staff.
M23	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of augmentees.
M24	Percent	Of joint force headquarters staff composed of augmentees.
M25	Percent	Of joint force primary subordinate commander's and functional commander's responsibilities identified prior to Phase 5 of Crisis Action Planning.
M26	Percent	Of joint force staff elements, represent force makeup as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank among concerned Services making up joint force.
M27	Percent	Of non-DOD agencies and forces participating in operation, identified in command and control annex of joint force OPORDER.
M28	Percent	Of required staff positions filled.
M29	Percent	Of required subordinate joint force staff positions filled.
M30	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees.
M31	Percent	Of employment of E-3 and NORAD Airborne Battle Staff (NABS) operations conforms to established directives.
M33	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees in same position.

OP 5.5.2 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure

M1	Hours	Until joint force liaison structure established (from Alert Order).
M2	Hours	Since LNOs attached to joint force HQ last received situation update from own unit.
M3	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed.
M4	Minutes	For joint force HQ LNOs to contact joint force HQ on behalf of unit to which sent.
M5	Minutes	For joint force staff sections to contact LNO attached to joint force HQ.
M6	Minutes	For parent unit to contact their LNO.
M7	Percent	Of adjacent units or agencies with liaison to joint force.
M8	Percent	Of joint force liaison personnel have required security clearances and identification credentials.
M9	Percent	Of unit or agency information missing or late.

OP 5.5.3 Integrate Joint Force Staff Augmentees

M1	Days	Before joint task force HQ prepared to release DJTFAC.
M2	Percent	Of augmentee requests issued during execution for immediate augmentation to fill unforeseen needs.
M3	Percent	Of required augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M4	Percent	Of required staff positions filled.

OP 5.5.4 Deploy Joint Force Headquarters Advance Element

M1	Hours	For joint force headquarters ADVON to establish in-country communications with host-nation and US DOS representatives (after arrival at deployed site).
M2	Hours	For joint force headquarters advance element to establish communication links up, down, across (after arrival in operational area).

13 September 1996

M3	Hours	For joint force headquarters to issue joint force OPORDER (from receipt of Alert Order).
M4	Hours	To deploy forward and establish in theater joint force headquarters element.

OP 5.5.5 Establish Command Transition Criteria and Procedures

M1	Hours	Before beginning of transition and redeployment to publish redeployment plan.
M2	Hours	Before execution, command transition plans provided to units.
M3	Percent	Of transitioning units have no gaps in command.

OP 5.5.6 Establish or Participate in Task Forces

M1	Days	For joint force to be dissolved (following achievement of end state).
M2	Days	To recommend organizations to fund various aspects of joint force.
M3	Hours	For functional (multinational) task force to be prepared to conduct operations (from decision to stand up).
M4	Hours	For functional or joint task force to be prepared to conduct operations (from decision to stand up).
M5	Hours	To appoint joint force commander
M6	Hours	To define JOA.
M7	Hours	To name commander (after decision taken to stand up subordinate functional or single Service task force).
M8	Hours	To provide directive or mission (after decision taken to stand up subordinate functional or single Service or task force).
M9	Hours	To provide directive with purpose, in terms of desired effect and scope of action required.
M10	Percent	Change in initial HQ manning allocation for functional or single Service task force, without change in mission.

OP 5.6 Employ Operational Information Warfare (IW)

M1	Percent	Degradation of adversary air defense C4 prior to penetration operations by air.
M2	Percent	Of adversary C2 assets have both lethal and non-lethal attacks developed.
M3	Percent	Of attacks on adversary C2, concurrently target primary and alternate C2 assets.
M4	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems, successful.
M5	Percent	Of attempted penetrations of adversary information systems successful and apparently not detected.
M6	Percent	Of C2W targets included in joint targeting plans.
M7	Percent	Of enemy operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified (because of C2W attack).
M8	Percent	Of friendly C2W operations employ three or more elements of C2W.
M9	Percent	Of friendly operations carried out as planned.
M10	Percent	Of friendly operations disrupted (because of enemy's interference with friendly information systems).
M11	Percent	Of successful penetrations of adversary info systems detected.
M12	Percent	Of C2W efforts, support IW plan.
M13	Percent	Of adversary penetrations of friendly info systems, source identified and targeted.

OP 5.6.1 Plan and Integrate Operational IW

M1	Hours	To issue IW policy (after crisis onset).
M2	Percent	Of indigenous media, available to IW cell.
M3	Percent	Of Public Affairs releases, coordinated with IW planners.

13 September 1996

M4	Percent	Of US and Allied forces, pursued common IW plans.
M5	Percent	Of work sessions had Public Affairs representation.

OP 5.6.2 Plan and Integrate Operational C2W

M1	Percent	Of C2W targets included in joint targeting plans.
M2	Percent	Of enemy operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified.
M3	Percent	Of friendly operations carried out when and as planned.
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs include deception plan.
M5	Percent	Of C2W elements, represented on C2W cell.
M6	Percent	Of C2W Staff hold SCI clearances.

OP 5.6.3 Control IW Operations

M1	Hours	After identifying new enemy C2 target, target attacked.
M2	Hours	To change C2W plan upon receiving status updates.
M3	Percent	Of C2W targets included in joint targeting plans.
M4	Percent	Of enemy operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified.

OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support

M1	Days	For joint force to successfully integrate coalition force doctrinal differences.
M2	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M3	Hours	To establish coordination process with AMEMBASSY and allied coalition partners (after establishment of joint force).
M4	Percent	Of agencies found in operations area at execution, known to joint force during planning.
M5	Percent	Of allied support requirements filled at time of execution.
M6	Percent	Of allies/coalition partners or other government agencies, participate in operation.

OP 5.7.1 Ascertain National or Agency Agenda

M1	Instances	Of coalition nation or non-DOD agency goals, of which joint force commander was unaware.
M2	Incidents	Of refusal by coalition or agency partner to support operation.
M3	Percent	Of allied and coalition support requirements identified at (or after) execution.
M4	Percent	Of allies or coalition partners provide their proposed end state.
M5	Percent	Of US government agencies provide their proposed end state.

OP 5.7.2 Determine National/Agency Capabilities and Limitations

M1	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M2	Percent	Of allies/coalition partners or other government agencies actively contributing to conduct of operation.
M3	Percent	Of execution taskings to coalition partners or agencies accepted.
M4	Percent	Of allies or coalition partners or other US government agencies, share their concept of operations and plans with joint force.

OP 5.7.3 Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure

M1	Days	From receipt of request for support from allies to determination of releasability.
M2	Days	From receipt of request for support from non-DOD US Agencies to determination of releasability.
M3	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M4	Days	To obtain commitment of support from non-DOD US Agency (after submitting request).
M5	Percent	Of intelligence information shared among all multinational partners.

13 September 1996

M6	Percent	Of intelligence information shared with one multinational partner shared with all partners.
M7	Percent	Of national forces and agencies operating with JTF have intelligence sharing arrangement.
M8	Percent	Of needed information, not passed to allies (because of classification).

OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations

M1	Days	Before execution, plans released to coalition members.
M2	Days	From determination of releasability to actual receipt of information by allies.
M3	Days	From receipt of request for support from allies to determination of releasability.
M4	Days	From receipt of request for support from non-DOD US Agencies to determination of releasability.
M5	Days	To respond to request for support from allies.
M6	Percent	Of agencies in operations area at execution known to joint force during planning.
M7	Percent	Of coalition partners reviewed plans prior to publication.
M8	Percent	Of validated allied support requirements filled at execution.

OP 5.7.5 Coordinate Host Nation Support

M1	Hours	For HNS response to request for support under existing agreement.
M2	Percent	Of DOD time standard, taken by HNS to accomplish job.
M3	Percent	Of joint force support personnel administer HNS (e.g., trainers, supervisors, security).
M4	Percent	Of joint force support requirements met by HNS.
M5	Percent	Of requests for HNS rejected.
M6	Percent	Of available host-nation maintenance supply replenishment and distribution assets integrated into meeting operational requirement.
M7	Percent	Of replenishment requirements met by host-nation support.
M8	Personnel	Supplied by host-nation to support facilities construction.
M9	Percent	Of lease/rental costs of real estate/real property assets paid by Host Nation.
M10	Percent	Of real estate acquired by HNS, lease or rent.
M11	Days	To coordinate for host nation support in providing facilities and real estate in support of operational campaign.

OP 5.7.6 Coordinate Coalition Support

M1	Hours	Since coalition nation last reported force status.
M2	Percent	Of coalition nations accurately reporting force locations.
M3	Percent	Of coalition nations allowing audit of force status or capability reporting.
M4	Percent	Of coalition nations fully reporting force capability.
M5	Percent	Of coalition nations fully reporting force status.

OP 5.7.7 Coordinate Civil Administration Operations

M1	Days	To establishment of military government (after occupation of area).
M2	Hours	To develop request for NCA guidance.
M3	Hours	Before required, NCA guidance or direction requested.
M4	Months	To prepare plan for local self-government.
M5	Months	To prepare populace for local self-government.
M6	Percent	Nutrition improvement in civil populace in hostile territory, after establishment of military government.
M7	Percent	Of children attending school.
M8	Percent	Of day under curfew.

M9	Percent	Of indigenous forces trained to conduct civil administration within contested areas.
M10	Percent	Of joint force dedicated to Civil Administration activities.
M11	Percent	Of population under curfew.

OP 5.8 Provide Public Affairs in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	In advance to provide PAG for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	After event to release news.
M3	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (after execute order).
M4	Hours	To obtain agreement on PAG from other coalition forces with whom joint force working.
M5	Hours	To obtain approval of PAG from Unified Command and any non-DOD agencies with whom joint force directly working.
M6	Hours	To provide an initial theater position on breaking news story.
M7	Hours	To provide PAG (after crisis event).
M8	Hours	To transmit print journalist stories during crisis or combat (from receipt).
M9	Percent	Of releases contain fallacies.
M10	Instances	Of information classified or withheld from press to avoid embarrassment.
M11	Minutes	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or major event.
M12	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media researched and included in planning.
M13	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials accepted.
M14	Percent	Of media support requests answered.
M15	Percent	Of plan phases have incorporated Public Affairs strategy.
M16	Percent	Of press operational access rules and security procedures incorporated in OPLAN.
M17	Percent	Of releases containing incorrect information.
M18	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M19	Percent	Of OPLAN's PA guidance coordinated with J-3 Operations and PSYOP and deception sections.
M20	Percent	Of unclassified units, media personnel allowed access.
M21	Press Releases	Per week.

OP 5.8.1 Manage Press Relations in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	Since last National Media Pool classified briefing.
M2	Days	To close required media equipment (e.g. CNN ground station) to JOA.
M3	Days	To get DOD media pool into JOA.
M4	Hours	For staff to turn answers to media questions.
M5	Hours	In advance of deployment, media guidance developed and distributed.
M6	Hours	Prior to deployment, media policy established and disseminated.
M7	Hours	To develop public opinion baseline.
M8	Hours	To develop PA Mission Analysis.
M9	Hours	To issue interim media guidance.
M10	Hours	To stand up JIB.
M11	Instances/Week	Of meetings among PA, PSYOP, CA and IW representatives.
M12	Minutes	To provide an initial briefing to media on "Bad News" story.
M13	Percent	Favorability rating of US operations in local mass media since crisis/operations began.
M14	Percent	Of accredited media have appropriate field gear, quarters and rations.
M15	Percent	Of indigenous and locally available international mass media favorable or neutral to joint force operations.

M16	Percent	Of international mass media favorable or neutral to joint force operations.
M17	Percent	Of JOA personnel submitted Home Town News Release.
M18	Percent	Of joint force and component senior officials offered predeployment media relations refresher course.
M19	Percent	Of media in JOA accredited.
M20	Percent	Of media in JOA attend JIB course on military terms and doctrine.
M21	Percent	Of media in JOA sign agreement to follow ground rules.
M22	Percent	Of media personnel, JIB has location data.
M23	Percent	Of PA objectives focus on behavior desired from target audience(s).
M24	Percent	Of Q&A submitted arrive OSD(PA) by deadline.

OP 5.8.2 Coordinate Command/Internal Information Programs.

M1	Days	To deploy AFRTS capability to JOA.
M2	Days	To deploy and distribute AFRTS palletized receivers into JOA.

OP 5.8.3 Plan and Conduct Community Relations Program.

M1	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M2	Percent	Of OPLAN's PA guidance has been coordinated with J-3 Operations and PSYOP and deception sections.

OP 6 Provide Operational Protection

M1	Percent	Of friendly communications hardened or redundant.
M2	Percent	Reduction in friendly LOC capacity.

OP 6.1 Provide Operational Aerospace and Missile Defense

M1	Errors	In performance of air surveillance, identification and track monitor procedures.
M2	Hours	Since last enemy attack.
M3	Minutes	To scramble fighters.
M4	Minutes	To tell air tracks to appropriate echelons.
M5	Percent	Disruption of friendly centers of gravity.
M6	Percent	Of attacking aircraft penetrate air defense network.
M7	Percent	Of attacking enemy aircraft destroyed.
M8	Percent	Of fighters directed against declared hostile aircraft.
M9	Percent	Of hostile aircraft and missiles engaged and destroyed.
M10	Percent	Of incoming SSMs penetrate defenses.
M11	Percent	Of joint operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M12	Percent	Of Threat Warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate.
M13	Percent	Of tracks told to appropriate echelons.
M14	Percent	Of units arrive at point of employment later than planned.
M15	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity.
M16	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems identified, targeted, and engaged/destroyed by friendly forces.
M17	Percent	Of losses caused by hostile air activities.
M18	Hours	To dispatch Deployed Weapons Teams (DWDs).
M19	Percent	Of Battle Staff and Operations Control Center personnel completing annual re-certification training.
M20	Percent	Of E-3 and NORAD Airborne Battle Staff (NABS) operations directed in optimum fashion.
M21	Percent	Of time required expansion into other Sectors accomplished.
M22	Percent	Of Battle Staff and Operations Control Center decisions accurately discussed in checklists, guides, Operating Instructions and Plans.

OP 6.1.1 Process/Allocate Operational Aerospace Targets

M1	Minutes	Of early warning provided joint force of imminent aerospace attack.
M2	Percent	Of enemy offensive air threats to which friendly forces assigned.
M3	Percent	Of enemy air attacks for which early warning provided.
M4	Percent	Of joint force aerospace defense system successfully negates incoming enemy aerospace targets.
M5	Percent	Of joint force has early warning of incoming missiles or aircraft to allow initiation of passive air defense.
M6	Percent	Of time joint force early warning system and nodes operational.

OP 6.1.2 Integrate Joint/Multinational Operational Aerospace Defense

M1	Hours	To designate AADC and ACA (upon recognition of a significant air threat and prior to employment of forces).
M2	Minutes	For AADC to pass targeting allocation decisions to designated systems and units.
M3	Minutes	To provide early warning indication of enemy air attack.

M4	Minutes	To task friendly attack systems to new aerospace target.
M5	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to air component.
M6	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to land component.
M7	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to sea component.
M8	Percent	Of allocated aerospace defense assets assigned to enemy targets.
M9	Percent	Of target information received by air defense systems and units in theater of operations/joint operations area.
M10	Percent	Of time AADC and ACA designated upon recognition of a significant air threat and prior to employment of forces.

OP 6.1.3 Provide Airspace Control

M1	Attacks/Day	By enemy air forces.
M2	Incidents	Of air-to-air mishaps in theater of operations/JOA.
M3	Kills/Day	By friendly weapons systems.
M4	Percent	Of fixed wing sorties receive clearances needed to complete mission.
M5	Percent	Of friendly air sorties interfered with by friendly ground fires.
M6	Percent	Of operational area for which a complete air picture available.
M7	Percent	Of rotary wing sorties receive clearances needed to complete mission.
M8	Percent	Of tracks Cross Told.

OP 6.1.3.1 Employ Positive Control Measures

M1	Hours	Since last publication of Air Control Orders.
M2	Hours	To establish Airspace Control Authority (upon entry in theater).
M3	Percent	Of air defense operations did not interfere with other operations.

OP 6.1.3.2 Employ Procedural Control Measures

M1	Percent	Of friendly aircraft not positively identified as friendly.
M2	Percent	Of friendly aircraft respond to friendly IFF interrogation.
M3	Percent	Of time AWACS monitors airspace to positively identify friendly aircraft.

OP 6.1.4 Counter Enemy Air Attack in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	To notify friendly counterair forces (to gain intercept position).
M2	Percent	Of COMMZ in which friendly freedom of movement allowed.
M3	Percent	Of enemy air attacks detected early enough to allow engagement.
M4	Percent	Of enemy air defense targets successfully engaged.
M5	Percent	Of enemy aircraft penetrate air defenses.
M6	Percent	Of first-shot kills by friendly fighters in air-to-air combat.

OP 6.1.5 Conduct Operational Area Missile Defense

M1	Casualties	To civilians attributed to missile attack.
M2	Casualties	To military personnel attributed to missile attack.
M3	Minutes	Warning provided to friendly assets prior to threat arrival.
M4	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses.
M5	Percent	Of launched air-to-surface missiles destroyed before impact.
M6	Percent	Of launched ballistic missiles destroyed before impact.
M7	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles destroyed before impact.
M8	Percent	Of theater assets defensible against theater missile threat.
M9	Percent	Of TMD capability damaged by incoming missile attacks.

OP 6.1.6 Conduct Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	To forward and disseminate Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (TW&AA) reports.
M2	Minutes	To forward Threat Warning Estimates after attack determination.
M3	Percent	Deviation from actual of Threat Warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers.
M4	Percent	Of Estimated Probability of Arrival Time (EPAT) calculations provided on air tracks are correct.
M5	Minutes	To plot or brief EPATs after information received.

OP 6.2 Provide Protection for Operational Forces, Means, and Noncombatants

M1	Casualties	To military personnel.
M2	Casualties	To US non-combatants.
M3	Incidents	Of damage to APOD and APOE facilities by enemy action (that impact scheme of maneuver).
M4	Incidents	Of friendly aircraft damaged or destroyed on the ground.
M5	Incidents	Of friendly ships damaged or sunk in port (not in action).
M6	Minutes	To construct simplified fallout prediction and calculate Zone I/II distance.
M7	Minutes	To construct simplified fallout prediction and plot ground zero.
M8	Minutes	To determine Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) yield in kilotons.
M9	Minutes	To Orient simplified fallout prediction.
M10	Minutes	To provide NBC I Nuclear report/series of reports or NORAD Form 46.
M11	Minutes	To relay to units warning of expected NUDET contamination
M12	Percent	Actual nuclear damage exceeds assessment.
M13	Percent	Actual radiation dose exceeds calculated current/expected total dose.
M14	Percent	Actual radiation levels exceed limited radiological survey.
M15	Percent	nuclear vulnerability exceeds analysis.
M16	Percent	NUDET decay rates exceed estimates.
M17	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M18	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly weapon systems.

OP 6.2.1 Prepare Operationally Significant Defenses

M1	Percent	Of critical fixed facilities hardened.
M2	Percent	Of fixed facilities in JOA with prepared defensive fighting positions with cleared fields of fire.
M3	Percent	Of JOA fixed base external communications hardened.
M4	Percent	Of JOA fixed base external communications have redundant backup.
M5	Percent	Of JOA fixed base internal communications hardened.
M6	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with an integrated sensor and obstacle physical perimeter defense.
M7	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with hardened storage of ammunition, food, water and medical supplies.
M8	Percent	Of planned facility hardening completed (at execution).
M9	Weeks	Since last review of fixed base physical security in JOA.
M10	Days	To prepare fortified positions, battlements, shelters.
M11	Percent	Of rear area facilities secure from attack.

OP 6.2.2 Remove Operationally Significant Hazards

M1	Casualties	Caused by operationally significant hazards (per week).
M2	Hours	Delay in executing scheme of maneuver.

M3	Percent	Of casualties attributed to operationally significant hazards.
M4	Percent	Of identified strategically significant hazards successfully removed or neutralized.
M5	Percent	Of joint force exposed to or affected by operationally significant hazard.
M6	Percent	Of operationally significant hazards identified by joint force staff.

OP 6.2.3 Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Incidents	Of electronic fratricide.
M2	Instances	Of meaconing, intrusion, and jamming events detected and reported by components.
M3	Minutes	Queuing time for message traffic.
M4	Percent	Of communications systems and assets supporting joint force in JOA destroyed by enemy action.

OP 6.2.4 Protect Use of the Acoustic Spectrum in Theater of Operations/JOA.

M1	Percent	Of time action must be taken to curtail friendly activities to ensure optimal use of acoustic spectrum.
M2	db	Loss due to transit of friendly ships.
M3	Hours	To recover an optimal acoustic spectrum after passage of friendly ships.
M4	Hours	Search time lost due to enemy actions to degrade the acoustic spectrum.
M5	Percent	Of time units observe Acoustic Emission Plan.

OP 6.2.5 Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces Within Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	Before enemy begins to mimic identification or recognition procedure.
M2	Minutes	To confirm identity of unidentified friendly target.
M3	Percent	Of coalition nations accurately reporting force locations.
M4	Percent	Of force with passive identification interrogation capability employing capability.
M5	Percent	Of friendly aircraft destroyed by friendly air defense.
M6	Percent	Of friendly aircraft destroyed by friendly fire.
M7	Percent	Of friendly casualties from friendly fire.
M8	Percent	Of friendly fire incidents cross-national.
M9	Percent	Of friendly fire incidents cross-service.
M10	Percent	Of friendly forces with procedures or equipment to allow positive identification, employ such procedures or equipment.
M11	Percent	Of positive identification false negatives (friendly identified as enemy).
M12	Percent	Of positive identification false positives (enemy identified as friendly).
M13	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly weapon systems.

OP 6.2.6 Conduct Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	To return NEO JTF to normal duties and readiness following evacuation of evacuees.
M2	Days	To transfer evacuees from US Navy ship to land based safe haven.
M3	Hours	After JTF formed or notified of NEO before FCE in place.
M4	Hours	Before all evacuees afforded medical attention (after evacuation).
M5	Hours	Before designated CJTF in direct contact with concerned Ambassador.
M6	Hours	Between evacuation departure and arrival at temporary safe haven.
M7	Hours	For force to initially respond to NEO tasking (ready to depart home station).
M8	Percent	Of AMCITs and designated foreign nationals accounted for by name during evacuation.

13 September 1996

M9	Percent	Of baggage approved for movement with evacuees delivered to temporary safe haven.
M10	Percent	Of evacuees reporting or located and agreeing to evacuation successfully evacuated.
M11	Percent	Of known AMCITs not reporting for evacuation located by search squad operations.
M12	Plans	Developed as NEO alternatives.
M13	Hours	Difference between actual execution time and EXORD scheduled start time.
M14	Percent	Of volunteering American citizens and designated third country nationals, evacuated safely.
M15	Percent	Of evacuees (requiring medical or other care), receive adequate care.
M16	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force (opposed).
M17	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force (unopposed).
M18	Percent	Of objectives seized within planned times.
M19	Percent	Degradation of mission effectiveness (lack of equipment interoperability).

OP 6.2.7 Establish Disaster Control Measures

M1	Days	To restore normal ground lines of communication following hostile action or disaster.
M2	Days	To restore public utilities to pre-event levels, following hostile action or disaster.
M3	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day for human consumption.
M4	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day for livestock consumption.
M5	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day to support sanitation measures.
M6	Minutes	Fire-fighting response at fixed bases in JOA.
M7	Percent	Difference in disease incidence in affected civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M8	Percent	Difference in mortality rates in affected civil populace, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M9	Percent	Difference in water availability to individuals in affected civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M10	Percent	Of affected civil populace displaced, as consequence of hostile action or disaster.
M11	Percent	Of affected civil populace without access to normal markets, to buy or sell, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M12	Percent	Of affected civil populace without public utilities, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M13	Percent	Of casualties to civil populace joint force prepared to treat (without impacting operational tempo).
M14	Percent	Of casualties to civil populace joint force prepared to treat.
M15	Percent	Of fires being covered by initial fire-fighting response at fixed base in JOA.
M16	Percent	Of fixed installations in JOA with fire-fighting equipment.
M17	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with backup energy sources which survive hostile action or natural disaster.
M18	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with backup energy sources.

OP 6.2.8 Establish NBC Protection in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Minutes	After initial NBC use to detect and warn friendly forces.
M2	Hours	After NBC attack to recover operational capability.
M3	Minutes	For joint force to issue downwind hazard warnings of NBC attack.
M4	Percent	Of friendly units employing NBC monitoring equipment.

13 September 1996

M5	Percent	Of NBC contaminated sites had decontamination operations initiated by joint forces.
M6	Percent	Of NBC contaminated sites had decontamination operations completed by joint forces.

OP 6.2.9 Coordinate and Conduct Personnel Recovery

M1	Hours	To reach area of isolated personnel after go decision.
M2	Hours	To rescue aircrew after ejection or bailout.
M3	Minutes	From notification person missing until rescue units prepared to authenticate identify of isolated personnel.
M4	Percent	Of aircrews missing behind enemy lines recovered.
M5	Percent	Of aircrews shot down rescued.
M6	Percent	Of escapees recovered.
M7	Percent	Of ground personnel declared missing later recovered.
M8	Percent	Of isolated personnel enter UAR system.
M9	Percent	Of personnel missing behind enemy lines recovered.
M10	Percent	Of personnel sending SAR/CSAR distress signal rescued.

OP 6.2.9.1 Provide Civil Search and Rescue

M1	Hours	From initial action until individual returned to friendly control.
M2	Minutes	To respond to request for civil SAR assistance by Host Nation.
M3	Minutes	For initial action (From awareness of emergency situation which might require search and rescue).
M4	Minutes	From initial action in potential search and rescue until planning allows sending SRVs to scene.
M5	Percent	Of joint force commander initiated civil SAR for joint force personnel or dependents protested by Host Nation.

OP 6.2.9.2 Provide Combat Search and Rescue

M1	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated aircrews and passengers downed beyond FLOT.
M2	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated ground force personnel (less those in aircraft beyond FLOT).
M3	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated individual.
M4	Minutes	For Component RCC to respond to report of downed or isolated individual (commence search and rescue effort).
M5	Minutes	For unit to respond to report of isolated unit member (commence search and rescue effort).
M6	Percent	Of isolated personnel returned to friendly control and their previous duties.
M7	Percent	Of isolated personnel returned to friendly control.
M8	Percent	Of joint force ACC resources tasked to support CSAR.
M9	Percent	Of aircrews transmitting location rescued within 24 hours (of being shot down).

OP 6.2.9.3 Support Evasion and Escape in JOA

M1	NM	Distance between two most distant evadee caches.
M2	Percent	Of caches compromised within six months of emplacement.
M3	Percent	Of identified evadees beyond range of pickup systems provided resupply by cache or air-delivered package.
M4	Percent	Of identified evadees captured at cache locations.
M5	Percent	Of personnel entered into Assisted Evasion subsequently returned to friendly control.
M6	Weeks	After outbreak of hostilities cache system established.

13 September 1996

OP 6.2.10 Develop and Execute Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials

M1	Cubic Yards	Of earth cleaned/replaced.
M2	Days	Delay in operation.
M3	Days	River closed as source of drinking water.
M4	Days	River closed to traffic.
M5	Dollars	For hazardous material removal or disposal.
M6	Dollars	To complete spill recovery.
M7	Gallons	Of hazardous material spilled.
M8	Instances	Of species endangered as result of pollution or spill.
M9	People	With newly polluted drinking water.
M10	Percent	Of operations canceled or delayed.
M11	Percent	Of population with newly polluted drinking water.
M12	Percent	Of wildlife killed as a result of pollution/spill.
M13	Pounds	Of hazardous material spilled.
M14	Spills	Reported per week.
M15	Wildlife	Killed as result of pollution/spill.

OP 6.3 Secure Systems and Capabilities in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Percent	Increase in security violations on command nets over time.
M2	Percent	Of adversary's trusted sources (systems and personnel) under friendly control.
M3	Percent	Of allies with which joint Information Security agreements exist.
M4	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems successful.
M5	Percent	Of enemy's sensor coverage known
M6	Percent	Of information systems within high security area.
M7	Percent	Of protect and deception operations with user cooperation.
M8	Percent	Of System Administrators with full OPSEC training.
M9	Percent	That source of adversary penetrations of friendly information systems identified and targeted.

OP 6.3.1 Employ Operations Security (OPSEC) in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Days	Since senior officers and officials changed daily movement patterns.
M2	Days	To complete OPSEC assessment.
M3	Hours	Before joint force knows of possible compromise of EEFI.
M4	Hours	To conduct preliminary assessment of OPSEC efforts.
M5	Hours	To develop critical info list from EEFI.
M6	Hours	To identify EEFI for an operation.
M7	Instances	A friendly attack pattern repeated (consecutively).
M8	Items	Of information (pieces or types) commander needs to make decision listed as FFIR.
M9	Items	Of information (pieces or types) commander needs to make decision listed as PIR.
M10	Items	Of information (pieces or types) joint force needed to protect itself listed as EEFI.
M11	Percent	Of critical information items covered by two or more measures.
M12	Percent	Of enemy attacks on previously identified (EEFI) joint force vulnerabilities.
M13	Percent	Of enemy capabilities not covered by OPSEC measures covered by other elements (i.e., PSYOP, deception, EW).
M14	Percent	Of friendly plan determined from self monitoring of EEFI.
M15	Percent	Of identified friendly vulnerabilities exploited by enemy action.
M16	Percent	Of joint operations disrupted as result of enemy detection and response.

13 September 1996

M17	Percent	Of operational movements conducted outside enemy overhead surveillance.
M18	Percent	Of operational support facilities protected from enemy observation.
M19	Percent	Of OPSEC and Deception coordinated at measure level of detail.
M20	Percent	Of OPSEC measures previously assessed unsatisfactory improved based on assessment.
M21	Percent	Of OPSEC Measures selected tied to Vulnerability Analysis.
M22	Percent	Of OPSEC planners accommodate measures required to protect trusted agent planning (e.g., given access).
M23	Percent	Of OPSEC planners have access to compartmented planning efforts.
M24	Percent	Of OPSEC planners input to and receive guidance and results from higher HQ OPSEC plans and surveys.
M25	Percent	Of OPSEC Surveys reflected in OPSEC Plans.
M26	Percent	Of routine actions with timing or location changed at least weekly.
M27	Percent	Of units equipped with anti-surveillance sensor and sensor jamming devices.
M28	Percent	Of vulnerabilities tied to specific enemy capabilities by planners.
M29	Percent	Of vulnerability items covered by two or more OPSEC measures.

OP 6.3.2 Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC)

M1	Percent	Of communications encrypted.
M2	Percent	Of communications sent by secure transmission means.
M3	Percent	Of joint force required to maintain more than one encryption system.
M4	Percent	Of time in restrictive EMCON condition.
M5	Percent	Of friendly emitters known to have been exploited by enemy.
M6	Teams	Fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
M7	Instances	Of frequency allocation or frequency management failing to prevent signal fratricide.
M8	Instances	Of interceptions of friendly communications during planning and execution.
M9	Percent	Of friendly communications sent via secure means.
M10	Percent	Of multinational units operating from a common CEOI.
M11	Percent	Of US Joint Force units operating from common CEOI.

OP 6.3.3 Employ Theater Electronics Security for Operational Forces

M1	Percent	Of time in restrictive EMCON condition.
M2	Percent	Of friendly emitters known to have been exploited by enemy.
M3	Teams	Fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
M4	Instances	Of procedures to prevent or disrupt the collection of ELINT by foreign intelligence agencies.
M5	Instances	Of procedures to reprogram noncommunications electromagnetic systems software in response to identified threats.
M6	Hours	To generate an operational change request message based on possible threat to noncommunications electromagnetic systems.
M7	Hours	To respond to operational change request on emergency basis.
M8	Days	To respond to operational change request on urgent basis.
M9	Months	To respond to operational change request on routine basis.

OP 6.3.4 Protect Information Systems in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To restore primary LAN in command center.
M2	Percent	Of adversary's trusted sources (systems and personnel) under friendly control.
M3	Percent	Of adversary penetrations of friendly info systems identified and targeted.
M4	Percent	Of allies with which joint information security agreements exist.
M5	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems successful.

M6	Percent	Of info systems within high security area.
M7	Percent	Of personnel familiar with command policies on information security.
M8	Percent	Of System Administrators with full OPSEC training.

OP 6.4 Conduct Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations

M1	Percent	Of desired time deception plan holds enemy's attention.
M2	Percent	Of EEFI/Critical Information addressed in deception plan.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces deployed to deal with deception threat.

OP 6.4.1 Develop Operational Deception Plan

M1	Hours	To provide deception plan to support evolving branch or sequel (during campaign execution).
M2	Instances	Discrepancies between operational deception story and targets and tactical deception story and targets.
M3	Instances	Of reinforcing Indicators with deception plan.
M4	Percent	Discrepancies between joint force deception plan and other joint force operational concepts (e.g., concept of operations, logistics support).
M5	Percent	Discrepancies between strategic deception story and targets and operational deception story and targets.
M6	Percent	Of tactical forces not available for major operations.
M7	Percent	Of time a deception operation uses an asymmetric application of force.
M8	Weeks	To fully coordinate a Deception Annex in peacetime.

OP 6.4.2 Conduct Operational Deception

M1	Hours	After actual operation H-Hour enemy identifies deception.
M2	Hours	Before enemy effectively reacts to actual operation.
M3	Hours	To implement pre-planned deception plan.
M4	Hours	To plan and implement ad hoc deception plan.
M5	Percent	Of enemy force decoyed away from main attack.
M6	Instances	Of news stories report deception operation as legitimate.
M7	Percent	Of staff knows campaign plan execution details from planning stage.
M8	Percent	Of time enemy takes desired action/inaction or reaction (or lack thereof).
M9	Percent	Of time joint force deception operation results in enemy mis-allocating resources (in time, place, quantity and /or effectiveness).
M10	Percent	Of time joint force incorporates deception in campaigns and major operations.

OP 6.4.3 Assess Effect of Operational Deception Plan

M1	Days	To complete deception assessment.
M2	Hours	To conduct preliminary assessment to determine if deception target received and acted upon desired perception..
M3	Percent	Of deception actions for which criteria were developed.
M4	Percent	Of deception measures assessed unsatisfactory, successfully employed later, after adjustment based upon assessment.

OP 6.5 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means

M1	Incidents	By enemy troops, or partisans, affecting security of force and means in joint operations area.
M2	Percent	Of LOCs secure.
M3	Percent	Of total troops used to secure critical facilities and LOCs in COMMZ.

OP 6.5.1 Provide Counter-Reconnaissance in Theater of Operations/JOA

13 September 1996

M1	Instances	Of compromise of friendly intentions (causing joint operations to be delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified).
M2	Percent	Of components that receive a counter-reconnaissance plan prior to execution.
M3	Percent	Of joint operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M4	Percent	Of impending joint operations in which enemy takes no counter-action.
M5	Percent	Of joint operations judged not compromised (based upon EPW interrogations or captured documents).
M6	Percent	Of requirements for priority intelligence assigned to counter-reconnaissance elements.
M7	Percent	Of time operational actions taken to disrupt enemy reconnaissance.

OP 6.5.2 Protect and Secure Flanks, Rear Areas, and COMMZ in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Casualties	Attributed to enemy actions (including terrorist attacks) in rear area.
M2	Instances	Of rear area attacks graded as Level III (which delay, disrupt, cancel or modify an operation in joint operations area).
M3	Instances	Of threats to joint force flanks, rear areas, or COMMZ by enemy forces.
M4	Percent	Of tactical units diverted to deal with rear area threat.
M5	Percent	Of total troops used to secure critical facilities and LOCs in operational area.

OP 6.5.3 Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations, Facilities, and Systems

M1	Hours	For reaction force to reach installation or facility under attack.
M2	Instances	Of operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M3	Instances	Of terrorists acts against coalition forces in OA.
M4	Instances	Of terrorists acts against US forces in OA.
M5	Percent	Of communications in operational area supporting operation hardened.
M6	Percent	Of communications in operational area supporting operation with alternate paths.
M7	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., PODs, command posts) destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by sabotage or insurgents or terrorist actions.
M8	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities hardened or protected against hostile acts.
M9	Percent	Of terrorist attacks penetrate security in operational area.
M10	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity resulting from enemy attacks.

OP 6.5.4 Protect and Secure Air, Land, and Sea LOCs in Theater of Operations/JOA

M1	Hours	To restore LOC following interruption.
M2	Minutes	For rapid reaction forces to reach point of LOC attack.
M3	Percent	Of traffic flow on LOCs (air, land, sea) interrupted by hostile action.
M4	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity (resulting from enemy attack in operational area).

OP 6.5.5 Integrate Host Nation Security Forces and Means

M1	Hours	Delay between requisitioning agreed support and receiving it.
M2	Hours	Delay in host-nation response awaiting translator or liaison officer.
M3	Incidents	Involving US forces and host-nation security personnel (per week).
M4	Instances	Of C4I capability, damaged by enemy forces, being repaired by host-nation damage control elements.
M5	Incidents	Require liaison officer to resolve (per week).
M6	Minutes	Delay in host-nation response awaiting translator or LNO.
M7	Minutes	Difference in response time between host-nation and US fire and rescue forces.
M8	Minutes	Difference in response time between US and host-nation forces.
M9	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled by host-nation forces without US backup.

13 September 1996

M10	Percent	Increase in availability of combat forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M11	Percent	Increase in availability of tactical forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M12	Percent	Increase in availability of Air Force forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M13	Percent	Increase in tactical force strength by using host-nation to fulfill security in joint plans.
M14	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled jointly by host-nation forces and US forces.
M15	Percent	Of communications capacity from host-nation infrastructure.
M16	Percent	Of host-nation incident responses require liaison officer or NCO.
M17	Percent	Of requirements delayed or disrupted.
M18	Percent	Of significant hazards removed by host-nation.
M19	Percent	Of total combat service support supplied by host-nation.
M20	Percent	Of total combat support supplied by host-nation.
M21	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M22	Percent	Reduction in loss of C3I capability after addition of host-nation damage control elements.
M23	Personnel	Of total number of combat service support personnel reduced by host-nation support.
M24	Percent	Reduction in combat service support personnel through host-nation support.
M25	Percent	Of C3I capacity provided by host-nation damage control and restoral.
M26	Percent	Of communications redundancy from host-nation common infrastructure.
M28	Percent	Of C3I capacity provided by host-nation infrastructure.